sources," that a debtor should be prosecuted, the court may so order, and if he be committed for trial by the magistrate, then the court may further order that the trial shall be in the district of the Central Criminal Court, and the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy may preside at the trlal. This seems to be the purport of a rather roundabout clause; and if so, it is to be hoped the Chief Judge will be the wonderful man who is required not only to manage the whole London bankruptcy business and the country appeals, but also to discover defaulting debtors and preside over their punishment. THE effect of a garnishee order, under the Common Law Procedure Act, as a security in bankruptcy, has lately been considered by us, and especially in comparison with foreign attachments in the Mayor's Court, London. A case before the Court of Appeal last week is of importance, as more clearly settling the time at which a creditor having issued a garnishee order becomes secured against a trustee in bankruptcy, or, which is now the same thing, under sect. 10 of the Judicature Act 1875, as against the liquidator who is winding-up a limited company. In Re The Stanhope Silkstone Collieries Company the judgment creditor had issued a garnishee order nisi against a debtor to the company, but had not served it before the petition for winding-up was presented, and yet it was argued on his behalf that he was a secured creditor, and that the fact of non-service made no difference, reliance being placed upon some expressions used in the recent case of Ex parte Joselyne (L. Rep. 8 Ch. Div. 327). Certainly Lord Justice COTTON there makes use of language that may be made to bear such a meaning, though in that case the order was served before the petition in liquidation, and that was the ground of the court's decision. He says: 66 'It is called an order nisi, but as against the judgment debtor it was a final and complete order, transferring at once to the judgment creditors the right to receive any money that might be due from the garnishee to the debtor." But Lord Justice JAMES put the point plainly thus: "The property in the debt was transferred, and there was a complete and perfect security the moment the order of attachment was served." This is followed in the case before the Court of Appeal the other day, where the MASTER of the ROLLS laid it down that a garnishee order did not give the judgment creditor any security until it was served upon the garnishee; and that, in short, the creditor acted as his own sheriff, and until service the execution was incomplete, and therefore gave no security. The application of this principle to the practice of foreign attachments also goes to strengthen what we have elsewhere written upon the pretensions put forward on behalf of this form of procedure in the Mayor's Court. THE Trustee Relief Act contains provisions under which those who hold money about which other are disputing can shelter themselves in a way at once cheap and convenient, so that it is no wonder its aid should be often sought. But it appears that the courts are by no means anxious to extend the application of the statute, as was shown last week by Vice-Chanc er HALL in the case of Re Sutton's Estate. There the point was, whether the bankers, who held money as a deposit from the deceased, could rightly pay it into court under the Trustee Relief Act to abide the event of a dispute between contending executors. Against them it was argued that a banker was in no way a trustee, and that the only relation between him and his customer was that of debtor and creditor. The case of Matthew v. The Northern Assurance Company (L. Rep. 9 Ch. Div. 80) was quoted, in which the MASTER of the ROLLS held that money payable under a life policy was not so held upon trust that it could be paid into court under this statute. But on behalf of the bank reference was made to sect. 25, sub-sect. 6, of the Judicature Act 1873, which enables all persons liable for a debt, and having notice of conflicting claims, either to call upon the parties to interplead, or to pay the money into court under the Trustee Relief Act. But although the words of that section are very wide, the ViceChancellor held that they were governed by the beginning, which shows that it applies only to cases where the debt has been absolutely assigned by writing. Here there was no such assignment, and therefore the bank was held to have been wrong. It would seem, however, that relief can be obtained in such cases by way of interpleader even without any action being brought. For this reason, and also because a party holding money in this way as a debt due to another is as much a trustee with regard to the difficulty of his position in respect of conflicting claims where there is no written assignment as where there is, the principle of this distinction seems hardly reasonable. The point applies not only to bankers, but to any one who is really a stakeholder, and, as it is one of practical importance, we hope it may soon be settled more satisfactorily. THE question what constitutes a proper service of a notice to quit as between landlord and tenant recently came before the Court of Appeal in a somewhat novel form in the case of Payne v. Burgess. The agreement for the tenancy provided that the notice to quit should be given by the tenant or his representative to, or received from, the landlord or his representative. Under this agreement was it necessary that the notice to be "received from the landlord, in order to be effectual, should actually come into the possession of the tenant? It appeared that the tenant, shortly after entering into possession of the demised premises, gave a bill of sale on certain chattels therein. A man was subsequently put in possession under this bill of sale, and] the tenant absconded. The landlord thereupon, desiring to serve a notice to quit on his tenant, sent his agent to the house with a proper notice. The agent, finding no one in the house except the bailiff, delivered the notice to him, and at the same time posted a copy in a conspicuous position in the principal room in the house. It was suggested that the man in possession should be treated as the agent or representative of the tenant, so as to make the receipt of the notice by him a compliance with the terms of the proviso in the agreement. This latter theory certainly seems somewhat absurd; for, looking at it from a common-sense point of view, it can hardly be supposed that a man would be likely to constitute as his agent a bailiff who comes to take possession of goods which he has assigned to some one else by bill of sale. A bailiff too, in a measure, represents the holder of the bill of sale, and enters the premises to hold the property as against the tenant of the house. On an à fortiori argument, therefore, it is somewhat approaching to a reductio ad absurdum to make out the bailiff to be the representative of the tenant. This contention, as to the bailiff being the representative of the tenant in the case in question, was not acquiesced in by the court, but they considered it unnecessary to decide the point, "the whole question turning," as Lord Justice BRETT aptly said, "upon the construction of the agreement, which contained a stipulation with regard to a known relation between landlord and tenant, and with regard to an ordinary and well-known act occurring in that relation.' The only question remaining was, whether any distinction should be drawn between the words "received by" and "served on," and, reading the whole of the stipulation together, it was evident that an ordinary service of notice was intended, and the Court decided accordingly. THE reversal of the decision of Vice-Chancellor MALINS in Re The Gold Company (Limited) (40 L: T. Rep. N. S. 5), and the enunciation by the Court of Appeal of the principle that a voluntary winding-up is a bar to the making of a compulsory winding-up order on a shareholder's petition in the absence of fraud or the like, give prominence to a branch of law which must practically affect the interests of a large section of the community. In the case to which we have referred, a company was registered for acquiring and working a mine, By the articles of association it was provided that the directors might allot and issue shares on such terms as they should think fit, and shares unallotted might in certain contingencies be distributed amongst the then shareholders. Within two months after the incorporation, by which time 25,000 shares had been allotted, a contract was signed between the company and all persons who were then holders of shares by which it was agreed that all the remaining 75,000 shares should be divided between the existing shareholders in proportion to their holdings, and allotted to them as fully paid-up shares. Subsequently resolutions were duly passed for a voluntary winding-up of the company, and appointing the secretary liquidator. Subsequently a shareholder who had bought 100 shares from one of the subscribers of the memorandum of association, believing the shares to be fully paid up, presented a petition for the compulsory winding-up of the company on the ground that the allottment of the 75,000 shares was fraudulent. It was argued before Vice-Chancellor MALINS that the court had no authority to make a compulsory order to wind-up a voluntary winding-up, and that the 145th section of the Companies Act 1862 supported that contention. The 145th section provides that the voluntary winding-up of a company shall not be a bar to the right of any creditor of such company to have the same wound-up by the court, if the court is of opinion that the rights of such creditors will be prejudiced by a voluntary winding-up. Hence the inference, that if a voluntary winding-up of a company is no bar to the right of any creditor of the company, it is a bar to the right of any other person than a creditor, and therefore is a bar to the right of a shareholder. In bis Lordship's opinion, however, the true principle was that a voluntary winding-up was not a bar, but that the Court would look at all the surrounding circumstances, and if it said that the resolution to wind-up voluntarily had been under such circumstances as to require further investigation, the Court would make a compulsory order. His Lordship being satisfied that it would be impossible to have a proper investigation by an application under the 138th section, or whilst the friendly liquidator remained in office, made the order required. The company appealed. Reliance was placed by the appellants on the case of Re Bank of Gibraltar and Malta (13 L. T. Rep. N. S. 387), where Lord Justice TURNER said: "The 145th section seems to give the right to such an order to creditors only, and, as it seems to me, not without reason, for the contributories must be bound by the resolution to wind-up voluntarily, and it would be strange if any of them should afterwards be allowed to destroy that resolution by obtaining such an order." This opinion, it will be JAMES went seen, had some weight with the Court of Appeal in the present case. Having expressed his opinion that if the matter was res integra he would come to the conclusion that the voluntary winding-up is an insuperable bar to the making of a compulsory order for winding-up, Lord Justice on to deal with certain cases in which a contributory has obtained an order for winding-up after a voluntary winding-up. Of these authorities Re West Surrey Tinning Company (L. Rep. 2 Eq. 737) may be cited as the leading case. There, however, the one man whose conduct was impeached, and whose dealings and transactions with the company required investigation, had a complete majority of the votes, so that he could, by his own votes, have determined that no proceedings should be taken against himself. The Court accordingly held that the resolution to wind up voluntarily was a sham. Lord Justice BAGGALLAY thought that the result of the case was that the Court will not entertain a petition from a contributory after there has been a voluntary windingup, unless it is shown that there has been fraud special circumstances almost amounting to fraud. During the argument the petitioner's counsel were asked if there is any case in which such an order has been granted in the absence of fraud. Re Fire Annihilator Company (8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 412) was at once suggested; but there the voluntary winding up had been dragging on for five years without any result; in the Surrey Tanning Company's case no complete winding up had been resolved upon, and in Re Littlehampton Steamship Company (11 L. T. Rep. N. S. 725), the petition for compulsory winding up the company was presented before the preliminary steps had been taken for obtaining a voluntary winding-up. or In the case of the Emma Silver Mining Company v. Grant, the MASTER of the ROLLS has, we venture to think, carried the doctrine of allowances to a "promoter" considerably further than was done by the Appeal Court in Bagnall v. Carlton (37 L. T. Rep. N. S. 481; L. Rep. 6 Ch. D. 371). In that case the promoters claimed to be allowed, out of the profit made, a sum of £6250 in respect of advertising, printing, and postage, incidental expenses, and conveyancing costs incurred in the formation of the company, and Lord Justice JAMES there said he thought "the costs, charges, and expenses they had a right to deduct, because what they were liable to pay the company was the profit which they had made in a fiduciary character-that was, the net profit; and he thought costs, charges, and expenses might properly be deducted in ascertaining the net profit." Lord Justice COTTON, in his judgment, said, "the principle on which he decided the case was that the trustee could not make for himself a secret profit, and the profit was the net balance after deducting any charges and expenses properly incurred in the formation of the company. The expenses allowed were, it is true, not closely examined, but the ratio decidendi why they were allowed was, it is evident-at all events according to Lord Justice COTTONbecause they were properly expended in the usual and necessary formation expenses of a company. In the Emma company's case last week the promoter claimed to be allowed not only the usual advertising and other formation expenses, but also a sum of €1500 paid to a gentleman to find directors of the neces sary standing and position, large sums paid in sustaining the market for the shares, other sums paid to find the directors their qualification; and, finally various sums paid to the press for "puffing" and laudatory statements. There was no doubt the sums had been paid, but the contention was, that the payments were clearly improper, and in effect made for the purpose of deceiving the public, that they were not within the principle of Bagnall V. Carlton, and ought not to be allowed. The MASTER of the ROLLS, however, allowed the promoter the whole amount proved to have been paid by him for any of the above purposes, and, as we said before, we think his decision goes far beyond that of Bagnall v. Carlton. The only limit apparently, according to his Lordship, would be that the payments must not be voluntary, but otherwise he said that, however much a judge might disapprove of the character of the payments made, still, having been made, he considered they ought to be allowed. As he read Bagnall v. Carlton only the net profit was repayable by the promoter, and he thought that some value to the company must have been obtained by means of the payments made, and therefore that they should be allowed. As the MASTER of the ROLLS said, during the argument, the courts have, undoubtedly, gone rather wild about these "promoter" cases, in order to hit the "promoter," but still the extent of the principle now introduced by his Lordship is, we cannot but think, putting too great a premium upon fraud, and is not what the Appeal Court intended by their decision in Bagnall v. Carlton. THE BANKRUPTCY LAW AMENDMENT BILL. WE have already touched upon the salient features of the new proceed to discuss the various provisions of the new measure more in detail. This Bill contains 160 clauses and four schedules. The first five clauses are preliminary, and declare the title, the application, and the commencement of, and the interpretation of certain terms in, the Bill, and provide for the exclusion of companies and large partnerships. Having enumerated the preliminary provisions, we come to the substantive provisions of the Bill. These are distributed into nine parts. Part I. deals with proceedings under a bankruptcy petition, including provisional orders and meetings of, and investigations by creditors. These subjects are contained in sects. 6 to 23. In this part of the Bill will be found the various provisions relating to petitions and acts of bankruptcy (clause 6); provisional orders against trader and non-trader (clauses 7 and 8); petitions by debtors, appointment of receivers, the filing of list of creditors by debtor, adjudication consequent on failure to file list (clauses 8 to 13); binding effect of proceedings, and commence→ ment of proceedings in bankruptcy, the summoning of creditors (clauses 14 to 16). The remaining clauses of Part I. deal with the meetings of and investigation by creditors. Here provision is made for the first general meeting, and the appointment of a committee of inspection, and trustee or receiver (clauses 17 and 18). Then follows a statement of the effect of resolutions at the first meeting (clause 19 and 20). Clause 21 deals with the second general meeting, and the remaining two clauses (22 and 23) deal with the duty of gazetting the bankruptcy and sitting for public examination, and the conduct of the debtor. Part II. deals with deeds of arrangement. The provisions relating to such deeds are contained in clauses 24 to 38. First we have regulations as to arrangement with creditors (clause 24), then the provision that debts of creditors are to be dealt with as in bankruptcy (clause 25), the necessity of confirmation by court, restriction on such deeds (clause 26 and 27). The 28th clause deals with the analogy between deeds of arrangement and procedure and administration in bankruptcy. Then follow various provisions. The order of the court confirming the deed of arrangement is to be conclusive; regulations are made for the appointment of receiver under deed and staying proceedings against debtor, the powers of creditors at meeting called after filing of the deed are defined, the effect of deed comprising all the property of a debtor stated, the power of the court to nullify deeds declared; provisions follow with respect to arrangements by partners, with joint or with separate creditors, and with creditors generally, and with respect to debts incurred by fraud (clauses 29 to 36). There is a saving of rights against third parties, and finally the court is empowered to remove trustee or inspector of deed and appoint a new one (clauses 37 and 38). The third part, which relates to the discharge of the bankrupt, takes up three clauses only (39 to 41). The important subject of the distribution of the property is treated in Part IV. The general provisions (clause 42) relate to the description of debtor's property divisible amongst creditors. The three following clauses (43 to 45) relate to dealings with that property, embracing provisions as to the possession of property by trustee or receiver, the disclaimer of onerous property by trustee, and restrictions on trustee's right to disclaim. The next seven clauses deal with the debts provabie (clauses 46 to 52), and contain provisions relating to the description of debts provable in bankruptcy, interest on debts, secured creditors, distinct contracus, set-off, the power of landlord to distrain for rent, and right of proof in case of rent and periodical payment. The last division of this part provides (in clauses 53 to 60) for the distribution of assets and dividend. The matters here touched upon are the payment of preferential and other debts, declaration of dividends, provisions for creditors residing at a distance, the right of a creditor who has not proved debt before declaration of a dividend, final dividend, right to sue for dividend, allowance to debtor for maintenance of service, debtor's right to surplus. This. concludes the provisions as to the distribution of property. The next part, viz., Part V., deals with the powers and duties of committees of inspection, trustees, and receivers. The provisions relating to these subjects are embraced in fifteen clauses (61 to 75); of those the first six (61 to 66) relate to the conduct and. powers of a trustee or receiver, the authority of the committee of inspection to deal with property, the powers of a receiver, and the jurisdiction of the court to confirm or reverse the acts of a trustee or committee. The following seven clauses (67 to 73) relate to various matters, more especially those relating to the remuneration and accounts of trustees and receivers. A scale of remuneration is fixed (clause 67) for trustees and receivers; provision is made for the payment of a solicitor who acts as trustee or receiver, as to the payment of moneys into bank, the filing of accounts under deeds of arrangement, and the return of accounts to comptroller. Clauses 72 and 73 deal with the duties and powers of the comptroller. The last division of Part V. relates to the removal and succession of committee of inspection, trustee, and receiver. Part VI. defines the constitution and powers of the court in sixteen clauses (76 to 91). The court is to consist of the London Court and the County Courts (76). Questions arising in a local bankruptcy court may be heard originally in the London Bank ruptcy Court (78), and courts may delegate certain powers (86). The other clauses relate to the power of the court to make transfers, the limits of the London bankruptcy district, the constitution of the court in London, the appointment of registrars, comptrollers, taxing masters, and other officers, their salaries; the duties of subordinate officers of the court, the jurisdiction of the London Court and of County Court judges, the general powers of bankruptcy courts, rights of appeal, warrants of such courts, and powers of commitment to prison. Part VII. is divided into four heads, according as its provisions are either supplemental or relate to joint debtors, or to the discovery of the debtor's property, or to dealings with the property specified. The clauses contained in this part are twenty-seven in number. The 92nd provides various supplemental regulations as to proceedings under a bankruptcy petition. The next eight clauses are concerned with joint debtors, treating of petitions against partners or joint debtors, the power to dismiss a petition against some respondents only, actions by trustees and committees and debtor's partner, joint contracts and provisional orders in case of absent or lunatic member of a firm (clauses 93, 94, 98 to 100). The property of partners is to be vested in the same trustee (95); provisional orders against partners may be extended to separate estates (96), and joint creditors may prove for the purpose of voting (97). The clauses from 101 to 107 relate to the discovery of the debtor's property. In these are dealt with the power of the court to summons persons in reference to the property of the debtor, the examination of parties by the court, orders of the court for payment of amount admitted on examination, power of the court to order examination out of England, the seizure of the debtor's property, the arrest of the debtor, and post letters addressed to the debtor. Lastly come a number of provisions relating to dealings with certain property. A creditor who issues execution or attachment must seize and sell before bankruptcy (110); goods taken in execution are to be sold by auction (111). Other clauses relate to the proceeds of sale of goods seized (108); the delivery of goods seized by sheriff to receiver (109); the avoidance of voluntary settlements, fraudulent preferences, and payment to petitioning creditor (112 to 114); the protection of certain transactions entered into by or in relation to the property of the debtor, the sequestration of ecclesiastical benefices, the appropriation of pay of officers and of salary to creditors, and the payment of money by agents to trustee or receiver (115 to 119). We now come to the general provisions. These are contained in Part VIII. First we have the provisions relating to evidence (120 to 127), dealing with the evidence of proceedings at meetings of creditors, the swearing of affidavits, the evidence of proceedings in bankruptcy, death of witness, the exemption of deeds from stamp duty, and the certificate of appointment of trustee and receiver. The 128th clause provides that general rules are to be made by the Lord Chancellor, with the advice of the Chief Judge. The remaining clauses (129 to 152) of this part are taken up with various miscellaneous provisions, e.g., the computation of time, change of jurisdiction by the Lord Chancellor, expenses of registrars attending meetings, power of assignee to sue, preferential (claims in cases of apprenticeship, removal of debtor from trusteeship, bankrupt or liquidating justices of the peace, construction of Acts mentioning commissioners of bankruptcy, solicitation for proxies and appointments, restriction on voting powers, powers to revoke provisional order and annual adjudication and consequences thereof, acts of creditors at meeting, application of Act to married women, returns by bankruptcy officer, scale of fees, superannuation of officers, transfer of estates from registrars of London Court to official assignee, and provision for filling vacancies in office of assignee, transfer of estates on vacancy in office of trustee in liquidation under the Bankruptcy Act 1869, and transfer of outstanding property on close of bankruptcy or liquidation under the Bankruptcy Act 1869. Formal defects are not to invalidate proceedings (130); judges and officers in bankruptcy are to be ineligible to sit in Parliament (131); solicitors of the Supreme Court are to be entitled to practise in the Bankruptcy Court (136); mayors are to be disqualified by arrangements (138); undischarged debtors under previous Acts may apply for orders of discharge under the new Act (141); and the Solicitor of the Treasury is to be deemed a creditor in respect of costs payable to the Crown officer (145). The questions relating to persons having privilege of Parliament are provided for in Part IX. Six clauses are given to those questions (153 to 158). Privilege of Parliament is not to prevent adjudication in bankruptcy (153) in the case of a member of the House of Commons. The Speaker is to issue a new writ (157). The other clauses provide for provisional orders against peers, the vacating of seat in the House of Commons, the giving of a certificate to the speaker, and extend the provision of 24 Geo. 3, s. 2, c. 26, to the case of bankruptcy (158). Part X. and Part XI. contain each one clause. The former (159) provides that unclaimed or undistributed funds and dividends shall vest in the Crown; the latter (160) repeals the Bankruptcy Act 1869. Schedule I. gives a description of traders; Schedule II. provides a scale for the remuneration of trustees or receivers appointed by committee of inspection when the assets do not exceed £3000; Schedule III. gives a list of County Courts; and Schedule IV. enumerates the statutes relating to unclaimed dividends. Having before them an analysis of the Bill, our readers will be prepared to follow us in a detailed examination of the measure now before the House of Lords. In the course of that examina tion we shall be chiefly concerned with those provisions which are new, and which consequently will have the effect of altering the existing bankruptcy law. THE PROBABLE RESULTS OF THE PASSING OF THE COUNTY COURTS BILL. THE Government measure for extending the jurisdiction of County Courts, which we printed and summarised last week, and which has since been referred to a select committee, is one of extraordinary interest and importance to the Profession. We propose therefore to point out what may be the effect if it is passed as it stands, and also what changes will be brought about by the repeal of the sections which are scheduled in the Bill. There was before the House of Commons a Bill affecting County Courts which, though bearing only the names of Mr. Norwood and others, was introduced upon the recommendations of the select committee, and was supported by the authorities. But this Bill, which we fully explained at the time, is now dropped to make way for the far more ambitious scheme since promoted by the Government. The new Bill adopts all the three plans that have been proposed for the purpose of extending the jurisdiction and increasing the business of the County Courts. First and foremost comes the clause which is really aimed at enlarging the exclusive juris diction protected by costs from £20 as at present, or, as the Bill puts it, from £50 to £200; and in equity matters up to £1000. Now, here we have the Bill at the outset in direct conflict with the last select committee, for that body, after long consideration upon a mass of evidence, reported most strongly against any increase of the jurisdiction of the County Courts as protected by costs. Yet this is the main object of the Bill, which will be found to consist of a deliberate attempt to force business into the County Courts up to the limit of their acquired jurisdiction by depriving suitors of their costs, not only in the High Court, but also in the older local and inferior courts about the country, of which the Mayor's Court is the best example. The Bill seeks to do this in a rather singular and suspicious manner. As already pointed out, the various sections of the old Acts that state the limit as £50 are amended to make it £200. This was done in Mr. Norwood's Bill, which then left the matter optional, and said nothing about costs. But clause 6 of the new Bill is really a cumbrous copy of the section in the Act of 1867 which deprived suitors of costs in the Superior Courts in actions up to £20, and it may have an even more extensive and injurious effect upon the interests of the Profession. It proposes that whenever an action is commenced in the High Court, which could under any of the statutes have been brought in a County Court, that court may order that the party bringing such action "shall, if entitled to costs, recover such proportion, not being less than two-fifths of his costs, exclusive of disbursements, when taxed, as the court may deem right." It would seem that this interference is only to be allowed to the court "if it is of opinion that there was no question of fact or law to be tried or decided of sufficient importance or difficulty to warrant the action being brought in the High Court." To take this part first. We have here clearly an absolute discretion vested in each judge who tries a cause, or, as it is not confined to trials, in each master at any time; and unless some rule be laid down by the court for its own guidance, the result will be left to mere individual caprice, varied by those whims of equitable wisdom that we have lately seen displayed upon the Bench. This clause is surely too dangerously vague to pass as it stands, and requires careful watching in committee. Not content with thus trying to make the County Courts safe as against the competition of the High Court, the Bill in clause 14 proposes to do the same thing for the inferior courts. This plan is to be found in Mr. Norwood's Bill, but here it is carried out more thoroughly. Where the plaintiff in any such court shall recover a sum not exceeding £20 in contract or £10 in tort, "whether by verdict, judgment by default, or on demurrer, or otherwise, he shall not be entitled to a greater amount of costs than he would have been allowed if the action had been brought in a County Court, any Act to the contrary notwithstanding." We hardly know what the framers of the Bill imagine will or can be the effect of this section. Take the Mayor's Court as an instance, and it will be found that upon trials there the costs are heavier than in a County Court in small cases, while upon judgments by default they are about the same, and rather less than more. This will doubtless astonish those who have forgotten the high fees of the County Court, which, though they are of no benefit to the plaintiff's solicitor, are as great a burden upon the defendant as if they were made up of profes sional costs. This clause extends the principle of sect. 29 of the Act of 1867, which is repealed, and which applied only to cases where the verdict was below the sum of £10. If carried out its practical working will be very cumbersome, as it will oblige these inferior courts also to have a sliding scale equal to the County Court costs upon the varying amounts; but it will by no means reduce their business, which is far more likely to be greatly increased. The second plan for extending the jurisdiction of the County Courts is to be found in clause 7 of the Bill, which gives them a concurrent or optional jurisdiction coequal with that of the High Court. This was proposed in the Commons committee, and is a measure harmless enough, because not compulsory, and practically resting upon the consent of the parties. For it is provided that, though the plaintiff may bring any action he chooses in a County Court, it shall be removed into the High Court by writ of certiorari, or otherwise, as may be prescribed by rules of court upon the application of the defendant." In Mr. Norwood's Bill this removal was said to be "as of right," and we are sorry to see these words omitted. Still more important is it, however, to consider what is meant by rules to be prescribed with regard to this removal; for, if that is to be hampered or hindered in any way whatever in its practical operation, then we have here a still further enlargement of exclusive jurisdiction. The third plan proposed for forcing business into the County Courts is contained in clause 8 of the Bill, and refers to the transfer of causes from the High Court. The present methods of sending the issue for trial under sect. 26 of the Act of 1856, and of transferring the cause upon the defendant's application within eight days after service of writ under sect. 7 of the Act of 1867, are wholly repealed in the schedule of the Bill. There would remain then sect. 10 of theAct of 1867, under which, in actions of tort, a defendant may send a case to the County Court in default of plaintiff's giving security for costs, and the clause proposed by the Bill, which is as wide as words can make it, would apply to common law actions up to £200, and certain Chancery suits as far as £1000. Under the new practice any of these may, "at any time, on application by either party to the court or a judge thereof, or without such application, be transferred to any County Court in which it might have been commenced or taken, or to which it appears desirable that it should be transferred for more convenient trial." Surely nothing could be more extensive or more vague than the discretion here conferred upon every chief clerk and master, who may even act without an application being made. It can also be called into action at any time, so that no suitor in the High Court will be sure that by to-morrow night his case may not have gone to a County Court judge for direction and decision. To complete the circle it may be moved by either party, and a plaintiff who has taken advantage of the speed and economy of the High Court in the early stages of his action, may, when he finds the result to be doubtful, fight it out with cheapness and comfort before a County Court judge. Wholly without check or guidance, the masters and chief clerks are left to themselves, and how they will deal with what used to be the common jury list of Nisi Prius time alone will tell. Many of the sections scheduled for repeal are only the old provisions giving power to make orders and rules that are now unnecessary, and have been superseded. But it is curious that the authority to the committee of County Court judges is also rescinded, as are the sections of the Act of 1846, upon which the present paltry allowances of 10s. and 15s. to solicitors, and one guinea to counsel in actions between £5 and £20, are founded. This repeal, and others of a similar character, are worthy of notice as showing that the authorities mean to review the present scale of costs, which is certainly unsuited for any real increase of business. This fact also points to the probability that the Lord Chancellor intends shortly bringing in his promised and complete measure consolidating the numerous County Court statutes. LAW LIBRARY. The Law of the Office and Duties of the Sheriff. By CAMERON CHURCHILL and A. CARMICHAEL BRUCE. London: Stevens and Sons. THIS is a work upon a subject of large practical importance, and seems to have been compiled with exceptional care. The table of contents in itself is unusually complete, although, as we have before had occasion to say, we do not attach much value to a table of contents when there is a good index-also a feature in this volume. Our authors in their preface describe the plan of the work in these words: The general plan has been to give to the reader, first, a brief account of the origin, appointment, and authority of the sheriff and sheriff's officers. These subjects occupy the first three chapters. The fourth chapter is devoted to the sheriff's judicial functions, and is divided into five parts, a separate part being allotted to each of the judicial duties performed by the sheriff, viz.-1. At the election of coroners. 2 In outlawry proceedings. 3. In the election of members of Parliament. 4. On a writ of inquiry. 5. In the compensation court. Similarly, the fifth chapter deals with the ministerial duties of the sheriff, dividing them also into five classes, viz.-1. At assizes. 2. In the summoning of juries. 3. In the execution of criminals. 4. As to interpleader. 5. In the execution of writs. In the last class it has been thought advisable to devote a separate section to each of the writs treated of under that heading (with the exception of those which are obsolete), as well as to each of the five following important subjects :-What may and what may not be taken or extended under a fi. fa. or an elegit respectively, the sheriff's fees and poundage, the landlord's security for rent, and the sheriff's return to the writ of fi. fa. The last chapter is devoted to the remedies against the sheriff, and is divided into three parts, the first part dealing with the remedy by attachment, the second with the remedy by action, and the third with the evidence to connect the sheriff. This order has seemed, after much careful consideration, the best for practical purposes, for though it would be more symmɛtrical to have given one section only to the writ of fi. fa. and to have included all its accidents, such as poundage and landlord's claim for rent,' &c., in the same section, the convenience of the reader will probably be best consulted by the order adopted. As to the carrying out of this plan, we have only one complaint to make, which is that in portions of the work there is some want of arrangement of the decisions, and the text has some appearance of a digest without observing the laws of collocation. An instance of this occurs at pp. 215 and 216, where the right of the landlord is mixed up with the duties of the sheriff-matters which ought to be distinct. It would be far better to classify the various matters embraced under the general heading, "The Sheriff's Ministerial Duties," showing what he can, as opposed to what he cannot do. But this complaint is not very serious, whilst the effect of the decisions and the general law are accurately and concisely stated. There is an appendix of forms which will be found useful, and we predict for Messrs. Churchill and Bruce a success, for they have supplied a decided want. NEW EDITIONS. MR. FREDERICK ALBERT LEWIN has edited the 7th edition of the late Mr. Thomas Lewin's well-known and valuable work on the Law of Trusts (London: William Maxwell and Son). A standard work of this class is beyond the reach of criticism. No material alteration has been made in the plan of the treatise, but much new matter embracing the legislation and case law down to the end of 1878 is to be found in it. The rapidity with which the branch of law treated of in this volume grows is remarkable, the addenda merely occupying several pages. To the practitioner and the student the 7th edition will prove, if not indispensable, in the highest degree serviceable. The Law relating to Factories and Workshops, by GEORGE J. NOTCUTT, Solicitor (London: Stevens and Sons), has reached a second edition. It comprises the Factory and Workshop Act 1878, and the orders of the Secretary of State made under it, giving notes and an introduction which show clearly and intelligently the course of factory legislation. which date is hereinafter referred to as the com→ mencement of this Act. 4. Interpretation of certain terms in the Act"Court"-" Registrar"-" Prescribed "-" Property"-"Secured creditor"-"Gazetted"-"Ordinary resolution"-"Special resolution"- Deed of arrangement" -"Creditor". "Person' "Trader"-" Bankruptcy petition"-" Receiver." In this Act, if not inconsistent with the context, the following terms have the meanings hereinafter respectively assigned to them, that is to say, "The court" means the court having jurisdic tion in bankruptcy as by this Act provided: "The registrar" means any registrar of the "court" as above defined: 66 Prescribed means prescribed by rules of coart to be made as in this Act provided: "Property means and includes money, goods, things in action, land, and every description of personal property wheresover situate, and every description of real property situate in the United Kingdom or in any of the dominions, plantations, or colonies belonging to Her Majesty; also, obligations, easements, and every description of estate, interest, and profit, present or future, vested or contingent, arising out of or incident to property as above defined: "Secured creditor" means any person holding a mortgage charge or lien upon the property of the debtor as security for a debt due to him from such debtor : Gazetted "" means advertised in the London Ordinary resolution" or "resolution" means Special resolution" means a resolution passed by the votes of a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of all the creditors who have proved their debts at the date of the meeting at which such resolution is passed, whether such resolution has been signed by such majority at the meeting personally or by proxy, or has, within seven days after the meeting, or, in case of absence of creditors from England, within such further time as the court shall allow, been signed personally or by proxy by such of the creditors as, together with those who signed the same at the meeting, make up such majority: Special resolution passed without proxies " means a resolution which, or a copy of which, having been at or after a meeting of creditors signed by a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors who have proved their debts at the date of such meeting, has been filed in court within seven days after such meeting, or, in case of absence of creditors from England, within such further time as the court shall allow : "Deed of arrangement" means a deed or instrument providing by way of trust, inspec torship, or otherwise, for the distribution of all or part of the property of a debtor among all his creditors, or for the payment of a composition to all his creditors out of his property or otherwise : "Creditor" includes any two or more persons to whom a debt is owing jointly, and also incorporated and joint-stock companies: "Person includes a body corporate and a firm: "Trader," for the purposes of this Act, means the several persons in that behalf mentioned in the first schedule to this Act annexed: "Bankruptcy petition means a petition pray. ing that the affairs of the debtor may be wound-up, and his property administered, under the provisions of the law of bankruptcy : Receiver" includes a manager. 5. Exclusion of companies and large partnerships. A provisional order or deed of arrangement ander this Act shall not be made against or by any corporation, or against or by any partnership or association or company registered under the Companies Act 1862. PART I. Proceedings under a Bankruptcy Petition. 6. Petition and acts of bankruptcy.-A single creditor or two or more creditors, if the debt owing to such single creditor or the aggregate amount of debts owing to such several creditors, from any debtor, amounts to a sum of not less than fifty pounds, may present a bankruptcy petition to the court, alleging as the ground for such petition any one or more of the following acts or defaults, in this Act deemed to be and included under the expression "acts of bankruptcy : (1.) That the debtor has, in England or elsewhere, made a conveyance or assignment of his property to a trustee or trustees for the benefit of his creditors generally, or has executed any other instrument whereby his property is made available for general distribution amonst his creditors: Provided that if such deed be filed in the court, a bankruptcy petition be presented against or by the debtor within three months after such filing. (2.) That the debtor has, in England or elsewhere, made a fraudulent conveyance, gift, delivery, or transfer of his property or of any part thereof: 43.) That the debtor has, with intent to defeat or delay his creditors, done any of the following things, namely, departed out of England, or being out of England re mained out of England; or being a trader departed from his dwelling-house, or otherwise absented himself; or begun to keep house; or suffered himself to be outlawed: (4.) That the debtor has filed in the prescribed manner in the court a declaration admitting his inability to pay his debts, or has presented a bankruptcy petition against himself: the petition an order, that the affairs of the debtor shall be wound-up, and his property administered under the law of bankruptcy, in this Act referred to as a provisional order." A copy of a provisional order shall in the case of a trader debtor be served on the debtor in the prescribed manner, together with a notice that within seven days if the debtor be in England, or within such number of days as shall be specified in the order if the debtor be absent from England, the debtor may show cause why the provisional order should be revoked; and if the debtor within the time appointed show to the satisfaction of the court that either the proof of the petitioning creditor's debt, or of the trading or of the act of bankruptcy, is insufficient, and if upon such showing no other sufficient petitioning creditor's debt, or trading or act of bankruptcy, is proved, or if any ground is shown to exist which would render the making of a provisional order inequit. able, the court shall revoke the provisional order, and, unless it see good cause to the contrary, order costs to be paid to the debtor; but if such order is not revoked within the time appointed, the court shall, at the expiration of such time, proceed as hereinafter in this Act provided in that behalf. 8. Provisional order against non-trader.-A bankruptcy petition against a debtor who is a non-trader shall be issued and served in the prescribed manner. At the hearing the court shall require proof of the debt of the petitioning creditor, and of the act of bankruptcy, or, if more than one act of bankruptcy is alleged in the petition, of some one of the alleged acts of bankruptcy, and if satisfied with such proof, and if no ground is shown to exist which would render the making of a provisional order inequitable, shall make against the debtor a provisional order. 9. Petition by debtor.-A debtor may present a (5. That execution issued against the debtor on any legal process has, in the case of a trader, been levied by seizure and sale of his goods, or enforced by delivery of his goods: Provided that a bankruptcy petition be presented against or by the debtor within four weeks after the date of such sale or delivery, and a provisional order be made thereon, or a deed of arrangement be filed by the debtor within the like period, and be confirmed by the court: (6) That the creditor presenting the petition has served on the debtor a writ specially indorsed with the particulars of demand sought to be recovered, in an action in the High Court of Justice wherein the creditor claims payment of a sum amounting to not less than fifty pounds, and has also served on the debtor in England in the prescribed manner at or at any time after the date of the service of the writ, a bankruptcy notice in writing in the prescribed form, requiring him to pay the amount indorsed upon such writ, and the debtor has not, if a trader, within seven days, or, if a non-trader, within twenty-one days after the service of such notice paid the amount due to the creditor or secured or compounded for the same to the satisfaction of the creditor: Provided that no bankruptcy petition shall be presented on the ground of such last-bankruptcy petition against himself, and the court mentioned act of bankruptcy unless the shall thereupon make a provisional order against creditor shall have obtained final judgment him. in the action for a sum of not less than fifty pounds within six months from the service of the specially indorsed writ. (7.) That the creditor presenting the petition has obtained final judgment against the debtor in an action in the High Court of Justice or in a County Court for a sum of not less than fifty pounds, and has served on the debtor in England or (by leave of the London Bankruptcy Court) elsewhere than in England a bankruptcy notice in writing in the prescribed manner and form, requiring him to pay the amount for which such judgment has been obtained, and the debtor has not, if such notice has been served in England, and if he be a trader, within seven days, or, if a non-trader, within twenty-one days after the service of such notice, and if such notice has been served elsewhere than in England (whether he be a trader or not), within such time as may be limited for the purpose in the particular case by the London Bankruptcy Court, paid such amount, or secured or compounded for the same to the satisfaction of the creditor: Provided (a) That where no shorter time is by this Act fixed in that behalf the alleged act of bankruptcy must have occurred within six months before the presentation of the bankruptcy petition : (b) That the debt of the petitioning creditor must, in the case of a trader, be a liquidated sum due or growing due at law or in equity, and in the case of a non-trader be a liquidated sum due at law or in equity, and must not in either case be a secured debt, unless the petitioner state in his petition that he will be ready to give up such security for the benefit of the creditors in the event of a provisional order being made, or unless the petitioner give an estimate of the value of his security, in which latter case he may be admitted as a petitioning creditor to the extent of the balance of the debt due to him after deducting the value so estimated, but he shall, on an application being made in the course of the proceedings within the prescribed time, by any person interested, give up his security to be dealt with as part of the property of the debtor for the benefit of the creditors upon pay ment of such estimated value. 7. Provisional order against trader.-As soon as may be after the presentation of a bankruptcy petition against a debtor who is a trader, the court, if satisfied by ex parte evidence or otherwise of the petitioning creditor's debt, and of the trading and of the act of bankruptcy (or if more than one act of bankruptcy is alleged of some one of the alleged acts of bankruptcy), shall make on 10. Appointment of receiver.-At any time after the presentation of a bankruptcy petition the court may appoint a receiver or manager of the property or business of the debtor. In cases where the estimated value of the property is less than two thousand pounds such receiver or manager shall be an officer of the court, unless sufficient cause be shown to the court for making another appointment, in which case, and in all cases where the estimated value of the property exceeds two thousand pounds, the court may appoint as such receiver or manager either its own officer or any person who may be proved to its satisfaction to be competent for the office. Every such appointment of a receiver or manager shall, where a provisional order has been made, be revoked if and when the provisional order is revoked; and such receiver or manager shall not (unless the court shall otherwise order) before the first general meeting incur any expense beyond what is necessary for the protection of the pro perty of the debtor. 11. Debtor to file list of creditors.-Where a provisional order is made against a debtor upon the petition of a creditor, and is not revoked within the time appointed, notice thereof shall be served on the debtor in the prescribed manner, together with an order requiring him to file in court, within the specified number of days after the date of the service of the order, a list of his creditors verified by affidavit of himself or some person able to depose thereto, showing which of such creditors are unsecured and which secured, and the value at which he estimates their securi ties, and the dates when such securities were respectively given, and the amount provable after deducting such value. Such order shall state that if the debtor does not, within the time limited by such order, duly file such list, the provisional order may, on the application of a creditor, be made an absolute order for bankruptcy, and that the bankruptcy will be gazetted. If a debtor present a bankruptcy petition against himself, he shall within four days thereafter file in court such list of his creditors as aforesaid. 12. List to be prepared by debtor or his clerk.The list of creditors to be filed by the debtor as hereinbefore provided shall be prepared by the debtor himself or by some clerk or servant in his ordinary employment, unless the court shall under special circumstances otherwise permit. 13. Adjudication on failure to file list.-If the debtor fail to file such list of his creditors within the time appointed, or to show a sufficient excuse for not having done so, the court may, on the application of any creditor, make an absolute order for bankruptcy against the debtor, and direct such bankruptcy to be gazetted. 14. Creditors bound by proceedings in bank ruptcy.-When a provisional order has been made against a debtor, no creditor to whom the debtor is indebted in respect of any debt provable in bankruptcy shall have any remedy against the property or person of the debtor in respect of such debt, except in manner directed by this Act. All proceedings to recover any such debt shall be |