never promoted insurrection against the cause which spelled only slavery for them. The call of both sections for volunteers brought forward thousands in excess of the demands made. The South's geographical position While it was to be a defensive war for the South, that region was easily attacked from several points. The Mississippi offered access from the Atlantic; from the North as well, it was a giant highway southward. The 3,000mile coastline of the South would be a prey to its enemy if not defended. For varying distances the land could be pierced from the sea or from the Mississippi-up the Potomac, Tennessee, Red, and Cumberland rivers, and the tidal Virginia streams. Railway systems from Washington on the east and Cincinnati and Louisville on the west offered passageway toward the heart of Virginia in one case and Tennessee in the other; and, from Tennessee, rivers and railways led to Memphis and Atlanta, in the very heart of the South. Yet while the South could be attacked from many sides, she was to fight on interior lines, defensively, and needed fewer troops than the North on whom lay the "burden of proof." The South centralized power while the North Although the South was governed by a constitution similar to ours, she had the wit to allow, in practice, the ignoring of "States' Rights" distributed it and granted a centralization of power in few hands which gave her an enormous advantage. Under the centralized control exerted by the Southern County Court people in that section had become accustomed to have authority exercised by individuals; social conditions had made this necessary. The South fought for a Confederacy with the methods of a Federal government, while, loosely speaking, the North fought for a Federal government with those of a Confederacy-its power being distributed. Orders issued by one bureau or commander were constantly being countermanded by another until often such confusion existed that generals in the field hardly knew who, if any one, was really in command. General Grant, commanding the Union armies advancing on Corinth, after the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson in 1862, was so ignored by orders sent out by the departmental commander that he wrote: "For myself, I was little more than an observer." Only the intervention of General Sherman prevented his resigning his command at that time in disgust. All the old evils common to American armies-short- North handicapped by old term enlistments, officers appointed through army evils favoritism by governors of states, bounties, lack of centralization of power-hampered the North to a degree unknown in the South. In generalship, when the North had finally sifted the wheat from the chaff, it found officers fully as capable as those of the South. READING LIST Stephenson, Chap. 8; Chadwick, Chaps. 10-19; Rhodes, III, Chap. 14; Nicholay and Hay, IV, Chaps. 3-6; W. E. Dodd, Expansion and Conflict, Chap. 13; J. Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederacy, I, Parts 3 and 4; J. B. McMaster, History, VIII, Chap. 96; N. W. Stephenson, The Day of the Confederacy (Chronicles of America, XXX) Chaps. 1-3; War-time addresses of Davis, Lincoln, Stephens, and Beecher in Harding, 358-420. QUERY AND DISCUSSION How fully would Andrew Jackson have approved of Lincoln's acts in 1861? Is pride in state or section a valuable asset to national patriotism? How could Southerners find Lincoln's First Inaugural consistent with his "House Divided" speech? How harmonize his statement that the nation could not exist half slave and half free with the statement that he would not touch slavery where it existed? Compare the classes into which Northerners were divided on the question of Civil War in 1861 to the classes into which the colonists were divided in 1775. How was Lincoln misunderstood in both North and South? Do you think he was equally misunderstood in the frontier cabins of the West? Explain the statement that the South fought like a Federal government. The Confederate Constitution made it possible for three states to compel the calling of a constitutional convention to vote on amendments. Was this as radical a change as you would have expected States Rights men would make when the opportunity to write a new constitution came to them? Would this change in our Constitution have satisfied the Kentucky legislature in 1798, the Hartford Convention radicals, or South Carolina in 1832? Section 41. From Bull Run to Hampton Roads The "Ana Like a giant serpent the North planned to enfold and crush the South by an "anaconda policy." This meant: (a) blockading her coasts, (b) throwing armies around her conda Policy" western flanks by way of the Mississippi and its Tennessee tributaries, and (c) delivering a deathblow by armies which should pierce the heart of Virginia and Georgia. Initial steps in this giant task were made in 1861 and developed more clearly in 1862. The Battle of Bull Run The proximity of Federal and Confederate forces near Washington resulted in the first battle of the war. The first of many 'on to Richmond" campaigns was started by General McDowell with 30,000 men, July 16, 1861. At Bull Run, a Potomac tributary, he met General Beauregard's Confederate force of 23,000 men, the battle opening auspiciously for the Union forces. In the nick of time, however, General Kirby Smith arrived on the half-lost field with a small but sufficiently determined body of Confederate troops from the Shenandoah Valley, and turned Union victory into defeat and then into rout toward Washington. The outcome very greatly elated the South. It was, however, of greater value to the North-teaching it at once how stern a task confronted it. The superb steadiness of a southern commander, Thomas J. Jackson, in standing his ground like a "stone wall," now gave that famous officer the nick-name of "Stonewall" Jackson for life and eternity. U. S. GRANT "Stonewall" The shock of striking this "stone wall" at Bull Run stunned the North into taking more time, raising more troops, and training them more carefully. To the westward of the Alleghenies, however, the "anaconda" performed much more successfully. The northern armies in that quarter were filled with Westerners who were, perhaps, bet- West ter impromptu soldiers; at any rate, they were bet Progress in the ter captained and had at hand a ready-made asset for successful campaigning of great value. When the heyday of the western BATTLEFIELDS IN THE EASTERN ZONE OF THE WAR, 1861-1863. (Showing alterations in Confederate territory.) steamboat arrived in the early Forties the West eclipsed the whole country in steamboat tonnage. This is presented graphically to the eye by a table of tonnage of 1842: Five inland western cities (St. Louis, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Louisville, and Nashville) had a registered tonnage of 45,285 and were all famous for their shipyards. This had largely increased by 1861. Thus the West was excellently equipped with transports for opening both the upper Mississippi and the Tennessee-Cumberland keys to the more level lands of central-western Tennessee and the line southward toward Atlanta. A federal ROBERT E. LEE Grant, now ascended the Grant's and Donelson "Army of the Cumberland" held central Kentucky under General Don Carlos Buell; and, with a (map p. 348) flotilla of over a hundred steamboats, the "Army of the Tennessee," under General U. S. Cumberland and Tennessee to conquer Fort Henry on the latter and Fort Donelson on the former. The North was thrilled by Grant's uncompromising attitude in stating to the commander of Fort Donelson that he would give no terms but "unconditional surrender." He soon got it (February 16, 1862) and became known as "Unconditional Surrender Grant." People saw that when the "unconditional-surrender" men of the North met the "stone-wall" men of the South it was to be a contest of Titans. Smashing his way southward up the Tennessee, Grant (opposing Gen. A. S.Johnston) won the Battle of Shiloh (April 6) which gave him access to the railway center of Corinth, Miss., which commanded the railway east from W. T. SHERMAN Battle of |