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It is necessary to add, that if the public give way to a humour of this kind, there will be no end of innovating. When some critics first thought of reforming the word bashaw, one would have it bassa, another pacha, and a third pasha; and how many more shapes it may yet be transformed into, it is impossible to say. riographer hath adopted just the half of Sale's reformation of the name Mahomet. He restores the vowels to the places which they formerly held, but admits his alteration of the consonants, never writing either Mahomet or Mohammed, but Mahommed. In regard to such foreign names of persons, offices, eras, and rites, it would be obliging, in writers of this stamp, to annex to their works a glossary, for the sake of the unlearned, who cannot divine whether their newfangled terms belong to things formerly unknown, or are no more than the old names of things familiar to them, newly vamped and dressed. Surely, if any thing deserves to be branded with the name of pedantry, it is an ostentation of erudition, to the reproach of learning, by affecting singularity in trifles.

I shall just mention another set of barbarisms, which also comes under this class, and arises from the abbreviation of polysyllables, by lopping off all the syllables except the first, or the first and second. Instances of this are hyp for hypochondriac, rep for reputation, ult for ultimate, penult for penultimate, incog for incognito, hyper for hypercritic, extra for extraordinary. Happily all these affected terms have been denied the public suffrage. I scarcely know any such that have established themselves, except mob for mobilé.* And this it hath affected at last, notwithstanding the unrelenting zeal with which it was persecuted by Dr. Swift, wherever he met with it. But as the word in question hath gotten use, the supreme arbitress of language on its side, there would be as much obstinacy in rejecting it at present, as there was perhaps folly at first in ushering it upon the public stage.

As to the humour of abbreviating, we need say very little, as it seems hardly now to subsist amongst us. It only arose in this island about the end of the last century; and when, in the beginning of the present, it assumed to figure in conversation, and even sometimes to appear in print, it was so warmly attacked by Addison and Swift,

correctly, either say aversion a change, the first syllable a having the force of the proposition; or, cutting off this prepositive, we must say version from a change." If any should think this representation exaggerated, let him compare the reasoning with that which hath been seriously used for mutilating the word alcoran, and he will find it in all respects the same. It is, I acknowledge, of no consequence, whether we say alcoran, or koran; but it is of consequence that such a silly argument shall not be held a sufficient ground for innovation.

As I am disposed to think that, in matters of this kind, the public is rarely in the wrong, it would not be difficult to assign a plausible reason for this preference. First, the word mobilé, from which it is contracted, can scarcely be called English, and, I suspect, never had the sanction of the public voice. Secondly, there is not another word in the language that expresseth precisely the same idea, a tumultuous and seditious rout: the word mobility, adopted by some writers, is a gross misapplication of the philosophical term, which means only susceptibility of motion; lastly, the word mob is fitter than either of those for giving rise, according to the analogy of our tongue, to such convenient derivatives as to mob, mobbed, mobbish, mobber.

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and other writers of eminence, that since then it hath been in general disgrace, hardly daring to appear in good company, and never showing itself in books of any name.

The two classes of barbarisms last mentioned, comprehending new words, and new formations from words still current, offend against use, considered both as reputable and as national. There are many other sorts of transgression, which might be enumerated here, such as vulgarisms, provincial idioms, and the cant of particular professions. But these are more commonly ranked among the offences against elegance, than among the violations of grammatical purity, and will therefore be considered afterwards.

SECTION II.

THE SOLECISM.

I Now enter on the consideration of the second way by which the purity of the style is injured, the solecism. This is accounted by grammarians a much greater fault than the former, as it displays a greater ignorance of the fundamental rules of the language. The sole aim of grammar is to convey the knowledge of the language; consequently, the degree of grammatical demerit in every blunder can only be ascertained by the degree of deficiency in this knowledge which it betrays. But the aim of eloquence is quite another thing. The speaker or the writer doth not purpose to display his knowledge in the language, but only to employ the language which he speaks or writes, in order to the attainment of some further end. This knowledge he useth solely as the instrument or means by which he intends to instruct, to please, to move, or to persuade. The degree of demerit, therefore, which, by the orator's account, is to be found in every blunder, must be ascertained by a very different measure. Such offence is more or less heinous, precisely in proportion as it proves a greater or smaller obstruction to the speaker's or writer's aim. Hence it happens, that when solecisms are not very glaring, when they do not darken the sense, or suggest some ridiculous idea, the rhetorician regards them as much more excusable than barbarisms. The reason is, the former is accounted solely the effect of negligence, the latter of affectation. Negligence in expression, often the consequence of a noble ardour in regard to the sentiments, is at the worst a venial trespass, sometimes it is even not without energy; affectation is always a deadly sin against the laws of rhetoric.

It ought also to be observed, that, in the article of solecisms, much greater indulgence is given to the speaker than to the writer; and to the writer who proposeth to persuade or move, greater allowances are made, than to him who proposeth barely to instruct or please. The more vehemence is required by the nature of the subject, the less

correctness is exacted in the manner of treating it. Nay, a remarkable deficiency in this respect is not near so prejudicial to the scope of the orator, as a scrupulous accuracy, which bears in it the symptoms of study and art. Eschines is said to have remarked, that the orations of his rival and antagonist, Demosthenes, smelled of the lamp; thereby intimating that their style and composition were too elaborate. If the remark is just, it contains the greatest censure that ever was passed on that eminent orator. But, as the intermediate degrees between the two extremes are innumerable, both doubtless ought to be avoided.

Grammatical inaccuracies ought to be avoided by a writer, for two reasons. One is, that a reader will much sooner discover them than a hearer, however attentive he be. The other is, as writing implies more leisure and greater coolness than is implied in speaking, defects of this kind, when discovered in the former, will be less excused, than they would be in the latter.

To enumerate all the kinds of solecism into which it is possible to fall, would be both a useless and an endless task. The transgression of any of the syntactic rules is a solecism; and almost every rule may be transgressed in various ways. But as novices only are capable of falling into the most flagrant solecisms, such, I mean, as betray ignorance in the rudiments of the tongue, I shall leave it to grammarians to exemplify and class the various blunders of this sort which may be committed by the learner. All I propose to do at present is, to take notice of a few less observable, which writers of great name, and even of critical skill in the language, have slidden into through inattention; and which, though of the nature of solecism, ought perhaps to be distinguished by the softer name inaccuracy.*

The first of this kind I shall observe is a mistake of the plural number for the singular, "The zeal of the seraphim breaks forth in a becoming warmth of sentiments and expressions, as the character which is given us of him denotes that generous scorn and intrepidity which attends heroic virtue." Cherub and seraph are two nouns in the singular number, transplanted into our language directly from the Hebrew. In the plural we are authorized, both by use and by analogy, to say either cherubs and seraphs, according to the English idiom, or cherubim and seraphim, according to the oriental. The former suits better the familiar, the latter the solemn style. It is surprising that an author of Mr. Addison's discernment did not, in criticising Milton, take notice of a distinction which is every where

* I am sensible, that, in what concerns the subject of this section, I have been in a great measure prevented by the remarks of Lowth and Priestley and some other critics and grammarians, who have lately favoured the world with their observations. Since reading their publications, I have curtailed considerably what I prepared on this article; for though I had rarely hit upon the same examples, there was often a coincidence in the matter, inasmuch as the species of fault animadverted on was frequently the same. I have now almost entirely confined myself to such slips as have been overlooked by others. I say almost entirely; for, when any error begins to prevail, even a single additional remonstrance may be of consequence: and in points on which critics are divided, I thought it not unreasonable to offer my opinion.

+ Spectator, No. 327.

so carefully observed by the poet. I shall add to this remark, that, as the words cherubim and seraphim are plural, the terms cherubims and seraphims, as expressing the plural, are quite improper. Yet these barbarisms occur sometimes in our translation of the Bible; which, nevertheless, doth not once adopt the plural form cherubim and seraphim, to express the singular; though one would naturally imagine, that this error must originally have given rise to the other. Inaccuracies are often found in the way wherein the degrees of comparison are applied and construed. Some of these, I suspect, have as yet escaped the animadversion of all our critics. Before I produce examples, it will be proper to observe, that the comparative degree implies commonly a comparison of one thing with one other thing; the superlative, on the contrary, always implies a comparison of one thing with many others. The former, consequently, requires to be followed by the singular number, the latter by the plural. In our language, the conjunction than must be interposed between the things compared in the former case, the preposition of is always used in the latter.

The following is an example of wrong construction in the comparative: "This noble nation hath of all others admitted fewer corruptions." The word fewer is here construed precisely as if it were the superlative. Grammatically thus: "This noble nation hath admitted fewer corruptions than any other." Sometimes indeed the comparative is rightly followed by a plural; as in these words, "He is wiser than we." But it cannot be construed with the preposition of, before that to which the subject is compared. There is one case, and but one, wherein the aforesaid preposition is proper after the comparative, and that is, when the words following the preposition comprehend both sides of the comparison; as, "He is the taller man of the two." In these words, the two, are included he and the person to whom he is compared. It deserves our notice, also, that, in such cases, and only in such, the comparative has the definite article the prefixed to it, and is construed precisely as the superlative; nay, both degrees are in such cases used indiscriminately. We say rightly, either "This is the weaker of the two," or "the weakest of the two." If, however, we may form a judgement from the most general principles of analogy, the former is preferable, because there are only two things compared.

I shall subjoin to this an inaccuracy in a comparison of equality, where, though the positive degree only is used, the construction must be similar to that of the comparative, both being followed by conjunctions which govern no case. "Such notions would be avowed at this time by none but rosicrucians, and fanatics as mad as them."† Grammatically they, the verb are being understood.

That the particles, as after the positive, and than after the comparative, are conjunctions, and not prepositions, seems never to have been questioned by any grammarian or critic before Dr. Priestley. I readily acknowledge, that it is use which must decide the point; nor should I hesitate a moment in agreeing to the notion he suggests, if

it were supported by what could be justly denominated general and reputable use. But to me it is manifest, that both the most numerous and the most considerable authorities are on the opposite side; and therefore, that those instances which he produceth in favour of that hypothesis, ought to be regarded merely as negligences of style, into which (as I shall have occasion to observe more fully in the sequel) even the best writers will sometimes fall. That in the colloquial dialect, as Johnson calls it, such idioms frequently occur, is undeniable. In conversation you will perhaps ten times oftener hear people say, "There's the books you wanted," than "There are the books ;" and "You was present," when a single person is addressed, than "you were present." Yet good use is always considered as declaring solely for the last mode of expression in both cases. The argument drawn from the French usage (which, by the way, hath no authority in our tongue) is not at all apposite.*

But, supposing good use were divided on the present question, I. acknowledge that the first and second canons proposed on this subject† would determine me to prefer the opinion of those who consider the aforesaid particles as conjunctions. The first directs us in doubtful cases to incline to that side in which there is the least danger of ambiguity. In order to illustrate this point, it will be necessary to observe, that the doubt is not properly stated by saying, with Dr. Priestley, that the question is, whether the nominative or accusative ought to follow the particles than and as; but, whether these particles are, in such particular cases, to be regarded as conjunctions or prepositions. For, on either supposition, it must be admitted, that in certain circumstances the accusative ought to follow, and not the nominative. But I insist that, as in such cases there is a difference in the sense, uniformly to consider those particles as conjunctions, is the only way of removing the ambiguity. Thus I say properly, "I esteem you more than they." I say properly also, I esteem you more than them," but in a sense quite different. If than is understood as a conjunction, there can be nothing ambiguous in either The case of the pronoun determines at once the words to

sentence.

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The oblique cases of their personal pronouns, answering to our me, thee, and him, are, me, le, and le, not moi, toi, aud lui. In these last we have the indefinite form, which serves indifferently, as occasion requires, for either nominative or accusative, and to which there is nothing in our language that exactly corresponds. Thus, to express in French, "He and I are relations," we must say, "Lui et moi, nous sommes parens." But in English, "Him and me, we are relations," would be insufferable. The nominatives je, tu, il, are never used by them, but when immediately adjoined to the verb, prefixed in affirming, or affixing in interrogating. In every other situation the indefinite form must supply their place. Le Clerc thus renders a passage of Scripture, (Rev. i. 18 ) "Moi qui vis présentement, j'ai été mort.” But who that understands English would say, "Me who live at present, I have been dead." Let this serve also as an answer to the plea for these vulgar, but unauthorized idioms, It is me, it is him, from the C'est moi, c'est lui, of the French. I shall observe, in passing, that one of Priestley's quotations in support of these phrases is defensible on a different principle, and therefore not to his purpose. "It is not me you are in love with." The me is here governed by the preposition with. “It is not with me you are in love." Such transpositions are frequent in our language.

+ Book II. Chap. ii. Sect. 1.