Money and Macroeconomic Policy, 第 1 卷Sami Daniel, Philip Arestis, John Grahl Edward Elgar, 1999 - 226 頁 Twelve contributions comprise this festschrift in honor of two influential British economists. The first three sections address a number of issues faced by the established industrialized countries, including the formulation of macroeconomic policy, aspects of central bank independence, and the prospects for macroeconomic policy in the near future. An additional couple of essays discusses macroeconomic policy outside the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in Poland and the micro states of the Eastern Caribbean. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 41 筆
第 86 頁
... independence ( CBI ) has become another fashionable fad in economic policy making . Here I argue why I disagree with independence and why it is a fashion that may not stand the test of time . I analyse the arguments and evidence for and ...
... independence ( CBI ) has become another fashionable fad in economic policy making . Here I argue why I disagree with independence and why it is a fashion that may not stand the test of time . I analyse the arguments and evidence for and ...
第 99 頁
... independence are more compelling . ACADEMIC EVIDENCE I have already referred to some of the evidence above . Table 6.2 summarizes the academic literature on the issue of central bank independence . Not all papers are summarized here ...
... independence are more compelling . ACADEMIC EVIDENCE I have already referred to some of the evidence above . Table 6.2 summarizes the academic literature on the issue of central bank independence . Not all papers are summarized here ...
第 103 頁
... independence as one might expect . And even some economists who are in favour of independence find strong arguments against . I do not agree that having an independent central bank is a necessary or sufficient condition for low ...
... independence as one might expect . And even some economists who are in favour of independence find strong arguments against . I do not agree that having an independent central bank is a necessary or sufficient condition for low ...
內容
a further tale | 10 |
Kaleckis Political Aspects of Full Employment revisited | 18 |
continuing relevance | 34 |
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