1896. HARTWELL V. TEFFT. Chambers, 80 Cal. 216; Wallace v. Rappleye, 103 Ill. 229: Tyler v. Reynolds, 53 Iowa, 148; Gill v. Sullivan, 55 Iowa, 341; Shearer v. Weaver, 56 Iowa, 578; Wyeth v. Stone, 144 Mass. 441; People v. Congdon, 77 Mich. 351; Morrison v. Session's Estate, 70 Mich. 297; King v. Davis, 91 N. C. 142; Upson v. Noble, 35 Ohio St. 655; Ex parte Clark, 87 Cal. 638; Sutherland, Stat. Constr. & 400, p. 510, § 139, p. 182; Smith v. Haworth, 53 Mo. 88; State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380, 29 Am. Rep. 506; Yankee v. Thompson, 51 Mo. 234; Mueller v. Kaessmann, 84 Mo. 323. Statutes of adoption should be strictly construed as against the adopted child. Keegan v. Geraghty, Ex parte Chambers, Wallace v. Rappleye, and Re Jessup's Estate, supra. The adopted child cannot take from the ancestor of the adopting parent. 24 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 424; Meader v. Archer, 65 N. H. 214; Sunderland's Estate, 60 Iowa, 732; Helms v. Elliott, 89 Tenn. 446, 10 L. R. A. 535; Keegan v. Geraghty, 101 Ill. 26. The rules of construction of wills must manifestly leave the question whether or not the word "children" or "issue" or other words shall be held to include adopted children, very much dependent upon the circumstances of the case and the context of the will in question. Where the words "issue" or "children" or "heirs" were used in the will, a child adopted after the execution of the will could not take under these words. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 N. H. 407; Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala. 48; Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 251; Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304; Bordlear v. Boudlear, 112 Mass. 184. And this principle has been carried so far as to refer, not only to the will of the ancestor, but to the will of the parent by adoption also. Boudlear v. Bowdlear and Russell v. Russell, supra. Mr. Willard B. Tanner, for respondent: In Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262, the court said that the words "child," "issue" and "lawful issue" do not mean heirs of the body, and the adopted daughter took the whole estate under the settlement. The language of the decision is broad enough to cover a case where the adopted child would take from an ancestor. Whitmore, Law of Adoption, preface, p. 4. The testator must be held then to have made his will in view of the statutory meaning of the word "issue," and the power of the granddaughter to give to an adopted child all the rights and status of issue, and therefore to have contemplated that an adopted child might take under his will. Johnson's Appeal, 88 Pa. 346; 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 301. The section in the law of descent which uses as the word "child" must be understood merely laying down the general rules of inheritance, and not as completely defining how the status is to be created which gives the capacity to inherit. Power v. Hafley, 85 Ky. 671; Fosburg v. An adopted child has the status of a child if he is not in fact a child. 2 Austin, Jur. 3d ed. 706, 709, 712, 974. Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 17 L. R. A. 435, is the same in principle as the case at bar. The court held that the adopted child would take as a lineal descendant of the legatee,not as a lineal descendant by birth, but as a statutory lineal descendant, and as lawfully in the line of descent as if he were placed there by birth. Re Newman's Estate, 75 Cal. 213; Johnson's Appeal, 88 Pa. 346; McGunnigle v. McKee, 77 Pa. 81, 18 Am. Rep. 428; Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274, 50 Am. Rep. 788; Pace v. Klink, 51 Ga. 220; Loring v. Thorndike, 5 Allen, 257; Rowan's Estate, 6 Pa. Co. Ct. 461. In Reinders v. Koppelman, 94 Mo. 338, the court observes that the words "heirs at law" and "lawful heirs" mean in common language those upon whom the descent is cast by law, not an heir by adoption, and that the testator would have used the words "adopted heir" or "heir by adoption," if he had meant to include the adopted child of the wife. But see Buckley v. Frazier, 153 Mass. 525; Power v. Hafley, and Fosburg v. Rogers, supra. In the case at bar the only indication of intention outside of the use of the words "lawful heirs" are the provisions that the property of descent. The latter words would indicate shall go to lawful issue agreeably to the laws an intention in accordance with the logical result of the statute of adoptions, which places the adopted child in the place of lawful issue under the statute of descents. Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262; Moran v. Stewart, 122 Mo. 295; Fosburg v. Rogers, and Humphries v. Davis, supra; Simmons v. Burrell, 8 Misc. 388; Eckford v. Knox, 67 Tex. 200; Wagner v. Varner, 50 Iowa, 532; McGunnigle v. McKee, and Pace v. Klink, supra; Re Wardell's Estate, 57 Cal. 484; Barnes v. Allen, 25 Ind. 222; Burrage v. Briggs, 120 Mass. 103; Re Newman's Estate, 75 Cal. 213; Power v. Hafley, 85 Ky. 671;. Wyeth v. Stone, 144 Mass. 441. Stiness, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The will of Dexter Thurber, late of Providence, left a fund to trustees, to pay the income, in stated proportions, to children and grandchildren, and upon their death to pay their respective portions to their lawful issue: and, if any of them should die without leaving lawful issue, then a gift over. The testator left a granddaughter, Emma Thurber Brown, who married Lyman B. Tefft. She died leaving no issue of her body, but after the death of the testator, she joined her husband in a petition to the municipal court of Providence for the adoption of the respondent, Mary Abby Tefft, the child of her husband by a former wife, as their child, pursuant to R. I. Pub. Stat. chap. 164, which petition was granted, and a decree entered. Mrs. Tefft having died, this bill is filed to ascertain whether the fund goes to her adopted daughter, under the bequest to her lawful issue. Our statute for the adoption of children (Pub. Laws 1866, chap. 627) says: "A child so RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT. adopted shall be deemed, for the purposes of | tion of a lineal descendant, who may take the Nov., inheritance by such child and all other legal legacy under a statute which prevents legacies consequences and incidents of the natural re- from lapsing when the legatee leaves lineal lation of parents and children, the child of descendants. The reasoning seems to be conthe parents by adoption, the same as if he had clusive. been born to them in lawful wedlock, except that he shall not be capable of taking property expressly limited to the heirs of the body or bodies of the parents by adoption, nor property from the lineal or collateral kindred of such parents by right of representation.' The argument for the complainant is, that in using the word " issue," the testator had in mind "beirs of the body" of his granddaughter, and so the case is really within the exception of the statute. based both upon a strict construction of the The argument is word issue," and the fact that the will was made in 1858, before the statute for the adoption of children. A codicil was added in 1865, another in 1867, and a third in 1869. The last two codicils were after the statute, and as they do not revoke the will, but expressly declare that they are to be a part and portion of the will and codicils, they are a republication of the will as of the later date. A part of the argument is thus disposed of, although the fact remains that the adoption did not take place until after the testator's death. It was, however, in his lifetime, and before the last two codicils to his will, a possibility which is presumed to have been known to him, and in view of such possibility his will must be construed. The meaning of the word “ will, where, as in this case, nothing appears to issue," in a limit its legal import, was carefully considered in Pearce v. Rickard, 18 R. I.142. Following the well-settled current of authority, it was held that the word, so used, includes all descendants; and as the statute gives to an adopted child the status of a descendant, and all the legal consequences and incidents there of, the same as though he were born in lawful wedlock, there could be no question in such a case as this were it not for the exception of a limited estate. The question then is whether this fund is within the exception. In Maine, under a statute similar to ours, it was held in Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, 17 L. R. A. 435, that the exception relates only to an inheritance as an heir of the body. The reasoning is that, where an estate is limited to one and the heirs of his body, it must go to those to whom it is expressly limited, and that an adopted child, although he is to be regarded as a child and heir and a lineal descendant of his adopting parents, does not answer the description of an heir of the body, and so he cannot take the property out of the line to which it was limited. An adopted child is put, by the statute, into the status of a child, issue, or lineal descendant, but not that of an heir of the body. Hence,as to a legacy, when a legatee dies before a testator, leaving an adopted child, such child answers the descrip34 L. R. A. in Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262, although the It is the same result that was reached reasoning in the latter case is not so fully and clearly set forth as in the former. holds that the words "heirs of the body" are used in the exception in their primary, techniThe court cal sense, with which the words "children" and "issue" are not equivalent terms. Gunnigle v. McKee, 77 Pa. 81, 18 Am. Rep. 428. Several cases have been cited which appear to See also Mctake a different view, but we think they are For example, in Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 N. H. clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. 407, under a similar devise and statute, the court said that the property was not expressly limited to the heirs of the body or bodies of the parents by adoption, but being a devise of land, and the statute of adoption of children not having been passed until after the death of the testator, he must have intended an heir in fact, and not one created for the purpose by subsequent legislation and judicial proceedings. A statute of New Hampshire dedefined the word "issue lineal descendants of the ancestors, and so the statute for the adoption of children could not to mean the lawful operate to act retrospectively upon the will already effectual, so as to turn a devise into a different channel from that selected by the tesaghty, 101 Ill. 26, the question was whether an death of Dexter Thurber. În Keegan v. GerHere the statute was passed before the adopted child could take by inheritance from a child of one of the adopting parents by a subsequent marriage, the adopted child not being a sister in fact. It was held that she could not. The statute of Pennsylvania is very different from ours. adopted child shall have all the rights of a child and heir of the adopting parent. Hence It provides that an in Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304, it was held that, in a devise of land to one and her children, an adopted child could not take, especially in view of the fact that the will took effect in 1851, and the statute of adoption was not passed until 1855, when vested interests had attached. These cases will suffice to show the distinctions. But even upon the assumption that the words are sufficient, if they had related to realty, to create an estate tail, the result would be the same in this case, because the gift was of personalty, which, under such conditions, becomes an absolute gift. Bailey v. Hawkins, 18 R. I. 573; Albee v. Carpenter, 12 Cush. 382. tator. ber Brown would, of course, now go to her 1896. EINGARTNER V. ILLINOIS STEEL Co. WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT. Joseph EINGARTNER, Appt., v. ILLINOIS STEEL COMPANY, Respt. (........Wis.. 1. A citizen of one state may maintain and their negligence in replacing the planks is 3. The mere existence of a slight variance of view, not amounting to a fundamental difference of policy, in the state in which a cause of action under the common law arose, and that in which it is sought to be enforced, does not deprive the court of the latter state of jurisdiction of the subject-matter. 4. The law of the forum prevails as to the form of the remedy, the conduct of the trial, and the rules of evidence in an action upon a transitory cause of action arising in another juris diction. man. Each time prior thereto, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant in its rolling mill, and that his particular business was to oil a machine called the "bloom rolls." This was a large, heavy machine, standing 3 feet or more high from the floor, operated by steam power, and It appeared by the having upon one side a series of cogwheels meshed into each other. evidence that at intervals a section of the floor at the side of this machine, close to the series of cogwheels, had to be removed in order to put in new rolls. It further appears that this removal of the floor was done by a separate gang of workmen, called the "sailor gang, and that, after the replacing of the rolls, the floor was put down again by another gang of workmen, called the "carpenter gang.' of these gangs worked under a separate foreThe evidence tends to show that plaintiff had nothing to do with either the taking up or the putting down of the floor, or with The plaintiff testifies that at the the work of either the sailor gang or the carpenter gang. time of the accident he was about to oil the part of the machinery near the cog wheels; that he stepped upon the end of a loose plank in that part of the floor which had to be removed when the rolls were changed, and the plank tipped up, thus throwing his right hand into the cogs, and severing it. The plaintiff's version of the transaction was to a certain extent corroborated by other employees who testified to seeing the loose board immediately after the accident. It appeared by the evidence that this section of the floor had been taken up, and the rolls changed, and the floor relaid, two or three days before the accident happened: that plaintiff was one of a night crew, working from 6 o'clock in the evening until 7 o'clock in the morning; and that he had to oil the maand was chine every fifteen minutes or so, obliged to walk over this portion of the floor where the plank was loose every time, but that he had not noticed that the plank was loose. The accident happened just before 7 o'clock in the morning. The plaintiff also offered in evidence the following decisions of the supreme court of the state of Illinois: Lake Shore & M. This is an action to recover for personal in- S. R. Co. v. Hessions, 150 Ill. 546; Lanark v. juries suffered by plaintiff on the 4th day of Dougherty, 153 Ill. 165; Wenona Coal Co. v. September, 1891, in the respondent's rolling Holmquist, 152 Ill. 581; Libby, McN. & L. v. mill, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, the plain- Scherman, 146 Ill. 540; Pullman Palace Car tiff being at that time and now a citizen of the Co. v. Laack, 143 Ill. 242, 18 L. R. A. 215. state of Illinois, and the defendant being an At the close of the evidence, a motion for nonIllinois corporation. The answer set up as a suit was granted, and judgment was rendered "First. Because it apdefense the citizenship of the parties in Illinois, dismissing the complaint upon the merits, for and the fact that the accident had occurred in the following reasons: the state of Illinois, and that a law of the state pears from the evidence that the occurrence of Illinois limited the time in which actions for out of which the alleged cause of action arose personal injuries might be brought to two took place in the state of Illinois, and not in years after the happening thereof, and, there- the state of Wisconsin; that both the plaintiff fore, that this action was barred by said stat- and defendant were at the time of such occurUpon the trial, after the plaintiff's evi- rence, ever since have been, and now are, residence had been introduced, a peremptory non-dents of the state of Illinois, and not of the suit was granted. It appeared by the evidence state of Wisconsin; that the alleged cause of that at the time of the accident, and for some action depends upon peculiar rules laid down 5. The statute of limitations of the state in which a cause of action arose is not available in an action in another state for the enforcement of such cause of action, unless it is offered in evi dence. A (October 13, 1896.) PPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the Superior Court for Milwaukee County in favor of defendant in an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from defendant's negligence. Reversed. Statement by Winslow, J.: ute. NOTE. As to the effect of the constitutional | other states, see portion of note to Louisville Safety guaranty of equal privileges and immunities upon Vault & T. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 14 L. the right of citizens to bring actions in courts of R. A., on page 583. by the courts of Illinois which do not prevail in Wisconsin, and never have done, and which are hostile and obnoxious to the law of the state of Wisconsin, as interpreted by the courts thereof; and that this court, therefore, in this action, is called upon to administer the laws of the state of Illinois, which it has no jurisdiction to do. Second. Because the plaintiff has wholly failed to show by evidence any negligence whatever on the part of the defendant which caused or contributed to the injury which is the basis of the action." From this judgment the plaintiff appealed. Mr. C. H. Van Alstine, with Mr. J. W. Wegner, for appellant: The court had jurisdiction of the subjectmatter of the action. Leonard v. Sparks, 117 Mo. 103. An action for a personal injury is a transitory action, and when the cause of action arises in one state, the action may be brought in another state, provided, of course, jurisdiction of the person can be obtained. in the later decisions requires as a condition of recovery by the plaintiff that the person injured must be found in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, and that the injury resulted from the negligence of the defendant. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Hessions, 150 Ill. 546; Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 Ill. 163; Wenona Coal Co. v. Holmquist, 152 Ill. 581. Messrs. Van Dyke, Van Dyke & Carter, for respondent:" The courts of this state are not bound absolutely to take jurisdiction in such cases, but they are vested with the sound discretion to take or refuse jurisdiction according to the circumstances of the case. Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134, 7 Am. Dec. 445; Great Western R. Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305; Morris v. Missouri P. R. Co. 78 Tex. 17, 9 L. R. A. 349. The plaintiff was the fellow servant of the person or persons who failed to nail or fasten the board, to the tipping of which he attributes his accident, and because such negligence was the negligence of the fellow servant, as that term is understood and construed in this state, the plaintiff could not, if the cause of action had arisen here, recover against the defendant. Cadden v. American Steel Barge Co. 88 Wis. 409; Filbert v. Delaware & H. Canal Co. 121 N. Y. 207. Curtis v. Bradford, 33 Wis. 190; Nonce v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 33 Fed. Rep. 429; Ackerson v. Erie R. Co. 31 N. J. L. 309; Hannibal & St. J. R, Co. v. Mahoney, 42 Mo. 467; Mason v. Warner, 31 Mo. 508; Smith v. Bull, 17 Wend. 323; Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134, 7 Am. Dec. 445; Latourette v. Clarke, 45 Barb. 327; Hoy v. Smith, 49 Barb. 360; Northern C. R. Co. v. Scholl, 16 Md. 331; Robinson | v. Armstrong, 34 Me. 145; Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354; Tyson v. McGuineas, 25 Wis. 656; Swift v. James, 50 Wis. 540; Mc-ferent. Leod v. Connecticut & P. Rivers R. Co. 58 Vt. 727; Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217; Dennick v. Central R. Co. 103 U. S. 11, 26 L. ed. 439; Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161. Whether there was negligence on the part of the defendant was a question for the jury. The cause of action having arisen in Illinois, the law of that state governs the right and the law of Wisconsin governs the remedy. The common-law duty incumbent upon every employer and which he cannot delegate to others in such manner as to relieve himself from the consequence of his nonperformance, is to fur-| nish his employee a reasonably safe place in which to work, and to use proper diligence to keep such place in a reasonably safe condition. The failure of the defendant to keep the place assigned to the plaintiff for the performance of his work in a safe condition is of the very gist of the action. Libby, McN. & L. v. Scherman, 146 Ill. 541; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, 143 Ill. 243, 18 L. R. A. 215. The court can say, as matter of law, that the injury was not caused by the negligence of a fellow servant. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Kelly, 127 Ill. 637; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Young, 26 Ill. App. 115; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Middleton, 46 Ill. App. 218; North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. Johnson, 114'Ill. 57. The law of Illinois respecting contributory negligence, as proved on the trial, is as follows: The doctrine of comparative negligence as announced in the earliest cases is no longer the law of Illinois. The doctrine announced If there is one common general object to be attained by the two servants, it is immaterial that the immediate object of their work is dif Smith, Neg. 77; Heine v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 58 Wis. 525; Fowler v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 61 Wis. 159; Pease v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. Id. 163; Mathews v. Case. Id. 491, 50 Am. Rep. 151; Kliegel v. Weisel & V. Mfg. Co. 84 Wis. 149; Dwyer v. American Erp. Co. 82 Wis. 307; Van den Heuvel v. National Furnace Co. 84 Wis. 637; Stutz v. Armour, Id. 623; Blazinski v. Perkins, 77 Wis. 9; Johnson v. Ashland Water Co. Id. 51; Corcoran v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 126 N. Y. 673; Stringham v. Hilton, 111 N. Y. 188, 1 L.. R. A. 483; Besel v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 70 N. Y. 171; Fraser v. Red River Lumber Co. 42 Minn. 520; Ell v. Northern P. R. Co. 1 N. D. 336, 12 L. R. A. 97; Buckley v. Gould & C. Silver Min. Co. 14 Fed. Rep. 833, note 840; Hoar v. Merritt, 62 Mich. 386; Killea v. Faxon, 125 Mass. 485; Quincy Min. Co. v. Kitts, 42 Mich. 34. Upon the question of how far the courts of one state will, in suits brought in them upon causes of action arising in another state between citizens of such other state, and depending for their existence upon peculiarities of the laws of such latter state, enforce such peculiar laws, there is a very wide and irreconcilable difference of opinion. The decisions seem to range themselves in three principal divisions. First, those which hold that a transitory cause of action arising in one state under its laws will be enforced in any other state, although, as between her own citizens and the events from which it arose happening within her own borders no cause of action would arise which her courts could recognize. Dennick v. Central R. Co. 103 U. S. 11, 26 | courts of this state have jurisdiction to enterL. ed. 439; Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 31 Minn. 11, 47 Am. Rep. 771. The second class of cases lays down the rule that a right of action arising at the common law, or under a statute of another state than that in whose courts it is sought to be enforced, will be sustained, if such latter state has a similar though not identical statute, so that if the occurrence out of which it arose had happened in the state of the forum, a right of action would also have arisen from it there. Leonard v. Columbia Steam Nar. Co. 84 N. Y. 48, 38 Am. Rep. 491; Lower v. Segal (N. J.) 34 Atl. 945: Wooden v. Western N. Y. & P. R. Co. 126 N. Y. 10, 13 L. R. A. 458; Knight v. West Jersey R. Co. 108 Pa. 250, 56 Am. Rep. 200; Morris v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 65 Iowa, 727, 54 Am. Rep. 39. The third class of cases holds that no action will lie in one state upon a right of action arising upon a statute of another state. Anderson v. Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. 37 Wis. 321; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375; Richardson v. New York C. R. Co. 98 Mass. 85; Woodard v. Michigan Southern & N. 1. R. Co. 10 Ohio St. 121; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. McCormick, 71 Tex. 660, 1 L. R. A. 804; Belt v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. 4 Tex. Civ. App. 231; Buckles v. Ellers, 72 Ind. 220, 37 Am. Rep. 156; Taylor v. Pennsylvania Co. 78 Ky. 348, 39 Am. Rep. 244; Willis v. Missouri P. R. Co. 61 Tex. 432, 48 Am. Rep. 301. If this were an action based upon an Illinois statute, it could not be maintained in this state. But it is not such an action but depends upon the common law, which is, theoretically, at least, the same wherever it exists at all. And what it is, one court has as much right to determine as another. tain such an action, although the cause arose In the It is provided by the Constitution of the United States (§ 2, art. 4) that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." The first attempt at a comprehensive definition of this clause of the Federal Constitution seems to be made in the case of Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371, where Mr. Justice Washington, referring to this section of the Constitution, says: "The inquiry is, What are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the Krogg v. Atlanta & W. P. R. Co. 77 Ga. several states? We feel no hesitation in con202; 1 Kent, Com. 470; Normal School Dist. fining these expressions to those privileges and Bd. of Edu. v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441, 31 L. R. immunities which are in their nature fundaA. 70; Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 148; Hough mental, which belong of right to the citizens v. Texas & P. R. Co. 100 U. S. 213, 25 L. ed. of all free governments, and which have at all 612; Gardner v. Michigan C. R. Co. 150 U. S. times been enjoyed by the citizens of the sev358, 37 L. ed. 1109; New York C. R. Co. v. eral states which compose this Union, from the Lockwood, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 357, 21 L. ed. 627; | time of their becoming free, independent, and Myrick v. Michigan C. R. Co. 107 U. S. 102, sovereign. They may, however, be 27 L. ed. 325; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. all comprehended under the following general Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 37 L. ed. 97; Balti-heads: Protection by the government; the enmore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 37 joyment of life and liberty, with the right to L. ed. 772. acquire and possess property of every kind and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the genTwo important questions arise in this case, eral good of the whole. The right of a citizen viz.: (1) Whether the court could, in its discre- of one state to pass through or to reside in any tion, dismiss the case because the parties were other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, both residents of the state of Illinois, and be- professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim cause the cause of action arose in the state of the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to inIllinois, jurisdiction of the person of the defend-stitute and maintain actions of any kind in the ant having been obtained within this state; courts of the state; to take, hold, and dispose (2) if the court could not dismiss the case for of property, either real or personal; and an exthis reason, then whether the evidence of the emption from higher taxes and impositions plaintiff was sufficient to entitle him to have than are paid by the other citizens of the state, the case submitted to the jury upon the merits.-may be mentioned as some of the particular These questions will be considered in the order indicated. Winslow, J., delivered the opinion of the court: privileges and immunites of citizens which are clearly embraced by the general description of This is an action to recover damages for in-privileges deemed to be fundamental." The juries to the person. It is therefore purely a transitory action, and the principle that the subject was again considered in Ward v. Maryland, 79 U. S. 12 Wall. 418, 20 L. ed. 449,. |