his own. When General McClellan was before the Committee of Investigation, to examine into the circumstances attending this action, he was asked, "What was your force at Antietam?" to which he replied, "I think that before these two divisions I alluded to came up, our force was about 90,000 mennot far from that; it may have been 93,000 or 94,000." When asked, "At what number did you estimate the force of the enemy?" his reply was, "I think our estimate at the time, and which was pretty well borne out by what occurred, was, that we fought pretty close upon 100,000 men."

In his "Report of the Operations of the Army of the Potomac," General McClellan is more explicit, and says: "Our forces at the battle of Antietam were as follows:

General Lee's force he then estimated, from the reports of "prisoners, deserters, spies, etc.," at 97,445 men; and this he declares "gives the actual number of men present and fit for duty" in General Lee's army.

It will no doubt surprise General McClellan when he ascertains the fact that General Lee had at Sharpsburg, all told, only 33,000 troops, and that the brunt of the fight was sustained by about 25,000, the others not having then come up. This fact was long ago known to the present writer, from General Lee's statement to General Stuart, that his force at Sharpsburg "did not exceed in all 35,000;" but General Lee's official report has since been published, and the exact numbers are given-33,000. The explanation of this paucity of numbers will be found in the

bad equipment of the Southern forces, the very defective commissariat, and the exhausting character of the movements which preceded the battle. In about three weeks the Southern army had marched from the Rapidan via Manassas and Frederick City to Sharpsburg. During this time they were almost wholly without rations, and so badly clad that they excited the pity and astonishment even of their enemies, who spoke of them as “ragged, hungry, and in all ways miserable." They had fought almost daily battles, and lost heavily; thousands had lagged behind from pure inability to proceed; and this was the explanation of General Lee's small number. Between the Rapidan aud the Potomac it has been estimated that more than 20,000 gave out on the march, or were killed or disabled in battle. All the roads of Northern Virginia were lined with soldiers comprehensively denominated "stragglers; " but the great majority of these men had fallen out of the advancing column from physical inability to keep up with it. Only a small portion, we believe, were "skulkers," for the troops were greatly elated at the idea of transferring hostilities to Pennsylvania; thousands were not with General Lee because they had no shoes, and their bleeding feet would carry them no further; or the heavy march without rations had broken them down. This great crowd toiled on painfully in the wake of the army, dragging themselves five or six miles a day; and when they came to the Potomac, near Leesburg, it was only to find that General Lee had swept on, that General McClellan's column was between them and him, and that they could not rejoin their commands. The citizens of that whole region, who fed these unfortunate persons, will bear testimony that numbers sufficient to constitute an army in themselves, passed the Blue Ridge to rendezvous, by General Lee's orders, at Winchester. These 20,000 or 30,000 men were not in the battle. Longstreet's corps of 26,000 men had dwindled to 13,000, just one-half. Jackson's was not quite so bad, but was greatly reduced. Nor was the bulk of the latter corps present until after four P. M., toward the end of the action. General Lee fought until late in the day, with Longstreet, D. H. Hill,

Ewell, and two other divisions, a force of about 25,000 men. The reënforcements from McLaws, Anderson, and Hill increased this number to 33,000, with which force General Lee met the 87,164 men reported by General McClellan as "in action" on the Federal side. Sharpsburg may fairly be called a drawn battle, and this result was highly honorable to the Southern arms.

In the movements which preceded the battle, General McClellan had again exhibited that skill and soldiership which saved the Federal army on the Chickahominy. He had promptly organized, from the remnants of General Pope's defeated battalions, and the new levies hurried forward, an army ready to take the field; and nothing but his great personal popularity and the confidence reposed in his military judgment by the troops, could have achieved a result so important. With this force he had advanced from Washington, and throughout the march his movements had been bold and judicious. His objects were to relieve Harper's Ferry and arrest Lee's advance. With these ends in view he pushed Franklin's corps toward Crampton's Gap, on the straight road to Harper's Ferry, and moved with his main body toward Hagerstown, which the head of Lee's column had reached.

But for the rapidity of Jackson's march, and the energy of his attack upon General Miles, McClellan would have succeeded in his attempt to save the garrison. On the night of the 14th he had concentrated at South Mountain an overwhelming force, and on the 15th would have swooped down on Harper's Ferry. But on that fatal 15th the place surrendered, and so much of the Federal general's programme was defeated. The other half, however, was successful. Lee's further advance was checked; his forces were moved back and concentrated at Sharpsburg; and as the sun went down on the evening of the 16th of September, his great army confronted Lee on the eastern bank of the Antietam. What followed is known.

CHAPTER XXI.

SHEPHERDSTOWN.

THE roll of great events was now exhausted, but another bloody encounter was to take place near the spot where Ashby had long before drawn rein, and sat on his white horse unmoved amid the Federal bullets.

General McClellan had no sooner received intelligence of the retreat of his adversary, than he pushed a strong column toward the Potomac in pursuit of him. Heavy batteries were promptly disposed along the high ground on the north bank of the river opposite Shepherdstown, and a determined fire was opened on the Confederate troops drawn up upon the southern shore. To this fire, General Pendleton, chief of artillery of the army, replied with vigor, and the Stuart Horse Artillery, under Major John Pelham, was especially active in engaging the enemy's batteries.

In the evening the fire of the Federal artillery was redoubled, and under the protection of the guns, General McClellan commenced crossing a column, driving off General Pendleton and Lawton's brigades, which acted as a support to the guns. By the morning of the 20th a considerable body had crossed to the southern bank, and Generals A. P. Hill and Early, who had moved with the rest of Jackson's corps toward Martinsburg, were directed to return and drive the enemy back.

These orders were promptly obeyed, and the troops were soon at the point of danger. General Hill, who commanded, drew up his force in two lines-the first composed of Pender's, Gregg's, and Thomas' brigades, under command of General Gregg; the second, of Lane's, Archer's, and Brockenbrough's brigades, under General Archer. General Early, with his own brigade and those of Trimble and Hays, took position in the woods on the right and left of the road leading to the ford.

The Federal infantry was drawn up on the high banks of the southern shore, and every point upon the Maryland side of the river was crowned with their batteries, ready to open upon the Confederate line as soon as it advanced. As General Hill moved forward to the attack, the Federal artillery commenced a rapid fire of shot and shell upon his advancing column, but no notice of this was taken by the troops. They pressed forward, and Pender found himself in front of the main Federal force which was massed to attack him. As he charged, they poured a volley into his line, and then rapidly extended with the view of turning his left. Archer promptly threw his brigade in that direction, and formed on Pender's left, when, advancing his whole line, Hill made an impetuous charge, and drove the Federal line before him, from the hill, down the bank, and into the river, where many were drowned in attempting to cross.

"With no stop or hesitation," says an eye-witness, "using no artillery, sending his men in steadily, General A. P. Hill drove the enemy into and across the river, taking 300 prisoners, and making the river blue with the dead."

Two hundred prisoners were taken in this affair, which seems to have discouraged the Federal commander from any further attempts to cross the river. The position on the bank was held by Hill throughout the day until relieved by Fitz Lee's cavalry, General Stuart having gone with the rest of his command to make an important demonstration above, in the vicinity of Williamsport, where he met and repulsed the enemy in a brief but spirited engagement.

On the same evening Jackson moved from Shepherdstown, and encamped on the Opequon, from which point, on the 27th, he moved back to Bunker's Hill, on the Martinsburg and Winchester turnpike, where, in July, 1861, he had in the same manner awaited the approach of General Patterson.

At Harper's Ferry, Sharpsburg, and Shepherdstown, he had lost 38 officers killed and 171 wounded, 313 non-commissioned officers and privates killed, 1,859 wounded, and 57 missing; making a total loss of 2,438 killed, wounded, and missing.