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American Academy of Political and Social Science
Station B, Philadelphia

viii

AN ISTHMIAN CANAL FROM A MILITARY
POINT OF VIEW.

Assuming that an Isthmian canal will be built by the United States, the question arises how can it be made to subserve the best interests of the government from a military point of view. Should it be free to the vessels of all nations on the same terms, in war as well as in peace, or should it be controlled by military power so that its use by our enemies in time of war could be prevented?

It is not proposed to discuss the cost of putting the canal under military control nor the ways and means of so doing. It will be assumed that it can be put under military control, or that it can be made free at the pleasure of the United States.

An Isthmian canal cannot be built within much less than ten years. What the relative naval strength of the various powers will be at the end of that period it is impossible to tell. Moreover, it is not easy to assign the proper place to some of the naval powers to-day. One nation may be strong in defensive but relatively weak in offensive power. The number, size and power of battleships and cruisers may not furnish the correct data for assignment of place. Naval

training and geographical positions are important considerations. The sub-marine boat is an unknown factor. But judging by the official lists, the principal naval powers have not greatly altered their relative positions in the last ten years. The United States and Japan have forged ahead; Spain and Italy have fallen behind. The eight strongest naval powers stand about as follows:

1. Great Britain,

2. France,

3. Russia,

4. United States,

5. Germany,

6. Italy,

7. Japan,

8. Spain.

Of these Great Britain and France are decidedly stronger

than the United States. Russia, the United States and Germany are approximately equal; and all others decidedly inferior.

War may take place between the United States and any of the other named powers, or combinations of two or more, or it might be with one of those allied to some weak power not in that list. It is impossible to foretell all the combinations that might arise, but it is probable that, if an alliance of any two or more Powers should make war against the United States, we also would have allies; so that in dealing with the question we shall consider only the cases of war between the United States and a single Power.

Let us suppose a war exists between the United States and some nation of inferior naval power: What effect would the existence of the canal have on the operations of either belligerent? The nature of the operations both of the United States and of the enemy would depend largely on the geographical position of that enemy, the more or less maritime character of the people, and the value of her commerce and colonial possessions. Our policy would be to

attack her war vessels wherever they could be found, shut them up in harbors by blockade if they could not be reached, bombard naval stations, possibly invade her territory if the conditions favored and the probable results justified it.

Japan, a young and vigorous naval power, occupies a favorable geographical position to operate against us in the far east, and is fairly well provided with modern cruisers for attacking our commerce in the Pacific. An attack on the Philippines is within the limits of probability. If successful, Japan might even make a naval demonstration as far eastward as our Pacific coast, but it is difficult to understand how a condition of affairs could arise that would make it desirable for her to send a fleet through an AmericanIsthmian canal to the Atlantic side: such an event could only happen in case our navy in the Pacific were destroyed, and that on the Atlantic side perilously weak-a condition, which it is safe to assume, is not likely to arise in a war with Japan.

As for the European nations that are inferior to us in naval power, none are capable of conducting important naval operations against us on either the Atlantic or Pacific sides of the United States, and none are provided with naval bases of supply in such proximity as to cause us any alarm. Some of them might send out cruisers to prey on our commerce, but they would not be sent through an American Isthmian canal to do so.

Of the republics of South and Central America it may be said, first that they do not possess sufficient naval strength to give us any concern, and second that their interests are so closely interwoven with ours that war between any of them and the United States is scarcely probable. But if it should occur, none of them would send their war ships through an Isthmian canal. The greatest danger would be in the possibility of the canal being damaged by a few men, and this danger would be greater if the canal were fortified than if it were neutral.

It is safe, therefore, to conclude, that in a war between the United States and a nation of inferior naval power, the canal would be of no value to our enemy under any circumstances, while a neutral canal would be as serviceable to the United States as one thoroughly fortified.

The nations that are approximately equal to the United States in naval strength are Russia, Germany and Italy. Measured by tonnage the first of these has a navy about 25 per cent larger than that of the United States; measured by number of vessels, it is more than double that of the United States. But Russia is so situated geographically that operations against us could only be carried on at a disadvantage. She has a position at Vladivostock which is reported as being strongly fortified. It will soon have railroad connection with the capital of the empire and will become an important base in the East. It lies uncomfortably close to the Philippine Islands, which are far removed from the support of the United States. The harbor of Vladivostock, however, is impaired by climatic conditions. The cold is so intense that the harbor is closed by ice for several months in the year. To reach the Philippine Islands and our commerce in the Pacific, the Suez route for Russia is shorter, better and less liable to interruption than one via an American Isthmian canal.

The geographical position of Italy is not good for conducting hostile operations against the United States. Like Russia, she has neither coaling nor supply stations on this side of the Atlantic. In tonnage she is below, but in number of war vessels she is above, the United States. She has an immense fleet of torpedo boats, a comparatively small number of fast cruisers, and is far behind the United States in modern built ships. Some of her battleships a few years ago were regarded as the most formidable afloat, as they carried the largest guns in existence. But these ships are not well adapted to operating at a long distance from a base. It is difficult to see how Italy could do us much harm on