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tion. Some portions of this policy were dictated by the English ministry; others were plans that had been tried in the previous war and were sure to win favor with the people; other ideas were Dudley's own, which he was especially chosen to carry out. It is much to his credit that he was able to weld all these plans into one harmonious scheme, which in general he imposed upon New England.

The defensive features of his plan were partly supplied by England, and were partly the result of his own experience. The English government was bent upon defending New England by frontier posts, — by forts at Piscataqua and Pemaquid, and the castle at Boston. Although Dudley made a special journey to view the ruins at Pemaquid, and although he repeatedly urged the Court to take some action, he was, as has been shown, obliged to report to the Board his failure in this direction.1 One reason for his failure lay in the general disinclination of the Massachusetts Court to engage in expensive operations so far from its own borders, and probably, too, in a genuine feeling that the fort at Pemaquid would not serve as "any bridle to the enemy or barier to our frontiers, being out of the usual route of the Indians";" but Dudley's path was not made any easier by the want of tact displayed by the engineer Römer, who was sent over by the English government to repair the fortifications. Römer's plans called for a large expenditure of money, larger than the Court felt able to contribute, and his overbearing manner was so irritating to the colonists that they took every opportunity to thwart him. Feeling the slights put upon him, Römer frequently appealed to Dudley, and sometimes directly to England, for support.3

1 Board of Trade, Papers, New England (Ms.), 11, M. 13 and N. 13. Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts, ii. 138.

Bodleian Library, Rawlinson Mss., A. 272, f. 215, 217, 218, 230; Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, viii. 346.

The governor furthered his plans as far as he could, and had the castle at Boston strengthened; but he was unable to force the Court to adopt the measure most insisted on by the English government and fortify Pemaquid.

In other features of his policy, Dudley was more successful. He gained information of the impending Indian raids, and was frequently able to warn the threatened locality, and sometimes even to forestall the blow. He organized a snowshoe brigade, and kept a fourth part of the militia of the colony ready to march upon twenty-four hours' notice. He also sent out frequent scouting parties to protect the frontiers. Finally, he was a constant and successful beggar. Before he sailed from England, he obtained an order from the Privy Council allowing him to import powder; 2 and he seldom failed to include in his reports a request for additional supplies and stores, which were generally sent according to his desire.

In addition to the purely military plans for defence, Dudley evolved a policy from which much might have been expected had he been adequately supported by the General Court. Early in July, 1702, on his journey to Pemaquid, he held a conference with the chiefs of the Maine Indians at which an agreement was made that kept the Indians of that region at peace during the first year of the war. His hope of holding them to the English rested upon a plan to win their trade,4 and to neutralize the efforts of the Jesuit priests by sending

2

1 Board of Trade, Papers, New England (Ms.), 12, M. 37.

Register of the Privy Council (Ms.), Anne, i. 54.

'Board of Trade, Papers, New England (Ms.), 11, L. 23. "I have from the Assembly their Compliments and addresses of thanks, for . . . the peace hitherto with the Indians which was more than they expected and depended wholly upon my personall knowledge of them and travail to pemaquid to meet them, and that is all I have of them to my support. — Ibid. L. 23.

Ibid. L. 5.

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English missionaries to them.' Again in the following year, Dudley and some of his Council made a journey to strengthen the peace which had been made. At Casco he met the chiefs from almost all the tribes in Maine, and negotiated what he hoped would be a permanent peace with them; but when the visitors learned that the salute fired by the Indians was a volley of deadly musket-balls, and that a party of French and Indians were on the way to seize them, they had reason to doubt the efficacy of the treaty.2

Although Dudley's plan was not permanently successful, yet his idea was a correct one, as the experience of New York showed; but in executing his schemes he offended the General Court to such an extent that successful accomplishment was impossible. He denied the Court any share in the appointing of commissioners to deal with the Indians, and carried on negotiations on his own responsibility. In so doing, he was technically within his rights; but this proper exercise of his prerogative was viewed with such jealousy by the people that they refused to adopt his plans for gaining and retaining the trade of the Indians, and thus lost the opportunity of winning their good will and interest, which might have been sufficient to keep them at peace.

The well-directed policy of the French was more successful in dealing with the Indians than were the divided councils of Massachusetts. French emissaries were busy in Maine, and "And yet.

1 Board of Trade, Papers, New England (Ms.), 12, M. 10. we shall lose them [the Indians] if we have not Ministers amongst them to defeat the French Missionaries to whom they are infinitely Biggotted. . . ." (extract of a letter from Governor Dudley sent to the Board of Trade by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, preserved in its manuscript Letters, ii. 43).

2 Penhallow (History of the Wars of New England with the Eastern Indians, 1859, pp. 16-18) gives an account of this conference, at which he was a participant.

two months after the treaty at Casco Bay, parties of Indians led by French officers fell upon the outlying settlements. Wells, Winter Harbor, Saco, and other hamlets were attacked, and the majority of the inhabitants either killed or taken captive. In the following winter the western frontier of Massachusetts was invaded. This attack was not altogether unexpected, for Dudley had received warnings from Cornbury that an expedition was aimed at Deerfield and had sent reinforcements to that town. Nevertheless, a band of French and Indians captured the town, massacred about fifty of the inhabitants, and set out for Canada with over a hundred captives. But Deerfield was not the only town to suffer. Every frontier settlement must expect a similar fate, and prompt measures for defence and reprisal were taken. Troops were stationed in the most exposed localities, patrols went from town to town constantly on the alert for war parties, small bodies of troops were sent to ravage the territory occupied by the Indians, and a large bounty was offered for Indian scalps. The war, if it may be called a war, was little more than a series of raids and counter raids conducted on each side with unnecessary cruelty.2

1

Dudley's offensive steps were vigorous and promptly taken. Under his lead, measures were passed by the Council to encourage privateers and to forestall any attacks of the French.3 He was in close touch with the Indians on the north and knew that the French were tampering with their fidelity; and,

4

1 According to Penhallow (History of the Wars of New England, etc., 48) this was an extremely expensive method of making war, as each Indian taken cost the colony £1000 at least.

2 For this warfare the Reverend Solomon Stoddard of Northampton urged the employment of dogs, of which the Indians had the greatest terror. See Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, 4th Series, ii. 235.

3 Council Records (Ms.), iii. 338, 350.

* Records of the General Court (Ms.), vii. 333.

1

realizing that the struggle was to be a long and protracted one, in which all the other colonies would be involved, he forced the unwilling Court to allow him to aid the neighboring colonies of New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York if occasion should arise during its recess. In so doing, he gave evidence of a broader spirit, which looked beyond the interests of Massachusetts to the welfare of the other English colonies; but he also offended the jealous Assembly, which saw in his act but one of his schemes to aggrandize himself at the expense of the people and an example of his ambition which was ready to sacrifice their interests for his own advancement.

The first offensive operation on a large scale was undertaken in 1704. In the previous year, the House, realizing that the chief source of danger lay in the French possession of Port Royal, voted that a volunteer expedition be sent against that fortress. This action agreed in part with the plans of the governor; for, although he could not countenance an expedition directly against Port Royal, the matter being still before the queen for consideration, he hoped to utilize this expedition against some of the more immediate enemies of the colony, the French and Indians of Maine. He therefore fell in with the suggestion of the Court and promoted the expedition with all his power. He asked aid from the other colonies, but succeeded in gaining only a hundred Indians from Connecticut.3 Even these were grudgingly furnished and were to be paid and equipped by Massachusetts and to be used only to garrison the northern posts of Massachusetts and New Hampshire.

1 Records of the General Court (Ms.), vii. 348.

4

* Speech of Dudley, September 1, 1703, ibid. 429. 'Dudley to Fitz-John Winthrop and replies, December 24, 1703, to February 27, 1704, Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, 6th Series, iii. 'Winthrop to Ashurst, June 5, 1704, ibid. 212.

163 et seq.