CHAPTER IV.

HOPE, AND ITS BEARINGS.-A FUTURE STATE

SECTION I

ANALYSIS, LOCATION AND BEARINGS OF HOPE

Expectation.-Anticipation of future good.

"Man never is, but always TO BE, blessed."

MAN Liveз a three-fold life. Through the agency of memory, he ive over, again and again, the past, for the ten thousandth time. He lives in the present by actual sensation. He lives in the future as often, as luxuriantly as he pleases, by mounting his glowing imagination upon the pinions of hope, and soaring aloft, and afar, to that blissful period in the future to which he expects ere long to arrive. But for hope, the heart would break, the hands hang down. Little would be attempted, because little would be expected. In trouble, we should be unwilling to change lest it but increase our misfortunes. In prosperity, we should not expect its continuance, but stand in perpetual fear of adversity. Indeed, words can but feebly portray the condition of the human mind, without the enlivening, invigorating influences of hope. Thankful should we be for its existence. Careful, lest we abuse it. And assiduous in its proper cultivation.

But, what is its legitimate function? What its true sphere? What its bearings? What great practical truths does it unfold?

IMMORTALITY A state of being beyond the narrow confines of earth, and extending down the endless vista of eternity, infinitely beyond the conception of imagination's remotest stretch! And an eternity of hap piness, too, if we but fulfil its conditions. And to an extent, the height, the boundaries of which, Hope, mounted on her loftiest pinions, cannot environ-cannot reach. Oh! the height, the length, the depth, the richness, of that ocean of love, of unalloyed bliss, opened up to the foretaste of mortals by this faculty!

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"But," says one," is not this world the natural sphere, the legitimate termination of hope? Have we not earthly desires and prospects, in our children, in property, fame, intellectual attainments, and kindred objects, sufficient to satiate this faculty, without resorting to these farfetched, and at best only visionary reveries, of this organ? What is your proof that another state, and not this, constitutes its legitimate sphere of exercise? We know, that to hope for this world's goods, is its true and natural function. Why, then, abandon its real, known function, for one that is both uncertain and chimerical ?" Look, first, at its location. Location is a certain guide to direction and cast of function. Though every organ is designed to act with every other, yet all the organs are designed to act most with those located nearest to them. As the heart and lungs, designed to act with perfect reciprocity, are therefore placed close to each other, and so of the eyes and brain, and of all the organs of the body; so, of appetite and acquisitiveness, that we may lay up eatables; so, of the social, of the intellectual, of the moral, of all the organs of man. We will not demonstrate this principle here, but simply refer the reader to that se ries of articles in Vol. VI., entitled, "The Philosophy of Phrenology," where it is fully stated and so applied as to develop many beautiful and valuable principles. (See also p. 34 of this work.) But, taking this principle of juxta position as admitted, and applying it to hope, we find its organ located among the moral organs; and not among the propensities. Now, if in the great economy of nature, the legitimate function of this faculty had been originally intended to be restricted to this world, (that is, been designed to operate with the propensities mainly,) it would have been located among the propensities. If man's hopes have been originally intended to fasten on property, and to inspire the hope of becoming immensely rich, or to operate with ambition so as to create a hope for fame; or with appetite, to make us anticipate rapturously every coming meal, or to work principally with the domestic organs, and inspire hopes appertaining to the family, &c., this organ would have been located by the side of acquisitiveness, or approbativeness, or appetite, or the domestic group. But it is located as far from these animal organs as possible, showing that its main function is not to be restricted to the things of time and sense, but it is located in the moral group, showing that its main office is to hope for moral pleasures, not animal. And what is more, is most, it is located by the side of spirituality on the one hand, so that it may fasten its anticipations mainly upon a spiritual state; and on the other, by the side of conscientiousness, so that it may expect the rewards of

1.

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our good deeds. It is this juxta position of hope and conscientiousness which makes us satisfied that when we have done right, we shall be the gainers thereby.

An example:- Let the Author, actuated purely by conscientious scruples, put forth truths in this work, or in his lectures, which he knows will be unpopular for the time being, and be a means of retarding its sale, as well as of seriously injuring him for the present, yet, the very fact that he is conscious of having done his duty thereby, makes him feel that he shall ultimately be the gainer by thus telling the truth. That man whose,conscience is clear, fears little. A clear conscience makes a stout heart. It renders its possessor bold, and makes him not only feel safe, but encourages hope to predict ultimate success. Truly "are the righteous as bold as a lion.” That is, when conscience is in its normal, self-approving state of action, it quiets cautiousness, and stimulates hope to expect happiness therefrom.

But, reverse this principle, and we see why it is that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth." For, when conscience is disturbed by the compunctions of guilt, this its painful action throws cautiousness also into a painful, fearing state, a state of alarm and terror, be. sides withdrawing all stimulous from hope. Hence it is that when a man feels guilty, he is conscious that he is continually exposed to punishment. Walled in on all sides, he could not feel safe. Protected by armies of true body-guards, he would live in continual fear. Let A. steal, or commit any crime, and let B. step up to him familiarly, and tap him on the shoulder: "I did not steal that," exclaims A. "No one supposed you did; but 'a guilty conscience needs no accus er,' I now think you did steal it, else you would not be so anxious to exonerate yourself," replies B. The plain fact is, that if a man would be happy, he must keep his conscience clear, and if he does this, he will rarely be miserable.

Secondly: Man expects to exist hereafter. No other faculty can exercise this feeling. As shown under the head of veneration, (p. 49,) all the other faculties are exclusively pre-occupied, and wholly engrossed, each in performing its own legitimate function. No one will question the position, that those who expect to exist hereafter, do so by exercising the organ and faculty of hope. Now, is this expectation of immortality the legitimate function of hope, or its abnormal, exotic, unnatural function? If the latter, then must this expectation of eternity be repulsive, and all up-hill work, contrary to the nature of man, and therefore certain not to continue long or extend far. No

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stronger proof can exist, that to hope for a future state of being is the natural function of this faculty, than the universality of this expectation in all ages, among all flesh. In short, the same argument by which the function of Divine worship was proved to be constitu ttonal, [p. 46 to 53,] mutatis mutandis, proves, with equal clearness, that to expect to exist hereafter is the legitimate, primitive function of hope, and not its perverted function. And that same branch of this argument by which it was shown that worship was not taught, but was innate, also proves the innateness of this expectation of eternity. Without this faculty, and unless to hope for eter. nity were its true function, man could form no more conception or idea of a future state than the blind man could of colors. In short, all the ramifications of that argument, apply to this. The premises, the data, the application, the answers to objections, the all of either, are every way alike.

But, again: (And this argument applies equally to veneration.) If to expect to live hereafter, be the true function of hope, that function, that hope, must be every way beneficial to man; for every organ, faculty, element of our nature, exercised in harmony with its normal, primitive constitution, is every way promotive of happiness, because in obedience to the laws of its constitution. But whatever exercise of any faculty is not in harmony with its normal, primitive constitution, violates the natural laws, and thus induces their penalty. Now, I submit to any reflecting mind, what pain, what penalty is there that grows naturally, necessarily, out of this hope of immortality? So far from experiencing pain in the act itself, the human mind even exults in the pleasures of such anticipation as much as in, perhaps, any other mental exercise whatever. If I wished to give the human mind a literal banquet of pleasure, I would feast it on thoughts of immortality. If I wished to make the strongest possible, and the most impressive, appeal to the mind or soul of man, I would found that appeal on eternity! Reader! does thy hope of existing hereafter, give thee pleasure or give thee pain? And if pain, is that pain the necessary, or the accidental, accompaniment of hope? That is, is it absolutely impossible for hope to be exercised without inducing this pain? Surely not. Nor do any painful after consequences grow necessarily out of this exercise of hope. Both the exercise of hope in this way, and all the products of that exercise, are pleasurable only, and pleasurable, too, in the highest possible degree. There is no pain, no punishment growing out of this exercise of hope, but a certain reward. Therefore, this exercise is in obedience to the

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fixed laws of our being, and the: efore in harmony with the primitive fanction of this faculty. Nor can this argument be evaded.

If it be objected, that thinking so mnch of another world, unfits us for this, I say thinking just enough about another world is the best possible preparation for enjoying this. I go farther: I say that, merely in order to enjoy this life fully, we require to hope for another, and I submit this remark to the consciousness of every reader. I put it home to the feelings of all, whether enjoying another world in anticipation, does not sweeten every pleasure of this; and whether a prac tical belief that there is no hereafter, does not render the pleasures of this life insipid; besides, weakening a most powerful motive for good, a powerful restraint upon evil. Nor do I feel that this position can be shaken or evaded.

If it be still further objected, that many, that even the majority of, professing Christians, spend so much thought upon another world. that they fail to study and obey the organic laws, and both shorten life and render it miserable; whereas, if they did not hope for another life, they would study to make themselves happy in this; I answer, by admitting the fact, but denying that it is a necessary consequence of believing in an hereafter. So far from it, the highest possible prepa ration for enjoyment in this life, constitutes the best possible preparation for enjoying immortality; and vice versa, the highest possible preparation for eternity, involves the very state which will best fit us to enjoy time. I know, indeed, that perhaps the majority of our truly religious people, neglect health, and often hasten their death, solely in consequence of their religious zeal. But, is this the necessary, the universal, inevitable consequence of this hope of immortality? Is a utterly impossible to indulge the latter without inducing the former Surely not, and he is simple who asserts otherwise.

In short: Viewed in any light, in all aspects, the inference is conclusive is established by the highest order of evidence-that the le gitimate, normal function of hope is to expect to exist beyond the

grave.

This established, and the inference becomes clear and even demonstrative, that there is a future state adapted to this faculty. If not-if there be no hereafter, why was this faculty, or at least this manifestation or exercise of it, ever planted in the breast of man? Would a God of truth and mercy thus deceive us? Would he cruelly raise the cup of immortality to our lips only to tantalize us therewith while alive, and then to deceive us with the hope of immortality thereby raised in our souls, while no immortality exists to await or fill this natural de