This relaxation, as explained in the last mentioned case, was "that ships sailing from America, before the knowledge of the blockade had reached America, should be entitled to a notice, even at the blockaded port, and that ships sailing afterwards, might sail on a contingent destination even for that port, with the purpose of calling at some British port, or at some neutral port, for information, and that they should be allowed the benefit of such a contingent destination to be ascertained and rendered definite by the information which they should receive in Europe. But in no case was it held that they might sail to the mouth of a blockaded port to inquire whether a blockade, of which they had received previous formal notice, was still in existence or not. If particular parties are innocent in their intention, it is still a measure of necessary caution, and of preventive legal policy, to hold the rule general, against the liberty of inquiring at the very mouth of the blockaded port: which would amount, in practice, to a universal licence to attempt to enter, and, on being prevented, to claim the liberty of going elsewhere.

The indulgence, thus limited, was considered as due in reason to the American merchants. "For," observed Sir William Scott in the case of the Betsy (1), "Lying at such a distance, where they cannot have constant information of the state of the blockade, whether it continues or is relaxed, it is not unnatural that they should send their ships conjecturally, upon the expectation of finding the blockade broken up, after it had existed for a considerable time. A very great disadvantage indeed would be imposed upon them, if they were bound rigidly by the rule, which justly obtains in Europe, that the blockade must be conceived to exist till the revocation of it is actually notified; for, if this rule is rigidly applied, the effect of the blockade would last two months longer upon them than on the trading nations of Europe, by whom intelligence is received almost as soon as it is issued."

The receipt of the notification will not prevent a neutral, who, at the time of receiving it, is lying in the very port blockaded, from retiring freely: and it has even been laid down in the case of the Betsy (2), that he may retire with a cargo which he may already have laden, and which has thereby become actually

(1) 1 Rob. Rep. 332. Neptunus, 2 Rob. 114. Vrow Johanna, 2 Rob. 109.; and see also

1 Acton Rep. 141. 161.

(2) 1 Rob. Rep. 92. and 152.

neutral property: the distinction being, that he is not at liberty to make any fresh purchase after the notification. From the case of the Rolla (1) it appears, that the court will hold every cargo to be a fresh purchase which was not delivered, previously to the notification, either on board the neutral ship itself, or in lighters.

The notification of blockade must be legal and regular. During a blockade, which extended only to Amsterdam, an English commander gave a notice to a neutral entering Amsterdam of blockade upon all Dutch ports. The notice was held to be invalid (2), 1st, with reference to the other ports, because, as we have seen, a commander of a king's ship has no right to enlarge a blockade; and, 2dly, with reference to Amsterdam itself, "Because," said Sir William Scott, "it took from the neutral all power of election as to what other part of Holland he should enter, when he found the port of his dsetination under blockade. A commander of a ship must not reduce a neutral master to this kind of distress; and I am of opinion, that if the neutral had contravened the notice, he would not have been subject to condemnation."

No formal notification can ever be necessary for vessels lying within the blockaded port. "The continued fact," said Sir William Scott, in the case of the Vrow Judith (3), " is itself a sufficient notice: it is impossible for those within to be ignorant of the forcible suspension of their commerce; the notoriety of the thing supersedes the necessity of particular notice to each ship."

This brings us to the consideration of the other mode, in which, as we have already seen, a neutral may receive what shall be deemed sufficient information of a blockade, that is, by the notoriety of the fact. "If," says Sir William Scott, in the case of the Columbia (4), " you can affect a neutral with the knowledge of the fact, a formal warning becomes an idle ceremony, of no use, and not to be required. But the sight of one vessel, before a harbour, would not be sufficient notice to a neutral, though that vessel might alone be adequate to the operations of the blockade." There must be an apparent, or notorious blockade, in order to affect a neutral with knowledge, unless there be

(1) 6 Rob. Rep. 364.

(2) Henrich and Maria, 1 Rob. Rolla, 6 Rob. 364..

146.

(3) 1 Rob. Rep. 152.

(4) 1 Rob. Rep. 156. 1 Rob. Rep. 83. 1 Rob. Rep. 146.

What is a viola

individual proof that he had received specific information of it (1). On the other hand, if the fact be of a nature manifestly notorious, a person violating such a blockade will be considered prima facie, as having knowingly offended; but he may be admitted to give evidence of his ignorance. For there is a distinction between this case, of a knowledge by the notoriety of the fact, and the before mentioned cases, of knowledge by formal notice. In these cases we have seen, that no plea of ignorance is ever admitted; in this, such a plea will be allowed, if fairly established. This rule is laid down in the cases of the Hurtige Hane (2) and of the Neptunus (3). In the latter, there is also this further distinction taken between the two classes of cases that, in the cases of a notification formally given, the act of sailing to the blockaded port with a contingent destination to enter if the blockade be raised, and to proceed if it be not, is sufficient to constitute the offence. It is to be presumed, that the notification will be formally revoked, and that due notice will be given of it; till that is done, the port is to be considered as closed up; and, from the moment of quitting port to sail on such a destination, the offence of violating the blockade is complete, and the property engaged in it subject to confiscation. It may be different in a blockade existing de facto only. There, no presumption arises as to the continuance; and the ignorance of the party may be admitted, as an excuse, for sailing on a doubtful and provisional destination."

Thus, we have gone through two of the three points which tion of blockade. are chiefly necessary to be considered in the question of blockade, namely, the existence of an actual blockade, and the neutral's knowledge of it. It remains for us to examine the third point, namely, the violation of the blockade, so existing and sc known. This violation may be, either, by going into the place blockaded, or by coming out of it with a cargo laden after the commencement of the blockade. But, in order to constitute such a going into the blockaded port as will subject the neutral to the penalties of confiscation, it is not necessary that the entrance be completed into the very heart of the harbour. heart of the harbour. Vessels are not permitted even to place themselves in the vicinity, if their situation be so near that they may, with impunity, break the blockade whenever they please. "If a vessel could under pretence of

(1) Mercurius, 1 Rob. 83. 6 Rob. 65.

(2) 3 Rob. Rep. 324.
(3) 2 Rob. Rep. 110.

proceeding farther, approach close to the blockaded port, so as to be in a condition to slip in without obstruction, then," said Sir William Scott, in the case of the Neutralitet (1)," it would be impossible that any blockade could be maintained It would, I think, be no unfair rule of evidence, to hold, as a presumption de jure, that she goes there with an intention of breaking the blockade; and if such an inference may possibly operate with severity in particular cases, where the parties are innocent in their intentions, it is a severity necessarily connected with the rules of evidence, and essential to the effectual exercise of this right of war." Still less is a neutral permitted to place himself in such a situation as to be within the protection of the batteries on the shore. (2)

A blockade is broken as completely by coming out as by going in. "There may be instances indeed, of innocent egress," said Sir Wm. Scott, in the case of the Frederick Molke (3), “instances where the vessels have gone in before the blockade; and, under such circumstances, it could not be maintained that they might not be at liberty to retire. But the utmost that can be allowed to a neutral vessel is, that having already taken on board a cargo before the blockade begins, she may be at liberty to retire with it. But it must be considered as a rule which this court means to apply, that neutral ships departing, can only take away a cargo bonâ fide purchased and delivered before the Commencement of the blockade. If she afterwards take on board a cargo, it is a fraudulent act, and a violation of the blockade."

violations of

In some cases, the violations of blockade may be excusable. What excuses In cases of this nature, the whole burthen of exonerating himself blockade. from the penal consequences lies upon the party. He must show that he was led into the blockaded port by some accident which he could not control, or by some want of information which he could not obtain; in doing this, he must prove his whole case; and however innocent his intentions may have been, he must explain his conduct in a way consistent, not only with the innocence of himself and his owner, but he must bring

(1) 6 Rob. Rep. 30. (2) Charlotte Christine, 6 Rob, Rep. 101. Gute Erwartung, 6 Rob. 182.

(3) 1 Rob. Rep. 86. 92. 150. 172. 6 Rob. Rep. 364. 5 Rob. Rep. 27. 256. 2 Rob. Rep. 124. 1 Edwards, 33.; and see case of

Effect of violation of blockade.

it within those principles which the court has found it necessary to lay down for the protection of the belligerent right, and without which no blockade can ever be maintained. An excuse that the ship went in to procure a pilot for another port is insufficient. (1)

The invention of neutrals has been abundantly fertile in providing excuses for their violations of blockade, but these excuses are received by the belligerent Courts of Admiralty with much suspicion. "An excuse," said Sir William Scott, in the case of the Fortuna (2), " in order to be admissible, must shew an imperative and overruling compulsion to enter the particular port under blockade. This can scarcely ever be the case with respect to mere want of provisions. That want may drive the master to seek some port, but can hardly force him to resort exclusively to the port blockaded." A continued gale of wind however may sometimes furnish an excuse.

If a place be blockaded only by sea, it is no violation of the belligerent rights for a neutral to carry on commerce with it by inland communications. In the case of the Ocean (3), which was a case arising out of the blockade of Amsterdam, Sir William Scott said (4), "The legal consequences of a blockade must depend on the means of a blockade, and on the actual or possible application of the blockading force. On the land side, Amsterdam neither was nor could be affected by a blockading naval force. It could be applied only externally; the internal communications of the country were out of its reach, and in no way subject to its operation." And in another case (5), arising out of the same blockade, he said, "The blockade of Amsterdam is, from the nature of the thing, a partial blockade, a blockade by sea; and if goods are going to Embden, with an ulterior destination by land to Amsterdam, or by an interior canal navigation, it is not, according to my conception, a breach of the blockade."

We will now consider the effect of those violations of blockane which have been thus defined. "Prima facie," said Sir

(1) The Arthur, 1 Edwards, 203.

(2) 5 Rob. Rep. 27. Adonis, 5 Rob. 256. Exchange, 1 Edwards, 39. Hurtige Hane, 2 Rob.

(3) 3 Rob. Rep. 297.

(4) Ocean, 3 Rob. 297. (5) Jong Pictor, 4 Rob. 79. Stert, 4 Rob. 65. Maria, 6 Rob. 204.