feat the ends of government. It however was determined, that this principle did not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank of the United States, in common with the other real property in a particular state, nor to a tax imposed on the proprietory interest which the citizen of the state might hold in this institution, in common with other property of the same description throughout the

state.

§ 193. It has also been held that a captain of a United

States revenue cutter on a station in the state of Pennsylvania was not liable to be rated and assessed for county taxes, as an officer of the United States, for his office. In this case, it was admitted that taxation was a sacred right, essential to government-an incident of sovereignty. That the right of legislation was co-extensive with the incident, to attach it upon all persons and property within the jurisdiction of a state; but that in our system, there were limitations upon that right. There was a concurrent right of legislation in the states and the United States, except as both are restrained by the constitution of the United States. Both were restrained upon this subject by express prohibitions in the constitution. And the states, by such as are necessarily implied where the exercise of the right by a state conflicts with the perfect execution of another sovereign power of the United States. That occurred whenever taxation by a state acted upon the instruments, emoluments and persons which the United States might use and employ, as necessary and proper means to execute their sovereign powers. The government of the United States was supreme in its sphere of action. The means proper to carry into effect the powers of the constitution were in congress. Taxation was a sovereign power in a state, but the collection of revenue by impost upon imported goods, and the regulation of commerce, were also sovereign powers in the United States. That congress

had power to lay taxes, duties, imposts, &c., and to regulate commerce; neither could be done without legislation. A complicated machinery of form, instruments, and powers must be established, and the better to secure the collection of duties revenue cutters, and officers to command them, were necessary. They were the means necessary to an allowed end; the end the great object which the constitution was intended to secure to the states in their character of a nation. That such officers were no less the means to carry into effect those great objects than the vessels or other instruments, neither of which could be taxed. To allow such a right of taxation to be in the states, would also, in effect, give to the states a revenue out of the revenue of the United States, to which they were not constitutionally entitled, either directly or indirectly. That the constitutionality of such taxation by a state, might be put upon its interference with the constitutional means which have been legislated by the government of the United States to carry into effect its powers, to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, &c. But that there was another ground upon which it might be put, that the power of the national government could only be executed by officers whose services must be compensated by congress. The allowance was in its discretion. The presumption was, that the compensation given by law was no more than the services were worth, and only such an amount as would secure from the officers the diligent performance of their duties. "The officers execute their offices for the public good. This implies their right of reaping from hence the recompense the services they rendered deserved, without that recompense being in any way lessened, except by the sovereign power from whom an officer derives his appointment, or by another sovereign power to whom the first has delegated the right of taxation over all the objects of taxation, in common with itself, for the benefit of

of

both. And no diminution in the recompense of an officer is just and lawful unless it be prospective or by way taxation by the sovereignty who have a power to impose it, and which was intended to bear equally with all, according to their estate. The compensation of an officer of the United States was fixed by a law made by congress. It was its exclusive discretion to determine what should be given. It exercised the discretion and fixed the amount, and conferred upon the officer the right to receive it when it was earned. That a tax by a state upon the office diminished the recompense and conflicted with the law of the United States, which secured to the officer its entireness. It had such an effect, and hence such a law could not be constitutional.(a)

§ 194. The third power granted to congress is: To regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and with the Indian tribes. This clause of the constitution has been frequently under consideration. In Gibbon v. Ogden, (b) the question arose, whether an act of the legislature of the state of New York, granting unto certain persons the exclusive right of navigating the waters of that state with steamboats, was in collision with the act of congress regulating the coasting trade, made pursuant to the constitution. It was held, that it was, and as the laws of congress thus made were supreme, the state laws must yield to that supremacy,

although enacted in pursuance of powers acknowledged

to remain in the state.

§ 195. It was held that the word "commerce," was not limited to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities. That it also comprehended

navigation. That commerce was traffic, but it was also something more, it was intercourse. it was intercourse. It was descriptive

The

of commercial intercourse between nations and parts of nations, in all its branches, and was regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. That the mind could scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce which should include all laws concerning navigation, which should be silent on the admission of the vessels of one nation into another. That unless commerce included navigation the government of the Union had no direct power over that subject, and could make no laws prescribing what should constitute American vessels, or requiring them to be navigated by American seamen. This had been done and had been understood to be a commercial regulation. All America understood commerce to include navigation. It was so understood when the constitution was framed. convention must have understood the word in that sense. This view was confirmed by the instrument itself. It was a rule of construction, that exceptions from a power mark its extent, as it would be absurd to except from a created power what was not granted. There were in the constitution plain exceptions from the power over navigation, plain inhibitions to the exercise of that power in a particular way, which was evidence that those who made these exceptions understood the power to which they applied were granted. The constitution declared, "no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over another." This clause was expressly applied to commercial regulations. The most obvious preference which could be given to one port over another in regulating commerce, related to navigation. Another clause, still more explicit, was: "Nor shall vessels bound to or from one state be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another." This power extended to commerce itself with foreign nations and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes. These words comprehend every species of commercial

intercourse between the United States and foreign nations; no trade could be carried on between them to which the trade did not extend. That commerce, as the word was used in the constitution, was a unit. If this was so in its application to foreign nations, it must be so throughout the whole sentence, unless there was some plain intelligible clause which altered it.

§ 196. The words, " among the several states," meant intermingled with, hence commerce among the states did not stop at the external boundary line, but might be introduced into the interior; not that the words comprehend that commerce which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man, or between different parts of the same states, not extending to or affecting other states. The word among, though comprehensive, might properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns states more than one. The latter, congress had the power to regulate, whilst the completely internal commerce may be considered as reserved to the states.

§ 197. In the regulation of commerce with foreign nations, the power of congress did not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several states. The commerce of the United States with foreign states was that of the whole Union. The power to regulate must be exercised wherever the subject exists. If it exists within the states, if foreign voyages may commence and terminate at a point within the state, then the power of congress might be exercised within a state.

§ 198. The power granted was a power to regulate, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in congress, was complete in itself, might be exercised to its utmost extent, acknowledges no limitation other than that prescribed in the constitution. The sovereignty of congress, though limited to specified objects, was plenary as to those objects. The power over commerce with foreign