new Bill will require the most careful examination at the hands of the Legislature before it can be pronounced a really successful measure. So great, indeed, are some of the innovations contemplated by the proposed enactment, that, giving to it all the consideration it deserves, we despair of seeing it become law during the present session of Parliament.

It has been said that the measure now under consideration is of a revolutionary character, and no doubt in several particulars it is such, many of Our well and long-established doctrines applicable to the administration of the criminal law being most ruthlessly swept away. Thus, we may refer to sect. 23, which deals with crimes committed under compulsion," "the second paragraph of which enacts that, no presumption shall henceforth be made that a married woman committing an offence in the presence of her husband does so under compulsion." Now here in a couple of lines we have a privilege enjoyed by millions of women from time immemorial utterly abolished and annihilated! We feel assured that the Legislature will never consent to this without the gravest and most mature consideration. It will be observed that the clause does not abolish the immunity of a married woman if established by evidence; but, inasmuch as it will always be impossible for a woman to prove the compulsion of her husband, the section in effect wholly abrogates this privilege of a wife. Now, is this desirable? We unhesitatingly assert that it is not. From the most remote times this privilege, with the exception of a very few classes of crime, for which there are special reasons for its not being allowed, has been in existence, and we venture to assert, with no real detriment to the substantial interests of public justice. Now and then a married woman may through the operation of this privilege have escaped a punishment which she may righteously have deserved; but, upon the whole, it has operated beneficially for the best interests of the community. It is not for the interests of society that a married woman should set herself in opposition to the directions and mandates of her husband. It is not convenient, considering the obedience which a wife owes to the commands of her husband, that she should refuse to obey his directions to assist him in doing that about which he is himself engaged. A married woman, by that obedience to her husband which she engages at the altar to observe, ought not to be expected to criticise his commands with reference to anything she is required to do in his presence. About such things she is supposed to defer to his superior wisdom and forethought, and the presumption, therefore, is a reasonable one that, with reference to the classes of offences upon which it at present exists, she has acted under his control and compulsion. In truth, this doctrine is a wise one, and is founded upon sound logical reasoning, that for the happiness of families and the insuring of domestic felicity it is much better that certain criminal actions on the part of the wife should be assumed to have been committed under the compulsory influence of the husband, than that she should be encouraged to question the commands of such husband. Our jurists from all time have approved of this immunity, and unless some manifest prejudice to public justice can be pointed to as flowing from it, we cannot see the policy and justice of its abolition.

As pertinent to the foregoing, we may turn to section 253, headed "Husband and Wife," which enacts that "No husband shall be convicted of stealing during cohabitation the property of his wife, and no wife shall be convicted of stealing during cohabitation the property of her husband; but whilst they are living apart from each other, either shall be guilty of theft, if he or she fraudulently takes or converts anything which is by law the property of the other in a manner which in any other person would amount to theft." Now it will be observed that the condition upon which criminality depends is the living apart from each other. But what is the definition of living apart from each other? They live apart from each other when the husband is a sailor at sea, or a soldier upon foreign service, where they may remain for years; or, in fact, when they separate by mutual consent. It may perhaps be said that the word fraudulently is a safeguard for each; but, in truth, it is no such thing, for the mere fact that the wife or the husband knowingly takes anything that belongs to the other must be deemed to have been legally fraudulently taken. Here, then, we have a perfectly new principle introduced into our criminal law, and one which may be turned to the most untoward consequences. Take it that a man and wife mutually agree to live separate-the wife on parting takes with her some of her husband's trinkets or money; he may have her arrested upon a charge of felony, and be sent to penal servitude! It is quite dreadful to contemplate what hideous enormities the law, as it is intended to be, may not thus legalise. Surely the Legislature will never consent to such a revolutionary enactment. Giving the foregoing merely as specimens

of some of the innovations contained in this Bill,
we cannot for a moment believe that the Legisla-
ture will adopt it upon the trust of the eminent
lawyers by whom it has been supervised, but that
they will give it, in all its sections, an investiga-
tion and a careful scrutiny which so important a
measure imperatively demands.
(To be continued.)

COVENTRY MAGISTRATES COURT.

Mine Managers and their authority.
THE following proceedings took place recently
before this court.-William James, engine-driver,
and William Beamish, head-banksman, were sum-
moned for having, on the 23rd and 28th Jan.,
disobeyed the commands of their employer, Joseph
Bradbury, contractor at the Charity Colliery, who
claimed of the former £3 and of the latter 23 12s.
damages.

Hugo Young, of the Midland Circuit (instructed
by Hughes and Masser Coventry), appeared for
the complainant.

out.

Evidence was given in support of the case by the complainant Bradbury) and James Wilkins, underviewer at the Hawkesbury Colliery.

Wilks intimated that if the Bench were against him he should ask them to state a case for a Superior Court.

Bradbury, the contractor, and that they had always taken their orders from him and were paid by him. Moreover, special rule 60 said that the men were bound to obey all orders "of the contractor in whose service they are." What the manager wished to prove was that he was entitled to go to James, the employed of Bradbury, and tell him to stop the engine for anything he thought proper, and not merely when the safety of the mine was endangered. Mr. Young then proceeded to quote the special rules of the colliery, and said, assuming the manager had some cause of complaint against Luckman and Tallis, for instance that they had infringed any rule of the mine; and if that involved no danger to the safety of the mine or any individual, it was not the manager's duty to stop the working of the mine generally; but he had provided for him, by Act of Parliament, means for punishing the workmen for any breach they had committed. It appeared to him that if Mr. Barker was to be allowed to do what he had, it Montagu Walks (Messrs. Dewes, Son, and Wilks, became impossible for any body of contractors to Coventry), for the defendants. carry out the work they had undertaken. The case Young said that he and his friend Mr. Wilks against Beamish was similar to James. There had had agreed on a great many facts, which would been a complaint by Mr. Barker against a man shorten the case materially. Before coming to named Tallis, and when the latter got into the the exact point in dispute, he would explain the cage to descend into the pit the manager gave general facts, as to which there would be no dis-orders not to allow it to descend until Tallis got pute. These were proceedings taken under the Bradbury objected to this, and ordered Employer and Workmen's Act, in order to settle the banksman to allow the cage to descend. a dispute between an employer and his men, Mr. Both Tallis and Bradbury remained in the Bradbury being employer and James and Beamish cage for half-an-hour, and then got out, but being two people whom the complainant said four hours later the manager revoked the were employed by him. The procedings were order, and allowed the cage to descend. Assumtaken in connection with the working of what was ing the manager had reasons for his conduct, he known as the Charity Colliery, belonging to the contended he had no power to do it, or in other Bedworth Coal and Iron Company. It appeared words, he had no right, simply because he by an agreement with Mr. Bradbury that they objected to a person, to give orders to others who had let to him the mining and working of this were not employed by him, and who were bound mine at a certain rate per ton. He should put in to obey Bradbury's orders; he had no authority the agreement. There was a manager (Mr. to interfere except in matters where the safety of Barker) who was appointed over the mine; and the mine or the men were concerned; and the real question to be settled was whether the therefore the defendants were bound to obey the people who were employed in the mine, and who contractor's orders, and were liable for the damage he should show, by the agreement, were to be claimed. appointed and paid by the contractor, were to obey the orders of the contractor or the orders of the manager. That being the simple point, it being a question whether these defendants were bound to obey the orders of the contractor or manager, it did not become necessary to inquire whether the manager was justified in the order that he gave that is justified by the facts, assuming he had power to give the order. The facts agreed upon were as follows: (1) That Mr. Barker was the manager of the mine; (2) That Bradbury was the contractor under an agreement (marked A) dated March 12, 1878, and that his connection with the colliery depended on that agreement; (3) that James, one of the defendants, was the engine-man. The fourth fact they were not agreed on, it would have to be proved, and it was this: By whom James was selected and appointed." (5) It was agreed that James was paid by Bradbury; (6) Beamish, the other defendant, was head banksman. The seventh term they were not agreed upon. "Who was Beamish selected and appointed by?" (8) It was agreed that Beamish was paid by Bradbury; (9) that on the 28th Jan. the manager ordered James to stop the engine; (10) that Bradbury ordered him to start the engine; (11) that James obeyed the manager and not Bradbury; (12) That on the 30th Jan. the manager ordered Beamish not to allow the cage to descend; (13) that Bradbury, the contractor, then ordered him to allow the cage to descend; (14) that Beamish obeyed the manager and not Bradbury; (15) the damages agreed at, £3 in each case, if any recoverable; (16) it was not agreed, that the stopping of the engine affected the safety of the mine. Proceeding, Mr. Young said the question and (taking one of the cases because the facts were the same) whether the engine-man was under the control of those who paid him-i.e., the contractor-or of the manager. Now he (Mr. Young) contended that under this agreement the whole getting of the mine was given to Bradbury; that he appointed the men to these offices-banksman and engineer -that they were paid by him; and that except as to provisions in reference to the safety of the mine, they were bound to obey his orders. That was the only exception they made. What he wished to prove was that the engine was stopped because the manager wanted Luckman discharged. Complainant considered he was Luckman's employer and entitled to discharge him, and he declined to do so. Mr. Yonng then read the clauses of the agreement, which were relevant to the case, and said there used to be an old rule, that "the person who pays the piper may choose the tune," and that they said in the preIt was only reasonable and proper that the person who took the working of a mine should be entitled to employ men to enable him to carry out his contract; and he should be able to prove in this case that James and Beamish were selected and appointed by

sent case.

The Magistrates' Clerk (Mr. T. H. Kirby) asked Mr. Young if he contended that the manager had no power whatever to give any orders; and Mr. Young replied that what they contended was that Mr. Barker had no power to give any orders except as to what concerned the well-being or the safety of the mine. Mr. Barker had no right to stop the mine because there was a man down the pit to whom he had an objection, and thus inflict a penalty on the contractor.

After some further discussion Wilks addressed the Bench for the defence. He said the Bench would have seen from his cross-examination that his defence really consisted in this: that these two men were both acting rightly in obeying the order, the written order, of the manager (Mr. Barker); and that they were thereby protected from any consequences of the summonses brought by Bradbury. În other words his contention was this-that so far as the question of obedience to the manager against Mr. Bradbury was concerned, both under the agreement which had been put in, the Act of Parliament, and the special and general rules of the colliery, Mr. Barker was master, and had entire control of the management of the pit, and Mr. Bradbury was simply a sub-contractor, qua pit No. 9, with regard to the actual getting and severing of the coal. The contract had been put in. He respectfully differed in toto with regard to the construction of the agreement sought to be placed upon it by his friend Mr. Young. He submitted that the meaning of the contract as a whole was a mere location of work - certain specific work which for convenience and for the sake of profit, was put out to be done by contract under the manager (Mr. Barker); and the contractor (Mr. Bradbury) had the right of taking the coal and choosing the men, subject to the special rules, add these men being chosen by him were of course paid by him. This letting of the pit to a contractor was simply to rid the company of any question of detail, but the company still retained the management of the pit in Mr. Barker, who had the supreme control. He would remind the Bench with regard to this construction, that this was the relation existing between sub-contractors and proprietors all over the kingdom at the present time. So important a point was it, and so seriously did the management of this colliery consider it to be, that he had instructions to ask the Bench if their decision was against him to state a case for the authority of the Supreme Court of Appeal. His clients felt this, that if Mr. Bradbury was to be master of the mine, and his orders were to be obeyed as against the orders of the properly constituted official and statutory officer of the pit there was an end to all

proper working of it. Mr. Bradbury contracted to work the pit subject to the Act of Parliament and the general and special rules of the pit, and Mr. Barker, as manager, had entire control of this pit. He contended that the discharge of any of these people must be subject to the approval of the

company.

was

The BENCH.-There is a very high authority for saying that no man can serve two masters. Wilks replied that it was a high authority, but he did not think that saying had ever had a judicial construction. Mr. Bradbury agreed to work the pit in accordance with the Coal Mines Regulation Act and the special rules of the colliery, and he must have known that it was a breach of rules for a man to work in the pit who had not been registered. Taking Mr. Young on his own ground --assuming for the moment that his contention as to the well-being and safety of the men right-he pointed out all the rules were one code inseparable and certified both by men and masters, to be as a whole for the miners' safety; and the danger to the men and to the pit, of persons being employed in it who were not competent and who had failed to be registered, and then proceeding to the facts of the case, he said the men Tallis and Luckman had infringed the colliery special rules, Tallis by absenting himself from his work without having previously obtained the permission of the manager, and Luckman for entering the mine without previously being registered. tinuing his argument that under the Mines Act, Con1877, the manager had entire control, and in reply to some observations from the Bench, Mr. Wilks pointed out that under the 26th section of the Act every mine must be under the control and daily supervision of a certificated manager.' contended that the manager had a large discretion He invested in him, and the course he adopted in ordering the engine to be stopped, and the banksman not to let the catches of the cage go until Luckman was brought up from the pit and Tallis out of the cage, was perfectly legal and right, and that a manager, from the necessity of his position, was not forced to exercise one species of trol," as urged by his friend, viz., summoning the men before that court.

con

The CHAIRMAN said the question really was, was it a reasonable interference?

Wilks said his contention was that it was. The Bench expressed an opinion that a better remedy might have been adopted, whereupon Mr. Wilks pointed out that Mr. Barker, before proceeding to extreme measures, asked Bradbury to send him out, and that he refused to do so.

After some discussion between the learned advocates and the Bench, Mr. Barker was called, and gave evidence in support of Mr. Wilks's statement.

After an inquiry of about five hours' duration, the Bench retired, and on their return into court, the Bench said they must decide in favour of the defendants, holding that the manager had power to give such orders as appeared to him to be necessary for the management and safety of the nine. Whether he exercised that power wisely or unwisely in the present instanee was a matter for further consideration and argument. magistrates considered that he exercised it in The a way less direct and satisfactory than he might have done, but that was them. The men were bound to obey the person not before who had ultimate authority, and was absolutely in charge of the mine. If there had been any mistake on the manager's part-which the Bench could not now determine the remedy of the contractor was against the persons contracting with him. For the men themselves it was simply a convenient rule, and one that must minister to the safety and welfare of those engaged in mining operations, that the manager must have ultimate authority and ultimate responsibility. Costs to follow.

SHIFNAL SESSIONS. (Before Col. KENYON SLANEY, Col. W. KENYON SLANEY, W. E. G. BOTFIELD, and T. E. HORTON, Esqs., and Capt. BROOKE.) Licensing Act, 1874 s. 16-Admission of Constable to Licensed Premises.

MOSES PASCALL, of the Albion Inn, St. George's, licensed victualler, was summoned for refusing to admit Thomas Chrimes, a police constable, to his licensed premises, on the night of the 7th March. Chidley, of Wolverhampton, defended.

The evidence of the complainant was to the effect that he and another constable heard a noise of voices in the kitchen of defendant's house at midnight, and knocked three times to gain admission. Mr. Thomas Pascall (defendant's manager) put his head out of a window and refused in offensive language to let him in. The witness, in the course of a severe cross-examination by Mr. Chidley, admitted that he did not imagine any offence was being committed against the licensing laws, and said his only motive was that he heard voices. He saw no light in the house, and did not see whether Mr. Thomas

THE LAW TIMES.

[APRIL 19, 1879.

MARITIME LAW.

been twice to the house in the daytime, and had
Pascall was in his nightdress or not. He had
seen something wrong, but had neither complained
nor reported it. The house was generally closed
allege any conviction against the house for twenty-DENCE.-In an Admiralty appeal from a County
a few minutes before the time. He could not
NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.
COUNT COURT APPEAL PRACTICE - EV-
complained of his swearing that a man was sober diction Act 1868, where there are no shorthand
six years. He was aware that Mr. Pascall had Court, under the County Courts Admiralty Juris
bury Sessions, whom the chairman in his charge by the judge of the County Court available for the
in a stabbing case tried at the Michaelmas Shrews- writer's notes of the evidence, and no notes taken
to the grand jury stated to be inflamed with purpose of appeal, the High Court (Admiralty
liquor. He declined to say whether he heard the Division) will order the appeal to be heard on vi
chairman's charge to the jury, although he was
the principal witness. He declined to say whether N.S. 201. Adm. Ct.)
he knew that Mr. Pascall had contemplated pro-
voce evidence: (The Confidence, 40 L. T. Rep.
ceedings for perjury against him. Mr. Pascall
had told him very excitedly that he had sworn an
untruth.

dence of the last witness, and said he heard several
Police-constable Finney corroborated the evi-
voices in the kitchen and the noise of a great
scuffling.

characterised as a planned affair on the part of
Chidley commented on the case, which he
against a house which had been conducted ex-
the policeman Chrimes to obtain a conviction
ceptionally well for twenty-six years without a
conviction. Even if the police spoke the truth,
he claimed the dismissal of the summons on the
ground of the 16th section of the Licensing Act
1874, which only authorised the entry of the con-
stable for the prevention or detection of "the
violation of any of the provisions of the principal
and a penalty only attached where a landlord
Act or this Act which it is his duty to enforce,"
refused or failed to admit a constable "in the
stable's duty to wake up respectable publicans
execution of his duty.'
from their beds, and the constable was bound in
It was no part of a con-
law, according to the eminent authority of
Paterson, J., "to prove that the statute was
about to be or had been violated." As to the
facts, it would be shown that there had neither
been a refusal or failure to admit the constable.
who proved that in consequence of a serious acci-
Chidley then called Mr. Thomas Pascall,
dent his father was not at home on the night
in question, and the only persons in the house at
ten minutes to eleven were himself and a ser-
vant named Caleb Davies, who slept in the same
room with him. After closing time witness locked
up and searched the premises as usual, and went
awakened by a loud knocking at the door, and
to bed about a quarter past eleven. He was
wanted. Police-constable Chrimes told him that
threw up the window sash and asked what was
he had heard a noise. Witness thought the police-
man was not there for proper motives, and, losing
his temper, said there was no noise. The police-
in."
man then said, "Are you coming down to let us
struck a light, and hurried downstairs, with only
Witness replied, "Yes," and immediately
his trousers and slippers on, but the policeman
had then disappeared. He went across the road
and shouted for them, but they did not come back.
He suspected them of hiding themselves. There
was not the slightest pretence for saying there had
been any noise in the house.

evidence, and Absolom Pitchford said he was the
The servant, Caleb Davies, corroborated the
and he believed no other persons were
last customer, and was locked out at closing time,
house when he left than Thomas Pascall and C.
in the
Davies.

proved, and convicted the defendant, imposing a
The BENCH decided that the charge had been
penalty of 40s. and costs.

the opinion of the Court of Quarter Sessions.
Chidley. My client under my advice will take

The CHAIRMAN.-On what grounds?
not within the 16th section, and that with all
Chidley. On the double ground that the case is
respect to the Bench they had misconceived the
facts.

lant's recognizances, which were accepted, for ap-
Chidley then made formal applications with re-
peal against the conviction.
spect to the appeal notices and amount of appel-

COMPANY LAW.
NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS.
WINDING-UP-SECURED CREDITOR

TICE.

- A creditor, who before the presenPRACtation of a petition for the winding-up of a company obtains a garnishee order nisi against a order on the garnishee until after the presentation debtor to the company, but does not serve the of the winding-up petition, is not a secured creditor within the meaning of the 12th and 14th secof which Act with regard to the respective rights tions of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, the provisions the 10th section of the Judicature Act 1875, made of secured and unsecured creditors are now, by applicable in the winding-up of companies under Fry, J. reversed: (Re The Stanhope &c., Comthe Companies Acts 1862 and 1867. Decision of pany, 40 L. T. Rep. N.S. 204. Ct. of App.)

MARITIME LIEN
JURISDICTION FOREIGN VESSEL OF WAR —
- EX-TERRITORIALITY - SAI -
VAGE.-The High Court of Justice, Admiralty D -
vision, will not allow a warrant to issue for the
ment to which she belongs have the care, at the
arrest of a foreign vessel of war, or of private prc-
perty on board of her, and of which the Govern-
N.S. 219. Adm. Ct.)
suit of salvors. (The Constitution, 40 L. T. Rep.

MAIL PACKET

JURISDICTION-COLLISION ARREST - Exfor the purposes of carrying mails and passengers TERRITORIALITY GOVERN MENT VESSEL.-A vessel belonging to or chartered by a foreign Government, and regularly employed and some cargo, is not entitled to the priviledes vessel of a British subject, and to arrest if the of a man-of-war as to ex-territoriality : but is suit is in rem. liable to an action for damage done by her to the The Crown of this country has

not power, by treaty with a foreign Government tional law to vessels of war. Where the Crown ap to give to vessels of, or employed by, that Govern ment other than vessels of war the privilege o freedom from civil process extended by interna pears to protest against the jurisdiction of the Parlement Belge, 40 L.T. Rep. N.S. 222. Adm. Ct.) court being exercised against a vessel belonging to a foreign power, it has the same right of reply as in cases where it appears on its own behalf: (The

WRECK COMMISSIONERS' COURT.
Saturday, April 12.

(Before Mr. H. C. ROTHERY, the Wreck Com-
missioner, with assessors).

Wreck Commissioner's Court as a Court of Surrey
THE BALMORAL (a.)
-Practice-Form of Order-Costs-39 & 40
The assessors were Mr. Robert Duncan, ship-
Vict. c. 80, ss. 7, 8, 9, 14, and 15. Rules of the
Court of Survey 1876, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 101,
8. 312.
builder, Port Glasgow, and Mr. J. R. Ravenhill,
civil engineer, London.

Merchant Shipping Act 1876, which establishe i
THIS was the first appeal under that part of the
Courts of Survey. It was tried at Glasgow. In
1878, a certificate No. 4 was issued for the
Balmoral, authorising her owner, Mr. Keith, to
in her between certain points. The certificate now
carry 331 passengers in summer, and 236 in winter
Kyles of Bute. On the expiry of the old certificate.
veyance of 616 passengers between Glasgow and the
sought for was No. 5. It would authorise the con-
the owner made the usual application for the new
one, and it appeared from the evidence that, subject
to certain specified repairs, the local surveyor of the
under 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 312, upon which a
Board of Trade was willing to make the declaration
certificate would be granted.
paid a visit to Glasgow, and inspected the vessel,
veyor of the board, Mr. Wimshurst, had, however,
The principal sur-
and had reported that the Balmoral was com-
panied by Captain Price, principal officer of the
the declaration he came down again, and, accom-
pletely worn out. Upon the application for
Board of Trade Survey Department for the west
coast of Scotland, as well as by the local surveyor.
the hull.
Mr. Fielden, made another careful inspection of

The result was again unfavourable. The board resolved to grant no certificate, and the surveyors were instructed to make no declaration. The owner, Mr. Hugh Keith, brought this appeal.

Douglas, counsel for the Board of Trade, opened the case, and called witnesses to prove the weakness of the vessel. He then read and handed into the court the following statement in writing: 'The Board of Trade require the court to make an order dismissing this appeal with costs."

Spens, for the owner, then called witnesses to prove the strength of the vessel, among whom was the local surveyor for the Board of Trade. At the conclusion of his case he said he had now to move that the court should make an order finding Shipping Act 1854, or otherwise to report that claration in terms of sect. 312 of the Merchant that the steamer Balmoral was entitled to a derate and reasonable repairs being done as the such declaration should be granted on such modeto costs. court might see fit to appoint, and, in the event of a finding to that effect, to find the appellant entitled

(1) Reported by Israel Davis, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

Douglas applied for leave to call further wit

nesses.

The application was refused.

reason of the fact that I have known him from a
much earlier period than the date at which I took
my seat in this court as its judge, and from the
myself were members of the same circuit for
many years, and attended the assizes and sessions
together, and that the friendship which we then
formed continued unbroken up to the close of his
life.

The court adjourned, and, unaccompanied by further fact that his late brother, the Q.C., and
the parties, personally inspected the vessel.
Spens addressed the court.
Douglas replied.

The COMMISSIONER delivered the judgment of the court, which declared substantially that the assessors found the ship to be a strong one. The order would therefore be that on the plates which had been found to be weak being renewed, on the patches being taken off and another garboard streak placed upon the vessel similar to that which was now found on her fore part, on the corroded frames being either doubled or replaced, on the girder and bilge keelsons or sister keelsons being so formed as to properly distribute the weight of the boiler and engines, and on the vertical bracket plates being renewed, a declaration entitling the vessel to a No. 5 certificate should be granted. As to the question of costs, the court found that both parties had been to blame, and that therefore each party should pay its own

costs.

said:

CCUNTY COURTS. MARYLEBONE COUNTY COURT. Tuesday, April 1.

(Before Mr. S rjeant WHEELER, LL.D., Judge.) Ar the sitting of the court, Mr. Scaife rose, and Before your Honour proceeds to the business of the day, may I ask you to kindly permit me to trespass upou your valuable time for a few minutes to refer to a matter which is interesting not only to my self but to the gentlemen practising in this court, whom I represent on this occasion. I allude to the absence from his accustomed place, which I now se occupied by another, of our respected friend, Mr. Torr, who has occupied that position for so long a period with so much ability and satisfaction. That gentleman has, as most of us know, filled the important office of Assistant or Deputy Registrar of this court for about twentythree years, and I am sure no one who has been in the habit of attending the court, and especially the registrar's office, where his most important duties lay, could have done otherwise than notice the zeal, industry, and ability, with which he discharged the responsible duties committed to him, and the way in which he laboured to promote the usefulness, and maintain the prestige of the court in which he took a warm interest. Under these circumstances it seemed to me that we should be wanting in our duty to him, as well as to ourselves, if we permitted this opportunity to pass without testifying our high appreciation of his merits and regard for him as a professional friend and a gentleman, and, at the same time, to express our profound regret that circumstances have led to his vacating an office which he has filled with so much credit to himself and benefit to the suitors, and to assure him that in doing so he will be accompanied by the sincere and cordial good wishes of us all for his future success and happiness, in whatever sphere he may hereafter be called to

оссиру.

MONMOUTH COUNTY COURT.
(Before J. M. HERBERT, Esq., Judge.)
JONES v. SUMMERS.

Gardner for claimant, and Watkins for the exe-
cution creditor.

issue to try the validity of a claim made by
His HONOUR said. This was an interpleader
William Summers to certain goods which had
under a warrant of fi. fu. against the goods of
been seized by the bailiff of this court in execution
claimant's brother, Henry Summers. The goods
in question had formerly belonged to the execution
debtor; but, having been seizel by the sheriff,
they were sold by him to the claimant, William
Summers. When the sale took place William
Summers paid the sheriff's officer £10 in part
payment, and gave him the joint I.O. U. of himself
and Mr. Gardner for the balance, and the sheriff's
officer gave the claimant the following receipt:
'Newport, Monmouthshire, Jan. 29th, 1879. Re-
ceived of Mr. Summers, Crown Inn, Raglan, the
sum of £20, being the amount for which I have
this day sold the whole of the effects of Henry
Summers to him, taken under an execution
from the Sheriff of Monmouthshire. (Signed)
J. A. George." There was no other document
relating to the transaction, but the claimant
admitted that he purchased the goods that Henry
Summers might continue to have the use of them,
with the right to repurchase them at the price
paid to the sheriff. Mr. Watkins, for the execu-
tion creditor, submitted that the receipt was a
bill of sale under the new Bills of Sale Act, and
that not having been registered, it was void
against the execution creditor. He cited a num-
ber of cases under the old Bills of Sale Act, all of
which are cited and commented upon in the recent
se of Ex parte Odell, Re Walden (L. Rep. 10
Ch. D. 76), before the Court of Appeal (10 Ch. Div.
76), and this case throws much doubt on the
previous cases of Allsop v. Day (31 L. J. 105,
Ex.), and Byerley v. Prevost (L. Rep. 6 C. P.
144), which ruled that a receipt with an in-
ventory of the goods attached, and a receipt with
an agreement to re-let the goods to the execution
debtor, did not require registration under the old
Bills of Sale Act; and in Er parts Odell, Lord
Chief Justice Cockburn and Baron Pollock, sitting
in the Exchequer Division, had held that the fol-
lowing document does not require registration:

31st May 1874, High Court of Appeal. Robert Wood (plaintiff) v. Charles D. Watson (defendant). Received of Mr. Thomas William Woodgate, Balham, Surrey, the sum of £589 17s., being the value of the undermentioned goods, chattels, and effects. Seized by the Sheriff of Surrey in the above action at 15, Atterbury-gardens, Lavender Hill, Battersea, in the county of Surrey, and sold to the said Thomas Williams Woodgate, W. Horek and Son. The receipt contained an invenHis HONOUR, in responding to the above address tory of the goods. At the same time Woodgate, from Mr. Scaife, said as follows:-Mr. Scaife, I by a written agreement, bearing date 31st May have listened with great interest to the eloquent 1875, let the house, Atterbury-garden, together tribute which you have paid to the excellent with the goods in question, to Watson, on a qualities of our friend, Mr. Torr, and to the regret quarterly tenancy, and Watson continued in which you express at the close of his connection possession as before. Baron Pollock directed the with this court as its Assistant-Registrar. I am jury that the receipt was not a bill of sale, and glad that you have taken the earliest opportunity did not require registration, and though in moving which the sitting of this court presents of bearing for a rule nisi for a new trial, counsel relied on public testimony on behalf of yourself and the Ex parte Cooper; Re Baum (10 Ch. Div. 315; 39 other members of the Bar, whom we are wont to L. J. N. S. 521), and Ex parte Odell; Re Waldon, see amongst us, to your respect for the character as authorities, that such a receipt was within of Mr. Torr, and to your appreciation of the care sect. 1 of 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36. The court held and fidelity with which his duties have been that since the sale was an out and out one by the discharged. And I beg to assure you that I sherif's officer, and since his receipt was not the sympathise most fully with your feelings, and medium of transfer, but only evidence of the pay. echo the good opinion which you have so well ex- ment, it was not within the Act, and did not pressed. You allude to the facilities which you require registration, and the rule for a new trial have all received from the kindness of Mr. Torr, was refused. In the case which I have to deal in your periodical visits to the offices of the court with there is a receipt for the purchase-money n business matters, and though in that special only. It is, therefore, my duty, I consider to department of his duty I have not the personal follow in the last case, and also in Re Allsop v. knowledge to which you can lay claim, I am quite Day, and Prevost v. Byerley, that a mere receipt prepare to accept your statement as a fitting for the price of goods sold which is not a medium expression of the obligations under which he has of transfer, but only evidence of payment unless laid both suitors and solicitors, and to believe the interpretation clause of the new Bills of that, as in the court itself, so in the offices of the Sale Act, which came into operation before the court, he has equally won general respect and con- sale by the sheriff to the claimant, includes such a fidence. What may be the particular channel document within the term "bill of sale." Now, into which our friend may turn his legal attain- by the 4th section of the New Act (41 & 42 Vict. ments is, I presume, at present uncertain; but I c. 31) the expression "bill of sale" shall include am quite sure that the good wishes of his friends bills of sale, assignments, transfers, declarations who have attended here to-day will accompany of trust without transfer, inventories of goods him in his future career, and that we shall all of with receipt thereto attached, or receipts for purus desire that that future may be one of comfort chase money of goods, and other assurances of and prosperity. I may say, in conclusion, that personal chattels, and also powers of attorney, the interest which I must always feel in the well-authorities, or having to take possession of perbeing of Mr. Torr is of a very special kind, by

sonal chattels as security for any debt, and

66

"

with

also, &c." It was contended by Mr. Watkins that
this clause includes mere receipts for purchase
money of goods," per se, as bills of sale; but after
much consideration I am unable to come to this
conclusion. It will be observed that re-
ceipts," &c., are connected by the next preceding
words "inventories with receipt attached," by the
disjunctive conjunction or whilst they are
immediately followed by the copulative "and"
connecting with all that has been specified
before the sweeping words "other assurances of
personal chattels. It seems to me, therefore,
that inasmuch as the word "or" would be super-
fluous if it was intended to make a mere receipt
a bill of sale, that the "receipts" must be taken
in connection with inventories, just as if the words
receipts for purchase money," &c. Indeed, if the
ran inventories with receipt attached, or with
clause have the meaning given to it by Mr. Wat-
kins, not only is the word or superfluous, but
the words inventories with receipt attached"
would likewise be so; and one has no right to
treat any words of a statute as superfluous if they
admit of a sensible interpretation: and the use
of the word "or" in the next mention of the
section seems to corroborate my view, because
there it is obviously used to connect together
powers of attorney, authorities, licenses
the words to take possession, &c.," and to dis-
tinguish them from the other kinds of assurances
which are specified both before and after them.
If, to illustrate my meaning one were to enumerate
a number of objects as included within a certain
category, or description, thus:-A., B., C., D. with
E. or F., and G., could any one doubt that the
meaning is that A. B.C. and G. come singly within
the category or description, but that D. is to be
brought in in connection with either E. or F.;
hence I come to the conclusion that the receipt for
the purchase-money of goods is not, by itself, a
bill of sale, and therefore that the receipt before
me did not require registration to give it validity
against an execution creditor. My judgment,
therefore, is for the claimant. Since I prepared
this judgment, the case of Woodgate v. Godfrey
has been fully reported in 4 Ex. Div. 59, and I see
appended to that report a note that the Court of
Appeal has granted a rule nisi. The authority
of that case, therefore, will come under considera-
tion in the Court of Appeal; but inasmuch as
there were in that case, besides the receipt for the
price of the goods, both an inventory and agree-
ment to let the goods to the original owner, which
are wanting here, but which seem to assimilate
that case closely to the Ex parte Odell, and as the
Lords Justices seem to have considered a mere
receipt for the price of the goods insufficient to
constitute a bill of sale, I do not think it incum-
bent on me to hold back my judgment until the
decision of the Court of Appeal in Woodgate v.
Godfrey is known.

HOLBEACH COUNTY COURT.
(Before JAMES STEPHEN, Esq., LL.D., Judge.)
MOULTON FORESTERS' LODGN บ. WILLIAM
SKELTON and Messrs. HACKWORTH and
Аввотт.

Foresters lodge-Friendly society. HIS HONOUR delivered judgment as follows:He said the plaintiffs in this action sued as the trustees of The Court Village Foresters,' a society registered under the Friendly Societies Acts, and they claimed £35 from the defendants under the following circumstances. It appears that one Thomas Horby, a publican, was in Dec, 1876, duly appointed treasurer to the above society. He was required by the rules, as well as by the provision as to treasurers contained in the Friendly Societies Act now in force, to execute a bond before taking upon himself the execution of his office. Though a bond was sent to him, however, it was never in fact executed, but he continued to act as treasurer from the date of his appointment until Oct. 1878. On the 8th of that month he owed the society £35 16s. 8d., the balance of contributions and other payments made to him as treasurer, after crediting himself with the relief and other payments he had made on behalf of the society. It was in respect of this balance, which was on the part of the defendants, that the action was brought, though the even money only (£35) was claimed in the summons. On the 16th Oct. 1878 Horby filed a petition for liquidation. At that time he owed the defendant Skelton, who was his landlord and also the brewer from whom he bought his beer, a considerable sum for rent, and also a large balance for beer sold; and shortly before he filed his petition he sent him some money which, so he said, he intended to go towards the rent. Anyhow, Skelton appropriated it to the trade account; and whether he had a right to do so seemed of no importance in the present action, as even had the sum sent gone in reduction of the rent, more than £35 would still have been due for rent in arrear at the time Horby filed his petition. In that state of things Skelton put in a distress, and the other two defendants were the

admitted

persons he employed. Under that distress, goods and chattels of Horby were seized, and in due course sold, and so much of the proceeds as were required to satisfy the landlord's claim was paid over to him, and the balance to the trustees of Horby's liquidation. Before the final balance was paid, and while more than £35 remained in their hands, a demand in writing on behalf of the society was made to the defendants, requiring the debt due from Horby to be paid over to them in priority to any other claimant. Now, the action was brought under the Friendly Societies Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 60) and under sub-sect. 7 of the 15th section, which, so far as was material to that case, was to the following effect-that if any "execution, attachment, or other process be issued against any officer of a registered society, having in his possession, by virtue of his office, any money or property belonging to the society-or against the property of such officer-the sheriff or other person executing such process shall, upon demand in writing of the trustees of the society, or any person authorised to make it, pay such money and deliver over such property to the trustees in preference to any other debts or claims against the estate of such officer." On the part of the plaintiffs it was contended that the circumstances of the case brought them within that provision that Horby, an officer, had in his possession on the 8th Oct. by virtue of his office, the £35 they claimed; that process," that

had no connection at all with any court of justice or
writ issuing therefrom. It was rather contradis-
tinguished from the act of such court, as being the
act of the party. It was simply a right which the
law gave to a landlord who had suffered the
injury of the withholding of his rent, to remedy
such injury by his own act, and thus it might be
said, in effect, to consist of the right to plead
such injury as a defence to an action brought
against him for resorting to such a remedy. It
would, he thought, be straining the words of the
section improperly to say that it intended to take
away from him the right to plead such a defence.
In further support of the conclusion to which
he had come, the learned judge remarked that
in the construction of an enactment it was a well
recognised rule to pray in aid a former one in
pari materia, although itself superseded by one
of later date. Hence, he might advert to the
previous Friendly Societies Act (18 & 19 Vict.
c. 63), where there was a provision (s. 23) which
answered generally to the one on which the
present action was grounded. That section was
more verbose than the present one, but the same
words were used, viz., execution, or attachment,
or other process," and it proceeded to direct a
privity of payment to the society "before the
money directed to be levied by such process is paid
over to the party issuing such process." Now, these
words appeared to him to refer only to a writ or
process issuing out of a court, and that the word
process" in the present Act-though the words
he had quoted from the previous one were not
repeated-probably with a view to conciseness-
showed the intention of the Legislature in using
that term. Upon the whole, therefore, judgment

would be entered for the defendants, with costs,
but, as the point was an important one, and, so
far as he knew, he should be very glad if the
plaintiffs saw their way to obtain the opinion of a
Superior Court.

On the hearing of the case,

Wilkin, of Lynn, appeared for the plaintiffs.
Lyttleton Chubb, barrister-at law, for Skelton.
S. S. Mossop for Hackworth and Abbott.

LAW SOCIETIES.

SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION.
THE usual monthly meeting of the board of
directors of this association was held at the Law
Institution, Chancery-lane, London, on Wednes-
day last, the 9th April, Mr. Sidney Smith in the
chair, the other directors present being Messrs.
Asker (Norwich), Brook, Gregory, M.P., Hedger,
Keen, Price, Rickman, Roscoe, Veley (Chelms-
ford), and Woolbert; Mr. Eiffe, secretary. A
sum of £185 was distributed in grants of relief;
thirty-seven new members were added to the
association; and other general business trans-
acted.

the Larceny Act and the Malicious Injuries Act
which would be best dealt with, in the case of boy,
by flogging. [The Larceny Act, 24 & 25 Vict. c.
96, ss. 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 33 to 37.
The Malicious Injuries Act, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97,
ss. 22 to 25, 37, 38, 41, 52, 63.] To effect this
either the word “indictable" in the twenty-ninth
line should be omitted, or after the word "homi-
cide" in the same line should be added the words
'any offence punishable on summary conviction."
The words in the fifteenth to the seventeenth lines,
"Do you desire the child to be tried by a jury and
object to the case being dealt with summarily?"
should be "Do you wish the child to be tried by a
jury at the sessions at
or tried here?"
In the thirtieth and thirty-fifth lines, the word
'indictable should be omitted.

66

Section 10.-"14," in the nineteenth line, should be "16" years. The cases in which flogging would have a good effect are those of boys between 14 and 16 even more than under 14. "Do you desire to be tried by a jury, or do you consent to the case being dealt with summarily?" should be "Will you be tried by a jury at the sessions at Or tried here?"

Sect. 11.-The like. eighth line, should be "wishes to do so." Sect. 12.-"Desires to do so," in the twenty

Sect. 13.-"You are charged with an offence in respect of the commission of which you are entitled if you desire it, instead of being dealt with summarily, to be tried by a jury. Do you desire to be tried by a jury?" should be "You can, if you wish be tried by a jury at the sessions [or assizes] at Do you wish to be tried by a jury there or tried here?"

Sect. 15.-The mode of recovering costs from a complainant, in a dismissed case, is a matter of some doubt. It is very desirable to have power to enforce payment of costs by a complainant. This could be done by the insertion in the seventh line, after "information," of the words "or is ordered to be paid by a complainant or informant."

Sect. 16. -The maximum of seven should be twenty-eight days. For instance, in cases under the Vagrant Act, the defendants usually are un known to the police and have no settled place of abode, consequently they would in many cases have to remain in custody, without bail, until the next petty sessions; the case might be met by a defendant having power to elect to be tried by a magistrate out of petty sessions, or at petty sessions.

Sect. 21.-The application should be to the same court, otherwise, one court may hear applications, as it were, on appeal from another. The complainant and his witnesses would be liable, as this stands, to be called upon to travel a distance of say thirty or forty miles to be present at a rehearing. The grievance intended to be remedied is that of magistrates requiring sureties for, say, six months, and imprisonment during that period, in default of finding sureties. In practice, if at the rising of a court a defendant cannot find sureties, the six months is reduced to, say, fourteen days. The case would be met by giving power to justices to order sureties for a certain THE following are the observations of the above period, and imprisonment in default for a lesser society upon the Bill:period.

BIRMINGHAM INCORPORATED LAW

SOCIETY.

SUMMARY JURISDICTION BILL, 1879.

was to say a distress, issued against his property; and that the persons executing such distress (to wit, the defendants) failed, after due demand, to pay over such money to the plaintiffs, they having sold the distress they took for more than would be sufficient for that purpose. In reply to that, the defendants said (firstly) that Horby was not an officer of the society, because he had failed to execute a bond. But as to that defence, he thought the case of Absolom v. Gething (32 L. J. 786, Ch.), to which he was referred at the hearing, and the more recent one of Moore v. Marriott (L. Rep. 7 Ch. Div. 543) were conclusive that it was not a sufficient answer to the action. The defendants next said that the section only applied to specific money or property of the society, and that none such was taken by the defendants (or at least detained), for it was admitted that one or two boxes belonging to the society found on Hornby's premises, and some of its paraphernalia, were given up on demand), and that the goods and chattels distrained and sold were things purchased by Horby, ont of his own money. If he (his Honour) had to decide the case, however, simply on that defence, he should on the whole be inclined to hold that it was an insufficient one, and he should rely to a certain extent on the case of Ex parte O'Donnell (L. Rep. 1 Q.B. 274). But there was a third defence set up by the defendants, and he thought it was in itself a sufficient one, whatever might be the law with regard to the other two. That was, that the section did not, in its terms, nor was it intended to, take away or affect the common law right of the landlord to distrain for his rent any property he found on his premises demised, whether such property belonged to his tenant or not. In his (the learned judge's) opinion, in order to take away such a right, words must be used appropriate to the end. Now, the Sect. 28.-There should be power to serve a witpower of distress attaching to a landlord at common law could not, as he thought, be termed reforms, notably in giving power to substitute ing it, without the necessity of obtaining the inness summons out of the district of the justice issu-a word which had a technical mean"process". fines for imprisonment and to try all petty indict-dorsement of the court of the district in which it is ing and imports some species of writ issuing out able offences, the mode of enforcing recognisances, served. In the case of a witness summons under of a Court of Justice. In Jacob's Law Dictionary. the extension of the right of appeal, and the the term " amendment of procedure. the Bastardy Acts no such indorsement is required was said to have two meanThe following sugprocess -7 & 8 Vict. c. 101. As the section stands, this ings. First, it was largely taken for all the pro-gestions and criticisms upon the Bill are respect indorsement could only be made in court, that is, ceedings in any action from the beginning to the fully submitted for the consideration of the Select end; and, secondly, that by which a man was called Committee of the House of Commons to which the than once a week. The words in the 21st, 22nd, in petty sessions, which in counties is not oftener into court. Indeed, that a distress at common law for rent did not come within the words jurisdiction for the county, borough or place in 23rd, and 24th lines, "and any court of summary "an execution or other legal process," as used in which the witness may be, may, on proof on oth the 13th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, and of the signature to the summons, indorse the sum thereby made restrainable, had been expressly mons and also the words in the twenty-fifth decided in the case of Ex parte Birmingham and line, so indorsed," should be omitted. Under Staffordshire Gas Light Company; Re Farnshaw the present law, a warrant for disobedience of a and Yorston (L. Rep. 11 Eq. 615). In that case, witness summons, but not a summons, requires the words which fell from the Chief Judge were, indorsement, when issued in one county and exeso far as they went, applicable to the case before cuted in another. him (Mr. Stephen). He said: "I think it quite plain that a distress for rent cannot be considered to be included in the expression, 'legal process,' inasmuch as no legal process whatever is necessary, and the landlord may, if he thinks proper, distrain with his own hands. As little can it be called an execution, for an execution is the result of a judgment which has been recovered in some court of law, but to a distress no legal proceeding whatever is necessary." He (the judge) adopted that line of argument, and in his opinion it made no difference that in the section before him the word "legal" was not inserted before" process," as it was in the Bankruptcy Acts, Nor did he think that a distress for rent was included in the term "attachment,' which (again to cite Jacob) was a seizure of body or goods by commandment of a writ or precept. The right to distrain, he would further observe,

This Bill will effect

Bill is referred.

several

important

Section 6.-The last paragraph in this section would be more intelligible if the words in manner directed were inserted after the word extends," in the tenth line.

Section 7.- We are unable to appreciate the grievance intended to be remedied by this section, The justices have power to mitigate fine and costs, and to remit them altogether. If in trivial cases it is the rule that the court direct all fees payable by the informant to be remitted, it will be an inducement to persons to bring forward trivial cases, as is commonly done, for the purpose of annoyance or spite, or to extort money. There is at present a salutary check, in complainants being liable for costs in dismissed cases. The last paragraph only "The court may order the fine or any part thereof to be paid to the informant, in or towards the payment of his costs," might be usefully retained.

Section 8. In connection with this section should be one empowering the court to order the payment of costs by a defendant directed to find sureties to keep the peace. At present a complainant has to pay the costs although the threats may have been of the most outrageous character. Section 9.-There are many cases of breaking down fences, damaging corn, stealing fruit, and other like cases, within the Acts commonly called

Sect. 31. Sub-sect. 3.-It is of the first impor tance to simplify and shorten and render intelligible to non-legal persons all the forms used in a court of summary jurisdiction, and not merely the warrant of commitment only. This sub-sect. 3 should be, " A summons warrant of apprehension or of distress or commitment or a conviction or order shall not be held void by reason of any defect therein if it state the offence in compliance with the first sub-section of this section, and in case of a warrant of distress or commitment or conviction or order, that the offender has been convicted or order made, and there is a good and valid conviction or order to sustain the

same."

Sect. 33.-In the third and fourth lines, instead of Registrar of County Court" it should be "a clerk of a court of summary jurisdiction." present, a summons is prepared in the office of the

At

clerk to the justices, and signed by a magistrate as of course. In many cases much time is expended in finding a magistrate. As the clerk is responsible for the issue of a summons, it is desirable it should be signed by him. Previous to the passing of the Justices' Clerks Act, when a clerk was paid by fees and not by salary, it might have been said he had a pecuniary interest in issuing a summons, but, being now paid by salary, he can have no such interest.

First Schedule.-To the first column should be added, "obtaining by false pretences any money or chattel," also " attempting to obtain by false pretences any money or chattel." The following offences should be added to the second column: Obtaining by false pretences any money or chattel not exceeding in value forty shillings. Attempting to obtain by false pretences any money or chattel not exceeding in value forty shillings. Obstructing or resisting, or rescuing or attempting to rescue a prisoner from a constable acting in the execution of his duty, or aiding, inciting, or encouraging any other person to do 80. In the metropolis only these cases can now be dealt with summarily. "Indecent assault should be added to the second column. This will not include attempt to rape, carnally know a child under twelve years, or attempt to do so. It has become the practice to deal with indecent assaults summarily by treating them as aggravated assaults. There may be some doubt whether this practice can be justified.

BRADFORD INCORPORATED LAW
SOCIETY.

REPORT of the COUNCIL submitted to the Mem-
bers of the Society at the Third Annual General
Meeting.
YOUR council have to report that during the
past year the proceedings of the society have not
been marked by any special features; at the same
time, they feel that its usefulness has been fully
sustained. The library, which has doubtless been
of greater benefit to the members generally than
any other feature of the society's operations, has,
during the past year, received the addition of the
following works. [We omit these.] One question
of professional practice has been submitted to the
council during the past year, and has been re-
ported on by the committee appointed by them for
the purpose.
The Parliamentary committee of
the council in connection with a committee from
the Surveyors' and Architects' Association, re-
ported in considerable detail on the Bradford
Corporation Improvement Bill of last session, and
the joint report was printed and submitted to the
town council, which body adopted many of the
society's recommendations. The question of the
adoption of a scale of fees in conveyancing
matters has received some attention by a com-
mittee of your council during the past year, but
no definite action has been resolved upon. The
council has the satisfaction of reporting that
their finances are in a more satisfactory state than
at the last yearly meeting. The balance-sheet, of
which a copy is sent herewith, it will be observed
commences with a balance in favour of the
treasurer, and ends with a balance in favour of
the society. Your council have again to draw the
attention of the members to the great importance
of their conforming to the rules of the library in
regard to the prompt return of books which may
be borrowed, and trust that the members will
meet the convenience of the officers of the society
and of their co-members by a rigid compliance
with the library rules. The number of members
of the society is forty-one.

At the annual meeting, the following officers were appointed Mr. Henry Yewdall, president; Mr. James Wood and Mr. John R. W. Thompson, vice-presidents; Mr. H. F. Killick and Mr. J. Tanner-Ray, hon. secs.; Mr. J. H. Wade, Mr. Thos. Senior, and Mr. J. R. Jeffery, members of conncil, in place of retiring members (J. R. W. Thompson, C. L. Atkinson, and J. T. Ray).

66

recognisances were estreated to the sum of 10s.
against the principal party, and 10s. each against
the sureties. When the case had ended, at my
suggestion, the chairman told the parties that
they were still bound by the recognisances.
Since the hearing of the case a magistrate of the
district has expressed a hesitation to follow the
above ruling. As I believe the question is likely
to arise again, I venture to trouble you. I find
from Nun and Walshe, and from Levinge, that
recognisances are usually" discharged by per-
formance of the condition. Estreat is defined in
"Les Termes de la Ley " (1685) as the copy or
true note of an original writing as estreats of
amerciaments imposed in the rolls of a court to be
levied by the bailiff or some other officer of every
man that hath offended. And so it is used in
Westm. 2, c. 2." I think I was right, therefore,
in submitting that the parties were not discharged
from the performance of the condition. And
again, I would ask you if you think the magistrates
can, as they threatened to do, estreat the recog-
nisances to the full amount in a case in which
they have already estreated them to a smaller
I think they cannot estreat to more than
the balance due.

sum.

A PETTY SESSIONS PRACTITIONER.

their having been clerks to solicitors for ten years previously, and have had their preliminary examination dispensed with in consequence. This is really a covert attack upon the judges who have made such orders, and who from their position and responsibilities are above reproach. CHARITY.

COUNTY COUNTY PROCEDURE.-I shall be glad if you will allow me space in your valuable columns to draw the notice of the Profession to a few points which I think deserving of their attention. 1. Upon what authority can the judge or registrar of a County Court make his own rules as regards costs to solicitors in the face of the County Courts Act 1867? On taking out a default summons for service by the plaintiff's solicitor or his clerk, the registrar of a metropolitan County Court allowed my principal 6s. costs on a debt of over £4. This sum is less than that allowed by the Act where the summons is served by the court. I remonstrated with the registrar upon the point, when he told me that his judge did not consider it right to give solicitors the full charge allowed by the Act, in cases where the debt did not exceed £5. Now, if a system such as this be permitted to exist, what is the use of the present County Court Act? Many County Court judges seem to delight in setting the Act at defiance in favour of their own discretion. Can nothing be done to remedy this state of things, and to at least compel every County Court to enforce the scale of charges allowed by the Act? Contrast

and to bailiffs for possession money. Having issued execution against the goods of a debtor, the plaintiff in the action was served with an interpleader summons returnable about fourteen days after date. The particulars of the claim were not open for inspection until four days before the hearing, by this means compelling the plaintiff to pay the possession money and the claimant's costs, without an idea as to the genuineness of his claim, or else to wait ten days, incurring a liability to pay possession money eventually at the rate of 5s. a day. When the day for inspection of the particulars of the claim arrived, the plaintiff decided to let it go on for hearing, as the question was then only of £1 more or less to be paid. The judgment went against him, and he was ordered to pay a sum for court fees and possession money amounting to over three-fifths of the original debt for which execution was issued. Again, why upon issuing a default summons should the plaintiff be compelled to make an affidavit of the truth of his claim? I think that, as in the Superior Courts, the practice should be for the plaintiff to be entitled to judgment unless the defendant should satisfy the court on affidavit that he has a good defence.

LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE STATUS OF SOLICITORS.-I take exception to many of the statements put forth by Sedens in Antro as to the present social status of solicitors, and the means by which he proposes to elevate them to the emi-this with the exorbitant sums paid as court fees nence occupied by curates, barristers, &c. My own experience leads me to the conclusion that in the legal, as in all other professions, perseverance, courtesy, and integrity are the chief aids to render a man esteemed and respected by society at large. I never before heard that solicitors were systematically ostracised from the magic ring of society into which "deacons, curates, architects, artists, and tallow-boilers are eagerly invited. Nay, I think, if worthies of these professions were canvassed as to their impressions of the social standing occupied by themselves and solicitors, they would answer in an envious rather than a contemptible strain. But Nemo quam sibi sortem seu ratio dederit seu fors objecerit illa contentus vivat. and it does not need a very querulous or sensitive temperament to make one fancy he or his profession is an object of scorn and derision. But if it be the fact that the status of solicitors is so low as to render them objects of contempt to successful tradesmen, nothing is more certain to mind my than that no educational tests will per se tend to elevate that status. No conglomeration of degrees, university or otherwise, will prove the sesame to throw open the doors of society and wealth to the legal profession, unless these are combined with these mystic affixed letters-quali ties that are the peculiar possession of no class. Your correspondent would have the legal preliminary examination more identically the same as that for matriculation at the Universities. Cui bono? In these days most embryo solicitors receive a fairly good education, and would, upon leaving school, find but little difficulty in passing those examinations. Consequently, I fail to see that such a test would materially alter the class of aspirants for the law as a means of livelihood. Of course there are and ever will be different grades of individuals in every profession. In that of the Church, for instance, there must be the widest possible gulf intellectually between University honour men and two-year theological students. Yet it by no means follows that the former succeed the better, or get freer access within the portals of society. If the rolls of the legal profession were thoroughly scanned, I doubt not it would be found that the most successful and most respected solicitors were entirely innocent of anything approaching an University education. This is most easily to be accounted for when we consider that the fact of being a graduate excuses, or rather deprives one of the advantage derived by two years' legal training. It is not as though University education offered any counter advantage to this. Graduates.

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE usually come straight from the college to the law,

PROFESSION.

NOTE.-This Department of the LAW TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional top,the Editors do not hold themselves responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it.

AT

ESTREATING RECOGNISANCES PETTY SESSIONS.-I should be very glad if you could give me a case on the question, whether estreating recognisances amounts to the discharge of the parties thereto from the condition. What suggests the question to me is this: A man was, in December last, bound over to keep the peace in £10, with two sureties in £5 each, for twelve months. In February last he was again convicted of an assault, and fined; and the usual notices under sect. 35 of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act were ordered to be served. On the 24th March, after proof of notices, &c., the

having had, except in a few cases, no previous
training in ancient and modern legal technicalities.
Consequently the two years' course they lose must
militate considerably against their prospective
success. This proposal-to admit as solicitors
none but University graduates-is, to my mind, a
most dangerous one. After all, it is but an ex-
perimental means of taking a higher position in
society. But supposing the experiment failed in
its object, we should then probably be told that a
solicitor was looked down upon because he had no
knowledge of medicine or surgery, and so medical
degrees would be necessary. Once give the reins
to the idea that any artificial means can improve
a profession, noble in itself, and we shall be landed
in the wildest schemes that misapplied ingenuity
can devise. Much has been said lately in animad-
version of the fact that clerks of long experience
have been admitted into the legal profession after
being articled for three years in consequence of

J., ARTICLED CLERK.

THE OCCUPATION OF ARTICLED CLERKS.— I cannot agree with "Q." in his strong protestations against the way in which articled clerks are usually employed by their principals. It seems to me to be idle to suppose that solicitors having a large practice to conduct can be always at their pupil's elbow, and personally instructing him in his studies. If this were the case I question very much whether the knowledge so acquired would be of any real service to the pupil; far better is it for an articled clerk to ground himself in the principles of law and points of practice, though this be done by such simple means as copying a draft or serving and endorsing a writ of summons. in cases of difficulty or doubt in his practical work or the study of his text books, that the aid of his principal is so invaluable, and I cannot think that this aid would ever be withheld. In my opinion

It is

an articled clerk who determines to make the best use of his pupilage will never despise the seemingly simple work that is at first given him, for he will always have before him the fact that he is acquiring in all the knowledge and experience which he will soon himself be expected to possess. J. W. S.

THE SETTLED ESTATES ACT.

The 6th

of the orders under the Settled Estates Act, 1877, seems to me to be a model of complexity, and an illustration of the saying that language was given to man to enable him to conceal his thoughts. The order in question reads thus: "In the case of a lunatic or infant tenant in tail by his committee or guardian applying or consenting to an application or giving a notification respecting an application, an application may be made at chambers by the petitioner after the petition is presented, that such committee or guardian may be directed to so apply or consent or give a notification, and in the case of an infant such application may be combined with the application to appoint a guardian." The order sets out with the hypothesis that an application is being made or a notification given by certain persons. It then proceeds to enact that in such a case the same persons are to be directed to make precisely the same application on the application of somebody else. For a long time after having first tried to extract a meaning fr

the