out negligence, we are permitted to consider | solute debtor for the money collected by him, and decide this appeal upon general principles, and that the fact that the money was stolen, and in the light of public policy. It is rather therefore, constituted no defense." The learned remarkable that, in a great business state like judge, after a further elaboration of his views New York, this question should not have been as to Albany Supers. v. Dorr, reaches the condecided long since by the court of last resort. clusion that, in view of the decisions of the In 1841 the case of Albany County Supers. v. Federal and state courts, the case should probDorr, 25 Wend. 440, came before the supreme ably not be regarded as binding authority in court, composed of Chief Justice Nelson and this state, and that the question therein decided Justices Bronson and Cowen. Dorr was county is an open one. He also held that it was not treasurer, and had given a bond to faithfully necessary to decide the question in the case in execute the duties of his office, and pay accord which he was writing, as the money received ing to law all moneys. The declaration was by the defendant surrogate was not public on the bond, alleging breaches in not paying money, but belonged to a private estate, or to over, and in not accounting. Dorr pleaded individuals. It therefore comes to this, that that the identical money received by him was for forty-five years the case of Albany County stolen from his office without negligence on his Supers. v. Dorr, 25 Wend. 440, has stood withpart. To this plea the plaintiff demurred. out being directly overruled by any case in Chief Justice Nelson, delivering the opinion of this state, and the rule of the limited liability the court, stated that the question was "whether of the common law approved therein by four an officer concerned in the receipt and disburse of our most distinguished judges. It must be ment of the public funds is an insurer of the admitted, however, that the weight of authorsame, ex virtute officii, whilst they necessarily ity in the Federal and state courts is in favor remain in his custody.' He then stated that of holding officials having the custody of pubthe principle was decided in favor of the de- lic moneys liable for its loss, although accruing fendant, in Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 646, without their fault or negligence. In many and subsequently confirmed in Whitfield v. of these cases the decision turned upon the Lord Le Despencer, 2 Cowp. 754, and is in con- construction of the local statute or the official formity with the general rule of daily applica- bond, but others squarely decide the question tion, that in order to subject the officer it is on principles of public policy. necessary to prove misconduct or neglect in the execution of his duties." Justices Bronson and Cowen concurred. An appeal was taken to the court of errors, and that court equally divided upon the question, the effect of which was to affirm the judgment below, and the case stands with no more force as a precedent than a unanimous opinion of the supreme court. Chancellor Walworth, in the court of errors, wrote for affirmance, thus adding his name to those of the distinguished justices of the supreme court who had decided to limit the liability of a public officer by the rule of the common law. It has been a mooted question whether this case was overruled by Muzzy v. Shattuck, 1 Denio, 233, decided in 1845. Mr. Hill, in his note to Albany Supers, v. Dorr, in court of errors (7 Hill, 584), says that in Muzzy v. Shattuck the law seems to have been settled, and properly, directly the other way. On the other hand, Judge Earl, in People, Nash, v. Faulkner, 107 N. Y. 486, in referring to Albany Supers. v. Dorr, says: "The doctrine of that case has been erroneously supposed to have been overruled by the decision in Muzzy v. Shattuck, 1 Denio, 233. In the latter case the action was upon the official bond of a town collector, and the defense was that the money was stolen from him. It was held that the defense was not good, the supreme court then being composed of Bronson, Ch. J., and Justices Beardsley and Jewett; and Bronson, who concurred in the prior decision, also concurred in this, without any indication that he had changed his views The prior decision was referred to in the opinion of the court, but not criticised or disapproved. This decision was based, not upon the common law, and not upon the force and effect of the official bond given by the collector, but upon the statutes defining the duties and liabilities of the collector; and the court held that by those statutes he was made an ab In the case at bar, the defendant Merrill is sought to be held liable for school moneys paid to him by the county treasurer, to disburse in payment of the salaries of school teachers upon the orders of the trustees. The statute imposing this duty reads as follows, viz.: It is the duty of every supervisor (1) to disburse the school moneys in his hands, applicable to the payment of teachers' wages, upon and only upon the written orders of a sole trustee, or a majority of the trustees, in favor of qualified teachers. 2 Rev. Stat. 8th ed. p. 1283, 6. By 8 of the same section a supervisor is required to pay to his successor all school moneys remaining in his hands. In this statute it will be observed that there are no explicit declarations of the legislative intent, as in the case of town collectors, to create a supervisor the debtor of the county for public moneys in his hands, and the condition of the bond to safely keep, faithfully disburse, and justly account for the same does not add to the liability created by statute. As before intimated, we must consider and decide this question upon general principles, and in the light of public policy. In the case of an offi eer disbursing the public moneys, much may be said in favor of limiting his liability, where he acts in good faith and without negligence; and a strong argument can be framed against the great injustice of compelling him to respond for money stolen or lost while he is in the exercise of the highest degree of care, and engaged in the conscientious discharge of duty. When considering this side of the case, it shocks the sense of justice that the public official should be held to any greater liability than the old rule of the common law, which exacted proof of misconduct or neglect. It is at this point, however, that the question of public policy presents itself, and it may well be asked whether it is not wiser to subject the custodian of the public moneys to the strictest liability, rather than open the door for the perpetration of fraud in numberless ways impossible of detection, thereby placing in jeopardy the enormous amount of the public funds constantly passing through the hands of disbursing agents. Without regard to decisions outside of our own jurisdiction, we think the weight of the argument, treating this as an original question, is in favor of the rule of strict liability, which requires a public official to assume all risks of loss, and imposes upon him the duty to account as a debtor for the funds in his custody. We do not wish to be understood as establishing a rule of absolute liability in any event. The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Thomas, 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 337, 21 L. ed. 89, held the surveyor of customs for the port of Nashville, Tennessee, and depositary of public money at that place, not liable, when prevented from responding by the act of God or the public enemy. If that state of facts is hereafter presented to this court, it will, doubtless, be carefully considered whether it does not present a proper exception to the general rule. It would not be profitable to refer in detail to the many cases, Federal and state, which sustain the strict rule of liability, and we content ourselves with a reference to a number of them involving losses by robbery, burglary, bank failure, and the like. United States v. Prescott, 44 U. S. 3 How. 578, 11 L. ed. 734: United States v. Morgan, 52 U. S. 11 How. 154, 13 L. ed. 643; United States v. Dashiell, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 182, 18 L. ed. 319; United States v. Keehler, 76 Ú. S. 9 Wall, 83, 19 L. ed. 574; Boyden v. United States, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 17, 20 L. ed. 527; Berans v. United States, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 56, 20 L. ed. 531; Hancock v. Hazzard, 12 Cush. 112; Com. v. Comly, 3 Pa. 372; New Providence v. McEachron, 33 N. J. L. 339: State, The Township, v. Powell, 67 Mo. 395, 29 Am. Rep. 512; Lowry v. Polk County, 51 Iowa, 50, 33 Am. Rep. 114; Perley v. Muskegon County, 32 Mich. 132, 20 Am. Rep. 637; Nason v. Directors of Poor, 126 Pa. 445; Omro Supers. v. Kaime, 39 Wis. 468; Redwood County Comrs. v. Tower, 28 Minn. 45; State, Wyandot County, v. Harper, 6 Ohio St. 607, 67 Am. Dec. 363; Halbert v. State, Martin County, 22 Ind. 125; Ward v. Colfax County School Dist. No. 15, 10 Neb. 293, 35 Am. Rep. 477. The views we have expressed lead to a final judgment against the defendant Merrill as supervisor of the town of Stockbridge, although he is shown by this record to have discharged his official duties in an honorable and faithful manner. The judgment appealed from should be af firmed, with costs. All concur, except Gray, J., dissenting, and Martin, J., not sitting. Harry C. ADAMS, Respt., V. NEW JERSEY STEAMBOAT COMPANY, Appt. (151 N. Y. 163.) 1. The relations between a steamboat NOTE. The above case is a novel and important one on the subject of the liability of a carrier by steamboat as an innkeeper. tice, for appellant: The mere proof of the loss of money by a passenger while occupying a berth does not make a prima facie case, and to sustain a recovery some evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant must be given. Morris v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 148 N. Y. 182; Henderson v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 123 U. S. 61, 31 L. ed. 92; Steamboat Crystal Palace v. Vanderpool, 16 B. Mon. 302; Clark v. Burns, 118 Mass. 275, 19 Am. Rep. 456; Gleason v. Goodrich Transp. Co. 32 Wis. 85, 14 Am. Rep. 716; Abbott v. Bradstreet, 55 Me. 530; McKee v. Owen, 15 Mich. 115; Weeks v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 72 N. Y. 50, 28 Am. Rep. 104. Carriers of passengers by water are not innkeepers. 2 Hutchinson, Carr. § 700, note 1. But innkeepers are held to no such liability as this without a chance of defense. Rosenplaenter v. Ræssle, 54 N. Y. 262; Becker Warner, 90 Hun, 187. v. There was notice to deposit valuables with the clerk. Hyatt v. Taylor, 51 Barb. 632, Affirmed 42 N. Y. 258; Walsh v. Porterfield, 87 Pa. 376; Swann v. Smith, 14 Daly, 114; Becker v. Warner, supra; Hayes v. Forty Second Street & G. S. F. R. Co. 97 N. Y. 259; Belch v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 90 Hun, 477. No negligence on the part of defendant had been shown. Every precaution and care required of defendant had been exercised. Carpenter v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 124 N. Y. 53, 11 L. R. A. 759; Kelly v. Man hattan R. Co. 112 N. Y. 443, 3 L. R. A. 74; Potter v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 136 N. Y. 77. The plaintiff had not shown facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and in addition had not shown that the property of which he claimed the loss had been committed to the care of the defendant. Carpenter v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. supra, Roth v. Hamburg-American Packet Co. 27 Jones & S. 49; Morris v. New York C. & As to the liability to passengers on sleeping car, see Mann-Boudoir Car Co. v. Dupre (C. C. App.) 21 L. R. A. 289, and note. H. R. R. Co. 106 N. Y. 678; Dwight v. Ger mania L. Ins. Co. 103 N. Y. 359, 57 Am. Rep. 729, and cases there cited; Wohlfahrt v. Beckert, 92 N. Y. 490, 44 Am. Rep. 406. Messrs. Gibson & Davis, for respondent: Defendant is a common carrier and an in surer. Hutchinson, Carr. 2d ed. pp. 63, 199, 813; Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234, 32 Am. Dec. 455; Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251, 32 Am. Dec. 470; Mc Arthur v. Sears, 21 Wend. 190; Powell v. Myers, 26 Wend. 591. The liability of the defendant is also analogous to that of an innkeeper. Crozier v. Boston, N. Y. & N. S. B. Co. 43 How. Pr. 466; Mudgett v. Bay State S. B. Co. 1 Daly, 151; Gore v. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. 2 Daly, 254. And the liability of an innkeeper is that of an insurer. Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571, 88 Am. Dec. 405; Piper v. Manny, 21 Wend. 282; 2 Parsons, Cont. 6th ed. p. 145. Defendant being liable both as common carrier and as an insurer, the presumption is that the loss occurred through defendant's default, and this can only be repelled by proof that the loss was attributable to negligence or fraud of plaintiff, or to act of God, or of the public enemy. Crozier v. Boston, N. Y. & N. S. B. Co., and Hulett v. Swift, supra. Defendant is liable though loss happened without its fault. Hulett v. Swift, supra; Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill, 485, 38 Am. Dec. 663; Macklin v. New Jersey S. B. Co. 7 Abb. Pr. N. S. 229 (affirmed | in court of appeals though not reported); Crozier v. Boston, N. Y. & N. S. B. Co. supra. Nor can defendant by a mere notice relieve itself from the vigorous rule of the common law, which, in the absence of a clear, special, and express contract, makes it an insurer. Holsapple v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co. 86 N. Y. 275; Westcott v. Fargo, 61 N. Y. 542, 19 Am. Rep. 300; Edsall v. Camden & A. R. & Transp. Co. 50 N. Y. 661; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Mineral Springs Mfg. Co. 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 318, 328, 329, 21 L. ed. 297, 302. And no presumptions will be indulged in, in favor of exemptions from common-law liability. Edsall v. Camden & A. R. & Transp. Co. supra. An express contract cannot spring from a notice. Hutchinson, Carr. 2d ed. p. 270. The money and clothing which plaintiff was entitled to have in his stateroom were in the custody and possession of defendant. | Fairfax v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 73 N. Y. 167, 29 Am. Rep. 119; Curtis v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 74 N. Y. 116, 30 Am. Rep. 271; Merrill v. Grinnell, and Holsapple v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co., supra. Defendant is unquestionably liable for plaintiff's loss, unless plaintiff, by his own negligence contributed to the loss; and if such were the fact, the burden of proof was on defendant to show it, as well as his own freedom from negligence. Aiken v. Westcott, 14 Daly, 504; Faucett v. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 377; Crozier v. Boston, N. Y. & N. S. B. Co. 43 How. Pr. 466. Plaintiff was under no obligation whatever to read a notice posted in his stateroom. Macklin v. New Jersey S. B. Co. 7 Abb. Pr. N. S. 229; Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234, 32 Am. Dec. 455; Camden & A. R. & Transp. Co. v. Belknap, 21 Wend. 354. Nor can defendant claim exemption under the hotelkeepers' liability act. Such act specifically applies to hotelkeepers and innkeepers; and it is well settled that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. Fitzgerald v. Quann, 109 N. Y. 441; Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152, 44 Am. Rep. 361; Sedgw. Stat. & Const. L. 2d ed. p. 267. But even if plaintiff saw the notice, or if it was brought home to his knowledge, it was unreasonable, so far as it claimed to cover personal effects and money necessary for traveling expenses. Pope v. Hall. 14 La. Ann. 324; Profilet v. Hall, Id. 530; Johnson v. Richardson, 17 Ill. 302; Krohn v. Sweeney, 2 Daly, 200; Gile v. Libby, 36 Barb. 70. O'Brien, J., delivered the opinion of the court: On the night of the 17th of June, 1889, the plaintiff was a cabin passenger from New York to Albany on the defendant's steamer Drew, and for the usual and regular charge was assigned to a stateroom on the boat. The plaintiff's ultimate destination was St. Paul, in the state of Minnesota, and he had upon his person the sum of $160 in money for the purpose of defraying his expenses of the journey. The plaintiff, on retiring for the night, left this money in his clothing in the stateroom, having locked the door and fastened the windows. During the night it was stolen by some person who apparently reached it through the window of the room. The plaintiff's relations to the defendant as a passenger, the loss without negligence on his part, and the other fact that the sum lost was reasonable and proper for him to carry upon his person to defray the expenses of the jourMudgett v. Bay State S. B. Co. supra; Mack-ney, have all been found by the verdict of the lin v. New Jersey S. B. Co. supra; Calye's Case, 8 Coke, 33; Gore v. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co., and Crozier v. Boston, N. Y. & N. S. B. Co. supra. Plaintiff was entitled to have in his stateroom sufficient money for the expenses of his journey, and while there it was in the custody of defendant. Crozier v. Boston, N. Y. & N. S. B. Co. supra; Merrill v. Grinnell, 30 N. Y. 594; Torpey v. Williams, 3 Daly, 162; Taylor v. Monnot, 1 Abb. Pr. 325; Hutchinson, Carr. 2d ed. p. 819; jury in favor of the plaintiff. The appeal presents, therefore, but a single question, and that is, whether the defendant is in law liable for this loss without any proof of negligence on its part. The learned trial judge instructed the jury that it was, and the jury, after passing upon the other questions of fact in the case, rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the amount of money so stolen. The judg ment entered upon the verdict was affirmed at general term, and that court has allowed an appeal to this court. The defendant has therefore been held lia- | court, though it seems that the case was not ble as an insurer against the loss which one of reported. its passengers sustained under the circumstances stated. The principle upon which iunkeepers are charged by the common law as in surers of the money or personal effects of their guests originated in public policy. It was deemed to be a sound and necessary rule that this class of persons should be subjected to a high degree of responsibility in cases where an extraordinary confidence is necessarily reposed in them, and where great temptation to fraud and danger of plunder exists by reason of the peculiar relations of the parties. Story, Bailm. S 464; 2 Kent, Com. 592; Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571, 88 Am. Dec. 405. The relations that exist between a steamboat company and its passengers, who have procured staterooms for their comfort during the journey, differ in no essential respect from those that exist between the innkeeper and his guests. The passenger procures and pays for his room for the same reasons that a guest at an inn does. There are the same opportunities for fraud and plunder on the part of the carrier that was originally supposed to furnish a temptation to the landlord to violate his duty to the guest. A steamer carrying passengers upon the water, and furnishing them with rooms and entertainment, is for all practical purposes, a floating inn, and hence the duties which the proprietors owe to the passengers in their charge ought to be the same. No good reason is apparent for relaxing the rigid rule of the common law which applies as between innkeeper and guest, since the same considerations of public policy apply to both relations. The defendant, as a common carrier, would have been liable for the personal baggage of the plaintiff unless the loss was caused by the act of God or the public enemies, and a reasonable sum of money for the payment of his expenses, if carried by the passenger in his trunk, would be included in the liability for loss of baggage. Merrill v. Grinnell, 30 N. Y. 594; Merritt v. Earle, 29 N. Y. 150, 86 Am. Dec. 292; Elliott v. Rossell, 10 Johns. 7, 6 Am. Dec. 306; Brown, Carr. § 41; Redf. Carr. § 24; Angell, Carr. $ 80. Since all questions of negligence on the part of the plaintiff, as well as those growing out of the claim that some notice was posted in the room regarding the carrier's liability for the money, have been disposed of by the verdict, it is difficult to give any good reason why the measure of liability should be less for the loss of the money under the circumstances than for the loss of what might be strictly called baggage. The question involved in this case was very fully and ably discussed in the case of Crozier v. Boston, N. Y. & N. S. B. Co. 43 How. Pr. 466, and in Macklin v. New Jersey S. B. Co. 7 Abb. Pr. N. S. 229. The liability of the carrier in such cases as an insurer seems to have been very clearly demonstrated in the opinion of the court in both actions upon reason, public policy, and judicial authority. It appears from a copy of the remittitur attached to the brief of plaintiff's counsel that the judg ment in the latter case was affirmed in this It was held in Carpenter v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 124 N. Y. 53, 11 L. R. A. 759, that a railroad running sleeping coaches on its road was not liable for the loss of money taken from a passenger while in his berth, during the night, without some proof of negligence on its part. That case does not. we think, control the question now under consideration Sleeping car companies are neither innkeepers nor carriers. A berth in a sleeping car is a convenience of modern origin, and the rules of the common law in regard to carriers or innkeepers have not been extended to this new relation. This class of conveyances is attached to the regular trains upon railroads for the purpose of furnishing extra accommodations, not to the public at large nor to all the passengers, but to that limited number who wish to pay for them. The contract for transportation and liability for loss of baggage is with the railroad, the real carrier. All the relations of passenger and carrier are established by the contract implied in the purchase of the regular railroad ticket, and the sleeping car is but an adjunct to it only for such of the passengers as wish to pay an additional charge for the comfort and luxury of a special apartment in a special car. The relations of the carrier to a passenger occupying one of these berths are quite different with respect to his personal effects from those which exist at common law between the innkeeper and his guest, or a steamboat company that has taken entire charge of the traveler by assigning to him a stateroom. While the company running sleeping cars is held to a high degree of care in such cases, it is not liable for a loss of this character without some proof of negligence. The liability as insurers which the common law imposed upon carriers and innkeepers has not been extended to these modern appliances for personal comfort, for reasons that are stated quite fully in the adjudged cases and that do not apply in the case at bar. Ulrich v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 108 N. Y. 80; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Smith, 73 Ill. 360, 24 Am. Rep. 258; Woodruff Sleeping & Parler Coach Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474, 43 Am. Rep. 102: Lewis v. New York Sleeping Car Co. 143 Mass. 267, 58 Am. Rep. 135. But aside from authority, it is quite obvious that the passenger has no right to expect, and in fact does not expect, the same degree of security from thieves while in an open berth in a car on a railroad as in a stateroom of a steamboat, securely locked and otherwise guarded from intrusion. In the latter case, when he retires for the night, he ought to be able to rely upon the company for his protection with the same faith that the guest can rely upon the protection of the innkeeper, since the two relations are quite analogous. In the former the contract and the relations of the parties differ at least to such an extent as to justify some modification of the common-law rule of responsibility. The use of sleeping cars by passengers in modern times created relations between the parties to the contract that wereunknown to the common law, and to which in a special car, has never been held to that high degree of responsibility that governs the relations of innkeeper and guest, and it would perhaps be unjust to so extend the liability when the nature and character of the duties which it assumes are considered. the rule of absolute responsibility could not car. The principle upon which the responsi be applied without great injustice in many | bility rests is the same in either case, though cases. But in the case at bar no good reason the degree of care to which the carrier is held is perceived for relaxing the ancient rule, and may be different. That must be measured by none can be deduced from the authorities. the danger to which the passenger is exposed The relations that exist between the carrier and from thieves and with reference to all the cirthe passenger who secures a berth in a sleeping cumstances of the case. The carrier of passcar or in a drawing room car upon a railroad engers by railroad, whether the passenger be are exceptional and peculiar. The contract assigned to the ordinary coaches or to a berth which gives the passenger the right to occupy a berth or a seat does not alone secure to him the right of transportation. It simply gives him the right to enjoy special accommodations at a specified place in the train. The carrier by railroad does not undertake to insure the personal effects of the passenger which are carried upon his person against depredation by thieves. It is bound, no doubt, to use due care to protect the passenger in this respect, and it might well be held to a higher degree of care when it assigns sleeping berths to passengers for an extra compensation than in cases where they remain in the ordinary coaches in a condition to protect themselves. But it is only upon the ground of negligence that the railroad company can be held liable to the passenger for money stolen from his person during the journey. The ground of the responsibility is the same as to all the passengers, whether they use sleeping berths or not, though the degree of care required may be different. Some proof must be given that the carrier failed to perform the duty of protection to the passenger that is implied in the contract before the question of responsibility can arise, whether the passenger be in one of the sleeping berths or in a seat in the ordinary But the traveler who pays for his passage, and engages a room in one of the modern floating palaces that cross the sea or navigate the interior waters of the country, establishes legal relations with the carrier that cannot well be distinguished from those that exist between the hotel keeper and his guests. The carrier undertakes to provide for all his wants, including a private room for his exclusive use, which is to be as free from all intrusion as that assigned to the guest at a hotel. The two relations, if not identical, bear such close analogy to each other that the same rule of responsibility should govern. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the defendant was properly held liable in this case for the money stolen from the plaintiff, without any proof of negligence. The judgment should be affirmed. KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS. OHIO & MISSISSIPPI RAILWAY COM- v. Justus TABER. 1. Provisions in a carrier's contract that notice of injury to cattle must be given before they are unloaded or mixed with others, and that no animal shall be considered as worth more than a specified sum, conflict with a constitutional provision that common carriers shall not contract for relief from their commonlaw liability. 2. Prohibiting common carriers from contracting to limit their common-law liability does not interfere with the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. (September 24, 1895.) The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. W. H. Marriott, for appellant: The petition, in failing to set out the whole contract and aver the performance of the condition precedent, has failed to show facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Newman, Pl. 673; Hodges v. Holeman, 2 Dana, 396. As between plaintiff and defendant this was a contract for interstate commerce, and cannot be controlled by state legislation, and the provision of the Constitution referred to, as to such a contract, is void. Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Com. 88 Va. 95, 13 L. R. A. 107; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114, 34 L. ed. 394, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 178; Brown v. Maryland, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347; Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co. 30 Fed. Rep. 9, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 411. PPEAL by defendant from a judgment A of the Circuit Court for Hardin County To say that the defendant shall not insert a in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to condition in its contracts for the carrying on recover damages for injuries to live stock of interstate commerce would be to regulate while in defendant's possession for transporta-commerce between the states. tion. Affirmed. NOTE.-As to the power of a carrier to limit the amount of liability in cases of negligence, see note to Ballou v. Earle (R. I.) 14 L. R. A. 433. The condition imposed by the 11th section of the bill of lading is a reasonable stipulation and valid, and will be enforced in the absence of fraud or mistake, unless waived. |