the other hand, Phips, a native, had gained Port Royal. Hence it seemed possible that in the present crisis, a colonialborn, rather than an English governor, would have more chance of success. Although Dudley bore a military title, he had had practically no experience in military service, and it can hardly be believed that such was expected of him by the authorities in England. He had, however, had long experience in dealing with Indian affairs, and had proved an extremely energetic administrator both in Massachusetts and in New York. He was a shrewd politician, skilled in the management of men and assemblies, and his supporters in England relied upon his abilities to gain the coöperation of Massachusetts for the plans of the crown. It was these qualities, rather than his military experience, that were particularly urged by them. Indeed, the position of Massachusetts fully justified the appointment of an able Indian negotiator and shrewd parliamentarian. Until England could detach a force large enough to conquer both Canada and the seaboard colony of Acadia, Massachusetts, though occasionally striking at the French, was obliged to secure her frontiers by controlling the Indians either through alliances or through threats of force. Of all the English colonial governors the governor of Massachusetts occupied the most difficult position. French expansion had not yet become dangerous in the Ohio valley, and Pennsylvania and Virginia were out of the danger zone; Rhode Island and Connecticut were safely sheltered behind Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and were thus able to turn their energies to their own domestic concerns. The burden of the war fell upon New York and Massachusetts. The governor of New York, it is true, was obliged to protect his northern frontier, which was accessible by the easy water route of the Richelieu River and Lake Champlain; but the governor of Massachusetts, who was at the same time responsible for the safety of the scattered settlements in New Hampshire and Maine, was threatened alike by war parties from Canada on the north, and by privateers from Port Royal on the east, which by the treaty of Ryswick had been restored to France. It was manifestly impossible for a single military leader to cover such a wide frontier; hence, until the time should come for striking directly at the seat of the French power, the activities of the governor of Massachusetts were rightly confined to negotiating with the Indians, encouraging local resistance, and occasionally fitting out expeditions to make a demonstration. Above all, he must so lead the General Court that it would be willing to second any plan that England might adopt, and be ready to join in a combined attack upon either Port Royal or Quebec. The difficulties of the governor of Massachusetts were further increased by the attitude of New York. In order to protect its own frontier against the invasions of the Iroquois and at the same time to gain and enjoy their trade, New York made a treaty of peace and friendship with the Five Nations. Considered solely as a measure of defence in order to utilize the Indians as a buffer against the raids from Canada, this step might have been justified; but, although New York enjoyed the trade and friendship of the Five Nations, she could not control their policy, and was unable to prevent them from making a similar treaty with the French. This neutrality of the Iroquois was so prized by both the French and the English that it brought about a virtual peace between Canada and New York, which lasted for five years of Dudley's administration. Again and again Dudley and the General Court of Massachusetts wrote to New York to urge the Indians to hostilities against the French; but the people of New York, recognizing the value of the protection that came to them from the neutrality of the Iroquois, refused to comply.1 Hence, while Massachusetts found her northern frontier ravaged and the Indians her enemies, New York was safe and escaped many of the horrors of the war. To the French, the value of this neutrality was also clear. Secure from Indian attacks on the side of New York, they could throw all their forces against the eastern frontier of Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. The advantages of the position were recognized both at Paris and at Quebec, and frequent letters and instructions were sent to the commanders directing them never to stir the Indians of New York to war, never to allow the Indians on the eastern frontier to be neutral, and to concentrate all their energies against the people of Boston. In this design they received more than purely passive aid from New York; for the Iroquois allowed war parties to pass unmolested through their territory on their way east, and kept the northern and eastern tribes supplied with arms and ammunition. Thus secure on the 1 In 1704, Dudley, acting in coöperation with Governor Winthrop of Connecticut, attempted to urge the New York Indians to war against the French. Assuming the consent of Lord Cornbury, Governor of New York, they despatched a joint commission. Cornbury, however, far from aiding the commissioners, took great offence, ostensibly against Livingstone, one of the commissioners; but it is likely that he was influenced by other than personal reasons. Any outside interference would weaken his control over the Five Nations, any hostile act would endanger the much-valued neutrality of the Indians, and open war would break up the lucrative trade. He therefore refused to allow the Indians to take a hand in the struggle; and without the assent of the governor of New York the New England commissioners could do nothing. See Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, viii. 100. The correspondence is given in the Winthrop papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, 6th Series, iii. 261 et seq.; it is also printed, with notes from the Council records, in Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, viii. 449–455. New York frontier, the French poured expedition after expedition into New England. An opportunity to pursue a similar policy came to Dudley and Massachusetts in 1705. The unfortunate captives of the Indian raids were offered for ransom, until, as Dudley reported, "the Indians had a better trade of taking Prisoners than hunting for Beavers." At considerable risk to his reputation he refused to ransom any more, but offered a series of articles providing for a mutual exchange of English and French prisoners. In return, Vaudreuil offered, with the consent of the king, a treaty of neutrality between Canada, Acadia, and New England which would put an end to the hostilities of both the French and the Indians. These articles, however, went beyond a mere neutrality convention, for by them the governors agreed that no vessel of one colony should fish in the waters of the other. This provision was manifestly more favorable to the French than to the English, and Dudley would have been justified in refusing to agree to the proposed terms on this ground alone; but Vaudreuil went even farther, and offered these articles only on condition that Lord Cornbury, as well as Dudley, should ratify them before the last of February. The articles were laid before the General Court, and a draft of the governor's letter to Cornbury was approved; but four days later a resolution was passed condemning the proposed treaty.1 Dudley, however, dragged out the negotiations, not with any intention of agreeing to such terms or because he felt the 1 Board of Trade, Papers, New England (Ms.), 13, Q. 37. 2 Ibid. Q. 38. 'Ibid. Q. 39; also New York Colonial Documents, ix. 770. Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, viii. 541, collates the translation of the treaty given in the New York Documents with the French in the Collection de Manuscrits. * Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, viii. 149. 2 need of a treaty, for he boasted to the Board of Trade that with a little help from England he could "remove him [Vaudreuil] & all the french from Canada & Port Royal," 1 — but rather for the sake of the tranquillity which the delay temporarily gave to the frontiers. Moreover, he utilized this pretence to gain information concerning the position of the French. Thus in 1705, young William Dudley, son of the governor, and Colonel Samuel Vetch, who were sent to negotiate with Vaudreuil, prolonged the negotiations and gave great offence to some French officers by studying the river, and even, it is asserted, measuring the fortifications. In like manner at a later date, Pontchartrain expressed his approval of the policy which Vaudreuil had adopted of giving the people of Boston "to understand that, if war continued between both Colonies, it was solely the fault of the Council of Boston; so as to be able in this way to create division between the people and the Council." This rather sharp game of diplomacy brought little advantage to either side; for, although Vetch gained some little knowledge of the St. Lawrence, the great expedition of 1711 was wrecked in spite of his presence. Nor did the French succeed in creating discord; for Dudley was always able to find and equip troops for his numerous expeditions, and his plans for the war were accepted both in England and in Massachusetts. The news of the declaration of war reached Massachusetts a few days after Dudley landed, and he at once summoned the Court and outlined the scheme which, as captain-general, charged with the defence of both New Hampshire and Massachusetts, he pursued consistently throughout his administra 1 Board of Trade, Papers, New England (Ms.), 13, Q. 37. June 6, 1708, New York Colonial Documents, ix. 813. |