but one that caused me more anxious thought than any other of my life. But after full and mature consideration of all the pros and cons, I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the order must be issued. There was to my mind no other alternative.

Allow me to allude to a few of the facts of the case. You and your officers, at our interview, estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at two hundred thousand men. Since then you and others report that they have received and are receiving large reënforcements from the South. Gen. Pope's army, now covering Washington, is only forty thousand. Your effective force is only about ninety thousand. You are thirty miles from Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety. With the enemy directly be tween you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect, neither can reënforce the other in case of such an attack.

If Gen. Pope's army be diminished to reënforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your forces be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you occupy, should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula is, under present circumstances, a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the Peninsula to some point by water, say Fredericksburgh, where the two armies can be united. Let me now allude to some of the objections which you have urged.

You say that to withdraw from the present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army, which is now in excellent discipline and condition. I cannot understand why a simple change of position to a new and by no means distant base will demoralize an army in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves assist in the demoralization, which I am satisfied they will not. Your change of front from your extreme right at Hanover Court-House to your present position was over thirty miles, but I have not heard that it demoralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sustained in effecting it.

Besides, the latter is between Richmond and Washington, and covers Washington from any attack by the enemy.

The political effect of the withdrawal may at first look unfavorable, but I think the public are beginning to understand its necessity, and that they will have much more confidence in a united army than in its separate fragments. But you will reply, Why not reënforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this, you said at our interview that you required fifty thousand additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought you would have chance" of success with twenty thousand, but you afterward telegraphed to me that you would require thirty-five thousand, as the enemy was being largely reënforced.

66

some

If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable, but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks. To keep your army in its present position until it could be so reenforced would almost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James River; and even after you got the reënforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean time Gen. Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy, without the slightest hope of assistance from you.

In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers-indeed a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me-are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula now advise its abandonment. I have not inquired, and do not desire to know, by whose advice or for what reasons the army of the Potomac was separated into two parts, with the enemy before them. I must take things as I find them. I find our forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you or any one else had A new base on the Rappahannock, at Freder- presented a better one, I certainly should have icksburgh, brings you within about sixty miles adopted it; but all of your plans require reënof Richmond, and secures a reënforcement of forcements which it is impossible to give you. forty or fifty thousand fresh and disciplined It is very easy to ask for reënforcements, but it troops. The change, with such advantages, will, is not so easy to give them when you have no I think, if properly represented to your army, disposable troops at your command. I have encourage rather than demoralize your troops. written very plainly, as I understand the case, Moreover, you yourself suggested that a junction and I hope you will give me credit for having might be effected at Yorktown, but that a flank carefully considered the matter, although I may march across the Peninsula would be more haz- have arrived at different conclusions from your ardous than to retire to Fort Monroe. You will own. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, remember that Yorktown is two or three miles H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. further from Richmond than Fredericksburgh is. OFFICIAL COPY: J. C. KELTON, Assist, Adjt-Gen. VOL. VI.-Doc. 15

without clothing, and the army could not move until it was supplied. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General. OFFICIAL COPY: J. C. KELTON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

ers. When about two miles out from Berryville, the firing was again renewed between our skir mishers and the rebel cavalry. Just as our infantry reached the scene of action, the rebel cavalry were making a charge upon our skirmishers.

The following is a copy of the telegram of the A few pieces of artillery were soon brought for

sixth instant :

WASHINGTON, D. C., October 6, 1862.

Major-General McClellan :

I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your line of operation, you can be reënforced with thirty thousand men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than twelve or fifteen thousand can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross the river. Also to what point the reënforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.

SURRENDER OF WINCHESTER, VA.

CAMP OF SECOND DIVISION TWELFTH ARMY CORPS,
BOLIVAR HEIGHTS, VA., Dec. 7, 1862.

ward, unlimbered, and a few canister-shot thrown among them; at the same time the Seventh Ohio infantry poured a volley of musketry into them, scattering them in all directions, killing four, wounding twenty, and disabling seven horses. None of our forces were injured. By this time it was dark, and we bivouacked for the night on the grounds of the scene of action. So ended our first day out.

Here, also, information was received that the rebel General A. P. Hill, with fifteen thousand men, was at Winchester. This threw somewhat of a damper on our party, so we remained nearly all of the second day (Wednesday) at Berryville, manoeuvring around and moving forward only about three miles toward Opequon Creek, where we bivouacked for the second night. Some of the rebel cavalry again showing themselves here, our artillery was again opened upon them, and they skedaddled toward Winchester. At this point Gen. Geary held a council of war with his general of ficers, the General informing them that he preferred being whipped rather than turn back and not have definite information from the enemy.

Next morning (Thursday) we moved cautiously forward until about ten o'clock A.M., when we came in sight of Winchester, with a line of rebel cavalry in view drawn up to dispute our entrance into the town. The column was halted, and a line of battle formed. The two forts built by Gen. White, while he held that place, frowned down upon us with an ugly look. It was soon ascertained that there were no guns mounted on the forts.

Ball, Surgeon Fifth Ohio, and Medical Director of
Second division, and Captain Shannon, of Gen.
Jackson's staff. The demand was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS, ASH HOLLOW,
December 4, 1862.

To the Hon. Mayor, or Chief Officer of the City of Winchester, Va.:*

At this point, Gen. Geary sent a flag of truce ANOTHER Successful reconnoissance was made to Winchester, demanding an unconditional surfrom this place on the morning of the second in-render of the place. The flag was borne by A. stant, (Tuesday.) Our force consisted of three thousand infantry from the three brigades of the division, twelve pieces of artillery, four pieces respectively from Knapp's, Hampton's, and McGilvery's batteries, and one company of the first battalion Indiana cavalry, with one day's cooked rations in haversack, and five days' rations carried in wagon. The column was formed by Gen. SIR: I am credibly informed by a large num Geary in person, and moved at half-past six A.M., out the Charleston and Winchester turnpike. ber of citizens, that your city has been recently About half-past eight A.M. we reached Charles-evacuated by the military. ton, where we unexpectedly encountered a com- Unwilling to shed blood, and destroy property pany of rebel cavalry. A brisk skirmish ensued, in which the rebs were routed and made good time on a run toward Winchester. We advanced cautiously on toward Berryville, which we reached toward evening, and found a regiment of rebel If you decline to accept these terms, I will im cavalry upon a hill, drawn up in line of battle.mediately move upon the city, in full force.

unnecessarily, I demand an instant and unconditional surrender of the city, pledging you, how ever, that the persons of non-combatants, and private property, shall be duly respected.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, A few pieces of artillery were soon placed in JOHN W. GEARY, position, and some shell sent among them, soon Brigadier-General Commanding, dispersing them on the road toward Winchester. General Geary immediately moved the forces for- In a short time they returned with a reply from ward, with the cavalry thrown out as skirmish- Major Myers's cavalry, as follows:

NEAR WINCHESTER, VA., Dec. 4, 1862. power to blight their energies. The prospect of Brig.-Gen. Geary, Com'g Federal Forces: soon reaching camp brightened the faces of all. GENERAL: The city of Winchester will be evac- We marched through Charlestown with colors uated in an hour's time, by the military forces flying, trudging through the snow, while ever under my command, which time I would request and anon a fierce blast of wind would sweep for you to be pleased to observe, to give non-com-into our faces from over the plains on either side, batants, desirous of leaving the town, an oppor- reminding us that we had other foes to encounter tunity to do so. beside the rebel soldiery. At last, twelve м., we arrived at Bolivar, the boys marching in proudly, each regiment to its own encampment, with as light hearts as though they had just started out, instead of just coming back from a five days' expedition. We did not lose a single man, killed or wounded, but some five or six stragglers were captured.

I have the honor to be, General, your obedient servant, SAMUEL B. MYERS,

Major Seventh Virginia Cavalry. This the General refused, sending back Doctor Ball to inform Major Myers that our column would move forward without delay into the town, and that the citizens would not be allowed to leave and would not be disturbed, unless our troops were fired upon by them; but the Major had made good his time and made himself scarce, and was nowhere to be found. The Doctor went on and demanded the surrender from the Mayor of the town, which was given, as follows:

Up to the return of the flag of truce, General Geary expected a battle. Upon the receipt of the Mayor's reply, the General advanced the column up to the forts and halted. The Doctor also ascertained that the small-pox was prevalent in the town, and to avoid this contagious disease, the troops were advanced no further. The Gen. eral and staff alone going into the forts and town, and taking formal possession. As the General and staff went into the fort, the army below gave three cheers for the General. Upon a hill beyond the town, the enemy's cavalry were looking on; they also threw up their hats and cheered, but the General soon put a stop to their sport, by sending a few well-directed shells among them, and they made themselves scarce.

Dr. Bell, and Lieut. Davis, A.D.C. on General Geary's staff, paroled one hundred and twentyfive rebel sick, in the various hospitals in town.

About three P.M. the General ordered a countermarch, and the column moved homeward down the Martinsburgh pike, halting at sunset about six miles from Winchester, and bivouacking for the night. At daylight next morning (Friday) the column resumed the march, passing through Bunker Hill at nine A.M., and reaching Smithfield at twelve м. At this point a severe snow-storm arose, and the wind blew cold and biting. The column pressed on and halted about three miles south of Charlestown, and bivouacked for the night. Notwithstanding the severe snow-storm and cold night, the boys rested very comfortably, and not seriously inconvenienced, and on the next morning (Saturday) were as joyous and light-hearted as though the winter blast had no

The results of the reconnoissance were such as to satisfy us positively that there are no considerable bodies of rebels in this vicinity, beyond the guerrillas and bushwhackers, who will linger here as long as the war exists.

On this expedition, the want of the requisite number of cavalry, so essential to reconnoissances, was severely felt; the command had to grope, as it were, almost entirely in the dark, as sixty men. the number of cavalry with us did not exceed

after it became known that the Mayor had surDr. Ball informs me, that while in town, and rendered the town to the Federals, the citizens became jubilant, the ladies waving American flags and pocket-handkerchiefs, and very anxious that our forces should come in and take possession, showing their satisfaction generally in their Mayor's doings. This shows quite a different state of feeling of the citizens to what it was last spring.

-Cincinnati Commercial.

Doc. 60.

GENERAL HINDMAN'S ADDRESS. GENERAL HINDMAN issued the following address to his soldiers before making his attack upon the national forces in Arkansas:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST CORPS, TRANS-MISSISSIPPI ARMY, IN THE FIELD, Dec. 4, 1862. SOLDIERS: From the commencement to the end of the battle, bear constantly in mind what I now tell you:

First. Never fire because your comrades do, nor because the enemy does, nor because you happen to see the enemy, nor for the sake of firing rapidly. Always wait till you are certainly within range of your gun, then single out your man, take deliberate aim, as low down as the knee, and fire.

Second. When occasion offers, be certain to pick off the enemy's officers, especially the mounted ones, and to kill his artillery horses.

Third. Don't shout except when you charge the enemy-as a general thing keep silent, that orders may be heard. Obey the orders of your officers, but pay no attention to idle rumors or the words of unauthorized persons.

Fourth. Don't stop with your wounded com