same majority. A vote of thanks to the chair- SHEFFIELD DISTRICT LAW STUDENTS' man concluded the meeting. SOCIETY. THIS Society held its usual weekly meeting on Tuesday the 26th inst., at the Law Library. H. W. Ibbotson, in the chair. The question for discussion was as follows: "A. has been convicted of felony and sentenced to twelve months hard labour; some years after the termination of the sentence, B. publicly and in writing calls him a 'convicted felon.' Will an action be against B. for libel.'

INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION.-I was articled on the 1st March 1878, for the term of five years. Please inform me the earliest opportunity I have for presenting myself for the intermediate examination ? R. F. H. Nov. 1830.-ED. STUD.'S DEPT.]

FINAL EXAMINATIONS, 1879.-Would you inform me whether the days on which the above examinations will be held, and also whether the subjects for such examinations are yet fixed? I had intended to go up for examination next month, and have already given my notice, but, unfortunately, owing to ill-health, I shall be unable to present myself, and am consequently anxious to know the days appointed and the subjects selected for the January examination, that, if there are any fresh ones, I may have time to study them. CHAS. WESTON. [You will find the desired information in our last issue.-ED. STUD.'S DEPT.]

Answers.

SEPARATE ESTATE-HUSBAND AND WIFE. If the money accumulated by A. after the decease of B. arose in any way out of his estate other than by an intestacy, the children of B. would be entitled to it absolutely. If, however, it arose from her own separate property, the nephews and nieces would be entitled to it without regard to the children of B. The question would probably involve an administration suit,as there would have to be an inquiry of what B.'s estate consisted at his death, to show from what fund the accumulation had arisen. WALTER F. ROBINSON.

MAGISTRATES' LAW.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

POOR-LAW-ORDER OF REMOVAL-DERIVA TIVE SETTLEMENT-39 & 40 VICT. C. 61, s. 35.The 35th section of the Divided Parishes and

himself a settlement in East Dean in the appellant
union. The son, therefore, had that settlement,
and having never acquired a settlement of his
In this case there was no
own, he retained it."
occasion to search for the derivative settlement of
the parent, and so the pauper's settlement was
that of his father. The next case is that of the
Guardians of the Woodstock Union v. The
Parish of St. Pancras (39 L. T. Rep. 256),
which was an appeal against an order of removal
of Emily Taylor from the parish of St. Pancras,
Middlesex, to the parish of Deddington, in the
Woodstock union. The sessions quashed the
order of removal subject to a case. The facts
were these: The paper became chargeable to the
parish of St. Pancras, and in June 1877, by an
order of removal, was adjudged to be settled in
the parish of Deddington. She was born in St.
Pancras in April 1859, and acquired no settlement
in her own right. Her father, George Taylor,
was born in the said parish of Deddington in
1815, and acquired no settlement in his own
right, but he was the son of William and
Martha Taylor (both deceased). It further ap-
peared that the said William Taylor, in the
year 1829 acquired a settlement in the parish of
Metton (in the Banbury union), by serving the
office of parish constable. The question reserved
was, whether the settlement of the pauper was in
the parish of Deddington? Upon the argument
it was contended for the appellants that, as the
settlement of William Taylor was in Metton, it
was therefore the derivative settlement of the
pauper's father, and the 35th section accordingly
applied; whilst on the part of the respondents it
was argued that as the pauper's father was born
in Deddington, that must be taken to be his
settlement, and consequently the settlement of
the pauper to which he was liable to be removed.
In giving judgment, Mr. Justice Field said: The
words are, no person shall be deemed to have
derived a settlement from any other person, whether
by parentage, estate, or otherwise.' But to that
general rule it makes two exceptions,
the case of a wife from her husband, and in
the case of a child under sixteen years of age,
which child shall take the settlement of its
father. . . . and shall retain the settlement
so taken until it shall acquire another." There-
fore, if the statute had stopped there, the
paper in this case would have taken her father's
settlement. In ascertaining that, you find that
his birth settlement would be in Deddington, but
a birth settlement is only a prima facie one, and
he may have acquired a settlement elsewhere, and
how is that settlement to be ascertained except
by making inquiries? and if in making such
inquiriesit cannot be shown what settlement
such child derived from her parent without inquir:
ing into the derivative settlement of such parent;"
then, it is enacted, not that she is to take her
father's birth settlement, which might have been
more in accordance with the policy of the Act, but
she is to be deemed to be settled in the parish in

except in

which she was born. The contention of the

Poor-Law Amendment Act (39 & 40 Vict. c. 61)
has given rise to some questions of considerable
practical importance in the administration of poor
law relief; and the Queen's Bench Division of the
High Court of Justice has been called upon to
put an interpretation more than once upon the
construction of the last paragraph in that section,
which, after the enactment in an earlier portion of
the section that "No person shall be deemed to
have derived a settlement from any other person
except in the case of a child under the age
of sixteen, which child shall take the settlement of
its father or of its widowed mother, as the case may
be up to that age, and shall retain the settlement
so taken until it shall acquire another," goes on to
enact that, "If any child in this section men-
tioned shall not have acquired a settlement for
itself. . . . and it cannot be shown what settle-
ment such child . . derived from the parent
without inquiring into the derivative settlement of
such parent, such child . . . shall be deemed to respondents cannot hold good against the plain
be settled in the parish in which he or she was born."
words of the statute, so we are bound to hold that
Upon the proper construction of this concluding the sessions were right." It is somewhat remark-
paragraph two decisions have recently been pro-able that in the discussion of this case no reference
nounced, the first being The Guardians of the whatever was made to the former case of West-
Poor of Westbury-on-Severn v. The Guardians of bury on Severn v. Barrow-in-Furness, in which
the Poor of Barrow-in-Furness (47 L. J. Mag. the same question was considered in the judgment
Cas. 79; 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 315), which was a case
of the court. We have, however, now a decision
stated by consent, under 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 11, which sets finally at rest all doubt as to the proper
upon an appeal from an order of two justices of
construction of this section, which, taking into
Lancashire, upon the application of the respon-
account some four or five other questions which
dents, adjudicating the settlement of James have been decided upon its provisions, has fur-
Dorrington, a lunatic pauper, to be in the parish nished a most remarkable crop of legal litigation.
of East Dean, Gloucestershire, within the appel-
lants' union. It appeared that the pauper was
born in the year 1811, and was the legitimate son
of Thomas Dorrington, and resided with his father
until he was upwards of seventeen years of age.
Before he attained sixteen years, his father, by
possession of a dwelling house in East Dean and
forty days' residence therein, became settled
within the appellants' union. The son never
acquired any settlement anywhere in his own right.
The question before the court chiefly turned upon
whether or not the enactment was retrospective?
The court held that it was, and judgment was pro-
nounced for the respondents; but in the course of
the considered judgment of the court, another
very important question was also decided. The
learned judge (Cleasby) who read the judgment,
said: "In reality, the legislation is directed to re-
move difficulties of proof more than to introduce a
law intrinsically better; this appears from the
nature of the enactment, but more distinctly from
the third paragraph of the 35th section, and there
is as much reason for applying such legislation to
the past as well as to the future. If, in order to
prove the place of settlement of the pauper as
derived from the father, it had been necessary to
prove a derivative settlement of the father, then,
by the direct enactment of the third paragraph of
the 35th section, the panper would be deemed to
be settled in the parish where he was born. But it
appears from the case that the father had acquired

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.
SCHOOL BOARD- SIX MONTHS ABSENCE
DISQUALIFICATION-RE-ELECTION.-A member
of a school board absented himself during six
successive months from all meetings of the board,
and the cause assigned by him was not approved
by the board. He ceased, therefore, to be a
member of the board, in pursuance of the Ele-
mentary Education Act 1870, second schedule,
first part, s. 14. He was, however, re-elected a
member at the next election of the whole board.
Held, upon a rule for quo warranto, that he was
not, by having so ceased to be a member of the
previous board, disqualified from sitting in the
new board, under sect. 12 of the said schedule:
(Re Turmine, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 255. Q. B.)

POOR LAW SETTLEMENT - CHILD UNDER
SIXTEEN - DERIVATIVE SETTLEMENT FROM
FATHER.-Where the father of a pauper, who has
acquired no settlement of her own, has himself
only a derivative settlement, the pauper has
a settlement at her own, and not her father's
birthplace. E. T., a pauper, who had acquired
no settlement of her own after attaining the age
of sixteen, was adjudicated to be settled in the
respondent's parish, in which she was born. Her
father had a derivative settlement at M., but was
born at D. Held, that, in accordance with sect.
35 of the Divided Parishes Act 1876, the pauper's

settlement was rightly adjudged to be in respondents' parish: (Woodstock Union v. Parish of St. Pancras, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 256. Q. B.)

REAL PROPERTY AND
CONVEYANCING.

-

NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. WILL-DEVISE TO TRUSTEES IN FEE-CO-EXISTENT EQUITABLE AND LEGAL INTERESTSGIFT OVER.-A testator by will, made prior to the Wills Act, devised two freehold houses to trustees in trust for the sole benefit of his two daughters, either to live in or let for their joint benefit, but in case either of his daughters should marry and have a child or children, then such child or children should have the mother's share of the rents and profits of the houses after its or their mother's decease. Both daughters married, but died without having had any children: Held (affirming the decision of Malins, V.C.), that they took equitable estates in fee as joint tenants subject to executory gifts over in the event of their dying leaving Issue, and that this event not having happened, the devisee of the survivor was entitled to the houses: (Yarrow v. Knightley, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 238. Ct. of Ap.) REAL ESTATE- SEISIN HEIR-AT-LAW WRONGFUL POSSESSION BY A STRANGER WILL.-R., being seised of real estate, died intestate in 1864, leaving A. his heir-at-law. Upon retained possession till her death in 1869, when R.'s death his widow wrongfully entered into and her devisees entered into possession. A., who had never entered into possession, died in 1871, having devised to the plaintiff "all real estate (if any) of which I may die seised." The plaintiff having brought his action against the devisees of R. s widow to recover possession, the devisees demurred on the ground that A.'s devise did not pass the property or any right of entry therein to the plaintiff. Held (affirming the decision of purely technical word, must be construed acJessel, M.R.), that the word "seised," being a cording to its technical meaning, and that, as A. had not at his death any seisin either in law or in (Leach v. Jay, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 262. Ct. of fact, the property did not pass under his devise: App.)

JUDGMENT CREDITOR-EQUITY OF REDEMPTION EQUITABLE EXECUTION-PRACTICE.-In an action brought by judgment creditors claiming upon the property of the debtor and for a receiver, a declaration that they were entitled to a charge elegit against the debtor's lands, but were unable and an injunction, the plaintiffs had sued ont an to obtain delivery by the sheriff by reason of the legal estate being outstanding, the debtor being only entitled to an equity of redemption therein: Held (affirming the decision of Hall, V.C.), that previously to 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112, were not any equitable rights which judgment creditors had Judicature Act 1873; and that the plaintiffs were affected or taken away by that Act or by the entitled to have, before decree, à receiver ap

pointed for the protection of the property available to answer their judgment. (Anglo-Italian Bank v. Davies, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 244.)

COUNTY COURTS. BRIGHTON COUNTY COURT. Friday, Nov. 8.

(Before A. MARTINEAU, Esq., Judge.) Re THOMAS GARD WOOD (a bankrupt); Ex parte NEWSHAM.

Bill of sale-Faiture to register the granter in custody, and the goods assigned at the date of the bill of sale, and thenceforth to the date of the bankruptcy in the possession of the police. HIS HONOUR.-This is an application by Mr. Newsham asking, in effect, that the trustee may be ordered to deliver to the applicant certain articles of jewellery which formerly belonged to the bankrupt, and which, since the bankruptcy, have come into the possession of the trustee, under an order of this court made the 18th July 1878. The applicant claims to be entitled to the jewellery as absolute purchaser, under a bill of sale, dated the 11th May 1878, whereby, in consideration of £80 paid by him to the bankrupt, the articles of jewellery in question, which were then in the possession or custody of the police, were assigned by the bankrupt to Newsham absolutely. This bill of sale was not registered. The applicant has sworn, and I am prepared to find as a fact, that on the 11th May, the date of the bill of sale, he had no notice of any act of bankruptcy committed by the bankrupt. The trustee opposes the application on two grounds-First, because the jewellery was, at the date of the act of bankruptcy, in the possession of the bankrupt within the meaning of the Bills of Sale Act; secondly, because the purchase was not a bona fide purchase

jewellery either for the purposes of trade or to wear; that he knew he would not get immediate delivery of the jewellery, if, indeed, he ever got t; that at the time of the alleged purchase he had £350 belonging to the vendor in his hands for some purpose connected with the attempt to bail the prisoner out; and, lastly, the fact that the £80 professed to have been paid for the jewellery actually came back to his hands on the very same day-all seem to me to indicate a colourable purchase; but, as I have said, it is unnecessary for me, holding as I do the bill of sale to be void under the Act, to find one way or the other as to the bona fides or reality of the purchase. If Mr. Newsham appeals to the chief udge, and the court should come to the conclusion hat I am wrong in holding that the non-registra ion invalidates the bill of sale as against the rustee, then all the facts which have been proved will be before the chief judge, who will be able to draw the proper inferences. All I can say is that, sitting as a jury and having heard Newsham give his evidence, I am not satisfied that the alleged purchase was a bonó fide purchase of the jewellery out and out, and the impression on my mind is that it was a colourable device. I prefer, how ever, to rest my decision on the first point. I decide that the bill of sale, not having been regis. tered, is void as against the trustee, and I refuse the application with costs. Under the power reserved to me by the order of Lindley, J., I give the trustee, as against Newsham, the costs incurred by the trustee in obtaining the order of Lindley, J., which will be included in the costs of the trustee of opposing the application. The costs will be taxed as between party and party, and paid by the applicant to the trustee. I usually leave it to the registrar to fix the amount of the deposit or security in case of an appeal; but to save trouble and expense I will fix the amount now at £20.

Hope, for Newsham, applied that Newsham might be at liberty to prove for the £80 advanced on the occasion of the purchase.

His HONOUR said the applicant might carry in any proof he might be advised, but he did not intend in any way to hold that Newsham was entitled to prove for the £80; and he observed that, according to the applicant, he had bought the jewellery for £80, and had lost the jewellery simply because he had not taken the precaution of registering the bill of sale.

SOUTH SHIELDS COUNTY COURT.
Thursday, Oct. 10.

(Before E. J. MEYNELL, Esq., Judge.) HARRISON V. THE SOUTH SHIELDS PROVIDENT

BUILDING SOCIETY.

Building society-Mortgage-Member-Redemption-Rights of society-Agency of solicitor. THE plaintiff in the case was Mr. John Harrison, master mariner, North Shields, and the defendants were the South Shields Provident Buildng Society, and Mr. John Robinson, Mr Wil. iam Black, and Dr. Legat, trustees of the same society. The facts are briefly that the plaintiff obtained an advance of £380 upon the mortgage of two houses. William Henry Bell, who was solicitor to the society, but who subsequently absconded, got plaintiff to indorse the cheque, and retained it, giving him a cheque for £130, the remaining £250 being required to pay off a prior mortgage. Bell, however, failed to pay over the £250, and the plaintiff now sought to get an order for the society to grant a redemption apon plaintiff paying £130. The contention for the plaintiff was that Bell acted throughout the entire proceedings as solicitor and agent to the society. Upon behalf of the society, however, it was urged that, after Bell obtained the plaintiff's indorsement to the cheque, he ceased to act as solicitor to the society, and that he was then acting as plaintiff's own solicitor.

The plaintiff claimed an injunction to restrain the defendants from taking any proceedings against him, or from exercising any power of sale incident to a mortgage ior £380 held by the society so long as he makes such payments, if any, as may be due on the footing of only £130 (less costs) having been advanced to him; and that the defendants may in the meantime be restrained pending the taking of the account hereinafter prayed, namely: "That it may be declared that the said mortgage of the 8th April 1876 has never been valid, except to secure such last-mentioned advances, and that the plaintiff may redeem on that footing, he hereby offering to redeem accordingly. That an account may be taken of what, if anything, is due to the defendants on the said mortgage on the footing of such declarations as herein before mentioned. That if it shall appear that, on the footing aforesaid, the defendants have been overpaid, they may repay the plaintiff with interest. Damages in respect of the nonpayment of the prior mortgage by the defendants. That the defendants may be ordered to pay the costs of this action. Such further or other relief s may be fit."

His HONOUR read the following judgment:
This suit raises the question which of two
innocent parties is to suffer by the defalca
tions of a dishonest solicitor. The facts of
the case are, that the plaintiff had mortgaged
some property to a Mrs. Armstrong for £250,
and being desirous of paying her off and
raising more money, he applied to Mr. Bell, the
solicitor of the defendant's society, for a loan of
£400. Mr. Bell's duties, as provided by the rules,
were to peruse title, prepare mortgage deeds, &c.,
and to act generally for the interests of the
society, and transact all professional business.
The application for the loan was made in the
regular manner, the property was valued, and
eventually Mr. Bell informed the plaintiff the
society would advance £380, with which the plain-
tiff was satisfied, and out of that sum Mrs. Arm-
strong was to be paid off. The plaintiff employed
no solicitor on his behalf. On the 8th April 1876
the plaintiff attended at Mr. Bell's, or the society's
office, which was in the same building, to execute
the mortgage deed, which he did. Mrs. Armstrong
was not made a party to the deed, nor was her
mortgage noticed in it. If the transaction had
been carried out as then intended, the legal estate
would have been left outstanding in her. The
plaintiff also signed a receipt on the mortgage
deed for £350. Mr. Bell also produced a cheque
signed by the chairman (also a trustee) and
the treasurer of the society for £350 drawn
to Mr. John Harrison or order; he never
gave plaintiff the cheque, but required him to
indorse it, saying he would then pay Mrs. Arm-
strong and get the title-deeds. Plaintiff did so,
and together they went to Mrs. Armstrong. Bell
told her they had come to pay the mortgage money
and get the deeds. Unfortunately Mrs. Armstrong
declined to receive the money, as she had only then
had three months' notice of the plaintiff's inten-
tion to pay off the mortgage. Mr. Bell then told
her he would hold the money in the society until
the notice had expired, and he would then pay her
over the money and get the deeds. Plaintiff re-
turned with Mr. Bell to the office, and the latter
said they could complete; he would hold the
money and give plaintiff the balance. It was the
society and Mrs. Armstrong had to settle. He
then gave plaintiff a cheque for £130 (less ex-
penses), and plaintiff remarked, "I signed that
cheque for £380, and I have not received it."
Bell told him he would give him a document to
certify that he had £250 of that to pay Mrs. Arm-
strong off, and he told his clerk to write out the
fellowing memorandum. Memorandum read.]
Mr. Bell never paid the £250 to Mrs. Armstrong,
he paid her the interest, and eventually absconded.
always making some excuse when applied to; but
The plaintiff has paid his subscriptions to the
society as on a mortgage for £380. He now prays
for an account, and seeks to redeem on the footing
of a mortgage for £130. The defendants contend
that they paid the plaintiff by their cheque £380;
that Mr. Bell was the solicitor for both parties;
and that after Mrs. Armstrong had refused to
receive the money, Mr. Bell held the cheque, or
the balance, as agent of the plaintiff. I think
there is a great deal of force in that contention,
and if the plaintiff had simply allowed Mr. Bell to
hold the money, on his undertaking to pay Mrs.
Armstrong, I might perhaps have come to the
conclusion that the plaintiff must bear the loss.
But the matter did not end there; and we must
consider the meaning of the memorandum,
and in what capacity Bell did keep the cheque,
whether as agent for the plaintiff or defen-
dant. It appears by the last four rules that the
society had power to borrow money at interest;
and, by a new rule of 28th Oct. 1875, it is pro-
vided that the signatures of not more than two
trustees, and that of one or more directors, be
required for each loan certificate, the same to be
countersigned by the secretary. What a loan
certificate is, is not stated-there is no form
given, nor is it mentioned in any other rule; but
I conclude it is a certificate to be given to the
lender of money to the society. The memorandum
which Mr. Bell gave to the plaintiff states that a
loan certificate is held by him for £250, for the
purpose of paying off a sum of that amount secured
to Mrs. Armstrong on houses, &c., which sum
secured by such certificate is intended to be
charged thereon in substitution for Mrs. Arm-
strong's mortgage. Now, it appears to me that
the meaning of the transaction and what Mr. Bell
undertook on behalf of the defendants' society,
was to receive back, as it were, the £250 on a
loan for three months, at interest, until Mrs. Arm-
strong could be paid. It seems a likely and proper
arrangement to be made. Something must be
done with the money. Mr. Bell, as solicitor to
the society, could not pay it over to the plaintiff,
and the plaintiff, having executed the mort-
gage deed, was liable to pay interest on
the whole sum of £380 from that day, and
also to pay three months' interest to Mrs.
Armstrong on the £250; and this view is further
confirmed by Mr. Bell having said to Mrs. Arm-
strong he would hold the money in the society.

I think, moreover, it was competent to Mr. Bell, acting as the society's solicitor, to make such an arrangement: he had the sole management of the mortgage transactions; as the secretary says in his evidence, he attended to the financial arrangements for mortgages. The secretary further says he (Mr. Bell) had received moneys on loan, but not generally. If he received money on loan certificates-which "he sometimes did-he ought to have handed it over to me and got my signature." I have come to the conclusion, therefore, that Mr. Bell undertook to hold the money as a loan to the society for three months, and he ought to have handed it to the secretary, and got a proper loan certificate to be held according to the memorandum, consequently that he held the money as agent for the defendants, and that they must bear the loss occasioned by their solicitor's default. The cases of Wells v. Cockerell (29 L. J. 816, Ch. ; 32 Ib. 276); Young v. White (7 Beav. 506; 13 L. J. 418, Ch.); Wrout v. Dawes (25 Beav. 369; 27 L. J. 635, Ch.), have a good deal of bearing on the point. I must declare the mortgage to the defendants' society is only valid to secure the sum of £130, and there must be an account taken of what, if anything, is due to the defendants on such mortgage; and they must have credit for any interest paid by Mr. Bell to Mrs. Armstrong, and the plaintiff must be at liberty to redeem on payment of what, if anything, is found to be due from him on the mortgage; and if the defendants have been overfendants, the building society, must pay the costs paid they must refund the surplus; and the deof the suit, and which must be dismissed as against Messrs. Robinson, Black, and Legat, whe seem to be unnecessary parties.

SOUTHWARK COUNTY COURT. (Before H. J. STONOR, Esq., Judge.) Monday, Nov. 18.

BLOYD V. HUNT.

Possession of tenements summons-Quære, whether
County Courts have jurisdiction in cases above
201. annual rent or value when the leasehold
title is in question?-19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 50;
9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 58; 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142,
s. 12.

HIS HONOUR this day delivered judgment as
follows:-This is a summons for the recovery of
the possession of certain premises let at £12 a
quarter, and therefore at the rate of £48 per
annum. Under the 50th section of the 19 & 20
Vict. c. 108, which provides that "where the term
ditament, where neither the value of the premises
and interest of any tenant of any corporeal here-
nor the rent payable in respect of the premises
nor the rent payable in respect of the tenancy
shall have exceeded £50 by the year, and on which
no fine or premium has been paid, has expired, or
has been duly determined by a legal notice to quit,
the landlord may enter a plaint for the recovery
of the same, and a summons shall issue thereupon,
and the judge may order the possession of the
premises mentioned in the plaint to be given by
the defendant to the plaintiff," and which pro-
vision is subject to the provisions of the 9 & 10 Vict.
c. 95, s. 58, as modified by the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142,
sect. 12, prohibiting the court from entertaining
a question of title if either the value or the rent
of the premises exceeds £20 yearly. The circum-
stances of the present case are peculiar. The
premises had formerly been let by the plaintiff to a
Mr. Thomson, at the above rent, for three years,
which term expired on the 25th March, 1877; and
then a Mr. Probert came in as a yearly tenant at
the same rent, and gave notice to quit, expiring
25th March, 1878, which was accepted by the
plaintiff. Previously to the last-named date Mr.
Probert introduced the defendant to the plaintiff,
and the defendant asked the plaintiff for a three
years' tenancy similar to that held by Mr. Thom-
son, which the plaintiff agreed to give, subject to
the defendant's references proving satisfactory.
On the 16th March, 1878, the plaintiff wrote to
Mr. Probert, stating that the defendant's refer-
ences had not proved satisfactory, and that he
would not give the defendant a three years' lease,
but there was no evidence that this letter was
communicated by Mr. Probert to the defendant,
who was let into possession by Mr. Probert on
the 28th March, as from the 25th March. The
rent of the premises had always
payable in advance, but on the 25th March
two quarters' rent were in arrear. On the 2nd
April the defendant paid these two quarters'
rent to the plaintiff on behalf of Mr. Probert,
having deducted the amount from a larger sum he
had paid to Mr. Probert for the goodwill of the
business of an auctioneer and public-house broker,
which had been carried on by Mr. Probert upon
the premises, and the defendant then took from
the plaintiff a receipt in Mr. Probert's name for
the same. The parties are agreed that on that
occasion some conversation took place as to the
defendant's proposed future tenancy, and that the
plaintiff promised to send the defendant the draft

been

of an agreement for his approval. The plaintiff, how-
ever, states that on such conversation he referred
to the letter he had written to Mr. Probert, and
said that he should abide by its terms, and that
the tenancy should be a quarterly one, or to that
effect, and that the defendant made no reply. The
defendant denies this statement, and says that all
that passed was that he said to the plaintiff, "You
must let me have a three years' agreement;" and
the plaintiff replied that "he would let me have a
draft of an agreement," and said nothing about a
quarterly tenancy. I may as well state here that
I believe the plaintiff's version of the interview.
On the 6th April, 1878, a draft agreement which
had previously been sent by the plaintiff to the
defendant (but when does not exactly appear) was
returned by the defendant to the plaintiff through
a witness, who was called, and deposed that the
defendant told him that he had looked through
the draft agreement and signed an approval of it
at the foot, subject to an alteration which he
had made in the last clause making the power of
distress for non-payment of the rent, which was
received quarterly, exercisable after fourteen
days' arrear instead of seven days. The draft
agreement was put in, and at its foot was written
this memorandum: "Read over and approved, as
witness our hands this 6th April, 1878," which
was signed by the plaintiff and the defendant.
The plaintiff agreed to the alteration above men-
tioned, and the draft agreement, so altered, proved
to be for a quarterly tenancy, at the quarterly
The defendant
rent of £12, payable in advance.
stated that, although he looked through the
draft cursorily before signing the approval of it,
he did not notice what the proposed term was;
bat, considering the previous negotiations and
all the circumstances attendant upon them, I can-
not believe that such was the case. After the 6th
April an application was made to the defen-
dant for payment in advance of the rent for the
quarter ending the 24th June, and on the 23rd
April the defendant wrote to the plaintiff expres-
sing his regret that it might be three weeks
before he could make that payment, adding the
words, "I shall not inconvenience you after this
quarter." Subsequent applications were made to
the defendant for payment of this rent, and also
for the execution of an agreement according to
the draft. Eventually the defendant paid the
rent on the 8th June, and a receipt was forwarded
to him, in his name, by the plaintiff (which mis-
carried), but the defendant declined to execute
the agreement, and the plaintiff on the 18th June
gave him notice to quit the premises on the 29th
September. The draft agreement, although the
memorandum of approval is signed by both
parties, clearly does not import an agreement,
but is merely evidence of something the parties
intended or contemplated agreeing to, and there-
fore I received it in evidence without a stamp,
according to the case of Doe d. Lambourne
V. Pedgriph (4 Carrington and Payne, 312;
and Sugden's V. & P. vol. 1, p. 185, 10th edit.
The question, therefore, remains whether, from
the payment by the defendant on the 8th June of
of the quarter's rent due on the 24th June, and its
acceptance by the plaintiff with the other circum-
stances of the case, a quarterly or a yearly
tenancy ought to be presumed. The fact of the
quarterly payment per se is of course not decisive
and scarcely material on the point, but, taking it
in conjunction with the other circumstances of
the case, I feel bound to find that the defendant
knew that the plaintiff contemplated a quarterly
tenancy, and a quarterly tenancy only, and there.
fore that he must be held to have paid the
quarter's rent, as the plaintiff clearly accepted it,
upon that footing. I, therefore, am of opinion
that the defendant's tenancy was a quarterly and
not a yearly tenancy, and that it has been duly
determined by the notice given by the plaintiff.
I, however, feel some doubt whether in the present
case the title to the premises is not in question
so as to bring it within the prohibition of the
9 & 10 Vict. c. 98, s. 58, as modified by
the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, s. 12. It is, indeed, laid
down in Pollock and Nicols' valuable book
of practice (which has contributed so much
to the success of the County Courts system)
that in cases where the limit of rent or value
is exceeded, the judge may nevertheless "decide
questions of title as to whether the landlord
has a rightful title to the possession; that is,
such questions as arise from a dispute whether the
lease was determined or the like" (8th edit. p. 268);
but I know of no authority that the judge can
decide, in the case supposed, as to the nature o
duration of the tenancy in its inception, if that is
disputed bona fide; and it appears to me very
difficult to distinguish between the case of the
tenant claiming bona fide the freehold, which
clearly ousts the jurisdiction of the court, in the
supposed case (Pearson v. Glazebrook, L. Rep. 3
Ex. 27), and his claiming bona fide a longer term
than that which the landlord admits, and,
although I have come to a conclusion adverse to
the defendant upon the conflicting evidence
before me, I am not prepared to say that his

|

defence ought not to be regarded as bona fide for
the present purpose. On the whole, however,
considering that the objection to jurisdiction was
not taken by the defendant at the hearing, that,
as far as I know, there is no decision in point;
and, that I feel no doubt as to the merits of
the case, I shall make an order for possession in
one month, with arrears of rent and costs at the
same time. And the defendant can appeal, or
apply for a prohibition in the meanwhile, if so
advised.

LAW SOCIETIES.

THE LEGAL PRACTITIONERS' SOCIETY.

|

G. H. Nelson, and resolved "That under the existing circumstances, a civil assize for Yorkshire in the month of October or early in November is highly inconvenient, and that such assize should be appointed for the month of December, at the same time as the Winter Gaol Delivery." A vote of thanks to the chairman terminated the proceedings.

The following is so much of the annual report as is of general interest.

LAW LIBRARY.-The sum expended during the year in the purchase of new books (not including the Serial Reports and Weekly Journals) is £56 48. 5d., and the sum paid for binding and repairs is £11 1s. 9d.

As a

an institution where

A MEETING of the council of this society was
LAW INSTITUTION.-At an extraordinary gene-
ral meeting of the society, held on the 6th March
held at the chambers of the Common Serjeant of last, the following resolutions were moved by Mr.
London, 5, Crown Office-row, Temple, on Wednes- George Hird Nelson, and unanimously carried:
"That the premises in Albion-place, shown on the
day last. Present: Mr. Edwin Low in the chair,
Mr. W. T. Charley, M.P., D.C.L. (hon. treasurer), plan produced at this meeting, be taken by the
Mr. Charles Ford (hon. secretary), Mr. Holroyd society on lease for the term of five years, at the
Chaplin, M.A., Mr. W. Frederick H. Wheat- yearly rent of £105, and used as a law institution,
croft, Mr. J. Godfrey, Dr. Tomkins, Mr. H. D. law library, sale room, and for other purposes of the
Jencken, and Mr. W. Griffith, B.A., and others. society. That the committee be empowered to agree
The hon. secretary read the minutes of the last to any modifications of the plan now produced,
meeting, which were confirmed. Mr. Ford then which, having regard to the purposes for which the
read the circular convening the meeting. A dis- premises are taken, they may deem expedient. That
cussion followed as to the holding of the annual the tenancy of the society commence as soon as
general meeting, which was fixed for the 8th of the premises are ready for occupation."
January at the Inns of Court Hotel, London, sale room had to be built, and considerable other
and the arrangements were left to a
sub- alterations were required to fit the premises for
committee. It was decided that the council the occupation of the society, some time has
should, as usual, dine together at the Inns of Court necessarily elapsed between the passing of the
Hotel after the meeting. Mr. Godfrey laid on
above resolutions and the occupation of the pre-
the table a bill having for its object the securing mises under it. As members are aware, the in-
of greater facilities for solicitors being called to stitution is now ready, and the society has entered
the bar. A long and animated discussion ensued into possession of it. The committee think that
the members may be congratulated on the com-
upon it, and its provisions were opposed by every
barrister present and supported by the solicitors pletion of a scheme which has been long under
present. Eventually Mr. C. Ford moved that it consideration, and which has been found to be
be referred to a sub-committee to confer with surrounded with many practical difficulties. They
Mr. W. Gordon, M.P., the president of the believe that the establishment in a central and
society, with a view to introducing the Bill convenient situation of
into Parliament in a more modified form in members can meet on common ground will do much
order to meet the susceptibilities of the bar- to facilitate the transaction of business, and will give
risters' branch of the Profession. Mr. Holroyd them opportunities hitherto wanting for becoming
better acquainted with each other. The com-
Chaplin seconded the motion. Mr. Charley, M.P.
and Dr. Tomkins stated that they felt compelled mittee also hope that the institute will shortly
to oppose the motion, the former gentleman develope into a legal exchange where members
stating that the Bill would be opposed by barristers will meet for business purposes, and where notices
in the House of Commons, and did not go far of sales, particulars of securities wanted and
enough for the Incorporated Law Society; and Dr. offered, will be regularly sent by all members.
Tomkins stated that he feared it would lead to If advantage be taken of this suggestion, the
the American system of partnerships between institute will become of great value in a purely
advocates and solicitors. On a division the meeting business sense. The new sale room is adapted
was equally divided, and the chairman gave a not only to its principal purpose of real property
casting vote in favour of referring Mr. Godfrey's sales, but also for the purposes of general sales,
Bill to a sub-committee, which was accordingly of creditors' meetings, arbitrations, and the like.
nominated. Mr. Wheatcroft called attention to Taking and furnishing these premises involves an
the serious inconvenience resulting from the great outlay which will only be justified by the success
of the scheme, and the committee rely on the
delay in procuring the taxation of Chancery costs,
and it was resolved that a memorial be presented support of the members to secure this success.
to the Lord Chancellor praying for an increase in
A set of conditions under which real property
the number of the Chancery taxing masters. The sales may be conducted is in course of pre-
question of equalising the annual certificate duty paration, and will shortly be submitted to the
for London and country solicitors was discussed, society. The committee cannot take leave of this
Mr.Ford stating that the operation of the Judicature subject without recording their obligation to
Acts warranted such an equalisation. The matter Messrs. John Latimer, Edmund Wilson, and
was ordered to stand over. Mr. Ford called atten- Frederic Eddison' for the valuable time they have
tion to the fact that the Bills of Sale Act of last devoted to the superintendence of the work.
session would come into operation on the 1st Jan.
next, and that a suggestion from the society as to
the fees to be charged by solicitors for attesting
the execution of bills of sale, and for explaining
the effect of the deed to the mortgagor might be
useful, but Mr. Wheatcroft pointed out that the
charges would probably be the same as in the
case of warrants of attorney, and the subject
dropped. After the transaction of some formal
business connected with the payment of the
subscriptions for the current year, a vote of
thanks to the chairman terminated the proceed-
ings.

THE INCORPORATED LEEDS LAW

SOCIETY.

THE annual ordinary general meeting for the year
1878, was held on the 30th ultimo at the Law
Institute, Albion-place, Leeds. Present-Mr. J.
D. Kay (president) in the chair, Messrs. G. H.
Nelson, F. Eddison, J. Latimer, J. C. Malcolm, J.
S. Newstead, J. Rider, J. Scott, J. Walker, F. H.
Barr, W. J. Cousins, T. G. Teale, E. Wilson, and
T. Marshall (hon. sec.). The report of the com-
mittee for the year having been presented, it was
proposed by Mr. Rider, seconded by Mr. Malcolm,
and resolved, "That the report now presented be
received and adopted." Messrs. W. Clarke, J.
Walker, J. C. Malcolm, and A. L. Booth, were
elected members of the committee in place of the
retiring committee-men. The treasurer's accounts
for the year having been presented, were received.
Mr. T. Marshall was re-elected secretary for the
year. Mr. J. D. Kay was re-elected treasurer for
the year. Messrs. William Warren and Octavius
Eddison were elected members of the society. It
was proposed by Mr. F. H. Barr, seconded by Mr.

SUSPENSION OF A SOLICITOR.-General complaints of improper conduct on the part of a solicitor practising in Leeds, but not a member of the society, having been made, the committee thought it their duty to investigate a particular case formally laid before them by a member of the society. The allegations appearing to justify preliminary inquiry, that inquiry was made at the expense of the society. The matter was subsequently laid before the Council of the Incorporated Law Society in the usual way, and proceedings were taken by that body which resulted in the suspension of the solicitor from practice for four years.

WINTER ASSIZES.-This question, which occupied so much attention last year, has at length been settled in favour of the applicaton to give Yorkshire a third civil assize; the committee of judges to whom the matter was referred by the Lord Chancellor admitting that the claim was too strong to be resisted. The first of these additional assizes is this year fixed for the beginning of November. This date scarcely allows the objects for which the third assize was required to be carried out. The interval between the summer assize, which terminates about the 10th of Aug., and an assize held at the end of October or the beginning of November, is too short, being less than twelve weeks, of which ten weeks fall within the Long Vacation; while that between the Winter Assize of November and the Spring Assize o March is too long. What is required is a Civi Assize in December, at or about the time a which the Winter Goal Delivery has been hitherto held. This subject was discussed at the Man chester Meeting of the Incorporated Law Society and a resolution was adopting urging it on th