hearts of the strong, strengthen the hands of the weak, and enlighten the understanding of the ignorant, and promote the general welfare of the cause of truth. If in the exhibition of this subject I should be so favored as to give a portion of the bread of life to the spiritually hungry-present the thirsty with a cup of the water of life-visit the diseased soul with the balm of Gilead-bring the prisoner into the liberty of the gospel, or clothe the naked with the garment of salvation, 1 shall in so doing be blessed with an ample recompense reward.

The first idea in the text which we proposed to illustrate, was that of divine justice, and show its compatibility with salvation. Justice, in the scripture sense of it, is one of the revealed attributes or perfections of the Almighty, and is represented by the prophet, in connexion with judgment, to be the habitation of his throne. By which we are to understand the immutable principle, or established constitutions of his government over all his works. Admitting the fact, that God is impartially just, we cannot suppose, or admit for a moment, that he can dispense with the execution of justice in any possible case, without implying an accusation of corruption, or maladministration. Hence, therefore, when we speak of the justice of God, we ought to conceive of it as a consistent principle, a strict and undeviating adherence to which, will exalt and glorify the character of God; otherwise our faith in his justice will virtually tax him with partiality and folly. We ought also to avoid the palpable inconsistency of supposing an event to be just in the divine government, which if imitated in its most perfect degree by finite beings, would be viewed as an act of injustice. An idea of any subject, to be correct, must be, in some good measure, definite, Hence, therefore, those fine spun theories which

represent the justice of God as something entirely different from justice with men, appear to be fallacious, and better adapted to darken counsel by words without knowledge, than to teach and enlighten the understanding. Justice is defined to be that essential perfection in God, whereby he is infinitely righteous and just, in his nature and works.

According to this definition, it must have been infinitely just with God, to have created just such a race of beings as men;-This we admit-for we believe in a just God. Admitting the act of creation to be just, we must conceive, that God created man, knowing at the same time, that he would be endlessly miserable, or else it was his determination to make him so; if misery is to be the ultimate portion of any. On either of these suppositions, was the act of creation just? If it was just, we admit the doctrine; if not, we reject it. But how shall we determine this question: We will not take for proof the ipse dixit or mere say so, of any man. We ask no one to take such proof from us. We must have evidence, or we must set the question aside. But we have introduced the question, and wish for a discussion.

The fact is, God did create the human race. And he created them for his glory. We think, he must have designed to glorify himself, either by making them all happy; or all miserable: or a part happy; and a part miserable. In view of these suppositions, we inquire: Where is the justice of creation, on the supposition, that God knew, that man would make himself endlessly miserable? Shall we say, that man abused his privileges, and involved himself in ruin, by misimprovement of his agency? This I know, is the usual way, in which the justice of God is vindicated, by one class of those who believe in the endless misery of a part of the human

race. If we ask, was it just for man to abuse his agency, and involve himself in misery, we are answered in the negative. We then observe, that according to this supposition, the injustice of man is necessary, to make the act of creation just. This renders the justice of God imperfect, and dependent on the actions of man. This, we are by no means, prepared to admit respecting an independent being. But would a plea similar to this be admitted in a court of justice? The law contemplates man, as morally able to obey it. The law secures to every man, his own. Admit this law to be just. Then let us suppose, that one man sets a fire on his own land adjoining to his neighbor's, which in its progress consumes his neighbor's property. In this case, the man who set the fire, is liable to make the damage good. But was it just to set the fire? We will answer, yes.

If then in this case, the justice of the law did not depend on the agency of the plaintiff, we cannot admit that the justice of God depends on the agency of man; or that it was just, to create on the ground, that man would disobey the law. On the ground, that God determined to make man miserable, we can see nothing that resembles justice. If we adopt the plain sentiment of the bible, that "God is love," we cannot, without invalidating the testimony of our senses, and contradicting all experience, say, that God created to any other purpose but to bless. If love and goodness created, they could not determine to make miserable; for that would set the attributes of God at direct opposition, and array the Almighty against himself, which would, according to his own word, overthrow his government.

God has been pleased to style himself a Father, and that in the most unlimited sense, that is, "the Father of the spirits of all flesh." As such, he requires man to be like him. What father is there, if he should conduct

towards his offspring, as this idea represents the father. of all spirits as conducting towards his, who would not meet with merited reproach from all? Are we then prepared to say, it is just with the Father of spirits to make his offspring miserable, and at the same time denounce as unjust, the man who should attempt to imitate the example? This surely is in the highest degree, unreasonable; and the sentiment ought to be exploded.

We think, therefore, that a just being would not create, knowing, that the creatures of his power would be from any cause, endlessly miserable: neither would he determine, that they should be so. But a just God has created beings capable of happiness: he must, therefore have created them to be finally heirs of good : and if so, without a derangement of his purpose, they must inherit the blessing. If it was just to create, it must be just to supply every implanted desire.

But justice has a demand, for which we ought to inquire. We are told, to be sure, but we look upon it to be bare assumption, that the justice of God requires the endless misery of the transgressor. If this is the fact, we see not how it can ever be satisfied, neither can we understand, how any can be saved. What then is the demand of justice? We answer, that it demands obedience on the part of man: because it is just for man to obey; and it requires, that man should suffer according to the demerit of his crimes, for his correction and amendment. To inflict punishment on man for any other purpose than these, appears to us in the highest degree cruel and unjust. We cannot therefore believe that a just God inflicts punishment on his offspring for any other purpose than this. Endless punishment cannot have this for its object: hence we cannot acknowledge the doctrine.

Endless punishment is argued as the penalty of the

law, because, say they, the law is infinite. But this is no proof, because it is only making one assertion to prove another, which we cannot admit. Besides, it appears to us to be inconsistent with reason, and contrary to scripture, to say that a finite being is amenable to an infinite law, or is capable of committing an infinite act. But it is further said by the advocates for endless misery, that sin is infinite, because there has been an infinite atonement made. But this is only making a third supposition to prove the other two. But man being finite, the law must have been finite, otherwise it was not adapted to his understanding, and he could not have understood its nature, and the extent of his requirements; therefore it appears to us, that to inflict punishment according to it, would be unjust-Hence if the law was finite, the offence was finite, and the punishment finite, which would lay the foundation for a finite atonement. These facts correspond with the revealed character of the Son of God by whom the atonement was made. On the supposition of the infinity of sin, we are unable to comprehend how it could be propitiated at all, without the atonement was more than infinite. For if sin was infinite, and the atonement infinite, they would stand exactly balanced: neither would preponderate, and sin would be as likely to do away the atonement, as the atonement would to do away sin. But if justice requires a finite or limited punishment, it can have its demands; and if it calls for obedience on the part of man, it can be satisfied. To inflict a punishment equal to the demerit of the crime, is according to scripture, and agreeable to every acknowledged idea of justice. Another idea which presses itself into notice in this place, and which is worthy of attention, is, that justice is satisfied with obedience. Hence if men had obeyed the law, justice would have had no other demands. Then how can it be