It had also been found that without this power to regulate commerce among the states, the power of regulating foreign commerce would be incomplete and ineffectual. For if the respective states were left free to regulate commerce, the laws of the Union in regard to this subject, whether for revenue, for restriction, for relation, or for encouragement of domestic products, might be evaded at pleasure, or rendered impotent. These, among other reasons, induced the convention to vest in congress the power to regulate commerce among the several states. The past experience of the nation under the articles of confederation, had demonstrated the necessity of vesting in the federal government also, the power to regulate and to exert a general superintendence over foreign commerce. The want of such a power in that government had operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and had also given occasion of dissatisfaction between the states. Foreign powers acquainted with our institutions, had declined to enter into stipulations with the federal government, by which they should concede on their part, important commercial privileges, knowing as they did, that the engagements on the part of the Union, might at any moment be violated by any member of the confederacy. Even the government of England, with which this country, from its position and productions, must ever sustain most intimate and important commercial relations, would only make provisions for a temporary intercourse with this country, on the ground that such had been found to answer every purpose essential to the commerce of Great Britain, and had intimated an adherence to that policy, until the federal government should acquire a greater consistency. Although several states had endeavored by separate prohibitions, restrictions, and exclusions, to influence the conduct of other nations in this particular, it had failed for the want of concert, arising from the

want of general authority, and from clashing and dissimilar views in the several states. To overcome these barriers to the commercial relations of the country, it was deemed indispensable to place the power over foreign commerce under the exclusive and general supervision of the federal Union.(a) Our only object in thus alluding to the difficulties arising under the confederation, has been, if possible, to discover and deduce therefrom the spirit, scope and design of these clauses of the federal constitution, to the end of giving to those clauses under consideration such a construction as will secure the end designed to be attained by those constitutional provisions and effectuate the spirit of that sacred instrument. The object of the powers conferred on the government of the Union, and the nature of the conflicting powers which remain in the states, should always be taken into view in aid of an exposition of those particular clauses of the constitution. Courts in construing that instrument upon sound principles of construction, ought not to carry the words of the prohibition beyond the object which the constitution is intended to secure. That object is best ascertained by an inquiry into the causes which conspired to lead to this constitutional delegation of power to congress. He bids fairest to a just interpretation, who keeps constantly in view the mischief and inconveniences which existed under the old confederation, and which were designed to be obviated by these constitutional provisions. From this succinct review, we think we may fairly infer, that the object of the constitution will be attained if we give to the federal government the exclusive power to regulate the external commerce of the nation and of the respective states, to determine the terms and conditions upon which, and to

(a) Federalist, Nos. 7, 11, 23, 42. Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, vol. ii. 511, 512.

prescribe the regulations by which the commodities and products of one state should be permitted to be introduced into another, or exports should be made from state to state, or through the several territorial sovereignties composing the confederacy, or the commodities of foreign nations introduced into the country, and to control and regulate such external commerce during the entire period in which the process of importation or exportation and introduction and incorporation among the great mass of property of the respective states is going on; and if it is held that such control should cease whenever the act of such importation, introduction and incorporation had been fully accomplished, and if we deny to the state sovereignties all interference, either by impost, duties, or other restrictions, or regulations with such commerce, while these processes of importation, introduction, and incorporation, is going forward. The language is "commerce among the several states." It has been held that the word "among" means intermingled with the several states-that commerce among the states may, and does not stop at the external boundary line of a state, but may be introduced into the interior, so long as these processes are going on, and until fully completed, and down to the time of its incorporation with the great mass of the property of the state. But the moment the ends of importation or exportation cease, then it ceases to be commerce among the several states, and becomes the commerce of a state. It then assumes a character which is purely internal between man and man in a single state, or between different parts of the same state, and not extending to or in any way affecting other states. Its regulation by state legislation after thus introduced and incorporated, never had been either the cause of conflict or complaint, nor was its regulation under such circumstances one of the evils which it was the object of the constitution to guard against, or one of the defects under

the articles of confederation which it was designed to remedy by this constitutional provision. The distinction above alluded to, and such a line of demarcation has, we think, been recognized in all the cases where this question has come under the consideration either of our state or the federal courts." "But it is said that if excise laws are held to be constitutional, we must admit the power of the state to impose duties on articles of foreign importation, and that such duties may be imposed to such an extent as to prevent all sales of the commodity imported -which in effect would be equivalent to an express prohibition upon importations, as it would defeat the object of importations, for without sales the right of importation would be worse than useless-and that if the states may regulate the sale of one article of commerce, they may do the same as to all others; which would in effect defeat these constitutional provisions. This does not, as we can discover, necessarily follow-but if it did, an answer to this argument is, that the states have never delegated to congress the power to undertake that any commodity introduced into the country shall meet with a sale; nor are they under any obligation to secure a market for the article when introduced. Congress has delegated to it the power to prescribe the subjects of importation, and the mode, manner and means of introduction, and when that is done, the commodities thus introduced must take their chance with all other property of the state, in finding a market. The states may regulate such sales unless expressly or impliedly restricted. If we are right in the position that when that introduction is consummated, the power of congress over the subject is spent, and the article then loses its character as an import-then any duty or tax imposed upon it when thus incorporated into the mass of the property of a state, is not an impost or duty on imports or exports. Nor under such circumstances are the powers of the state limited by the con

stitution. It also should be borne in mind that a state law should not be considered as subject to a constitutional objection because it may in its operation incidentally or remotely have some influence upon a subject matter over which power is delegated to congress. For such a construction would include state legislation in reference to almost all subjects of internal police which have uniformly been conceded as within the powers reserved to state sovereignties. For most internal police regulations have a remote bearing on the commerce of the nation. It is not enough to bring an act within the circle of this constitutional prohibition that it may in its effects lessen the extent of sales in the country of a particular commodity. But to render such an act unconstitutional, there must be some direct conflict or repugnancy or incompatibility with the power granted to congress. In the language of Chief Justice Parker, "It must either in its actual exercise, or in its nature, be of a character to control, defeat, limit or impair some power of the general government, or interfere with its action, so that if admitted, that power could no longer be efficacious and adequate to accomplish the object for which it was given. If it merely operates upon the subject matter, but not in such a manner to show a plain incompatibility, a direct repugnancy, or an extreme practical inconvenience, it is not unconstitutional, because there may be a possible or potential inconvenience." The power attempted to be exercised under this statute, is not one resorted to for the purpose of revenue, but has always been regarded in the light of a mere police regulation, having for its aim the welfare, health, and morals of our citizens, limiting and controlling the manner and circumstances, under which, a traffic which has ever been productive of a deep and wide-spread moral pestilence shall be regulated, and designating the individuals to whose hands shall be committed the right to ve