The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to "Pragmatism,"Longmans, Green, and Company, 1909 - 297 頁 |
其他版本 - 查看全部
常見字詞
absolute absolutists abstract abstractly account of truth acquaintance actual agnosticism agree altho Anti-Prag anti-pragmatist believe cognitive common sense conceive conception concrete consciousness consequences consists copying Corot crete critics define definition ence epistemological eternal exist experience fact false feeling function G. E. Moore Hébert human humanistic idea true ideal intermediaries Ivanhoe kind knower knowledge known lead logical matist matter mean ment mental mind mind-stuff Monism nature never notion object opinion particular percept philosophers physical possible postulate practical Prag pragmatism pragmatist Pratt present Professor proposition psychological rationalists reader reality relation resemble rience saltatory satisfactions satisfactory Schiller scholasticism seems self-transcendency sensation simply solipsism sort statement substitute supposed sure terminate theory things thought tical tigers tion tism transcendentalist treat true idea trueness truth-relation universe of discourse verify whole word truth
熱門章節
第 42 頁 - And the tangible fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.
第 42 頁 - Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
第 99 頁 - ... required to make the relation intelligible is given in full. Either the knower and the known are: (1) the self-same piece of experience taken twice over in different contexts; or they are (2) two pieces of actual experience belonging to the same subject, with definite tracts of conjunctive transitional experience between them; or (3) the known is a possible experience either of that subject or another, to which the said conjunctive transitions would lead, if sufficiently prolonged.
第 103 頁 - Whenever such is the sequence of our experiences we may freely say that we had the terminal object 'in mind ' from the outset, even although at the outset nothing was there in us but a flat piece of substantive experience like any other, with no self-transcendency about it, and no mystery save the mystery of coming into existence and of being gradually followed by other pieces of substantive experience, with conjunctively transitional experiences between. That is what we mean here by the object's...
第 281 頁 - It may be said — and this is, I believe, the correct view — that there is no problem at all in truth and falsehood ; that some propositions are true and some false, just as some roses are red and some white...
第 ix 頁 - The essential thing is the process of being guided. Any idea that helps us to deal, whether practically or intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings, that doesn't entangle our progress in frustrations, that fits, in fact, and ' adapts our life to the reality's whole setting, will agree sufficiently to meet the requirement. It will hold true of that reality. Thus, names are just as "true" or "false" as definite mental pictures are.
第 202 頁 - Empiricism is known as the opposite of rationalism. Rationalism tends to emphasize universals and to make wholes prior to parts in the order of logic as well as in that of being. Empiricism, on the contrary, lays the explanatory stress upon the part, the element, the individual, and treats the whole as a collection and the universal as an abstraction. My description of things, accordingly, starts with the parts and makes of the whole a being of the second order.
第 vii 頁 - Grant an idea or belief to be true,' it says, 'what concrete difference will its being true make in any one's actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?
第 187 頁 - Ordinary epistemology contents itself with the vague statement that the ideas must "correspond" or "agree"; the pragmatist insists on being more concrete, and asks what such "agreement" may mean in detail. He finds first that the ideas must point to or lead towards that reality and no other, and then that the pointings and leadings must yield satisfaction as their result. So far the pragmatist is hardly less abstract than the ordinary slouchy epistemologist; but as he defines himself farther, he...
第 110 頁 - ... reality,' as around the Dyak's head of my late metaphor, floats the vast cloud of experiences that are wholly subjective, that are non-substitutional, that find not even an eventual ending for themselves in the perceptual world — the mere day-dreams and joys and sufferings and wishes of the individual minds. These exist with one another, indeed, and with the objective nuclei, but out of them it is probable that to all eternity no interrelated system of any land will ever be made.