highest to the lowest, Lee must needs make. For him to retreat without a decisive encounter is morally impossible. Neither the political nor the military exigencies of the Confederacy will admit of it. But will he seek first to manoeuvre the Army of the Potomac out of its position by a movement around one or the other of its flanks? If he commits himself to an immediate attack, will it be against our left, where the terrible battle of the second day has barely ceased to rage; against our left center, along Cemetery Ridge, now held by Hancock; against our right center on Cemetery Hill, which Early and Rodes only last night attempted; or against our right, from which the Confederates have this very morning been driven? As the veteran regiments of the Potomac army lie awaiting the coming assault, does each soldier more hope that the honor of the conflict may come to him and to his comrades under the same tattered flag; or that the decision of the Confederate commander may direct the blow upon some other part of the long line, and the cup thus pass from his own lips? Does the long delay bring relief to the feelings with which the troops arose from their bivouac; or does it but intensify the sense of strain as the period of suspense is prolonged? Only for himself can any of the survivors of that memorable day answer these questions.

Meanwhile Hancock was intently engaged in preparing for the defense of the long line assigned

to him, which embraced the positions occupied by the First Corps, now under Newton, as well as those held by the Second, of which Gibbon had taken immediate command. The popular notion regarding the third day at Gettysburg greatly exaggerates the strength of the Union left center. Abrupt, and at points even rugged, as were the faces of Culp's and Cemetery Hills, the descent from Cemetery Ridge toward the west was not considerable, even at the first; while, as our line ran still farther south, the ridge shrank more and more into the plain, until, in the positions where the Third Corps had the day before at first been stationed, the ground presented scarcely any advantage over that directly in its front.

In fact, the point which the Confederate commander had selected for his great attack was at about the middle of Hancock's long line, and was also about at the mean as regarded elevation. "The clump of trees," which Lee had that morning pointed out to Longstreet, stood upon ground which a casual observer three or four hundred yards in front might have deemed little higher than his own, although the eye of a trained artillerist would. at once have seen that it afforded just elevation enough for the best effect of canister. To the right of this position lay the division of Alexander Hays. "The clump of trees" itself and the ground immediately to the left was occupied by the

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division of Gibbon, while farther on was Doubleday's division of the First Corps (comprising the Second Vermont brigade, of which we shall have much to say), and then Caldwell's division of the Second Corps. The shorter convex line of the Union army allowed the service of far less artillery than was massed upon the longer concave line of the Confederates; but, on the other hand, the formation of the Union line facilitated in a high degree the passage of troops from flank to flank, as the exigencies of battle should require. Finally, the convexity of the Union line might make the positions of the artillery reserve, of the ammunition trains and of headquarters and staff an almost intolerable one, as the fire of three or four miles of batteries should converge into the narrow space between the Union wings.

I esteem it a great good fortune to have from the pen of a soldier, a jurist and a man of affairs, the account of an interview with General Hancock just before the mighty cannonade of the 3d of July broke out. There are countless tributes-in letters, in books, and in official reports-to the bearing and demeanor of the commander of the Second Corps upon the field of battle; but the impression made by Hancock upon a man like Wheelock G. Veazey

*

* Then Colonel of the Sixteenth Vermont regiment; subsequently Justice of the Supreme Court of Vermont, Commander in Chief of the Grand Army of the Republic, and now (1894) a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

can not fail to be of interest. Colonel Veazey had, on the night of the 2d, been on duty as the Field Officer of the Day for Stannard's brigade, and had established the picket line of that command over a portion of the ground afterward swept by the great charge of the 3d. Owing to the exigencies of the service, the men on picket had not been relieved in the morning, but were still kept out as skirmishers, closely engaged with the enemy's sharpshooters. About one o'clock Colonel Veazey rode back to report the exhausted condition of his men and see if he could not obtain an order for their relief. The following are his words:

"The general said he had had them in mind all day and would have sent out reliefs but that he was afraid it could not be done without considerable loss; but, as it was quiet on the front at that time, he would order a relief and have them report to me at his headquarters, and asked me to remain there with him until they came up. I had served in the same division with him since the organization of the Potomac army until after the Peninsula campaign. I saw him when he turned the rebel left flank with his brigade at Williamsburg, had seen him in other battles of that campaign, and had often been thrilled by his proud and fearless bearing in action. But I had never seen him when he looked every inch the magnificent, ideal soldier so truly as on this occasion. I knew from every word and look that

General Hancock had correctly divined the determination of the men who lay along the crest to the right and left to stay there and never be driven therefrom. He knew that they as well as he appreciated the consequences of defeat. They knew him; and believed that whatever tactical skill and courage could attain he would accomplish. Leader and men were never better suited to each other. As he repeatedly examined his line with a field glass, I could see the expression of satisfaction, confidence, and impatience. But he had not long to wait, for, just as the first detail he had ordered was approaching, the signal gun from the opposite crest was fired, followed in a minute by one hundred and forty others."

The great battle of the third day had begun. To prepare the way for his daring and resolute infantry, Lee had organized one of the mightiest cannonades in the history of war. Nearly a hundred and fifty guns had been brought into action along Seminary Ridge and now turned their grim muzzles upon the crest which Longstreet's column was to assault. Owing to the nature of the Union position, only eighty guns could be brought to bear in reply, while, from the same cause, the rear of our line was peculiarly subject to the effects of the hostile fire. The whole space behind Cemetery Ridge was in a moment rendered uninhabitable. General headquarters were broken up; the supply and re