(p. iv) Priestley declares that it is his object to make Hartley's system clearer' by exhibiting his theory of the human mind, as far as it relates to the association of ideas only, omitting even what relates to the doctrine of vibrations, and the anatomical disquisitions which are connected with it'. See also the First Introductory Essay.

23. Hartley was constrained, &c. See the Observations, Pt. I,

Ch. i, Prop. 10: Sensations may be said to be associated together, when their impressions are either made precisely at the same Instant of Time, or in the contiguous successive Instants.' Cp. also Biog. Lit. i. 69: 'Hobbs ... must have reduced all its forms to the one law of time.'

PAGE 77 1. 4. our whole life would be divided, &c. Cp. Letters, p. 428 (Aug. 1803): 'If I had said no one idea ever recalls another, I am confident that I could support the assertion.' And marginal note in Maass, p. 29 (quoted Biog. Lit. 1847, i. 116), to Maass' statement that 'Every representation calls back its total association': 'Rather is capable, under given conditions, of recalling: or else our whole life would be divided between the despotism of outward impressions and that of senseless memory'. An interesting note on the power of association over the will is to be found in A. P. 1804 (p. 64), where Coleridge attributes lack of volitional energy to the streamy nature of the associative faculty', and adds, in confirmation of his statement, that 'it is evident that they labour under this defect who are most reverie-ish and streamy-Hartley (Coleridge's child), for instance, and myself'.

18. which would be absolute delirium.

Lit. i. 62, l. 15.

Cp. note on Biog.

PAGE 78 1. 2. a year or two before my arrival at Göttingen. Coleridge reached Göttingen in Feb. 1799.

PAGE 80 1. 3. this, perchance, is the dread book. Cp. Crabb Robinson, Diary, &c., July 12, 1819: 'Coleridge has the striking thought that possibly the punishment of a future life may consist in bringing back the consciousness of the past.'

II. But not now dare I longer discourse, &c. In almost precisely similar terms Coleridge excuses himself in the concluding lines of the Essays on the Principles of genial criticism, from the further pursuit of an equally recondite subject. The quotation from Plotinus occurs Ennead I. Lib. 6, §§ 4 & 9.

CHAPTER VII

PAGE 81 1. 13. the Grimalkins in the Cat-harpsichord. See The Spectator, No. 361, April 24, 1712: 'A dissertation upon the cat-call.'

17. It involves all the difficulties... of intercommunion, &c. Cp. Letters, Jan. 1804 (p. 454), where Coleridge speaks of the

sophism... that all have hitherto-both the Necessitarians and their antagonists—confounded two essentially different things under

one name •

PAGE 82 1. 20. well might Butler say. Cp. Butler, Miscellaneous Thoughts, 11. 93-102.

Washington Allston, the American

35. my friend Allston. painter, for whom see Biog. Lit. ii. 223 n.

PAGE 83 1. 27. The process by which Hume degraded the notion of cause and effect. See the Enquiry, Sect. vii, 'On the Idea of necessary connection' (ed. Selby-Bigge, pp. 60-79) and Editor's Introd., p. xv; the Treatise, Pt. III, Sect. XIV and XV.

PAGE 84 1. 3. the proofs of the existence and attributes of God. Pt. ii, Ch. i, of the Observations: 'Of the Being and Attributes of God, and of Natural Religion.'

II. the faith... is a collective energy, a total act, &c. In 1796 (Letters, 202), Coleridge thus defined faith: 'By faith I understand, first, a deduction from experiments in favour of the existence of something not experienced, and secondly, the motives which attend such a deduction.' And he adds: Now motives, being selfish, are only the beginning and the foundation, necessary and of first-rate importance, yet made of vile materials and hidden beneath the splendid superstructure.' In 1810 he stated to Crabb Robinson (Diary, &c., MS. Dec. 20) his opinion that 'Religious Belief is an act, not of the understanding, but of the will. To become a believer-one must love the doctrines and must resolve with passion to believe.' And in the Essay on Faith (supplementary to Aids to Reflection, pub. 1825), faith is defined as 'fidelity to our moral being-so far as such being is not and cannot become an object of the senses'; further, 'It subsists in the synthesis of the Reason and the individual Will' and 'by virtue of the latter... it must be an energy, and inasmuch as it relates to the whole moral man . . . must be a total, not a partial—a continuous, not a desultory or occasional-energy'. See also Biog. Lit. i. 134 ff.; ii. 216 ('what we can only know by the act of becoming'); and Letters, p. 710 (1820).

...

28. who deem themselves most free, &c. These lines originally appeared in the passages contributed by Coleridge to Southey's Joan of Arc in the first edition, 1796: they were removed from later editions, and incorporated by Coleridge in his Destiny of Nations. The footnote appended to them in the Joan of Arc (referred to in the last chapter) was not subsequently reprinted.

PAGE 85 1.7. the mistaking the conditions of a thing for its causes and essence. For this, the fundamental error which Coleridge ascribes to Locke, cp. letter to Brabant, 1815 (Westm. Rev., April 1870, p. 354): 'Locke's whole book is one ospiσμа éτepoľnτýσEWS,

the fallacy that the soil, rain, air and sunshine make the Wheatstalk and its ear of corn, because they are the conditions under which alone the seed can develope itself;' and Biog. Lit. i. 94: 'The first book of Locke's Essays . . involves the old mistake of "cum hoc; ergo propter hoc".

...

17. Leibnitz Lex Continui. This law, 'la loi de la continuité' ('Natura non agit saltatim') is first laid down by Leibnitz in his Lettre à M. Bayle sur un Principe Général, &c. (Opera, ed. Erdmann, i. 104; ref. Biog. Lit. 1874).

29. let a man watch his mind while he is composing: cp. 'On Thinking and Reflection' (Miscellanies, p. 252): 'Who has not tried to get hold of some half-remembered name, mislaid as it were in the memory, and yet felt to be there?' and the opening paragraph of the 'Essay on Beauty' (Biog. Lit. ii. 250). What Coleridge here calls the passive faculty would in modern phraseology be termed the 'sub-conscious mind'.

PAGE 86 1. 8. an intermediate faculty, &c. Cp. Kant's definition of the 'productive imagination' (Kritik der r. Vernunft; Werke, ed. Hartenstein, iii. 126), and Schelling, Werke, I. i. 357.

9. In philosophical language, &c. This parenthesis seems out of place here, forestalling, as it does, the promised deduction of chapter xiii.

18. Nothing... can be more easy, &c. Coleridge's argument in this paragraph may perhaps be more briefly restated thus :-if any impression A recalls any other impression B, our consciousness of A is, necessarily, inseparable from our consciousness of B: that is, the act of association is one; but it does not, therefore, follow that originally the two impressions were co-temporaneous, or that only those impressions, which originally occurred in one moment of time, can recall each other.

PAGE 87 1. 5. The act of consciousness is indeed, &c. Cf. A. P. 1803 (p. 57): Free unresisted action, the going forth of the soul, life without consciousness, is, properly, infinite, that is, unlimited. For whatever resists limits, and whatever is unresisted is unlimited. This, psychologically speaking, is space, while the sense of resistance or limitation is time, and motion is a synthesis of the two.'

24. a debasement of the fancy. Cp. Coleridge's definition of fancy given to Crabb Robinson (Diary, &c., Nov. 15, 1810): 'Fancy is the arbitrary bringing together of things which lie remote, and forming them into a unity.' A system of training which relies upon such arbitrary and artificial associations cannot (such appears to be Coleridge's meaning) ensure an objectively true representation of things. It encourages fanciful connexions.

F. N. intensify. Coleridge, it seems, may fairly lay claim to the origination of this term: and usage has justified his choice.

CHAPTER VIII

PAGE 88 1. 8. Des Cartes was the first philosopher. See the Principia, ii, §1; and Cousin's introduction to his edition of Descartes, p. 26; Mahaffy's Descartes (Blackwood), pp. 156-7.

14. has been long exploded. Leibnitz (Lettre sur la question, &c.; Euvres, Erdmann, i. 113) defined matter as possessing not only mobility (the capacity of movement), but also resistance (which includes impenetrability and inertia). See Biog. Lit. 1847, i. 131. Sara Coleridge (ib.) compares this passage with Schelling, Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre (Werke, I. i. 343; see especially pp. 375 foll.); and the System des transcendentalen Idealismus (ib. I. iii. 406-7).

PAGE 89 1. 5. Leibnitz's doctrine of a pre-established harmony. See Leibnitz's works passim; but esp. the Troisième Éclaircissement du nouveau Système, where occurs the famous comparison of the body and soul to two watches, which keep perfect time with each other. The conception of a pre-established harmony Leibnitz claimed as his own: and he here demonstrates its superiority over the rival theories of mutual influence and of occasionalism. ̄` (See also Sur le principe de la Vie, Théodicée, §61.) But the idea had already occurred to Descartes' disciple Geulinx, who wavered between the theories of pre-established harmony and of occasionalism, and who, I believe, was the first to use the illustration of the two watches (or clocks).

6. which he certainly borrowed from Spinoza. Spinoza nowhere clearly formulates this doctrine. Even the principle of the parallelism of mind, as thought, and body, as extension, he seems to deny almost as frequently as he admits it. See Dr. Martineau's Study of Spinoza, pp. 135, 182, 239, 287.

7. Des Cartes's animal machines. In order to substantiate his distinction of soul and body, Descartes maintained that all the vital or bodily functions were purely mechanical, the result of heat and motion. I desire you to notice,' he writes (Tract on Man, concluding summary), 'that these functions follow quite naturally in the (animal) machine from the arrangement of its organs, exactly as those of a clock, or other automaton, from that of its weights and wheels; so that we must not conceive or explain them by any other vegetive or sensitive soul,' &c. It is doubtful, however, whether this doctrine furnished any hints to Spinoza. The animal spirits, it is true, he accepts from Descartes; but this hypothesis, so far from assisting the theory of parallelism, really assumes an interaction between body and mind. (Descartes, Passions, i, §§7-16; Mahaffy, ib. pp.175-7; Martineau, ib. pp. 182–3; Kuno Fischer, ib. p. 415.)

12. Wolf, the admirer and illustrious systematizer. Christian

Wolf (1679-1754), founder of the German rationalistic school of philosophy. Although he owed much to Leibnitz, Wolf had not sufficient imagination to penetrate to the true meaning of his theories; and his own system is at once more and less than an exposition of that of Leibnitz.

16. The hypothesis of Hylozoism. Cp. A. P. (1800?), p. 14: ‘Materialists, unwilling to admit the mysterious element of our nature, make it all mysterious-nothing mysterious in nerves, eyes, &c., but that nerves think, &c.! Stir up the sediment into the transparent water, and so make all opaque!'

29. But it is not either the nature, &c. In the following paragraph (as is pointed out Biog. Lit. 1847, i. 133), Coleridge has drawn upon Schelling's Transc. Id. (Werke, I. iii. 406-7), and the Abhandlungen, &c. (Werke, I. iii. 379). Sara Coleridge also compares the introduction to Schelling's Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (Werke, I. ii. 25).

PAGE 91 1. 5. like a God by spiritual art. Slightly altered from Cowley's 'All over Love' :

But, like a God, by powerful art,

'Twas all in all, and all in every part.

21. the propensity so common among men. Cp. p. 74, 1. 25 and note; Letter to Wordsworth (1815), Letters, p. 649; and T. T., May 15, 1833.

28. Even so did Priestley. This controversy was made public in the form of a printed correspondence in 1788. The two opponents were intimate friends, and both liberals in theology; but while Priestley was a materialist and necessitarian, Price upheld the free agency of man and the immateriality of the soul: anticipating in his ethical doctrines some of the fundamental ideas of Kant. (See Leslie Stephen, Eng. Thought in the Eighteenth Century, under 'Priestley' and 'Price'; Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals; Priestley, Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit, &c.)

PAGE 92 1. 2. the PRODUCTIVE LOGOS human and divine. This work (Coleridge's magnum opus) is, according to Mr. Dykes Campbell, first mentioned in a letter of Sept. 1814, when Coleridge writes that his morning hours are devoted to a great work printing at Bristol at the wish of two friends. The title is Christianity, the one True Philosophy; or Five Treatises on the Logos, or communicative Intelligence, natural, human, and divine.' He adds, 6 The purpose of the whole is a philosophical defence of the Articles of the Church, so far as they respect doctrine, as points of faith.' (Life, p. 207; Letters, p. 632.) There is, however, a prior public allusion in the Essays on Criticism, published in Bristol in Aug. 1814. (See Biog. Lit. ii. 230.)