The leader chosen was Major Benjamin Church, who had been a noted Indian fighter in King Philip's War.1 Although Church was over sixty years of age and of such unwieldy bulk that it required the assistance of a private soldier to help him over the obstructions of the trails, he was a popular man, and by his popularity drew a mixed mob of volunteers into the service. Church begged hard to be allowed to attack Port Royal; but this Dudley forbade, directing him to proceed against the Indians in Maine.

A mixed force of about seven hundred men sailed to Castine, where they killed or captured the inhabitants of the fort, did some little damage, were guilty of murdering some settlers who had already surrendered, and then sailed for Grand Pré on the Bay of Fundy. Here they met with some slight resistance, but were able to burn the houses, destroy the crops, and do considerable damage. It was to the credit of Church that he restrained the Indians under his command, and contented himself with taking off only so many of the inhabitants as were needed for the purpose of exchange for the captives of the Indian raids. Thus far the expedition was following a liberal construction of the governor's plan; but, at a distance from Dudley, Church now decided to try a bold stroke on his own account and attempt to carry out his cherished design of making an attack upon Port Royal. Aside from the question of obedience of orders, the expedition was bound to prove futile; for Port Royal, warned by the fate of the other settlements, was strongly reinforced and fairly well fortified, and Church had only about four hundred men available for landing. As such a small force would necessarily prove ineffective, the officers and captains of the fleet decided that a landing

1 Church's own account is found in Thomas Church's History of Philip's War, 1829, 243-286.

was out of the question; and after bombastically summoning Port Royal to surrender, Church was forced to sail for Boston.

The governor reaped a just reward for his want of frankness. He had utilized the popularity of Church and the enthusiasm excited by the prospect of an expedition against Port Royal for other ends. A better leader than Church might have excited more terror among the Indians in Maine; but, as it was, little harm had been done there and none to Port Royal, while the resources of the colony had been frittered away. At best the expedition had been a futile one, but some of the critics went even farther, and insinuated that Port Royal had been spared to serve as a depot for the illegal trade to which, as some believed, the governor was a party. Cotton Mather, growing cold toward Dudley and repenting his share in helping him win his appointment, thus summed up the hostile criticism: "When Church went with his forces to Port-royal he could easily have taken the fort, or done anything in the world, but the reason which he has often given for his not doing it is, because you absolutely forbad him, you peremptorily forbad him. The cause you assigned was, because the matter had been laid before the queen, and the queen had sent over no orders for it, and though the queen had sent no orders we send with a pretence to take it - But the story grows now too black a story for me to meddle with it-The expedition baffled The fort never so much as demanded An eternal gravestone laid on our buried captives - A nest of hornets. provoked to fly out against us - A shame cast upon us that will never be forgotten-I dare not, I cannot meddle with these mysteries." 1

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After the attack upon Deerfield Dudley began to negotiate

1 January 20, 1707, Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts, ii. 135 note.

for the liberation of the captives. He wrote several letters to Vaudreuil protesting against the harsh treatment of the English prisoners, threatening reprisals, and, after the Church expedition, suggesting the possibility of an exchange of prisoners.1 To these Vaudreuil replied, denying the charges of cruelty, accusing the English of murdering in cold blood prisoners who had surrendered, and asserting that the French had learned from the English the practice of paying the Indians for the scalps of their enemies. His letter also contained a slur upon Dudley's authority which long rankled in the governor's mind: "If you were the sole ruler in New England as I am here, I would not have hesitated to accept your word and it would also have been a pleasure to me to return all your prisoners ... but as you have a council, which is often divided in opinion, and where you have nothing more than your vote, you ought not to take it ill that I must have assurances for the return of the prisoners coming to me, the more so because on my side, being the sole master, I am always in a position to keep my word."2 Nevertheless, Vaudreuil sent the Sieur de Courtemanche with instructions to negotiate for a mutual exchange of prisoners without regard to numbers, particularly for the return of one Baptiste, "without which there will be no exchange." This Baptiste was a border ruffian who plundered either side as it seemed most profitable, and who had been captured by the English in 1702 while he was operating with the French. The colonists claimed that as a renegade British subject and pirate, Baptiste should not be released with the other prisoners of war; but the General Court agreed

1 These letters are translated from the Collection de Manuscrits, ii. 410 et seq., and printed in Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, viii. 497 et seq. 2 Ibid.

For the details of the capture, see the petition of John Harraden in Massachusetts Archives (Ms.), lxii. 438, printed in Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, viii. 278.

with Dudley and advised him to release Baptiste if the exchange could be effected in no other way.1

Dudley, however, sought to gain from Courtemanche his consent to the exchange of some of the prisoners, not including Baptiste, and in this way to keep the negotiation open. To this proposal Courtemanche consented, either in violation of his instructions or because he had orders which he did not make public. Doubtless both Dudley and Courtemanche were inclined to continue the negotiations since a cartel of exchange of prisoners was executed by the governors of the Leeward Islands and Martinique. At all events, even in spite of a petition from some of the Boston merchants,3 the Court authorized Dudley to prolong the negotiations even if he should be obliged to surrender Baptiste. The governor sent his son William and Samuel Vetch to Quebec with a proposal for the exchange of prisoners (which has unfortunately been lost) and a letter from Dudley to Vaudreuil. In the letter Dudley took the opportunity to answer the slights that Vaudreuil had put upon him. "You go too far in your letters," said he, "when you speak of the command that I have here as if it were not equal to your own. I have in this place all the just and reasonable power than an English governor could wish, and find a correspondingly just and reasonable obedience; although by the grace of God the number of my people exceeds that of yours tenfold. the thing which ordinarily constitutes the difficulty of government." 4

1 Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, viii. 120-121, chs. 13, 15; Council Records (Ms.), viii. 128.

2 Printed in Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, viii. 482.

Massachusetts Archives (Ms.), lxxi. 152, printed in Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, viii. 511.

4 Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, viii. 513, translated from Collection de Manuscrits, ii. 435.

On November 21 Vetch and William Dudley returned, bringing not merely a project for the exchange of prisoners, but the draft of a treaty of neutrality. This was probably quite different from Dudley's proposals; it was not what he anticipated, and, as has been seen, was not accepted. Thereafter the exchange of prisoners was carried on by negotiation for individual cases, and no general treaty was made until the end of the war. Dudley kept these negotiations in his own hands. The messengers were his intimate friends, and, though admirably suited for the occasion, did not possess the confidence of the colonists; hence it soon began to be whispered that the envoys were not confining their activities to negotiations for the exchange of prisoners, but were trading with the enemy and supplying them with munitions of war.1

Such accusations were by no means a novelty in America. At the outbreak of the previous war, Andros was accused of furnishing the natives with arms and ammunition; and the merchants of Albany, more enterprising than scrupulous, did not hesitate to send to the north arms which, though designed to be used against Canada, found their way to the Indians of New England. In the first years of Dudley's administration there is no doubt that such trade was going on, and even that some eager traders of New England were duplicating the methods of the people of Albany. In fact, in 1702 and 1703, the Council handed over the suspected merchants to the Superior Court for trial.2 The crisis, however, came in 1706 with the accusation of Vetch; and the matter is interesting not only for the constitutional points involved but for its effect upon the governor.

1 The French authorities also were suspicious of the activities of Vetch, as is seen by the letters from the French Government to the governors at Quebec and Port Royal. See Collection de Manuscrits, ii. 450-451, translated in Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, viii. 544. 2 Council Records (Ms.), iii. 327.