pressing forward in ghostly columns toward the battlefield in a long, unstaying march.

Such were Hancock's services on the memorable first day at Gettysburg. Two points require to be emphasized further than they have been in the course of this narrative. The first was Hancock's

keen perception of the danger of a Confederate movement around our left. To the other officers who overlooked the field on the afternoon of the 1st of July it seemed that Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill were especially likely to be the points of attack. Meade himself, coming up during the night, was so impressed with the same idea that he gave little or no attention, then or in the morning, to the left. But Hancock's first message pointed out the danger of a movement by the enemy in this direction which was so painfully manifested on the following day. The first use he made of the re-enforcements arriving on the field was to send them southward, two of Geary's regiments actually passing the night at Little Round Top, though called away the next morning without being replaced. And, on Hancock's return to general headquarters, he halted the Second Corps on the Taneytown road.

The second point to be further insisted on is Hancock's relations to Howard. I have given the text of the instructions under which Hancock went up to Gettysburg; and no one who knew aught of that officer should need to be assured that, if ordered

to take command of any force, he took command of it with all which that implies, and fully exercised the authority given him until he formally relinquished it to some one who had the right to receive it. Yet, in an article in the Atlantic Monthly of July, 1876, General Howard sought to make out that Hancock did not assume command upon his arrival at Cemetery Hill, but merely acted as a sort of personal representative of, or temporary chief of staff to, General Meade. The following is his description of the meeting and what immediately followed:

"General Hancock greeted me in his usual frank and cordial manner, and used these words: 'General Meade has sent me to represent him on the field.' I replied: All right, Hancock, this is no time for talking. You take the left of the pike and I will arrange these troops to the right!' He said no more, and moved off in his peculiar, gallant style to gather scattered brigades and put them into position. I noticed that he sent Wadsworth's division, without consulting me, to the right of the Eleventh Corps, to Culp's Hill; but as it was just the thing to do I made no objection-probably would not have made any in any event-but worked away, assisted by my officers, organizing and arranging batteries and infantry along the stone wall and fences toward Gettysburg and along the northern crest of the ridge. It did not strike me then that Hancock, without troops, was doing more than

directing matters as a temporary chief of staff for Meade."

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Upon this view of his relations to Hancock on the first day at Gettysburg, General Howard has insisted down to the present time. When, on the 4th of February, 1891, I had occasion to read a paper on General Hancock before the New York Commandery of the Loyal Legion, General Howard, in conversation with me, took exception to the statements I had made on this subject, and gave his own account of the 1st of July in substantially the terms of the Atlantic article. "There we were," he said, working away just like two brothers." Now, I desire to remark, first, that if there was any officer in the Union army who was incapable of performing in the "two-brothers act," it was Winfield Scott Hancock; and, secondly, that the whole record is dead against General Howard's position. Certainly General Abner Doubleday, who succeeded to the command of the First Corps upon the death of Reynolds, was not in doubt that Hancock came to take command. In his History of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg he says: "About half-past three General Hancock arrived with orders from General Meade to supersede Howard . . . Howard stated, in a subsequent account of the battle, that he merely regarded Hancock as a staff officer acting for General Meade . . . I know that he rode over to me and told me that he was in command of the field"

(pp. 150, 151). But Hancock is entitled to be heard on this matter in his own words. In the Galaxy Magazine of 1876 he published an account of the meeting on Cemetery Hill. The following quotation will suffice: "General Howard claims that there was an understanding between us whereby I was to take charge of the troops on the left of the turnpike while he arranged those on the right. He does not disclose the fact that I exercised independent powers; but, in his letter to General Meade, already quoted, he says: General Hancock assisted me in carrying out orders which I had already issued.' Now, I had no such understanding with General Howard, and I did not so assist him in carrying out orders which he had already issued. The only pretext for his statement of such an understanding is that, as I was about riding away to the left, I understood him to indicate to me that he would prefer the right, where his troops were then posted, for his own position, and he said that he would be found there personally; but there was no division of command between General Howard and myself. Indeed, one of the first orders I gave on assuming the command was for the troops of the Eleventh Corps (Howard's) to be pushed forward to the stone walls in the next field, to give room for development and to deter the enemy's advance. And about the same time I addressed a few words to his own troops on the left of the pike, with a

view to encourage them to hold the position while our lines were forming. I then rode on to place the First Corps farther to the left, in order that we should cover the whole of Cemetery Hill, only a small portion of which was occupied when I rode

upon the field. General Doubleday, commanding the First Corps after the fall of Reynolds, can give positive evidence that I assumed immediate command and directed the disposition of his troops as soon as he fell back to Cemetery Hill. General Buford was also directed by me to hold his command in the flat to the left and front of Cemetery Hill as long as possible, in order to give me time to form our line of battle on the hill itself. I took charge of all our forces on the field, as my orders directed me to do, and, seeing the importance of the point, immediately sent Wadsworth's division and a battery to occupy Culp's Hill. I had no idea of consulting General Howard as to the propriety of that movement, which he states he noticed but to which he made no objection.' I ordered the movement because, as commander of the troops and being responsible for what was done on the field, I considered it proper that it should be promptly made."