condemned to death for violations of rules and regulations of military discipline, or for the discharge of minors or persons of infirm mind, held to military service, it may be said in general terms that these were never made in vain. He was readily accessible to petitioners of every grade and rank in life. It was his habit to receive first those who came by special appointment, or were privileged by official station, and then to have the doors of his cabinet opened and all who were in waiting brought in, each in his order, to a general audience. This was very exhausting to the President, especially if he had, as he often had, a weight of apprehension on his mind by reason of some military crisis or similar complication.

Lincoln was accustomed to fits of abstraction from which no ordinary call could rouse him. At such times his eyes had a far-away look, as if his soul were wandering in space and must be deaf to the voice of any caller. Once, at the close of an unusually exhausting day, an intimate friend found Lincoln sunk in a state of collapse, as it were, with the old faraway look in his eyes. Being brought back by repeated calls of his name, the President laughed cheerily, and explained that he had had a hard day and his wits "had gone wool-gathering."

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE PRESIDENT AND HIS CABINET.

Popular Expectation that Secretary Seward would be the Leading Spirit of the New Administration-Mr. Lincoln's Firmness and Kindness with the Secretary of State-Mr. Stanton's Criticisms of Lincoln-Why Secretary Cameron left the Cabinet-The Exit of Postmaster-General Blair-Secretary hase's Restiveness-His Subsequent Appointment as Chief-Justice-The President Deferred to the Ministers.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S relations with his

Cabinet ministers were always friendly and cordial. With each member he was habitually frank and sincere in his treatment of all questions that affected the personal relations of each. It was not the habit of any of the Cabinet ministers, excepting Secretary Seward, to visit the White House on purely social and informal errands. Mr. Seward lived not far from the Executive Mansion, and, more than any other of his associates, he was a customed to make casual calls upon the President and his family. It may be remembered, to the credit of both of these eminent men, that it was Mr. Seward, rather than any other member of the Cabinet, who might have had occasion to feel restive over his own position in the councils of the President. Mr. Seward was the most prominent and conspicuous rival of Mr. Lincoln for the Presidential nomination in 1860. He may have

"

felt that his failure to secure that honor was due to an accident rather than to Mr. Lincoln's fitness for the place into which he was installed. We cannot say what was the estimate which Lincoln put on the qualifications of Seward for the Presidential office; but we may be sure that Seward once thought himself the greater man of the two. Undoubtedly he was not alone in holding that opinion Many patriotic and intelligent men thought Seward was not only the greatest man in the new administration, but they expected and believed that he would be the author and director of its policy. It is possible that this was also Mr. Seward's expectation.

Very early in the history of the Lincoln Administration this question was to be settled once for all. When Mr. Lincoln had written his inaugural address to be delivered March 4, 1861, he submitted it to the criticism of several persons who were near to him, among others, Mr. Seward. Returning the document to the President-elect, Mr. Seward suggested numerous changes and emendations, some of which Mr. Lincoln adopted and others he rejected. It may be said that the joint labors of the two resulted in the production of a State paper of great power and dignity; that Mr. Seward's share in this work was, after all, inconsiderable; but the fact that the President-elect, then regarded as a raw and unskilled statesman, from whom no greatness could be expected, was willing to accept corrections and suggestions from the future Secretary of State was enough to give Mr. Seward encouragement to magnify his office as "premier" of the new administration.

The next step in the direction of addition to the dignity and importance of his office was taken by Mr. Seward at the end of the first month of the new administration, April 1, 1861. Although State after State had passed ordinances of secession from the Union, public opinion all over the North was in a greatly confused condition. Nobody knew what would be the result of these so-called secessions, whether there would be war, a peaceful breaking up of the Federal Union, or a series of concessions that would pacify the Southern seceders and restore things on a new basis of union. Even patriotic men were in some instances ready to make compromises for the sake of peace, and others equally patriotic were willing that the new administration should secure "peace at any price."

Perhaps as good an illustration as any other of the too prevailing popular opinion about Lincoln's abilities may be found in the letters of Edwin M. Stanton, written about this time. Mr. Stanton was a loyal and upright man, devoted to the cause of the Union; and afterwards, as Secretary of War under President Lincoln, he achieved fame for his herculean labors in defence of that cause. Yet, writing in June, 1861, he gave currency to the belief that the Rebels would be in possession of Washington "within thirty days," and in consequence of that "painful imbecility of Lincoln " to which he referred with grim sarcasm in a letter written about that time. While men were wondering what the new administration would do, and if it would do anything but parcel out the offices, Secretary Seward wrote for

President Lincoln's consideration a memorandum in which the general depression and uncertainty were dwelt upon, and a line of policy was marked out. Briefly, this extraordinary paper proposed that the topic of slavery extension as a political question be laid aside, and "Union or Disunion?" be substituted therefor; and, having set this forth as the local policy, the Secretary proceeded to suggest that explanations for alleged unfriendly acts be demanded from the governments of Spain, France, Great Britain, and Russia, that agents be sent to the colonial dependencies of some of these to stir up strife, and that, in default of satisfactory replies from Spain and France, war be declared against them. In other words, the newly installed President was asked to turn his back on the party that had elected him, and to divert the attention of the Southern rebels from their rebellion by an invitation to join in a series of foreign wars.

This scheme of the Secretary of State had in it a certain suggestion of arrogance, because it contained a very direct hint that he expected to be the officer charged with the duty of carrying out the policy which he had thus boldly outlined. He said that if the President did not choose to manage this undertaking, he should "devolve it on some member of his Cabinet." He added: "Once adopted, all debates on it must end, and all agree and abide. It is not my especial province. But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility." The President's reply to this amazing communication was simple, direct, and in admirable temper. Having disposed of the Sec