any time sell them, and the mortgagor attorned tenant to the defendants at a yearly rent of £800 for ten years, and it was to be lawful for the defendants, without notice or demand of possession, to enter on the mortgaged premises. The mortgage was executed by the mortgagor, but not by the defendants. The defendants distrained for one year's rent. Shortly afterwards the mortgagor became bankrupt. The Court of Exchequer Chamber, affirming the decision of the Queen's Bench, held that the deed, though inoperative under the Statute of Frauds, as a lease for ten years, operated as a tenancy from year to year, and defendants' claim prevailed over that of the plaintiffs, who were the assignees in bankruptcy of the mortgagor. And Chief Baron KELLY added that the question of the security's being a bill of sale did not arise;" and, even if the question had arisen, we should hold that this deed is not an evasion of the Act, and is not a bill of sale requiring registration within the meaning of the Act." Mr. FISHER (Mortgages, p. 56), treating this as an obiter dictum, is of a contrary opinion. There can, however, be no doubt that the Act, which comes into operation this year, will put an end to any similar attempts. In the recent case of Ex parte Williams, Re Thompson (37 L. T. Rep. N.S. 764; L. Rep. 7 Ch. Div. 138) Lord Justice JAMES dealt very summarily with a similar experiment, in which a fic titious rent was made payable to a mortgagee to enable him to distrain, and thereby gain an advantage over the mortgagor's trustee in bankruptcy. In that case, of course, the deed was not registered. Morton v. Woods was not referred to from the bench, but we can scarcely think Chief Baron KELLY's dictum would have proved palatable to the court; indeed, in view of the stringent terms of the 6th section, the arrangement made in Ex parte Williams would be very dangerous, even if the rent were not a fictitious but a fair and reasonable rent, for the proviso at the end of the section has only a limited application: "Provided that nothing in this section shall extend to any mortgage of any estate or interest in any land, tenement, or hereditament which the mortgagee, being in possession, shall have demised to the mortgagor as his tenant at a fair and reasonable rent." The words in italics are important.

UNMARRIED-WITHOUT HAVING BEEN MARRIED.

Ir has long been settled that the word "unmarried" is one of flexible meaning; that, although in its primary sense it may possibly be taken as synonymous with "never having been married," such primary sense will yield readily to a context or to the circumstances under which the word is applied, and, when so controlled, may mean "not having a husband or wife living at the time." In fact, the later authorities appear to deny that the word "unmarried" has any such primary sense as we have ascribed to it, but to regard it as of a double meaning "-"a flexible term depending for its true construction upon the context" (per Lord Wensleydale in Clarke v. Colls, 9 H. L. Cas. 618). Thus, where personalty after the death of a wife in the husband's lifetime is to be held for such persons or person as would have been entitled thereto in case she had died possessed thereof intestate and unmarried, the word has been interpreted to mean "free from coverture," and this construction has not been varied by the fact of an express provision having been made for children in the same instrument out of the same or another fund, and who would of course be excluded if "unmarried" were held to mean 'never having been married."

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In the Weekly Notes of the 8th inst., we have before us a short report of Re Ball's Settlement, decided by Mr. Justice Fry on the 28th, to the following effect: "By a marriage settlement, a sum was settled in trust after the death of the wife, and, in default of appointment by her, for such persons as would have been entitled if she had died without having been married; she died without making any appointment, leaving a child. The money was paid into court, and the child petitioned for payment. . Mr. Justice Fry held himself bound by the authorities to decide that the child was entitled."

This case strikes us as going beyond any authority that we are at present aware of. In Wilson v. Atkinson (11 L. T. Rep. N.S. 220; 4 De G. J. & S. 455), which comes nearest to it, the decision was warranted by a special context pointing to the inclusion of children; though it must be admitted that the Lords Justices seemed to think that a similar result might or must have been arrived at without such special context. We infer from the statement that the settlement, Re Ball, like that in Wilson v. Atkinson, though made on marriage, was not in the usual form, and that there was in it no special provision for the children of the marriage conferring on them vested interests as to sons at twenty-one, and as to daughters at that age or marriage, since the petition is said to be that of a child, and not that of a guardian or next friend on the child's behalf.

If this be so, the decision may possibly be supported on the extreme improbability that parties contemplating a marriage should at the same time intend to exclude their issue from any benefit, and to let in collaterals in their place. In such a case, every effort would be made by a court to put a meaning consistent with the intention of the parties on any language that was not actually intractable; and if the language used proved too stubborn

so to be dealt with, would rectify the deed on slight evidence of mistake. If, however, on the other hand, it should turn out that the settlement did contain the usual provision for children at twenty-one or marriage, or if Mr. Justice Fry intended to lay down as a general rule the proposition that the expression "without having been married" is insufficient to exclude children, who in the only events in which they really need to be provided for have been already provided for, we can only say that the decision will operate on numberless settlements and wills in a manner totally opposed to the intentions of the professional advisers by whom they have been framed.

Thus Mr. Davidson (vol. 3, part 1, p. 190, 3rd edit.), in discussing the proper mode of framing the trusts of a wife's property in default of issue, and of appointment by her, and in case she die in her husband's lifetime, states it to be "for the person or persons who, under the Statutes of Distribution, would have become entitled, had the wife died possessed of the trust property intestate and without having been married, &c It is

not sufficient to describe a devolution as if the wife had died without being married,' or unmarried.' These expressions, though they would exclude the husband, would not prevent the trust property from devolving on children surviving the wife, but dying without having attained a vested interest under the trusts in favour of the issue of the marriage, who would thus, by virtue of the reference to the statute, take under the ultimate trust the interest which they failed to acquire under the special trusts in favour of children-a result which could hardly be in ended, and would generally defeat the main purpose of the ultimate trust by carrying over the property to the husband as administrator of his children, instead of to the wife's family."

So also Mr. Prideaux says (Conveyancing, vol. 2., p. 185, 9th edit.): "The ultimate trust in default of appointment by will, and in case the wife dies during the coverture, should be in favour of the persons who would have taken under the Statutes of Distribution if the wife had died, &c., without having been married." The italics are those of Mr. Prideaux. Both Mr. Davidson and Mr. Prideaux in their Precedents use this identical expression, without apparently entertaining the least doubt as to its sufficiency for the purpose intended. Mr. Hayes, again, in his Concise Conveyancer, for the same purpose uses the expression "a spinster," suggesting in a note at p. 553, 3rd edit., as an equivalent, "without having been married,' and further remarking that it is not enough merely to say "unmarried," &c.

We can scarcely think that the opinions and practice of our leading conveyancers on the point we are discussing would be disregarded by any court; but, until the question is settled beyond all doubt, it may be prudent to revert to a modification of a somewhat antiquated form, to be found in Bythewood's Conveyancing, vol. 11, p. 682, where the trust is "for such person or persons as would have been entitled, &c., if (the woman) had been absolutely entitled thereto, and had died intestate without leaving a husband or child," &c.

MORTGAGE-TRUSTS FOR SALE AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

THE fate of Re Alison (Johnson v. Mounsey), on the hearing of the appeal from Vice-Chancellor Malins on the 12th inst., was not altogether destitute of a ludicrous element. The case before the Vice-Chancellor is fully reported 40 L. T. Rep. N.S 93. The ViceChancellor had decided that the devisees in trust of a mortgage, who by possession for twenty years had acquired the fee simple under the Statute of Limitations, could, if so minded, exercise the trust for sale contained in the mortgage deed; that in the case before him the devisees in trust had, in fact, exercised the power; and, that having exercised the power, it followed that the mortgagor or his representatives were entitled to the surplus moneys, after satisfaction of what was due on the security. The learned ViceChancellor founded his judgment on certain remarks of Lord Justice James in Locking v. Parker (L. Rep. 8 Ch. App. 30), from which he thought an inference might be drawn, that after such a sale the mortgagee or his representatives would hold the surplus moneys on express trusts, so as to be unaffected by any period of statutory limitation.

On the question as to the rights of the mortgagor and testator at the time of his death, the Vice-Chancellor expressed his entire adherence to the main point decided in Locking v. Parker, and accordingly held that the mortgagee at his death had a clear and absolute fee simple, and that the deed creating the security, though expressed in the form of a trust for sale, was nevertheless in fact nothing but a mere mortgage," the trust being one which the mortgagor could not enforce, and therefore within the 28th section of the statute, and not within the 25th section, which relates to express trusts, or more strictly, as the Master of the Rolls took occasion to point out, to "land or rent vested in a trustee upon any express trust."

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On the case being called on, counsel in support of the appeal, after a brief statement by the appellant's counsel, were required to explain how it came to pass that devisees in trust could have power to throw overboard the estate of their testator, and to disregard the interests of their cestuis que trustent. This, of course,

could not be done, though a hopeless contention was raised to the effect that the case was one of express trust within the 25th section. The Master of the Rolls prefaced his judgment by noticing the peculiarity of a litigation in which an appealed case had to be supported by an elaborate attempt to controvert the law as propounded by the court below.

The remarks of Lord Justice Baggallay, effectually disposed of the Vice-Chancellor's misapprehension as to the remarks of Lord Justice James in Locking v. Parker, which were evidently intended only to apply when a sale had been made before the expiration of the statutory period.

In the judgment of the Master of the Rolls, rightly read, there is not, we think, anything to encourage the notion that the mortgagee himself, if living, could have revived the trust for sale. That it would be within the competency of a mortgagor to create an absolutely new trust to correspond in all respects with the trust for sale barred by possession, no one would dispute; but it is equally beyond dispute that it would require a very plain and clear expression of intention on the part of a mortgagee so circumstanced, in order to establish a trust in favour of the mortgagor or his representatives, mere strangers, so far as the mortgagee would be concerned. What a mortgagee with a statutory title might probably do, in order to relieve a purchaser from being satisfied with mere negative evidence that there had been no acknowledgment during the statutory period, would be to purport to sell under the power. In such a case the purchaser would acquire a title quâcunque viâ; but if, in fact, the power was non-existent, or, in other words, if there were Lo occasion for its exercise, it would be hopeless to contend that the mortgagor or his representatives were intended to be, or were in fact, benefited by such a transaction, rem inter alios actam.

COSTS ON COUNTER-CLAIMS.

In the recent case of Garnet v. Bradley (3 App. Cas. 944), counsel, when arguing the case before the House of Lords, after explaining the inconsistent, contradictory, and unintelligible rules that formerly prevailed at common law with regard to costs, said: "The Judicature Acts were passed to put an end to all this confusion, and to establish one clear universal rule of practice, and this has been done by Order LV. The words of that Order were clear and positive."

Such having undoubtedly been the intention of the Legislature, it is not a little disappointing to find that an Order apparently so simple has already given rise to intricacies and anomalies. Some of these points we propose to consider.

I. A. brings an action for slander against B. The jury find a verdict for A. In this case, A. is entitled to costs if no order is made: (Garnet v. Bradley.) But B. may either (1) apply for an order at the trial-such order is probably final, unless leave to appeal is given; or (2), apply to a Divisional Court, within a reasonable time after the trial: (Bowey v. Bell, 4 Q. B. Div. 95.)

II. A. brings an action founded on contract against B. and recovers £10. In this case, unless the judge certify on the record that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the Superior Court, or unless the court or a judge at chambers shall by rule or order allow such costs, A. gets no costs (County Courts Act 1867, s. 5). So far the law is now simple. But when we come to consider more complicated cases, new difficulties arise. Thus suppose :

III. A brings an action founded on contract against B., and claims £100. B. defends, and counter-claims to the amount of £90. The action is tried by a jury, and both claim and counterclaim are successful. In this case (1), a verdict may be taken both upon the claim and the counter-claim; in which case the County Courts Act 1867 will not apply, and each party will be entitled to his costs (per Lopes, J., in Potter v. Chambers, 4 C. P. Div. 69); or (2), the jury may find a verdict for the plaintiff for the balance. In this case, by the County Courts Act, unless an application is made by the plaintiff in either of the ways directed by sect. 5, the plaintiff can get no costs: (Staples v. Young, 2 Ex. Div. 324.) On the other hand, the defendant is not affected by the County Courts Act 1867, as he did not choose the tribunal: (Blake v. Appleyard, 3 Ex. Div. 185.) Nevertheless he is not entitled to any costs for the issues he has proved: (Potter v. Chambers.)

IV. But if, in Case III., B. had failed as to £20 of his counterclaim, and the jury had found a verdict for the plaintiff for the balance, in this case A. is entitled to his costs (Òrder LV., r. 1), and B. is entitled to the costs of so much of the counter-claim as he succeeds in: (Blake v. Appleyard.)

V. Again, if in Case III., A. had succeeded as to £80 only, and the jury had found a verdict for the defendant for the balance, as the County Courts Act does not apply to a counter-claim, B. would be entitled to his costs. But what would become of A.'s costs? There seems no reason why he should not be as much entitled to the costs of proving his claim, and of the issues, so far as they related thereto, as B. was in Case IV. with regard to his counter-claim, as the County Courts Act 1867 has nothing to say to the case. On the other hand, is it reasonable that A.

should get certain costs because he failed to prove £20 of his claim ?

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This appears to be the net result of the three cases, Staples v. Young, Blake v. Appleyard, and Potter v. Chambers. But, it must be asked, is this either clear or satisfactory? The whole difficulty would have been avoided if in such a case as Staples v. Young the verdict had been treated as a recovery" by the plaintiff of the sum for which he proved his claim, and a "recovery" by the defendant of the sum for which he proved his counter-claim. But Blake v. Appleyard was decided or the authority of Staples v. Young, and in Potter v. Chambers the Court confessed the difficulty of reconciling the two cases. We trust that a successful attempt may yet be made to set the law on this subject on a satisfactory basis.

ESTOPPEL BY NEGLIGENCE IN THE CUSTODY AND TRANSFER OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. THE decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Baxendale v. Bennett (40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 23) is both important to the commer. cial world and interesting to lawyers. By it a new principle may be said to be established as governing the above subject; and, of two old and very familiar cases which are to be found in all the text books, one is questioned and the other overruled. These are Young v. Grote (4 Bing. 253) and Ingham v. Primrose (7 C. B. N. S. 82). The first was the case of a man leaving with his wife some blank forms of cheques, one of which was so carelessly filled up by the latter that the clerk to whom it was intrusted for presentment was enabled, by the insertion of words and figures, to make it payable for and obtain payment of a larger amount than was intended. The second was the case of the acceptor of a bill tearing it in two animo cancellandi, in the presence of a person who picked up the pieces; and, after having joined them together in such a manner as to convey no notice of the cancellation to a stranger, transferred the bill to a bonâ fide holder. In both these cases, as will be remembered, the negligence was held sufficient to estop the party guilty of it from denying the validity of the instruments.

In a recent case (Arnold v. The Cheque Bank, 34 L. T. Rep. N. S. 729) decided in the Common Pleas Division in April 1876, these two cases were distinctly and expressly approved, and were supposed to support, though indirectly, the conclusion there arrived at, and yet it is curious to observe that the authorities there directly relied on, and the rationale of the decision itself, were exactly the same as in the case under present notice. Both there and here, in fact, the decision of the court may be said chiefly to have rested upon the dictum of Lord (then Mr. J.) Blackburn in Swan v. The North British Australasian Company (32 L. J. 273, Ex.), a case which has been so frequently acted upon that it may be said to be the leading one upon the subject of estoppels by negligence. When that case was in the Court of Exchequer the rule had been laid down by Mr. Baron Wilde thus: "If a man has led others into the belief of a certain state of facts by conduct of culpable neglect calculated to have that result, and they have acted on that belief to their prejudice, he shall not be heard afterwards as against such persons to show that the state of facts did not exist." In the Exchequer Chamber, Lord Blackburn stated that this was correct as far as it went, but did not go far enough, and he added the following very important qualifica tion: "The neglect must be in the transaction itself, and be the and proximate cause of the leading the party into that mistake; also it must be the neglect of some duty that is owing to the person led into that belief or (what comes to the same thing) to the general public, of whom that person is one, and not merely neglect of what would be prudent in respect to the party himself, or even of some duty owing to third persons with whom those seeking to set up the estoppel are not privy."

Here it will be noticed that it is laid down that there are two distinct and necessary ingredients in the neglect which will amount to an estoppel, and, if this be so, it is clear that the absence of either of them will prevent its having that effect. The neglect must be in the transaction itself, and be the proximate cause of leading the third party into mistake, and it must also be the neglect of some duty owing to such third party, either individually or as one of the general public. In accordance with this rule, the validity of which cannot, we think, be now called in question, it was held in Arnold v. The Cheque Bank that negligence in the custody of a draft, or in its transmission by post, will not disentitle the owner of it to recover the draft or its proceeds from one who has wrongfully obtained possession of it. Lord Coleridge, who delivered the judgment of the court, after quoting the words of Lord Blackburn above set out, said: Young v. Grote, when correctly understood, is in entire accordance with the rule thus expressed, and so is Ingham v. Primrose." In the last-mentioned case, at any rate, it would however, we venture to think, be difficult to point out the necessary duty of which the neglect was a breach, and the absence of this component part of the estoppel in question was evidently the difficulty which was felt by the Court of Appeal in dealing with these cases in their decision in Baxendale v. Bennett, which we now proceed to notice. There the defendant received for his acceptance from a creditor

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of his Lamed Holmes the form of a bill of exchange with no drawer's name contained in it. The defendant accepted it and sent it back to Holmes. The latter, however, not desiring to use it, returned it to the defendant without filling in the drawer's name, and the defendant then put it away in an unlocked desk in his chambers. It was afterwards taken away by some unknown person, and came by indorsement to the plaintiff as a bona fide holder for value, the name of one Cartwright having been inserted as drawer by some one through whose hands the bill had passed. The defendant had never authorised any one to take the draft, or to fill in the drawer's name. Mr. Justice Lopes, who tried the case, acting probably upon the two old decisions, held that the defendant's negligence entitled the plaintiff to recover and gave judgment accordingly. A rule nisi for a new trial was obtained, and this rule was argued at the same time as a motion for judgment by the defendant to the Court of Appeal. That Court, while unanimously of opinion that the judgment was wrong, and ought to be entered for the defendant, differed in the reasons which guided them. Lord Justice Bramwell thought that, though there was negligence on the part of the defendant, such negligence did not amount to an estoppel, because it was not the effective or proximate cause of the fraud. He thought that the two old cases went a long way to justify the judgment which had been given, but, without otherwise expressly disapproving of them, said that they might be distinguished from the present case on the ground that in them the document had been voluntarily parted with. Lord Justice Brett, in whose reasons Lord Justice Baggallay concurred, grounded his decision chiefly on the fact that the law as to the liability of a person who accepts a bill in blank is, that he gives an apparent authority to the person to whom he issues it to fill it up to the amount which the stamp will cover. Unless he deliver it to some one there can be no such authority. Here, although it was once issued, his Lordship thought that when it was sent back the defendant was in the same position as if it had never been issued at all. He, however, went on further to say that he thought that there was no negligence in fact, or at any rate none which could amount to an estoppel, because in connection with the draft the defendant owed no duty to anyone after it had been returned to him. Ingham v. Primrose obviously stood in the way of applying this doctrine to the case of a bill of exchange, and the Lord Justice got over the difficulty by saying explicitly and candidly, "The best mode of dealing with that case is by saying that we do not agree with it." A3 to the other case of Young v. Grote he thought that its authority had been very much shaken by subsequent decisions, but that it might possibly be upheld on the ground of the existence of a duty in a customer towards his banker; and we venture to think that if the case should again arise this reason ought to prevail.

It will be observed that the reasons of both these judgments are consistent with the doctrine laid down in Swan's case. Lord Justice Bramwell may be said to have applied the first part of Lord Blackburn's rule, and the other Lords Justices the second part, and as each part is distinct and independent of the other, forming of itself an objection to the creation of an estoppel, the difference of opinion does not involve an inconsistency, and there may well be the double reason for the conclusion arrived at.

One important effect of this decision, coupled with that of Arnold v. The Cheque Bank, may be noticed in conclusion. In the notes in Byles on Bills of Exchange it is stated that the doctrine upon which the decision in Ingham v. Primrose proceeded has never been extended to instruments under seal, and Swan's case is cited in support of the assertion. It is clear that now the doctrine established in Swan's case is applicable to bills of exchange, and the difference which was then supposed to exist in the law of estoppel as regards bills of exchange, and as regards other instruments, has no existence at the present time.

THE BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENT BILL.
III-PART II.

THE second part of the Bill, relating to deeds of arrangement, contains fifteen clauses (clauses 24 to 38). In these the multifarious questions arising in respect of such deeds are provided for. The first innovation deals with the filing of the deed after execution. It may be filed by means of an attested copy filed in the court within three days after execution or such time as the court

may order, the former time applying to the case of deeds executed in England, the latter to others (clause 24, paragraph 1). The second paragraph of the same clause is a re-enactment from the Act passed in 1868 to amend the Bankruptcy Act 1851. The 1st section of that Act provided that no deed or instrument entered into between a debtor and his creditors relating to the debtor's debts and liabilities shall be as valid as if they were parties to the same, unless certain specified conditions were fulfilled. These conditions relate (1) to the filing of a list of the debts and liabilities of the debtor and the consideration for the same. The Bill provides further a means of verifying such list and statement (paragraph c) by the debtor's affidavit. The 6th paragraph of clause 24 contains an important re-enactment from the Act of 1868, sect. 3, to the effect that a deed of arrangement must be assented to by a majority in number representing three-fourths in value, and also by a majority of the committee of inspection; if any-creditors of sums not exceeding ten pounds being reckoned' only in the majority in value. The amount of the proof is to be determined as in bankruptcy (clause 25).

The 27th clause introduces an important modification of the existing law, and was the subject of some adverse criticism in the House of Lords. It orders that, where deeds provide for the acceptance of a composition, such composition must not be less than five shillings in the pound. The adoption of any sum as the minimum to be allowed in a composition deed must be more or less arbitrary; but it cannot be said that the Bill errs on the side of undue severity. It may be fairly anticipated that the effect of this clause, if it becomes law, will be that the number of compositions in future exceeding five shillings in the pound will bear a very favourable comparison with the number under the Act of 1869. Greater efforts will necessarily be made by debtors who wish to avail themselves of the benefits of a composition deed to comply with the provision, and as a result the creditors will probably be benefited, if not quite in proportion to the efforts made, at least to a great extent. The 28th clause deals with certain analogies between deeds of arrangement and the procedure and administration in bankruptcy; thus the date of the filing of the deed and the date of its confirmation are equivalent to the date of the filing of a bankruptcy petition, and of the making of a provisional order respectively.

An important power is given to creditors after the filing the deed by clause 31. When duly summoned they may appoint persons to investigate the affairs of the debtor, and a receiver or manager of the property. They may confirm or revoke the appointment of a receiver or manager appointed by the court, or abandon proceedings upon the deed, but the court may confirm the acts which a trustee or inspector acting under the deed may have done in pursuance thereof. So a provisional or absolute order for bankruptcy against the debtor may be made, no proof of an act of bankruptcy being necessary.

The 33rd clause treats of the power of the court to declare such deeds void. The grounds upon which this power may be exercised are as follows: (1) A frivolous or vexatious execution of such deed by the debtor; (2) execution for the purpose of delay, and not with a view to an arrangement in good faith with his creditors; (3) fraud or culpable negligence on the part of the debtor in reference to the list of creditors, or statement of property filed by him, or otherwise in reference to the proposed arrangement; (4) the commission by him of any act made a statutable misdemeanour in a case of a deed of arrangement. The court may also, upon the petition of any creditor or person interested, declare that the deed, if confirmed, so far as any release to the debtor therein provided for, shall be void; or, if the deed has not been confirmed, declare the deed void to all intents, saving in its discretion the rights of trustee or inspector. By the same or any subsequent order of the court, the bankruptcy proceedings may be revived, or a provisional or absolute order of bankruptcy made without proof of any act of bankruptcy.

The last clause also of paragraph 2 deals with one of the marked features of the Bill, viz., the checks placed upon the trustee or inspector under a deed of arrangement. This clause is founded upon sects. 83 and 117 of the Act of 1869, and provides. generally that the court may remove the trustee or inspector of a deed, and appoint a new one, and in such appointment may have regard to the wishes of the creditors and to the provisions of the deed.

diction of coroners shall continue until altered by or in pursuance of this Act.

Where a county is divided into districts, a coroner for the county shall be elected for a particular district, and shall be elected by the persons residing within that district who are at the time of election qualified to vote at an election for coroners for the county, and the election of such coroner shall be held in some place within the district.

A coroner elected for a coroner's district of a county shall reside within that district or in some place not more than two miles beyond the boundary of that district.

It shall be the duty of a coroner elected for a coroner's district of a county to hold all inquests in that district, but he shall be deemed to be a coroner for the whole county, and he may, by himself or his deputy, hold in any other coroner's district of the same county any inquest during the vacancy of the office of coroner elected for that district and also any inquest which from any cause cannot be held by the coroner elected for that district or his deputy.

37. Division of county into coroner's districts and alteration of districts (see 7 & 8 Vict. c. 92, 88. 1-7)-(1.) Her Majesty may, from time to time, by Order in Council, for the purposes of the jurisdiction of coroners, divide a county into two or more coroners' districts, or alter any then existing coroners' districts in a county, whether by the division or union of two or more coroners' districts, or parts thereof, or by the variation of the boundaries of any two or more coroners' districts, or by the abolition of all the coroners' districts in a county and the re-division of the county into coroners' districts; and Her Majesty may make any such Order in Council, either upon such petition from the local authority of the county as is hereinafter mentioned, or whenever it seems fit to Her Majesty to direct the issue of a writ for the election of an additional coroner for a county above the number of those who have been theretofore customarily elected in that county.

(2.) Where it appears to the local authority of a county expedient that an Order in Council under this section should be made in relation to their county, they may pass provisionally a resolution that it is expedient to petition Her Majesty for such order, and may adjourn the consideration of the petition until a future day not less than two months subsequently.

(3.) The petition referred to in such provisional resolution shall specify the proposed division or alteration together with such particulars as may be required for enabling Her Majesty to determine the expediency thereof.

(4.) The clerk of the peace shall serve a copy of the petition proposed by the provisional resolution on every coroner for the county who is affected by the proposals of the petition, and shall at the same time give to every such coroner notice of the day when the petition will be taken into consideration by the local authority.

(5.) Notice of such day shall also be given in the like manner in which notices of the meetings of the local authority are ordinarily given.

(6.) The local authority on the said day when they take the petition into consideration shall confer as to the petition with every coroner affected by the proposals of the petition who attends, and shall, after taking into consideration any matters urged by such coroner, pass a resolution adopting, with or without modification, or abandoning, the petition. If a resolution is passed adopting the petition, with or without modification, the petition as so adopted shall thereupon be presented to Her Majesty, certified under the

hands of two or more members of the local authority present at its adoption, and shall pray that the proposals thereof may be carried into effect by Order in Council.

(7.) The clerk of the peace shall serve a copy of such petition upon every coroner for the county. (8.) Her Majesty, after taking into consideration such petition, and also any objection made by a coroner affected by the proposals of the petition, may, by Order in Council, either adopt the proposals of the petition, with or without modifications, and divide the county into coroners' districts, or alter the coroners' districts accordingly, or reject the petition altogether.

(9.) Upon an Order in Council being made under this section, the local authority of the county shall make such arrangements as may be necessary for carrying the order into effect, care being taken to assign, so far as is possible, some coroner's district to every coroner for the county holding office at the date of the order, and where the Order in Council alters any district the district constituted by such order shall, so far as prac ticable, be assigned to the coroner usually acting in the same district or the larger part thereof in area before the date of the order. A coroner so assigned to a district shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be a coroner elected for that district. As part of such arrangement the local authority shall cause a list to be prepared by the clerk of the peace of the parishes comprised in

the district, and shall specify therein the places in the district at which the court for the election of coroner for the district is to be held and the poll to be taken.

(10.) The Order in Council shall be enrolled amongst the records of the county.

(11.) In dividing a county into coroners' districts or altering any coroners' districts of a county, care shall be taken so far as is possible to make every district consist of a group of parishes and to avoid interfering with existing local boundaries. (12.) Nothing in this section shall be construed to abridge or affect the royal prerogative.

Coroner of the Queen's Household.

38. Appointment and jurisdiction of the coroner of the Queen's household (see 28 Ed. 1, c. 3; 27 Hen. 8, c. 24, s. 10; 33 Hen. 8, c. 12).—(1.) The coroner of the Queen's household shall continue to be appointed by the Lord Steward for the time being of the Queen's househeld.

(2.) The coroner of the Queen's household shall have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of inquests on persons whose bodies are lying within the limits of any of the Queen's palaces or other house where Her Majesty is then demurrant and abiding in her own royal person, notwithstanding the subsequent removal of Her Majesty from such palace or house.

(3.) The jurors on an inquest held by the coroner of the Queen's household shall consist of officers of the Queen's household, to be returned by such officer of the Queen's household as may be directed to summon the same by the warrant of the said coroner.

(4.) The limits of the said palace or house shall be deemed to extend to any courts, gardens, or other places within the curtilage of such palace or house but not further, and where a body is lying dead in any place beyond those limits the coroner of the Queen's household shall not have jurisdiction to hold an inquest on such body, and the coroner of the county or borough shall have jurisdiction to hold that inquest in the same manner as if that place were not within the verge.

(5.) Where the inquisition charges a person with murder or manslaughter, the coroner of the Queen's household shall deliver the inquisition, depositions, and recognisances to the Lord Steward of the Queen's household, or in his absence, to the treasurer and comptroller of the Queen's household, and the recognisances shall be taken for the appearance of the persons bound by them before the said Lord Steward, or in his absence before the said treasurer and comptroller.

(6.) All other inquisitions, depositions, and recognisances shall be delivered to the Lord Steward of the Queen's household to be filed among the records of his office.

(7.) The coroner of the Queen's household shall make his declaration of office before the Lord Steward of the Queen's household, and shall reside in one of the Queen's palaces, or in such other convenient place as may from time to time be allowed by the Lord Steward of the Queen's household.

(8.) Save as in this section specially provided, the coroner of the Queen's household shall, within the said limits have the same jurisdiction and powers, be subject to the same obligations, liabilities, and disqualifications, and generally to the provisions of this Act, and to the law relating to coroners in like manner as any other franchise

coroner.

(9.) The Lord Steward of the Queen's household, or the treasurer and comptroller of the Queen's household, shall not have any jurisdiction committed beyond the limits aforesaid, or to to inquire of, try, hear, or determine, any offence arraign, try, or give judgment upon any person charged by any inquisition found before a coroner for any place beyond the limits aforesaid, and heard, and determined, and every such person every such offence shall be inquired of, tried, shall be arraigned, tried, and have judgment according to the ordinary course of law.

Franchise Coroners.

a

under this Act to be elected a coroner to be his deputy, but such deputy shall not act except during the illness of the coroner, or except on any inquest which the coroner is disqualified under this Act for holding. (3.) Where there is no coroner capable of holding inquests, or of holding a particular inquest in a franchise, the coroner for the county in which the franchise is situate, or if it is not situate in a county for the county to which the franchise adjoins, shall be interim coroner for the franchise, and for all purposes until there is another coroner capable of holding inquests in the franchise, or in the case of a particular inquest, for all purposes in relation to that inquest, the franchise shall be deemed to be part of the said county, and if the county is divided into districts of the district in which the franchise is situate or to which it adjoins.

The coroner for the county shall be entitled to be paid by the authority or person by whom the franchise coroner is paid the sums following, namely, if the franchise coroner is paid by fees, the same fees as would be payable to that coroner, and if he is paid by salary, then, in the case of a particular inquest, such reasonable sum as the local authority of the county direct to be paid, and in any other case the same salary as if he were coroner for the franchise.

Where the franchise adjoins more than one district, the coroner for such district of the county as the sheriff determines shall be interim coroner, and where the franchise, not being situate in any county, adjoins more than one county, the same shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be situate in that county with which it has the longest common boundary. (4.) A coroner for a franchise shall make his

declaration of office before the sheriff of a county in which the franchise or any part thereof is situate, and shall reside within his franchise or within a convenient distance from the boundary thereof.

(5.) A person not qualified to be elected a

coroner for a county, shall not be qualified to be appointed after the passing of this Act a coroner for a franchise, except where the office of coroner is annexed to some other office.

(6.) Nothing in this Act shall interfere with any power of removing a franchise coroner which is vested by law in any person or body of persons.

Where a franchise coroner is removed in pursuance of the powers conferred by this Act, the person or body of persons in whom the appointment of such coroLer is vested shall forthwith appoint another coroner. (7.) This section shall apply to Her Majesty in

right of her Duchy of Lancaster, in like manner as to any person in whom the appointment of a franchise coroner is vested.

40. Power to surrender existing franchises.Any person or body of persons having power to appoint a franchise coroner may surrender such power to the local authority for the county or borough in which the franchise is situate, and such surrender may be made on such conditions and on payment of such compensation (if any) as may be agreed upon.

Any compensation payable by the local authority under this section may be charged on and paid out of the local rate.

On such surrender being completed the power so surrendered shall be extinguished, and the franchise shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to form part of the area within the juristhere are coroners' districts shall be deemed to diction of the local authority to whom the surrender has been made, and in a county where form a district subject to alteration by an Order in Council under this Act.

The provisions of this Act with respect to the surrender to the local authority of the power of appointing a franchise coroner, shall authorise the surrender of the power of appointing a franchise coroner within the liberties of the Duchy of Lancaster, or within any of those liberties, and such surrender may be made by the Chancellor and council of the Duchy of Lancaster on behalf of Her Majesty under the seal of the duchy.

The jurisdiction of the coroner of the Queen's household within the limits of the Queen's palaces or houses mentioned in this Act, or of any of them, may, if it seem fit, be surrendered in pur suance of this section, and such surrender may be made by warrant under the Royal Sign Manual countersigned by the Lord Steward of the Queen's household.

41. Saving for remuneration of franchise coroners (see 25 Geo. 2, c. 29, s. 15; 7 & 8 Vict. c. 92, ss. 25, 26).-Where a franchise coroner is, at the passing of this Act, paid a salary out of the local