nations and among the several states was vested in congress as absolutely as it would be in a specific government, having in its constitution the same restrictions in its exercise of power as are found in the constitutions of the United States. This power comprehends navigation within the limits of every state in the Union, so far as that navigation may be in any manner connected with commerce with foreign nations, or among the several states, or with the Indian tribes." It might pass the jurisdictional line of New York, and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition in this act applies. Indeed, it was by no means certain, but that the words "to regulate," imply, in their nature, full power over the thing to be regulated, and excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation upon the same thing. That regulation is designed for the entire result, applying to those parts which remain as they were in the states as well as those which are altered. A state law which comes in collision with an act of congress, which deprives a citizen of a right which such act entitles him to, whether such law was passed in virtue of a concurrent power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states," or in virtue of a power to regulate their domestic trade or policy; in such case the state law must yield to the law of congress.

§ 199. The law of New York which was under consideration in this case, was held to conflict with the law of congress in relation to the license and enrolment of vessels, which declared that vessels enrolled as described in the act, and having a license in force, "and no others, shall be deemed ships or vessels of the United States, entitled to the privilege of ships or vessels employed in the coasting trade." The form of the license for carrying on the coasting trade given to the steamboat, as pre

scribed by the law of congress, is, "license is hereby granted for the said steamboat (Bellona) to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade for one year from the date hereof." These were the words of the legislature, and conveyed an implied authority in the act, intended to give and operate as effectually as if they had been inserted in any other part of the act than in the license. The word "license" means permission or authority to do any thing; and if granted by one having power or authority to render it, transfers to the grantee the right to do it. The privilege thus granted could not be separated from the trade, nor could be enjoyed unless the trade might be prosecuted. The grant of the privilege would be an idle empty form, conveying nothing unless it conveyed the right to which the privilege is attached, and in the exercise of which its whole value consisted. Any other consideration of the word would be an apparent disregard of the intent of the act. As congress had the power to render the grant of this privilege and had exercised it, no state law could impair the right thus secured.

§ 200. This power of regulating commerce extends to navigation carried on by vessels exclusively employed in the transportation of passengers. This general grant of power comprehends all vessels. If none are excluded by the language none should be excluded by construction. The duty act applies to such vessels, and they are governed by the general law of navigation. This power also extends to vessels propelled by steam as well as those navigated by the instrumentality of wind and sails. The enrolment and license act authorized steamboats to be enrolled and licensed, when employed or intended to be employed only in a river or bay of the United States. This act demonstrates that they might be enrolled and licensed in common with vessels using

§ 201. It was held, in this case, that state inspection laws, health laws, and laws for regulating the internal commerce of a state, and those which respect turnpike roads, and ferries, &c., are not within the powers granted to congress. Although inspection laws have a remote and considerable influence on commerce, the right to pass them was not denied from the power to regulate commerce. They act upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of commerce among the state. They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the boundary of the state not surrendered to the general government; hence inspection laws, quarantine laws, and health laws of every description, as well as laws regulating the internal commerce of the state, and those which respect turnpike roads and ferries, and may be exercised by the state. That no direct general power over these objects was granted to congress; and, consequently, they remain subject to state legislation. If the legislative power of the Union can reach them, it must be for national purposes; it must be where the power is expressly given for a special purpose, or is clearly incidental to some power which is expressly given. It is obvious, that the government of the Union, in the exercise of its express powers, that, for example, of regulating commerce with foreign nations and among the states, may use means that may also be employed by a state in the exercise of its acknowledged powers, that, for example, of regulating commerce within the state. If congress license vessels to sail from one port to another, in the same state, the act is supposed to be necessarily incidental to the power expressly granted to congress, and implies no claim of a direct power to regulate the purely internal commerce of a state, or to act directly on its system of policy. So, if a state, on passing laws on subjects acknowledged to be within its control, and

with a view to those subjects, should adopt a measure of the same character with one which congress might adopt, it does not derive its authority from the particular power which has been granted, but from some other, which remains with the state, and may be executed with the same means. All experience shows, that the same measure, or measures scarcely distinguishable from each other, may flow from distinct powers; but this does not

prove that the powers themselves are identical, although the means used in their execution may sometimes approach each other so nearly as to be confounded, there are other situations in which they are sufficiently distinct to establish their individuality.

§ 202. In our complex system, presenting the rare and difficult scheme of one general government, whose action extends over the whole, but which possesses only certain enumerated powers; and of numerous state governments, which retain and exercise all powers not delegated to the Union-contests respecting powers must arise. Were it even otherwise, the measures taken by the respective governments to execute their acknowledged powers, would often be of the same description, and might sometimes interfere. This, however, does not prove that the one is exercising, or has a right to exercise, the powers of the other. The acts of congress passed in 1796 and 1799, (a) empowering and directing the officers of the general government to conform to, and assist in the execution of the quarantine and health laws of a state, proceed, it is said, upon the idea that these laws are constitutional. It is undoubtedly true that they do proceed upon that idea, and the constitutionality of such laws has never, so far as we are informed, been denied. But they do not imply an acknowledgment that a state may rightfully regulate commerce with foreign

(a) 2 U. S. Laws, 345; 3 U. S. Laws, 126.

nations, or among states; for they do not imply that such laws are an exercise of that power, or enacted with a view to it. On the contrary, they are treated as quarantine and health laws, are so denominated in the acts of congress, and are considered as flowing from the acknowledged power of a state, to provide for the health of its citizens. But as it was apparent that some of the provisions made for this purpose, and in virtue of this power, might interfere with and be affected by the laws of the United States, made for the regulation of commerce, congress, in that spirit of harmony and conciliation, which ought always to characterize the conduct of governments standing in the relation which that of the Union and those of the states bear to each other, has directed its officers to aid in the execution of these laws; and has, in some measure, adapted its own legislation to this object, by making provisions in aid of those of the states. But, in making those provisions, the opinion is unequivocally manifested, that congress may control the state laws, so far as it may be necessary to control them, for the regulation of commerce.

This

§ 203. Chief Justice Marshall on the subject says:"It seems to be settled that a statute health law which may, in its consequences, impair or impede the navigation of a stream which previously had been navigable, is not within the restriction contained in this clause of the constitution, unless congress shall have enacted some law regulating the navigating of such stream." principle was settled in the case of Wilson and others v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Company. (a) This com pany, incorporated in Delaware in 1822, were authorized and empowered to construct a dam across said creek. They proceeded to erect such dam, by which the navigation of the creek, which before was navigable, was

(a) 2 Peter's R. 245.