neither of them, consist with the ends of society and government; and men would not quit the freedom of a state of nature, and tie themselves up under a government, were it not to preserve their lives, liberty, and fortunes, by stated rules of right and property. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they the power to do so, to give any one or more an absolute, arbitrary power over their persons and estates! For this was to put themselves in a worse condition than a state of nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their rights against the injuries of others, and were upon equal

terms.

Whereas, by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute, arbitrary power of the legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him to make a prey of them when he pleases. That the supreme power cannot take from any man his property without his own consent. For the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should have property and be protected in it, without which they must be supposed to lose, by entering into society, the very thing which was the end and design of the social compact to secure, and for the attainment of which they entered into it. If this position be true, it was fallacious to think that the supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth can do what it will, irrespective of the principles of natural justice, or dispose of the estates of the subjects arbitrarily, or divest vested rights at pleasure.(a)

§ 130. Robert Hall, speaking of the extent of the rights which mankind surrender up to government upon entering into civil society, says:

(a) Locke's Works, vol. v., ch. 11, p. 416.

"That there are natural rights, or in other words a certain liberty which men may exercise, independent of permission from society, can scarcely be doubted by those who comprehend the meaning of the terms. Every man must have a natural right to use his limbs in what manner he pleases that is not injurious to another. In like manner he must have a right to worship God after the mode he thinks acceptable; or in other words, he ought not to be compelled to consult any thing but his own conscience. These are a specimen of those rights which may properly be termed natural; for, as philosophers speak of the primary qualities of matter, they cannot be increased or diminished. We cannot conceive the right of using our limbs to be created by society, or to be rendered more complete by any human agreement or compact.

"But there still remains a question, whether this natural liberty must not be considered as entirely relinquished when we become members of society. It is pretended, that the moment we quit a state of nature, as we have given up the control of our actions in return for the superior advantages of law and government, we can never appeal again to any original principles, but must rest content with the advantages that are secured by the terms of the society. These are the views which distinguish the political writings of Mr. Burke, an author whose splendid and unequalled powers have given a vogue and fashion to certain tenets which from any other pen would have appeared abject and contemptible. In the field of reason the encounter would not be difficult, but who can withstand the fascination and magic of his eloquence? The excursions of his genius are immense. His imperial fancy has laid all nature under tribute, and has collected riches from every scene of the creation and every walk of art. His eulogium on the Queen of France is a masterpiece of pathetic composition; so

elect are its images, so fraught with tenderness, and so rich with colours "dipt in heaven," that he who can read it without rapture may have merit as a reasoner, but must resign all pretensions to taste and sensibility. His imagination is, in truth, only too prolific; a world of itself, where he dwells in the midst of chimerical alarms, is the dupe of his own enchantments, and starts, like Prospero, at the spectres of his own creation.

"His intellectual views in general, however, are wide and variegated, rather than distinct; and the light he has let in on the British constitution in particular, resembles the coloured effulgence of a painted medium, a kind of mimic twilight, solemn and soothing to the senses, but better fitted for ornament than use.

"As government implies restraint, it is plain a portion of our freedom is given up by entering into it; the only question can then be, how far this resignation extends, -whether to a part, or to the whole? This point may, perhaps, be determined by the following reflections:

"The advantages that civil power can procure to a community are partial. A small part, in comparison of the condition of man, can fall within its influence. Allowing it to be a rational institution, it must have that end in view which a reasonable man would propose by appointing it; nor can it imply any greater sacrifice than is strictly necessary to its attainment. But on what account is it requisite to unite in political society? Plainly to guard against the injury of others; for, were there no injustice among mankind, no protection would be needed; no public force necessary; every man might be left without restraint or control. The attainment of all possible good, then, is not the purpose of laws, but to secure us from external injury and violence; and as the means must be proportioned to the end, it is absurd to suppose that, by submitting to civil power, with a view to some particular benefits, we should be understood to

hold all our advantages dependent upon that authority. Civil restraints imply nothing more than a surrender of our liberty in some points, in order to maintain it undisturbed in others of more importance. Thus we give up the liberty by repelling force by force, in return for a more equal administration of justice than private resentment would permit. But there are some rights which cannot with any propriety be yielded up to human authority, because they are perfectly consistent with every benefit its appointment can procure. The free use of our faculties in distinguishing truth from falsehood, the exertion of corporeal powers without injury to others, the choice of a religion and worship, are branches of natural freedom which no government can justly alter or diminish, because their restraint cannot conduce to that security which is its proper object. Government, like every other contrivance, has a specific end; it implies the resignation of just as much liberty as is needful to attain it; whatever is demanded more is superfluous, a species of tyranny which ought to be corrected by withdrawing it. The relation of master and servant, of pupil and instructor, of the respective members of a family to their head, all include some restraint, some abridgment of natural liberty. But in these cases, it is not pretended that the surrender is total; and why should this be supposed to take place in political society, which is one of the relations of human life? this would be to render the foundation infinitely broader than the superstructure.

"From the notion that political society precludes an appeal to natural rights, the greatest absurdities must ensue. If that idea be just, it is improper to say of any administration that it is despotic or oppressive, unless it has receded from its first form and model. Civil power can never exceed its limits, until it deviates into a new track. For, if every portion of natural freedom be given up by yielding to civil authority, we can

never claim any other liberties than those precise ones which were ascertained in its first formation. The vassals of despotism inay complain, perhaps, of the hardships which they suffer, but, unless it appear they are of a new kind, no injury is done them, for no right is violated. Rights are either natural or artificial; the first cannot be pleaded after they are relinquished, and the second cannot be impaired but by a departure from ancient precedents. If a man should be unfortunate enough to live under the dominion of a prince, who, like the monarchs of Persia, could murder his subjects at will, he may be unhappy, but cannot complain; for, on Mr. Hey's theory, he never had any rights but what were created by society, and on Mr. Burke's he has for ever relinquished them. The claims of nature being set aside, and the constitution of the government despotic from the beginning, his misery involves no injustice, and admits of no remedy. It requires little discernment to see that this theory rivets the chains of despotism, and shuts out from the political world the smallest glimpse of emancipation or improvement. Its language is, he that is a slave, let him be a slave still.

"It is incumbent on Mr. Burke and his followers to ascertain the time when natural rights are relinquished. Mr. Hey is content with tracing their existence to society, while Mr. Burke, the more moderate of the two, admitting their foundation in nature, only contends that regular government absorbs and swallows them up, bestowing artificial advantages in exchange. But at what period, it may be inquired, shall we date this wonderful revolution in the social condition of man? If we say it was as early as the first dawn of society, natural liberty had never any existence at all, since there are no traces even in tradition, of a period when men were utterly unconnected with each other. If we say this complete surrender took place with the first rudiments of law and