sistence, advocated the extension of the jurisdiction of the County Courts. Still, there can be no doubt, if the Bill becomes law and these inferior courts are patronised to the extent anticipated, it will become necessary to increase the salaries of the judges, and this will enable the appointment of a higher class of practitioners to the office of judge. EXECUTIONS AND BANKRUPTCY. SECTION 87 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 is one of much practical importance to execution creditors, as upon its construction depends often the question whether the debtor's property shall go to them or pass to the trustee. This turns upon the meaning that is to be given to the words by which the limit as to £50 is there defined; and as those words are as loose and vague and ill put together as they could well be, the result has been an ample crop of litigation. Now, however, after a study of ten years, their construction has been settled in a series of six cases; and as, by a recent decision, this series is now so far complete, we may briefly review them in their order, and point out the process by which this section in outline has been filled in by judicial interpretation. Not only may such a collection prove useful to practitioners, but it will perhaps afford a lesson in legislation to those who think nothing is easier than drafting a bankruptcy bill in a few short and simple sections. The words that had to be construed are: " Where the goods of any trader have been taken in execution in respect of a judgment for a sum exceeding fifty pounds." As Lord Justice James said, in the first case upon the point: "The amount of £50 being a merely arbitrary limit, for which no reason can be assigned, there is nothing else to go upon than the words which the Legislature has used." This was in Ex parte The Liverpool Loan Company; Re Buller (L. Rep. 7 Ch. 732), where, the judgment being under £50, and the actual levy by the sheriff over that amount, as it included costs and his expenses, the question arose to whom did the money belong? For the execution creditor it was naturally argued that his was not, in the words of the section, "a judgment for a sum exceeding fifty pounds;" and this seemed the more plausible when it is remembered that under the analogous section 73 of the Act of 1861 only the amount of the judgment debt was considered. But the Court of Appeal held that the true construction of the section is "taken in execution for a sum exceeding fifty pounds in respect of a judgment." This certainly seems rather like turning the sentence upside down grammatically speaking. The Court had, however, to consider in whose favour a doubtful construction should be turned; and between a particular creditor and the trustee representing the general body of the creditors there could be no doubt as to the leaning of equity. So far, then, the theory that the amount of the judgment alone had to be looked at was exploded, and henceforth the amount to be considered was the sum indorsed on the writ of fi. fa. at the least. In the case of Howes v. Young (L. Rep. 1 Ex. D. 146) this point came before the Court of Exchequer, where the above decision was followed, it being held that sheriff's poundage and such incidental and legal expences must be reckoned within the meaning of the section. The point as to including possession money was also raised, though not decided, as it was not necessary in determining the question in the case. But here we find Lord Justice Bramwell, then Baron, saying, "I can understand the argument that possession money is not to be included in the amount because the words 'a sum exceeding £50' must mean at the time that the goods are taken, and at that time it is uncertain what the possession money will be, or whether there will be any." Baron Amphlett also said, "I agree that the question of possession money stands upon a different footing." In the course of time, however, this point, too, came up for decision, and the section had to undergo a little further of that development" which is spoken of in reference to doctrines of religion rather than of law. Re Grubb, Ex parte Sims (L. Rep. 5 Ch. Div. 375) is the next case in our series, and there the view taken with regard to possession money was entirely opposed to that of the Court of Exchequer. There the question was whether the sheriff should be paid five shillings for one day's possession money, as being a legal expense of the execution; and upon this small sum the whole point depended. It was decided against the execution creditor by the Chief Judge, who was upheld by the Court of Appeal in laying down the rule that possession money may be included if the sheriff is compelled to take possession. The Lord Justices, in fact, somewhat amplified this decision, for they held, that all the expenses which the sheriff is entitled to at the time of the sale of the goods are to be included in ascertaining whether or not the sum exceeds the limit. It will be observed that we have already got far beyond the rule stated by Lord Justice Bramwell in Howes v. Young, under which the time when the goods were taken iz execution was fixed as the period to be considered. But, even by this decision, possession money could only be added where the sheriff had been compelled to take possession. This line has however, since been passed like the rest; and we are now still farther on the road to a development that seems unending. By the recent case of Ex parte Lithgow, Re Fenton (L. Rep. 10 Ch. Div. 169), the court has taken a long step further in construing. this section to the trustee's advantage as against the execution creditor. The judgment is that of the Chief Judge, but as a proposed appeal has since been abandoned it stands as law, at least for the present. This case decides that in determining whether the amount for which the execution has been levied exceeds fifty pounds, possession money may be taken into account even if an injunction has been granted restraining the sheriff from selling the goods. Here the actual judgment, and the amount endorsed for levy were under the limit, which was only exceeded by the addition of possession money charged by the sheriff during the time he was restrained from selling by an interim injunction which was afterwards continued. But as Re Grubb had laid down the rule that the time of sale was the period at which the sum was to be reckoned, this remarkable result logically followed. The ground given by the Chief Judge was that, as, when the execution was satisfied by means of a sale, the sum which the sheriff was entitled to retain was over £50, the case came within the meaning of the section as judicially interpreted. We have called this case the end and completion of the series because it is. difficult to see how any other point can well arise by which the operation of these words may be further extended in any direction. But another point arose of some importance in the application of sect. 87, for creditors, finding how easily judgments and fi. fa.'s originally under the limit of £50 were increased to beyond that amount, tried the experiment of abandoning a part of their claim, and so being able to keep the fruits of executions against the debtor's property. In Ex parte Reya, Re Dalinger (L. Rep. 6 Ch. Div. 332), it was held that a creditor who has sued a trader for a debt exceeding £50 is entitled to abandon part of his claim, and to sign judgment for a sum less than that limit, so as to avoid the operation of sect. 87. There was a great deal of argument against this common sense view of the matter, founded on the cases we have quoted, and upon the principle that the Court should not favour any plan by which the creditors generally might be defeated. But this was going too far for the Court of Appeal, so they pointed out that even an execution creditor had some rights remaining. Lord Justice James said, "Here the judgment has been signed and the levy made for less than fifty pounds, and in my opinion a man has a right to abandon a part of his debt. There is nothing in the Act to prevent his doing so." It would be wonderful indeed if there were. This decision was followed and extended by the latter case of Re Hinks, Ex parte Berthier (L. Rep. 7 Ch. Div. 832), where it was held that a creditor who has sued a trader for a debt and who has signed judgment for a sum above £50, may, by issuing execution for less than that limit, avoid the operation of the section. Here the liberty given a creditor is enlarged, for in the former case the judgment itself was signed for less than £50, while in this it was above and only the amount to be levied was reduced. But there can be no donbt the same principle applies, and any other view of the case would be as unsound in argument as it would be unsupported by the section of the Act which alone has to be considered. We have now followed the course of the cases, and the result may be shortly stated. The "sum" mentioned in sect. 87 means the amount realised by the sheriff at the time of the sale, and so includes the judgment debt, and all costs and expenses whatever, even possession money that becomes chargeable, while the sheriff is restrained from selling by an injunction from the court granted or continued. It is also equally clear that a creditor may, by signing judgment for less than his claim, or by levying for less than his judgment, avoid the operation of the section. This is the state of things after ten years, and upon six cases deciding the construction of the statute. We have advisedly called it a lesson in legislation, for by the use of plain language all this litigation might easily have been avoided. If, however, the principle of sect. 87 is to be maintained in the next Bankruptcy Act, though this seems uncertain, and its reason and justice may well be doubted, then we trust it will not be by drawing another section differently worded which will have to be construed all over again. Either let the same phrases be employed which have now a judicial meaning, or let the above cases be codified into a complete section; but in any case we hope this unlucky clause will always show the danger of using loose words in short and simple statutes. LEGISLATION AND JURIS- SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACTS A Bill intituled an Act for amending the Supreme BE it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent 1. Construction and short title.-This Act shall, as far as is consistent with the tenor thereof, be construed as one with the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873, 1875, 1877, and, together with those Acts, may be cited as the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873 to 1879. This Act may be cited separately as the Supreme Court of Judicature (Bankruptcy) Act 1879. 2. Appointment of additional judge of High Court of Justice.-It shall be lawful for Her Majesty to appoint a judge of the High Court of Justice, in addition to the number of judges of that court authorised to be appointed by the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873, 1875, and 1877. 3. Position of additional judge. The judge appointed in pursuance of this Act shall be in the same position as if he had been appointed a puisne judge of the High Court of Justice in pursuance of the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875; and all the provisions of the Supreme time being in force in relation to the qualification and appointment of puisne judges of the High Court, and to their tenure of office, and to their precedence, and to their salaries and pensions, and to the officers to be attached to the persons of such judges, and all other provisions relating to such puisne judges, or any of them, with the exception of such provisions as apply to existing judges only, shall apply to the additional judge appointed in pursuance of this section in the same manner as they apply to the other puisne judges of that court respectively. Court of Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875, for the The judge appointed in pursuance of this Act shall be attached to the Chancery Division of the High Court, subject to such power of transfer as is in the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 mentioned. 4. Consolidation of London Court of Bankruptcy with Supreme Court of Judicature.From and after the day of one thousand eight hundred and seventy-nine (in this Act called the date of transfer ") the London Court of Bankruptcy shall be united and consolidated with and form part of the Supreme Court of Judicature, and the jurisdiction of the London Court of Bankruptcy shall be transferred to the High Court of Justice. For the purposes of this union, consolidation, and transfer, and of all matters incidental thereto and consequential thereon, the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, as amended by the subsequent Acts, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have effect as if the union, consolidation, and transfer had been effected by that Act, except that all expressions referring to the time appointed for the commencement of that Act shall be construed as referring to the date of transfer. 5. Transaction of bankruptcy business-32 & 33 Vict. c. 71.-(1.) Subject to rules of court, and to orders of transfer made under the authority of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, and Acts amending the same, (a.) All matters pending in the London Court of Bankruptcy at the date of transfer, and (b.) All matters to be commenced after the date of transfer under any Act of Parliament by which exclusive jurisdiction in respect to such matters has been given to the London Court of Bankruptcy, shall be assigned to the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice. (4.) Provided that a judge of the High Court of brought or filed in a County Court but for this Justice appointed before the passing of the Bank-section, such action or petition shall be removed ruptcy Act 1869 shall not be appointed under this into the said High Court by writ of certiorari or section without his consent. otherwise, as may be prescribed by rules of the High Court, upon the application of the defendant to the action or the party opposed to the petitioner, but any order made or act done prior to snch removal shall be valid if so ordered by the High Court. 6. Definition of puisne judge.-A puisne judge of the High Court of Justice means, for the purposes of this Act, a judge of the High Court of Justice other than the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice of England, the Master of the Rolls, the Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and the Lord Chief Baron, and their successors respectively. 7. Repeal of 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77, s. 9.-Section 9 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875 is hereby repealed. 8. Rules of court.-" Prescribed" in this Act means prescribed by rules of court. Rules of court may be made for carrying into effect the provisions of this Act in such manner as may be thought expedient. COUNTY COURTS. 8. Transfer to County Court of actions or proceedings. Any action or proceeding pending in the High Court of Justice which might have been commenced or taken in a County Court except under the last preceding section of this Act, may, at any time, on application of either party to the court or a judge thereof, or without such applica tion, be transferred to any County Court in which it might have been commenced or taken, or to which it appears desirable that it should be trans ferred for more convenient trial. Upon any such order of transfer being filed, with the original writ or petition, with the registrar of the court to which the same shall have been transferred, the action or proceeding shall be carried on in such court as if the same had been com A Bill intituled an Act to extend the Jurisdiction Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Act 1850.-Wherever in section one of the County 2. Extension of jurisdiction — County Courts 66 thereof. 4. Extension of jurisdiction — County Courts Act 1865, &c.-Wherever in section one of the County Courts Act 1865, or in sections nine and twenty-four of the County Courts Act 1867, or in section twelve of the Partition Act 1868, the words "five hundred pounds" occur, the words one thousand pounds shall be read in lieu thereof. 5. Extension of jurisdiction to certain actions (1.) In all suits for relief against fraud or mis- (3.) In all proceedings for orders in the nature 6. Disallowance of costs in certain cases.— Wherever an action is commenced or petition filed in the High Court of Justice which may be commenced or taken in a County Court by virtue of any provision contained in any Act passed between the years one thousand eight hundred and (2) All such matters shall be transacted and forty-nine and one thousand eight hundred and disposed of by or under the direction of such one seventy-nine, the court, if it is of opinion that of the judges of the High Court of Justice attached there was no question of fact or law to be tried or to the Chancery Division thereof as may be ap- decided of sufficient importance or difficulty to pointed for that purpose by the Lord Chancellor. warrant the action being brought in the High (3) Notwithstanding such union, consolidation, Court, may order that the party commencing such and transfer as aforesaid, the Chancery Division action or filing such petition shall, if entitled to of the High Court of Justice or other division for costs, recover such proportion, not being less the time being administering the law of bankruptcy | than two-fifths of his costs, exclusive of disburseshall, in so far as relates to proceedings in bank-ments, when taxed, as the court may deem right. ruptcy, be styled the London Court of Bankruptcy, or in any other prescribed manner; and the appointed judge shall, when sitting to hear and determine bankruptcy matters, be styled the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, or any other prescribed manner; and all bankruptcy matters shall continue to be entitled as hitherto, In bankruptcy," or in some other prescribed manner. 7. Certain actions and proceedings brought in a County Court may be removed as of right to High Court.-Any County Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine all actions and petitions which can be brought or filed in the Chancery, Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, or Exchequer Divisions of the High Court of Justice; but, where such action or petition could not have been 9. Where in certain cases actions may be tried. -Wherever any party to an action in a County Court considers that the court in which the action is commenced is inconveniently situate for the attendance of counsel or solicitors, it shall be lawful for such party to require, in manner to be prescribed by rules of court, the action to be tried expensively obtained, and which is presided over in a court in which legal assistance can be less by the judge of the court in which the action has opinion that the expense of the action has been been commenced; provided that if the judge is of increased by its trial in such court, he shall direct the increased cost the other party may have been put to thereby to be paid by the party at whose instance the action was transferred to such court, and deducted from the other party, whether he obtains a verdict or not. 10. Judgment by default after eight days.Wherever in section one of the County Courts Act 1875 the words sixteen days occur, the words eight days" shall be read in lieu thereof. 11. Damages awarded to an infant may be invested for the benefit of the infant.-Whenever a verdict is given for the plaintiff in an action brought in any County Court by the next friend of any infant to recover damages by way of compen sation for any personal injury inflicted upon such infant, it shall be lawful for the court to order any portion it shall think fit of the amount of the damages obtained in such action to be paid into a post-office savings bank in trust for the sole personal benefit of such infant; and sections twenty-four, twenty-five, and twenty-six of the County Courts Act 1867, and all rules and orders made for the purpose of carrying out such Act, shall apply to all moneys so paid into the postoffice savings bank under the power hereinbefore conferred. 12. On death of judge a barrister of seven years standing may be appointed to act as judge for a period not exceeding three months. On the death of a judge who shall not have appointed a deputy, the Lord Chancellor may, for a period not exceed ing three months, provisionally appoint a person who shall be a barrister-at-law of seven years standing, or who shall have practised as a bar rister-at-law and special pleader for at least seven years, to discharge the duties, and such person. during the time for which he shall be appointed. shall have all the powers and privileges, and perform all the duties of a judge of a County Court, and shall receive as remuneration for the period for which he may be so appointed a rateable proportion of the salary and travelling allowances attached to the office of judge of the court or courts to which he is so appointed to act provisionally as judge. 13. Lord Chancellor may permit a registrar not to reside in district under certain circumstances.The Lord Chancellor may dispense with the requirements in section three of the County Courts Act 1850, that a registrar shall reside within the district of a County Court, either where from there being no solicitor resident within the district of the court in which the office of registrar is vacant, or where he shall think it desirable that the requirement should not be enforced. 14. Costs in inferior courts not to exceed costs allowed in a County Court.-Where in any action commenced, after the commencement of this Act. in any court, other than the High Court of Justice the plaintiff shall recover a sum no exceeding twenty pounds, if the action is founded on contract, or ten pounds if founded on tort whether by verdict, judgment by default, or o demurrer, or otherwise, he shall not be entitled to a greater amount of costs than he would hav been allowed if the action had been brought in County Court, any Act to the contrary notwith standing. 15. Enactments in schedule A. repealed.-Th several enactments specified in schedule A. t The words "for any malicious The whole of sections seventy- six. this case. word "event" in the rule? and added, "it is about as vague a term as could be used; does it mean the verdict or the judgment?" On the other hand no such difficulty seems to present itself to the mind of the Lord Chief Baron, for recently in a case before his Lordship at Westminster, Mr. Day, Q.C., on a question of costs, said, "Will your Lordship depart from the usual rule that judge replied, "No, that had better be followed in these should follow the event?" to which the But the question before the court in the Southwark Gas Company v. Quick gave rise to discussions on other points. Baron Pollock drew a distinction between a judgment for costs and an order for costs, and pointed out that while the former could be appealed against, the latter could not. But perhaps the chief feature in the discussion was that which showed that a judge can now practically, by his power over the question of costs, for some purposes practically override the decision of the jury. For instance, in the case before us, the jury found for the plain The County Courts The whole of sections twenty-tiffs £212, and on a counter-claim for the defen Act 1856. The County Courts Act 1865. three, twenty-six, thirty-three, in The words "with respect to such The words "under section one dant for £83, and Lord Coleridge made an order defined rule at chambers on this point. Moreover, such issues ought to be disposed of in chambers by a judge without any delay, which, in nine cases out of ten, is used for the purpose of depriving execution creditors of their legitimate rights. The present practice in chambers as regards interpleader summonses is highly unsatisfactory. dinner of the Manchester Incorporated Law AssoWe publish a short report of the recent annual ciation. Gatherings of this character are to be encouraged. They correspond in a measure with banquets of the Inns of Court, which take place every Sittings. With the solitary exception of tion, Chancery-lane, some five years ago by the a large meeting of solicitors at the Law Institu invitation of the then president of the society, London solicitors have not for years made any attempt to bring about professional social gather ings of the kind in question. CHANCERY JUDGES CHAMBERS. (Before MALINS, V.C.) Wednesday, Feb. 26. Vendors and Purchasers Act 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 79, s. 9)-Sale of freehold - Non-delivery of abstract of title-Application by purchaser for return of deposit money, with interest, costs, &c. THIS was an application upon an adjourned summons originating proceeding in chambers, the appli cation being for return of £68 deposit money, £9 for fees, &c., paid by purchaser at the time of the sale, and for compensation for breach of contract by the vendors. Charles Ford (agent for R. Marvin, Portsmouth), The County Courts The words "provided that the question of costs, without coming to the conclu- for the applicant (the purchaser.) Act 1866. salaries and expenses of the exceed the sum allowed to the vices of a clerk, and for the eight, fifteen, and twenty-nine. SOLICITORS' JOURNAL. WE publish to-day a letter from our correspondent, Mr. James Rawlinson (who took so deep an interest in the question of the appointment of an additional Chancery taxing master), on the question of the block in the Common Law Divisions of the High Court. Our correspondent is of opinion that it is not expedient to extend the jurisdiction of County Courts with a view of relieving the pressure of business in the High Court, and Mr. Rawlinson refers to the County Courts as small debts courts. We are unable to share his opinions, and it should be added that County Courts have, at all events since the Act of 1867, ceased to be small debts courts in the sense in which that expression could formerly be applied to them. County Court judges have for some years been called upon to discharge onerous judicial duties, of which the most laborious, perhaps, are in connection with bankruptcy. The tendency of modern legislation is in favour of localising the administration of justice, and it cannot be expected that district courts of the High Court of Justice should be created without an attempt to utilise the County Courts with a view to relieving pressure of business in the London courts. When the underground railway was constructed there were those who prophesied that Hansom cabs would disappear from our streets. Our conviction is that the extension of County Court jurisdiction will not only not leave the London courts with nothing to do, but that the judges of the High Court will always be fully occupied. Large numbers of cases originating in County Courts would come before the High Court by way of appeal, and many cases would be removed to London for trial. Already much of the work formerly disposed of by County Court judges is disposed of by the registrars, and the duties of such judges are of a much more responsible character than formerly. If the Lord Chancellor's Bill becomes law, as we hope it will, the salaries of County Court judges will have to be considerably increased; otherwise there will naturally be a disposition in some quarters to send business away to the High Court as often as possible.' a THE light that beats upon the judicial bench is much more fierce than that to which the officials in the law offices and chambers are subjected. The common law taxing masters for instance are daily newspapers for mistakes, either real or apnot very liable to be dragged over the coals in the parent, committed by them. So far as the work of these masters at the judges' chambers is concerned, it would be well if their decisions were made more public, and were more frequently reported than they are. We could mention half a dozen subjects in each of which masters take different view of the orders that ought to be made upon particular classes of summonses. This is especially so in the case of sheriffs' interpleader summonses, so that solicitors are never sure what kind of order to expect in a particular case. Only recently, one of the masters, upon a asking for costs against the defendant in the issue on summons by a plaintiff in an interpleader issue the plaintiff within the time limited in the interthe ground that he had not returned the issue to pleader order, declined to make any order. About the same time Master Manley Smith, in another interpleader action, was asked, on a summons issued by the defendant, to order the plaintiff to pay defendant's costs where notice of trial had not been given in consequence of the goods, the subject of the interpleader; having been distrained for rent, and the master made the order. A few another interpleader issue, and by the same solicidays later the same master was applied to in tors who were for the plaintiff in the case last referred to, for an order for the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs on the ground that the plaintiff had not delivered an issue within the time limited paid money into court or given security as required in the interpleader order, neither had such plaintiff by such interpleader order; and Master Manley Smith, although reminded of his order in the previous case, now declined to make any order, thereby leaving each party to pay his own costs. It is impossible to reconcile such decisions with one another. These matters ought to rest upon some intelligible basis. A claimant to goods under a bill of sale or otherwise is often simply conspiring with an execution debtor to defeat the execution creditor by setting up a claim with a view to an interpleader, by which time is gained for liquidation proceedings, the claimant, in the meantime, showing no bonâ fide disposition to go on with the interpleader issue. In such cases an execution creditor should surely be entitled to his costs as against the claimant incurred by notice of claim to the sheriff, and by resisting the execution creditor at chambers. A claimant who forces a sheriff to issue an interpleader summons ought to do so at his peril as regards costs of an execution creditor thereby occasioned, and there should be a well W. P. V. Wallis (solicitor) for himself and Miss Vyse (as vendors). Stopher and Rundle, as former solicitors of vendors, had been served, but did not appear. Ford stated the facts, and read an affidavit, which showed that the sale by auction had taken place at Portsmouth in November last, that the particulars and conditions of sale were headed "Sale by order of the mortgagees," whereas in connection with the particular lot purchased by the present applicant, the sale was stated to be the equity of redemption. Just before the sale, a solicitor present objected to the sale taking place, as he was solicitor for first mortgagees who knew nothing of any second mortgagee, and the first closure suit; the sale, however, proceeded, the mortgagee having obtained a decree in a forepurchaser's agent, not hearing these statements, or not understanding them, purchased the lot in question, and paid deposit and the necessary fees for contract, &c. The conditions of sale required an abstract of title to be delivered in ten days, no abstract having been delivered, and over two months having elapsed, the present summons was issued, and the applicant solicitor asked for an order declaring that the contract for sale had been broken by the vendor, unless a full and complete abstract was delivered in a limited time, and relied upon a case of Phillips v. Penfold, disposed of by Malins, V.C., in chambers, in 1875, and upon other cases. and 8th conditions of sale which entitled the venWallis, for the vendors, relied upon the 3rd dors to rescind the contract at any time upon the simple return of deposit money, and complained of the conduct of the solicitors of the first mort gagee in refusing to produce the title deeds or give any facilities to the vendors. The Chief Clerk considered the conditions in question gave no such right, and made the order asked for on the summons. the summons, Wallis contended that the appliOn the question of costs of and incidental to cant was not entitled to them as a matter of course, but that they were in the discretion of the judge, after hearing the solicitor for the applicant the Chief Clerk ordered that the such Purchaser in any event, that is whether the costs should be paid by the Vendors to the abstract was delivered and the purchase completed, or whether the contract was cancelled in default of this. Between the first hearing and the adjournment, an abstract had been delivered to the London agents of the purchaser's solicitor, but was at once returned, pending the disposal of the summons, and as no time or place was named for production of the title deeds. JUDGES' CHAMBERS. GOLDSMITH AND OTHERS v. EVANS AND ANOTHER. Costs-Plea of tender and payment into court- The statement of claim alleged that defendants agreed to rent of plaintiffs for a year certain a certain berthing place at £40 a year; and that defendants occupied and used such berthing place for three years, and that £10 only had been paid by defendants. The statement of defence alleged that defendants occupied such berthing place under the said agreement for the year, and subsequently from time to time used it, by plaintiff's permission, for eight months longer, for which latter use the defendants considered £10 a fair amount to pay. The defendants admitted having paid only £10 before action brought, and under their defence paid £40 into court in satisfaction of claim, and as to that sum alleged a tender. The plaintiffs, long after the time for replying had elapsed, but before delivering a reply, accepted such sum of £40 out of court in full satisfaction of their claim, and gave notice to defendants, pursuant to Order XXX., r. 4, of the Judicature Acts. The action was therefore at an end, and the plea of tender, so far as the pleadings disclosed, was neither admitted nor denied. Subsequently the defendants applied to dismiss the action with costs for want of prosecution in not delivering a reply. which application was dismissed. The defendants then sought by summons to rerecover their costs of the action, which summons came on for hearing before Mr. Justice Field at chambers, on Saturday, the 15th, and Wednesday, the 19th Feb. 1879. It was then submitted on the part of the defendants that the plaintiffs, by accepting the £40 out of court in satisfaction, practically admitted the plea of tender, and, therefore, the defendants should recover their costs. On the other hand, it was submitted on the part of the plaintiffs that their proceedings were quite regular. That Order XXX., r. 4, empowered them to accept such sum before replying by giving notice, and they were not bound to reply to the plea of tender, and could not be compelled to do So. It was undoubtedly hard upon defendants pleading a tender, but it was submitted the fault was with the Judicature rules in not making a provision to meet such a plea. His LORDSHIP said that if plaintiff's contention were allowed, a plea of tender would be useless, and decided that plaintiffs should there and then elect if they would deny and take issue upon the plea of tender, and upon their declining to deny it, his Lordship ordered that defendants should be paid their taxed costs of the action. REPORTS OF SALES. Friday, Feb. 21. By Messrs. ELLIS and SON, at the Mart. Whitechapel-No. 146, High-street, freehold-sold for £2780. Camden-road.-No. 9, Hilldrop-crescent, term 69 years-sold for £760. By Messrs NORTON, TRIST, WATNEY, and Co., at the Mart. City of London.-No. 18, Leadenhall-street, term 45 years— sold for £2000. Southwark.-Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11, Duke-street, and a warehouse in the rear, term 33 years-sold for £9850. A redeemed land tax of £7 103. 4d. per annum-sold for £170. South Hackney.-Nos. 67, 69, 71, 73, and 75, Well-street, term 77 years-sold for £2145. Nos. 1 to 6, Havelock-road, term 77 years-sold for £1390. of a freer interchange between the two branches of the Profession is well timed, and shows how deep an interest is taken in this important matter by students for both branches of the Profession. We cannot agree with the suggestions in detail on the question, but the general idea as to the conditions under which the freer interchange should be allowed appears to us to be a good one. In the report before us the committee have performed a useful service for the Profession. THE following lectures and classes are appointed to be delivered and held during the ensuing week in the Lecture Hall of the Incorporated Law Society, Chancery-lane: Monday, Common Law Class 4.30 to 6 o'clock p.m.; Tuesday, ditto; Wednesday, ditto; Thursday, Common Law Lecture, 6 to 7 o'clock p.m. Members of the Incorporated Law Society may attend the lectures. WHERE articles expire between 10th Jan. and 15th April, candidates may be examined in January; if between 14th April and 22nd May, candidates may be examined in April; if between 21st May and 2nd Nov., in June; and if between 1st Nov. and 11th Jan., in November; or, of course, at any subsequent examination. Fortytwo days' notice at least is necessary for these examinations, the same to be calculated up to the first day of the examination. See No. 23 of the new regulations under the Solicitors Act 1877. THE regulations as to re-admission on the roll of solicitors, and as to taking out and renewal of annual certificates, issued on the 2nd Nov. 1875, are still in force, and provide in effect that if any solicitor of the Supreme Court, after having at any time taken out a stamped certificate, shall, for the space of a whole year from and after the expiration thereof, have neglected to renew the same for the following year, or has failed to obtain such a certificate within twelve months from the date of his admission on the Roll, the registrar shall not afterwards grant a certificate to such solicitor, except under an order of the Master of the Rolls, and for the purpose of obtaining such an order the applicant shall, six weeks before the application is intended to be made, give notice thereof as in the case of an original admission, and the affidavits in support of such application shall be filed at the Petty Bag Office, and a copy thereof shall at the same time be left with the clerk of the Petty Bag, to be delivered by him to the Registrar of Solicitors, and the order for such taking out or renewal, shall (if made) be drawn up on reading such affidavits, and an affidavit of such copies having been left and notices given. Upon an application to dispense with the required notice of intention to take out or renew a certificate, a summons must be served on the Registrar of Solicitors calling on him to show cause within' ten days' notice why such taking out or renewal of certificate should not be allowed; and if no cause be shown to the satisfaction of the Master of the Rolls, he may make an order for allowing such certificate to be issued. ARTICLES of clerkship (whether original or sup Westminster-Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, and 17, Dacre-street, free-plemental) dated on any day during March hold-sold for £2965. Edgware-road.-Nos. 144 and 446, term 42 years-sold for £2490. LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL. Inquiries, as to Students' Societies, as to Service under Articles, as to the several Examinations, as to admission on the Roll of the Supreme Court, as to being called to the Bar, and as to taking out and renewal of solicitors' annual Certificates, should be addressed to the Editor (Law Students' Department). WE have been reluctantly compelled, owing to must be enrolled at the Petty Bag Office, Chancery-lane, on or before the same day in the month of September next, and when articles are enrolled and registered on any day during the month of March they must be entered at the Law Institution on or before the same day in the month of June next. See 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, ss. 8 and 9, and 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 7. Failure to comply with these statutory requirements often entails a loss of time upon articled students. LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY. AT the meeting of this society on Tuesday evening last, at the Law Institution, London, Mr. T. B. Napier in the chair, the question for discussion was, "Is the tendency to substitute modern languages and sciences for the Latin and Greek languages in our present educational system worthy of support ?" Mr. E. I. Crosse, M.A.. opened the debate in the negative, maintaining that the present practice in schools of modern and classical divisions was injurious, and that the substitution of modern languages would tend to alter the tone of the country. Mr. J. W. Evans, B.Sc., followed in the affirmative, holding that a boy should spend what time he could in learning what would be most useful to him in his future career. The same side was further supported by Mr. Farlow, Mr. Moule, and Mr. Napier; the opposite view being taken by Mr. Nicholls, Mr Betts, Mr. F. D. Williams, Mr. Lloyd Jones, Mr. Benwell, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Royle, Mr. Van Sommer, and Mr. G. H. Bower, the majority holding that it was unnecessary to separate the two classes of education. At the conclusion of the debate, the question was put to the meeting, and decided in the negative. The above regulations are prescribed by 6 & 7 see the Solicitors Acts for other information con- LEEDS LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. THE fourth ordinary meeting of the above society for the latter half of the session 1878-9 was held on Monday last, at 7.30 p.m., in the rooms of the Leeds Law Institute, at which G. W. Morrison, Esq., the town clerk, presided. Upon the reading and confirming of the minutes of the previous ordinary meeting, the secretary announced the receipt of the annual report of the United Law Students' Society, and also the report of the com. mittee appointed by that society to consider the subject of legal education, and read to the meeting portions of the same. then passed in favour of J. Paterson, Esq., of Goldsmith-buildings, Temple, E. C., for his kindness in having presented to the society his Commentaries on the liberty of the subject. Mr. Hird then gave notice of a motion for the commencement of a library. The subject for debate was as A vote of thanks was follows: "That works of fiction, especially those of female authors, are of an injurious and weaken. ing mental tendency." Mr. Beaumont opened the debate for the affirmative, and Mr. Hird for the negative. After an animated discussion, which lasted two hours, and a clear and careful summary of the arguments in favour of and against the question by the chairman, it was decided in favour of the negative by a majority of four. A hearty vote of thanks to Mr. Morrison concluded the meeting. STUDENTS' NOTTINGHAM LAW SOCIETY. THE annual dinner of this society was held on Monday the 10th (ult., at the Flying Horse Hotel, at 7 p.m., Mr. Richard Enfield, the president of the society, in the chair, and Mr. Jesse Hinde, in the vice-chair. About thirty-six solicitors and articled clerks were present, besides a few visitors. After the usual loyal and patriotic toasts had been duly honoured the Chairman proposed, "The Nottingham Law Students' Society," urging the usefulness of the society, especially as a school of elocution. As every young lady learnt to sing, so every young gentleman ought to learn to speak. For debating purposes this society was of great value, and he appreciated the novel scheme they had carried out so well of having "mock trials." The toast, which was drunk with enthusiasm, was replied to by Mr. H. Wyles. The other toasts were: "The Chairman," proposed by the vicechairman, who expressed a hope that he would long live to represent the oldest firm in the town. Mr. D. Whittingham then proposed "The Legal Profession," associating with the toast the name of Mr. G. B. Rothera. The last toast, "The Ladies," was proposed by Mr. A. Browne, and responded to by Mr. H. Barber. The fourth meeting of the present session was held on the 14th inst., at the Guildhall, Mr. Arthur Browne in the chair. The secretary reported that Mr. James Paterson, barrister-at-law, had presented a copy of his well-known text book "Commentaries on the Liberty of the Subject' to the society. A unanimous vote of thanks to Mr. Paterson for his gift was immediately passed, and the secretary was directed to forward a copy of the resolution to Mr. Paterson. Mr. J. C. Warren and Mr. Browne then made some observations as to the desirability of establishing a "student's library," as had been done at BirAfter the election of mingham and elsewhere. two new members (Messrs. J. R. Everall and J. Jackson), the following motion was brought forward by the secretary (Mr. W. P. W. Phillimore), "That the Imperial Parliament ought to be strengthened by the addition of delegates from the colonies and dependencies." Messrs. J. C. Warren, M.A., S. G. Warner, Green, W. H. Stevenson, E. Cartwright, and Swift then spoke all against the motion, which was lost by a large majority. MAGISTRATES' LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. UNITED LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. THE above society held its fortnightly meeting at the Law Institution on Monday, the 24th Feb., under the presidency of Mr. Shirley-Shirley. The subject for discussion was the following, viz. :" A.,-DISPUTES TO BE SETTLED BY ARBITRATION.— a thief, employs B., an auctioneer, to sell stolen property; after B. has sold the property and handed over the proceeds to A., C., the rightful owner, brings an action against B. for the price of the goods. Is B. liable to such action ?" (Hollins v. Fowler, L. Rep. 7 Q. B. and L. Rep. 7 H. of L. 757). The discussion was opened by Mr. Owen in the negative, who was supported by Messrs. Gatey and Ashton Cross; and Messrs. ShirleyShirley, E. H. Quicke, Collyer, and Eustace Smith were for the affirmative. Mr. Owen replied. The Chairman, having summed up, put the motion to the meeting, when it was lost by a majority of six. The house adjourned at 9.15 p.m. A meeting of the society was held on Wednesday evening, Feb. 26, at Clement's-inn Hall, when the following resolution was moved by Mr. V. K. Dhairyavan, of India, That it is unjustifiable to charge the expenses of the Afghan war on the revenues of India." In a forcible and lengthy speech the mover urged the desirability of England paying the whole bill. In this view the rest of the speakers-Messrs. Parsons, Brown, Collyer, Tobin, and Carpenter-concurred, and the motion was carried by seven votes. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO We, your committee, appointed to consider the subject of legal education, and to report thereon, have, during a series of meetings, anxiously discussed the question submitted to us, and beg now to lay before you, in as concise a form as possible, the conclusions at which we have arrived. Having carefully examined the existing regulations, we are of opinion that those regulations neither provide adequate instruction for law students, nor afford to the public sufficient security that the candidates for admission to either branch of the legal profession have the necessary qualifications for practice. The abuses connected with the present system of granting, at the discretion of a judge, a dispensation from passing the preliminary examination have been so frequently pointed out as to make it needless for your committee to dwell upon them. The desirability of such an examination is admitted, and we are of opinion that, unless it is to be compulsory upon all who kave not passed elsewhere an examination of equal difficulty, it is useless to hold it at all. Our first recommendation then is, that under no circumstances whatever should a dispensation from passing a preliminary examination be granted. The views which have been propounded as to the proper scope and character of the preliminary examination may be reduced to two: the one is, to make it a severe and stringent test, with a view to raise the status of the Profession, by excluding all persons who have not received a liberal education; the other, in which the majority of your committee have concurred, is that the subjects of the present solicitor's preliminary examination are sufficiently wide, but that the questions asked should be made somewhat more searching. Your committee, without wishing to express any opinion as to the possibility or advisability of amalgamating the two branches of the legal Profession, are nevertheless of opinion that the divergencies at present exist, between the education of students for the Bar and solicitors' Profession respectively, present unnecessary obstacles to those who, having in the first instance selected the one, may in the course of their studentship wish to transfer their choice to the other branch. We think that many of the present difficulties might be overcome, by assimilating the length of the term of service for bar students and articled clerks by allowing them to attend the same lectures; and by subjecting them to the same examinations. To deal first with the subject of articled clerks. Your committee are of opinion that the term of service should be shortened, and would propose to fix its length at three years, as being a period long enough for acquiring the necessary practical knowlege. The term of five years was fixed in an age when there were few, if any, books of practice; when that practice was abstruse and technical in the highest degree, and when, moreover, the proficiency of the articled clerk was not ascertained by any examination whatever; the altered state of circumstances in these days seems to your committee an unanswerable argument in favour of the proposed reduction. We cannot, however, recommend any curtailment of this period of service in the case of gentlemen who have obtained an University degree, as we consider that the practical knowledge necessary for a solicitor cannot well be acquired in a shorter time than three years. (To be continued.) A friendly society which did not receive contribu- POOR RATE-ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE-AP PEAL AGAINST VALUATION-RE FERENCE TO AR- REAL PROPERTY AND term was vested in them erected no buildings. The plaintiffs, as reversioners, sued the defendants, as assignees of the term, for damages in respect of all the buildings on the demised land, the defendants contending that they were only liable in respect of the buildings erected on the firstmentioned piece or parcel of land, the site of the original messuage and garden. Held by the Exchequer Division (Kelly, C.B. and Pollock, B.), that the covenant to repair extended to the whole of the demised land and the buildings thereon erected, and that the defendants were therefore liable to the full extent of the plaintiffs' claim: (Hudson v. Williams, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 632. Ex.) WILL-NATURALISED ALIEN-CERTIFICATE OF SECRETARY OF STATE.-Where an alien natu ralised in 1858 under a certificate of the Secretary of State, which conferred upon him the rights of a native-born British subject, with the exception (inter alia) of “any rights and capacities of a native-born British subject, out of and beyond the dominions of the British Crown and the limits thereof, other than such as may be conferred upon him by the grant of a passport enabling him to travel in foreign parts," made a codicil to his will taking the certificate and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 66, s. 6, in the Canton of Ticino, in Switzerland: Held, together, that such codicil could not be admitted to probate in England: (Re Carlo Gatti, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 639. Prob. Ct.) COMPANY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. BORROWING FOR NECESSARY PURPOSES OF COMPANY'S BUSINESS-MORTGAGE BY COMPANY OF ITS UNDERTAKING.-A company mortgaged all its undertaking to A. It was allowed to carry on its business, for the necessary purposes of which it borrowed money from B., who knew of A.'s mortgage; and it assigned to him a debt falling due from C. The company was afterwards wound-up. Held, that the assignment of the debt to B. was good notwithstanding A.'s mortgage: (Ex parte Pitman, 39 L. T. Kep. N. S. 658. Malins, V.C.) WINDING-UP PETITIONER'S CALLS IN ARREAR.-OFFER TO PAY-FULLY PAID-UP SHAREHOLDER.-A petition to wind-up a company, presented by a shareholder who has not paid his calls, will be heard if he undertakes to pay before the order is made. A petition by a fully paid-up shareholder to wind-up a company which it alleges to be insolvent is demurrable. Secus, if it alleges that the insolvency is caused by the fraud of the directors, and that enough can be recovered from them under sect. 165 of the Companies Act 1878 to make the company solvent: (The Diamond Fuel Company, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 602. Malins, V.C.) WINDING-UP NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LANDLORD AND TENANT-COVENANT TO REPAIR-" BUILDINGS ERECTED AND BUILT, OR TO BE ERECTED AND BUILT, UPON THE DEMISED PREMISES OR ANY PART THEREOF ""-EXPIRACONTRIBUTORY-DIRECTOR'S TION OF TERM-DAMAGES FOR NON-REPAIR— QUALIFICATION-RESOLUTION OF SUBSCRIBERS LIABILITY OF ASSIGNEE. A lessor, in 1779, TO MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION.-The artidemised for a term of ninety-nine years, from 29th cles of association of a company did not require Sept. 1778, premises described in the parcels in the lease as "all that piece or parcel of land situate shares, but the subscribers to the memorandum that a director should be qualified by holding any on the north side of East-lane, in Walworth, abut-of association passed a resolution that the qualiting south on the said lane, north, &c." (setting fication of future directors should be the holding out the other abuttals), and which said piece or of fifty shares each, and that R. should be one of parcel of land hereby intended to be demised conthe future directors. R. subsequently became tains in width, &c." (setting out the measurea director, and acted as chairman at some meetments), "together with the messuage or tenement and all other erections and buildings erected and ings. R.'s name also appeared as a director in the prospectus. R. stated that when he acted as built, or which may at any time during the term chairman he was not aware that any qualification hereby intended to be granted be erected and was necessary, and that as soon as he heard of it built, on the said piece or parcel of land or any he took steps to get this resolution rescinded, part thereof." The description in the parcels and ultimately wrote to the secretary resigning then continued as follows: "And also all that one his seat at the board. R. had signed a proxy acre of land lying at the back of the garden bepaper as "a member of the company," but had longing to the said messuage as the same is now never applied for any shares, nor were any ever fenced in and inclosed; which said messuage and allotted to him. The chief clerk settled R. on the garden is in the occupation of H. P., and the said list of contributories in respect of fifty qualificaacre of land in the occupation of the said lessee;" cation shares. Held, that a resolution of the and the lessee covenanted "that he, his heirs, subscribers could not alter the constitution of the administrators, and assigns, should and would from time to time, and at all times during the said company, and that there being no contract on R.s term, well and sufficiently repair, amend, uphold, part either express or implied to take shares, his name must be removed. No costs allowed, in maintain, and keep the said messuage or tenement consequence of the lapse of time between the date and erections and buildings erected and built, or of the certificate and the present application: hereby demised, or any part thereof, in and by all to be erected and built, upon the said ground (Ranken's case, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 664. Bacon, needful reparations, and the said messuage or V.C.) and sufficiently repaired and kept, at the end of tenement and premises, being in all things so well the said term peaceably deliver up to the lessor, 1779, the only building on any part of the demised his heirs or assigns. At the date of the lease, in land' was the messuage or tenement mentioned in the first portion of the parcels. During the assignees of it from time to time built houses upon currency of the term, however, the various the land, so that at the expiration of the term in 1877, not only the site of the original messuage and garden, but also the one-acre field lying be: hind, was covered with numerous small houses, all SALE OF SHARES-DIVIDEND AFTERWARDS DECLARED RIGHT OF PURCHASER TO.-Upon the sale of shares in a company, under conditions of sale by which the purchase is to be completed on a future fixed day, and which contained no mention of dividends, dividends on the shares, in respect of a period anterior to the date of the right to the shares, with all accruing benefits and contract, declared between such date and the date fixed for completion, pass to the purchaser, whose liabilities, became vested in him the moment the contract of purchase was effected at the sale : (Black v. Homersham, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 671. Ex.) ERRATUM, Page 283, twelfth line from top of third col.. for "34 L. T. Rep. N. S.," read "39 L. T. Rep. N. S." |