was under the immediate direction of General Stuart, who was everywhere in the thickest of the fight-the target of artillery and sharpshooters alike. The latter had posted themselves two or three hundred yards off, behind a hedge, and no doubt attracted by the plume and uniform of a general officer, directed their fire upon him, striking him twice, but not doing him injury. Meanwhile, the batteries never for an instant relaxed in their fire. All through the afternoon they continued the fight, those which were disabled or out of ammunition retiring, to be replaced by others.

Just at sunset Stuart ordered all his batteries to advance. This was done in consequence of a message from Jackson that "he was going to advance and attack the enemy precisely at sunset, and General Stuart was desired to advance his artillery and fire as rapidly as possible, taking care not to injure the troops as they attacked." This order was promptly obeyed. Stuart took up a position so much in advance as to be almost on the flank of the Federal line, not five hundred yards distant, and opened a more rapid and determined fire than before. When General W. H. F. Lee, one of his cavalry officers, sent to ascertain how matters were going on, Stuart replied, "Tell General Lee that all is right. Jackson has not advanced, but I have; and I am going to crowd them with artillery." This was boldly and effectually done, and the result was apparent. The Federal fire slackened, then ceased; and when General Stuart's voice, in the darkness, ordered a new advance toward the Bowling Green road, no response could be elicited from their guns, and the Confederates remained masters of the field.*

* The force which operated against the Confederate right in this action is stated to have been, as we have said, on Federal authority, 55,000 men. This is not improbable, as the bulk of the United States forces was used in this important assault. The army consisted of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 9th, and 11th Corps; and if these were recruited to the full number they possessed by General McClellan's statement, at Sharpsburg, it would bring the Federal force, exclusive of the 3d, 11th, and one division of the 5th Corps, to 72,718 As the 11th was a corps of reserve, the Federal force was probably

men.

On the left a similar result followed the assault upon Marye's Hill. In this fierce and determined attack, which was made by Meagher's brigade, composed chiefly of Irish, the Federal loss was frightful. The troops were compelled to cross the open ground between the suburbs of the town and the base of the hill, and while doing so were subjected to a close and deadly fire from Cobb's and Cooke's brigades, posted behind the stone wall at the foot of the heights, and from Colonel Walton's artillery in the earthworks above. This combined fire of bullets and canister drove them back, but they again charged. The result was the same-they were again repulsed with heavy loss, and were forced to fall back, with shattered ranks, to the protection of the houses. In this struggle General Cobb was killed and General Cooke severely wounded, nearly at the same moment.

Such was the battle of Fredericksburg. It is remarkable for the small proportion of Confederate troops engaged, and for the bad fighting of the Federal forces. The explanation of the latter fact must be left to conjecture, but with the exception of Meagher's brigade, no portion of the Federal infantry seems to have acted with their customary efficiency. The charge upon Jackson seemed hot and determined, but in spite of the heavy force engaged in it-55,000 men, by General Burnside's statement-it was repulsed without difficulty by Jackson's first and second lines, certainly falling short of 15,000 troops. The Federal forces seemed to fight without enthusiasm or confidence in their leaders. They had lost morale from some reason; and so easily was their advance repulsed, that General Lee regarded the affair as nothing more than a heavy demonstration to feel his position, not a definite trial of strength with the whole Federal army. From the hill above Hamilton's crossing, in company with Jackson, General Lee witnessed, on the next (Sunday) morning, the imposing spectacle of the Federal army drawn up in battle array, with banners flying, as though about to advance to the assault; but that assault was not to take place.

not far short of 100,000 troops. General Lee's numbers are not known to the present writer.

The explanation of the fact will be found in an extract from General Burnside's testimony before the subsequent Committee of Investigation, in which he states both his plan of attack and the considerations which induced him to abandon all further designs of carrying the heights occupied by the Confederates.

"The enemy," said General Burnside, “had cut a road along the rear of the line of heights, where we made our attack, by means of which they connected the two wings of their army, and avoided a long détour round through a bad country.

"I obtained from a colored man from the other side of the town, information in regard to this new road, which proved to be correct. I wanted to obtain possession of that new road, and that was my reason for making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend to make the attack on the right until that position had been taken, which I supposed would stagger the enemy by cutting their line in two, and then I proposed to make a direct attack on their front and drive them out of the works.

"I succeeded in building six bridges, and in taking the whole army across. The two attacks were made, and we were repulsed -still holding a portion of the ground we had fought upon, but not our extreme advance. That night. I went all over the field on our right. In fact, I was with the officers and men until daylight. I found the feeling to be rather against an attack the next morning. In fact, it was decidedly against it.

"I returned to my headquarters, and after a conversation with General Sumner, told him that I wanted him to order the 9th Army Corps, which was the corps I originally commanded, to form the next morning a column of attack by regiments. It consisted of some eighteen old regiments and some new ones, and desired the column to make a direct attack upon the enemy's works. I thought that these regiments, by driving quickly up after each other, would be able to carry the stone wall and the batteries in front, forcing the enemy into their next line, and by joining in with them they would not be able to fire upon us to any great extent. I left General Sumner with that understanding, and directed him to give the order

"The order was given, and the order of attack was formed. On the next morning, just before the column was to have started, General Sumner came up to me and said: 'General, I hope you will desist from this attack. I do not know of any general officer who approves of it, and I think it will prove disastrous to the army. Advice of that kind from General Sumner, who has always been in favor of our advancing whenever it was possible, caused me to hesitate. I kept the column of attack formed, and sent over for the division and corps commanders and consulted with them. They unanimously voted against the attack. I then went over to see the officers of the command on the other side, and found that the same opinion prevailed among them.

"I then sent for General Franklin, who was on the left, and he was of exactly the same opinion. This caused me to decide that I ought not to make the attack I had contemplated; and besides, inasmuch as the President of the United States had told me not to be in haste in making this attack-that he would give me all the support he could, but he did not want the Army of the Potomac destroyed-I felt that I could not take the responsibility of ordering,the attack, notwithstanding my own belief at the time that the works of the enemy could be carried.

"In the afternoon of that day I again saw the officers, and told them that I had decided to withdraw to this side of the river all our forces, except enough to hold the town and the bridge heads, but should keep the bridges there for future operations in case we wanted to cross again."

It was determined, however, by the advice of General Hooker, not to attempt to hold the town even, and on Monday night the Federal army commenced recrossing the river. By Tuesday morning the forces had disappeared from the south bank of the Rappahannock, and General Burnside's was another name added to the list of Federal generals who had suffered defeat at the hands of Lee and Jackson.

CHAPTER XXIX.

GENERAL BURNSIDE ATTEMPTS A LAST ADVANCE.

WE have not described the excesses which the Federal officers permitted the troops to commit in Fredericksburg-the burning of houses, the rifling of wardrobes, and the general spoliation of private property. These scenes, of the tragic and grotesque mingled-for men were found dead after Meagher's charge, with women's shawls and bonnets on-would take up too much space, and excite only disgust. They will doubtless be recorded by local historians in the future, and will remain a dark portion of the great picture of the recent struggle.

We pass to General Burnside's final effort to gain a foothold south of the Rappahannock. In the latter part of January, the Federal commander massed his army opposite Banks' ford, several miles above Fredericksburg, and the troops were already in motion to attempt the crossing of the river, when the weather suddenly changed, and torrents of rain descended upon the army.

The fate of any movement at this most unpropitious of seasons, was soon shown. General Burnside was literally stuck in the mud, and could not carry out his projected advance. The movement is described so vividly in army letters written to Northern journals at the period, that we shall make one or two extracts, and then dismiss the subject. One correspondent writes:

"Within a space of two miles the scene of confusion was greatest. In a deep gully, and on a hill-side, where the road ascended, where stuck fast more than a dozen guns, caissons, brigade wagons, and great headquarter wagons. The guns and pontoons were three days in reaching the ford, and had to be dragged by united labor of men and horses, when it was discovered that approaches to the river were impracticable. The mud in the freshly-cut roads was too deep. The men got in sight, they said, of rebel camp-fires.