it. But this is quite contrary to the doctrine of the Scriptures, and to that of the Creed; and it is altogether a great theoretical error. Must we then deny, that any who are in this theoretical error can be saved? Since, if they are pious Christians, they will be saved even in this error, so will those who maintain other wide views and forms of expression respecting the same doctrine, provided they sincerely believe in Christ, and do what he has commanded, and make a saving use of the blessings which we owe to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. No man is saved by theological formularies, or holding fast any forms of words. We must conclude, that the hypotheses and definitions of the schools have nothing to do with the instruction of the people and of the young, since they cannot be made intelligible to them, but rather occasion great confusion and perplexity of thought. So judged once the Emperor Constantine (Epist. ad Arium, ap. Socr. I. 7): Such questions must not be commanded by any legal necessity; they are not even to be trusted to the hearing of all.' It would be well," adds the Lecturer, "if he had continued ever after faithful to this rule."

The history of theology forms a very interesting and instructive part of the work. In pursuing this way the student often discovers abundant sources of thought in regions where all appeared steril and desert at a distance. I extract the first part of an historico-theological passage, under the 9th article, "On Sin, and the Punishment of Sin," from a section which is headed, "Views of Human Depravity by the early Teachers of the Church, and in what Manner the Phraseology and Doctrinal Formulas of the Church have been constructed out of them by degrees:"

"The first Christian teachers of the church agree, generally, that death is a consequence of Adam's sin; but the entire biblical view of innate depravity is wanting in most of the Greek fathers, or at least it is not stated by many of them in a sufficiently plain and definite manner. Since no controversy on the subject had taken place hitherto, there was no ecclesiastical determination of it in general authority: yet it was the common persuasion, that a predominance of the sensual nature, or human depravity, had existed since the fall of Adam, and had spread as a universal disease through the race of man; but that this is to be considered as an actual sin, and that it will be punished as such, they never taught, but rather the contrary. (See Justin Mart. Apol. I. 54 sq.; Iren. adv. Hær. IV. 17 sq.; Athanagoras Legat. c. xxii.; Clemens Alex. Strom. III. contra Eucratitas.) He says, 'No man is indeed pure from sin; yet a child which has itself never transgressed, cannot be subject to the curse (the punishment) of Adam; but all men who have the use of reason, through their natural pravity are led into actual sin, and are therefore subject to punishment.' Also (in Pædag. III. 12,) the Logos alone is without sin; for to sin is innate, and common to all. Cyrillus of Alexandria, in the Commentary on Isaias, declares that evil is not natural in men; and against Anthropomorph., Ch. viii. he says, Adam's descendants are not punished as such, not having transgressed the commandment of God with him.' So Origen, and those who followed him, as Basilius, Theodorus, who, according to Photius, wrote against those who taught that men sinned by nature, and not you. There were among the Greek fathers some who derived evil desires, and the sins consequent upon them, from the mortality of the body, as Chrysostom and Theodoret. This hypothesis was resumed, and brought forwards by Whitby, de Imputatione," &c.

"In the earliest Latin Church, even in Africa, many of the fathers declared that death is the consequence of Adam's sin; but that the evil result is not a sin in itself considered, and is not punished as such. Cyprian says, A

C

new-born child has not sinned, except that by natural descent from Adam it has contracted the contagion of death. Through baptism sin is forgiven to it, not its own, but another's.' Ambrosius, on Psalm xlviii, says, A disposition towards sin there is in all, but this is not in itself sin. God punishes us only for our own sins, not for the crimes of another's iniquity, for those of Adam.' Also, according to Tertullian, (de Testim. Animæ, c. iii) the consequence of Adam's sin is solely condemnation to natural death, in which opinion Hilarius agrees with him. Still we find in the African fathers before Augustin's time much more of indistinctness and indecision on this subject than in the Greek fathers, owing, perhaps, to misconception of the phraseology of the New Testament, which might be obscure to them, especially in the Latin translations. But by Augustin the doctrine was carried much farther. He affirmed the imputation of Adam's sin in the strictest juridical sense, and with it the total depravity of man, and his utter inability for all good, in a sense in which it is not affirmed in the Holy Scriptures. Perhaps this was greatly owing to the fact, that he had been formerly a Manichæan, for the doctrines of Manichæism in this respect were very severe. Hence Pelagius named Augustin's representation of original sin a Manichæan doctrine. Augustin maintained, that the consequence of Adam's sin is not only the death of the body, but eternal death, (Mors secunda cujus non est finis,) to which all men are subjected: also children, who have not thought or done good or evil. Yet some are rescued by the unmerited grace of God, absolutum decretum. (De Civit., xiv. 1.) Fulgentius Rusp. (de Fide, c. xxix.) affirms, that children who have lived in the mother's womb, and died without baptism, must suffer everlasting punishment in hell. Many of the schoolmen taught the same, according to Petrus Lomb. b. ii. Augustin attributed a sort of physical effect to baptism, with which only he joined the grace of God. His followers, in support of their doctrine, generally, but not universally, maintained the natural traduction of the human soul; the Pelagians as generally denied it. Indeed, Pelagius denied not only the imputation of the sin of Adam, but even the physical propagation of human depravity. He taught that the moral nature of man is unaltered, and that man is now born in the same state in which Adam was created; that infirmity, imperfection, and death, have been natural to man from the beginning; that -man will be punished solely by reason of his own sinful actions; that human depravity is not propagated by birth (physicè), but merely through the imitation of bad examples (moraliter) from Adam onward. Omne bonum aut malum, quo vel laudabiles vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum nascitur, sed agitur a nobis. Capaces utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur; et ut sine virtute, sic sine vitio procreamur. These views differed widely from those of Augustin and other Africans, and, in many respects, also from the plain doctrine of the Bible. This was observed and objected by Augustin; and through the counter opposition of Pelagius, the zeal of Augustin was heated more and more, till it rose to the polemical degree But the African or Augustinian hypothesis was by no means common in the fourth century.

"In the East (as in Palestine) they defended Pelagius and his doctrine, as according in many points with that of Origen. It did indeed differ from the prevailing opinion in the East at that time; but it may be seen in the indifference of so many Greek teachers of the church, that nothing had yet been decided on church authority; and that many of the Greek teachers were not at first aware of the importance of the doctrine. Even in the churches of the West, out of Africa, many saw nothing to be reprobated in the opinions of Pelagius at the beginning of the dispute; and Zosimus, the Bishop of

Rome, pronounced at first his acquittal; but through the efforts of the Africans, and their union with the Anti-Origenists, it was at last accomplished, that the doctrine of Pelagius was formally condemned as heretical; and after the year 418, the doctrine of Augustin became the prevailing one, at least in the western churches," &c., &c.

At some future time I propose to communicate farther notices of this useful work; and I regret that I cannot gratify the theological student with larger portions of it, without making too great a demand on the pages of your Repository.

SIR,

J. M. Heidelberg.

IT is difficult to accommodate the terms of a language like the German, which is only surpassed by the Greek in fitness for exact verbal distinctions, with adequate and familiar English expressions. The foreigner feels this the more, because the metaphysical philosophy of Germany has scattered its vocabulary over almost every department of literature. I shall connect, with some terms that are in frequent use, brief remarks and quotations, which are intended to illustrate the sense in which they are used, as well as the manner of thinking of some men of eminence on several interesting questions.

Ideas, Objectivity, Subjectivity.-When impressions have been received through the senses, they are taken up by the understanding, and represented according to its innate laws of conception. Ideas are the result of this cooperation. That which is given by sensation is Objective; that which is given by the understanding is Subjective. This is Kant's resolution of ideas of sensation. Hence he maintains knowledge à priori. The idea of causality, which is not given in sensation, must be given by the understanding. Thus Hume's scepticism opened the way to the idealism of Kant.

Sense, Understanding, Reason.-This is Kant's well-known distribution of the human mind. In this partition Understanding was wronged, and Reason was enriched and aggrandized at the expense of Understanding. Understanding has at length obtained a hearing, and is likely to be reinstated in all its rights. But that impartial justice may be administered, and both parties go out of court well satisfied, it is thought that a rich domain will be adjudged to Reason. That it may feel no degradation in being stripped of some of its exclusive titles, it will be declared for the future sole proprietor and lord paramount of the ground of moral judgments. The rest of the ancient estate of universal truths is to revert to the old possessor, and the shade of Locke will be appeased.

Objective Unity.-When several impressions made upon the senses are united into one object of perception, as when a ball is felt to be hard, round, smooth, and white, in the language of Kant the understanding is said to construct them into an Objective Unity.

Absolute Idealism, vulgarly confounded with Absolute Idiotism.-When we say of any man, that he knows himself, the subject and the object of knowledge are the same in a very intelligible sense. With the absolute idealist this is true of all knowledge. The mind makes its own objects; it has none without itself: thus, if the mind knows what it is about, knowledge comes first and the objects afterwards; because it gives them out, or creates them, and has no other objects It would be more correct, perhaps, to say, that its knowledge is without an object; and this is so much like knowing nothing, that the disciples of this school, which is now that of Hegel, (and it reckons a great number of disciples of different ages,) ought to be the most

unassuming of men, and confess with the philosopher of antiquity, that the end of all their speculation is, that they know nothing. The mystic does this, and finds at last that the whole duty of man is to believe, and let ignorant authority usurp the seat of knowledge.

Nature. The material universe, or the external world. Its reality, which is still disputed by many, is very sensibly established, when our voluntary power is engaged in a conflict with physical force. This appears to be the only case in which the argumentum baculinum is able to enlighten the understanding; and happily, in this particular case of mental aberration, it cannot be applied without producing immediate conviction.

Naturalist.-"The object of his inquiry is Nature,-its substance, and its forms: with the first he becomes acquainted through his senses: he feels it to exist. His conceptions of the latter are the work of the understanding. The substance as such, that is as a mere subsistence, is quite clear: the forms, conditions, and changes, alone are obscure; yet they are conceivable by us, and therefore an object for our understanding. Nature itself is the substance, changeable indeed in its forms, but constant in its existence, and therefore a real object of inquiry."

Beauty." It is properly subjective; it is thrown upon the object by the soul of man. What is called objective beauty, and regarded as a property of external things, is merely their form. This is not Beauty itself; it only yields the conditions of the beautiful appearance. The real existence of Beauty is in the spirit of the observer, and it diffuses itself over the object, the forms of which are fitted to receive it. It is a fruitless labour to decipher the nature of Beauty out of harmony, proportion, or whatever name is given to the relations of the forms of things. What else is all this weighing and measuring than a help to the artist, who would represent the conditions of the object? They are mere form: the Beauty is the inspiration of the soul. There rests in the bosom of nature a second world, which is not the natural world; and wonderful as it is, all the objects of nature can be represented in this second world, in which, however, they acquire another character, and are represented under another and very different law. Let nature be.contemplated, not merely as it is seen by the naturalist, but as the man of feeling and imagination sees it; with regard, not merely to its material constitution and laws, but rather to the impressions which it makes upon our heart; and it appears cheerful or severe, great, mighty, and sublime, or mild, soft, and beautiful. Imagine one to whom the sense of the beautiful and sublime should be all at once communicated, and a new world rises before him. The same natural objects are there after their proper forms, order, and laws; but through the interpretation of this second world they are become very different objects, and put on a very different nature." (Seebold.)

Philosophical Speculation; that is, Natural Philosophy.-To speculate is to theorize, and Philosophical Speculation is theoretical reasoning on the facts of nature. This conducted Newton to the discovery of the law of gravitation. Its object is physical truth. To expect that moral and religious truth can be found in this way is a mistake which has led to mysticism and scepticism, to pantheism and atheism. It may make a Hutchinson, a Fichte, or a French Encyclopedist. "Natural philosophy knows no other reality han nature itself. If it were to speak of a God, it must be as an object of speculation only, while, pointing to the never-ending chain of causality, it discourses of the highest existence in nature, of the origin, and of the soul, of nature: but of God, as he is contemplated in religion, as intelligence and goodness, as the moral ruler of nature, it cannot speak. This is no accusa

tion against natural science any more than it is against mathematical learning, that it teaches nothing of God, as we are taught to know God in morality and religion: but it is a great error to require of it what lies wholly without its province, that is, moral and religious truth. The term Philosophy has contributed to the confusion and its consequences: in antiquity the philosopher united the two offices of a teacher of natural science and a teacher of moral wisdom; and proposed not merely to assist the inquirer into nature, but to build up the whole intellectual and moral man."-(Seebold.)

Naturalism, Spiritualism.-In France the Naturalists intrench themselves within their exclusive maxim-sur le principe de la certitude. They acknowledge no reality but the facts of the sensible world. Hence the facts of consciousness,-that we feel, think, and will,-since they are undeniable, must be regarded in no other light than as the product of a material organ. This organ is their proper cause, and not a mere instrument in the service of the real power. On the other side, Spiritualism, which prevails in Germany, and has now very eloquent advocates in France, denies the existence of material forces, and contemplates the material universe only as a vast apparatus of organs or instruments. In every conjuncture of events we see only the sequence. The force acts through the proper instruments; but the organ is no more the power, than the engine is the steam. Since nothing but conjunction is ever discerned by our senses, if there is no reality but the facts which are observed by sense, or inductions from them, a cause is not a reality, and the whole doctrine of causes is a fiction. It is not surprising that Spiritualism should be pronounced a word of no signification by a late Westminster Reviewer, who defines a sensation to be, the reception, in the brain or spinal cord, of an impression which has been received in the organ of sense, communicated to the nerve, and transmitted by the nerve to the brain or spinal cord; and who resolves all mental phenomena into associated sensations-that is, by his definition, impressions received and combined in the cerebral organ. These indeed are words of great signification. They denote the change of an impression into a sensation, by a simple transfer from one portion of nervous matter upon another portion of nervous matter, which is differently lodged.

Jouffroy (Ancien Maître de l'école Normale,) remarks, in a very sensible preface to his translation of Stewart's Moral Philosophy," that physiologists have never seen, and will never be able to see, that it is the brain itself which feels, thinks, and wills; and that all the facts of their observation respecting the connexion which exists between the organ and the phenomena of consciousness may be explained on the supposition, that the brain, like the nerves, is but an intermediate between the principle of sense, intelligence, will, and the external object, just as well as on the supposition that it is itself the principle. Whence it follows, that the latter assertion is purely hypothetical. It is possible, that in a more extensive and profound acquaintance with the facts of consciousness, demonstrative reasons may be found in support of the opinion which refers them to a principle distinct from the cerebral organ: or that, by examining more closely the hypothesis of the physiologist, it may be possible to reduce it ad absurdum. We have even particular reasons for believing that it can be done. Till then, let it be hypothesis against hypothesis."

Psychology.-Knapp says, "What is the nature or constitution of the soul of man, is one of those dark and difficult questions which can never receive a satisfactory answer in this our terrestrial life. There is nothing in the Bible by which it can be determined: there it is merely opposed to the