to the same purpose, it should appear, that the revenues of the crown, and of the royal family, are, and have been, subjected to the national taxes of Great Britain, as well as the estates of all the peers and commoners of our mother-country, from whence we derive ourselves and our constitution, it will be difficult to conceive any good reasons why our proprietaries, and their great estate in this province, should alone, of all his majesty's subjects, be exempted from the payment of taxes for the defence and security of their own estates. But our governor is pleased to inform us, that if we tax them at all, it must be as proprietaries and chief governors, which is the only capacity by which they are connected with, or related to, the inhabitants; that they hold the government and soil under the the same grant, and their title to both is entered in their persons, and cannot be separated, without destroying their authority. Now we certainly have other connections with Thomas Penn, and with Richard Penn, besides their being chief governors; and I suppose they may separately eject or commence actions at law for rent, or other actions, in his majesty's courts within this province, in their private capacity, in the same manner that other inhabitants and freeholders could do in like cases; and the powers of government might have descended through the eldest branches of the family, or either of our proprietaries, without injuring their property in the soil; and in this case, the governor would have been sufficiently authorised by commission under him, in whom the powers of government were vested. But the commission of property (which our governors have not been concerned with till very lately) would have been insufficient, unless executed by all who had a property in the lands, and is now executed by the governor by virtue of that commission in opposition to his commission as lieutenant-governor, which expressly enjoins him not to grant lands, or otherwise interfere with the proprietaries affairs of property. But to return, as it is evident that the peers of Great Britain do not vote in the election of members to serve in parliament, yet their estates are taxed by bills of aids, and supplies to the crown, which arise out of the house of commons; I am of opinion, that the conclusion the governor draws from his reasoning in the message of the thirteenth of August last, is in direct opposition to the rights and usage of the house of commons; and consequently our offering a bill, whereby the proprietary estate was to be taxed with all other estates within this province, was not against the very principles of the British constitution, as he would imagine. Have the proprietaries, says the governor, a right to vote in the election of representatives as landholders? surely not. Being hereditary governors of the province, and having a vote in the legislature by their own particular representative the goHow then came you by a vernor. To which it may be answered, Have the peers of Great Britain a right to vote in the election of representatives as landholders ? surely not. Being hereditary peers of Great Britain, and having a vote in the legislature by their own particular representation in the house of lords. How then came the house of commons by right to tax them as fellow-subjects and landholders, seeing they had no voice in choosing you, nor were entitled to any, though owners of land in every county? a right to tax the peers as fellowsubjects and landholders, seeing they had no voice in choosing them, nor were entitled to any, though owners o land in every county? From the very principles therefore (says the governor) of the British constitution, you have no right to tax them as freeholders, or fellow-subjects, But all this kind of reasoning serves only to ease us from the whole force of it, and leaves the governor to dispute the principles of the British constitution with a British house of commons, before whom he will undoubtedly think it his duty to produce stronger arguments than these. The fallacy of this manner of reasoning is very obvious. The knights, citizens and burgesses, represent the whole commons of England; but the peers are present in parliament for themselves only; as it would be unjust to tax the peers if they had no representation in the legislature, by which they might give their consent; so it would be equally unjust to tax the proprietary estate here, without his assent by his representative the governor. The peers and our proprietaries have their negatives upon all bills; but the equity of taxing themselves, as well as all others, for their common safety and defence, induces the lords to give their assent to bills offered to them for that purpose; and do doubt the same equity ought to be equally binding on our proprietaries; and it may be hoped, that all restrictions, by which their deputy is disabled from discharging his duty, will, in due time, be considered by our superiors. Our proprietaries, I presume, have no right to vote for our representatives, though they are certainly landholders in this province; and under this consideration they are exempted from paying assemblymen's wages by our country rate and levy act. The peers of Great-Britain are as certainly landholders, and many of them burges-/ ses and members of corporations; yet they neither vote for the knights of the shire or burgesses; and under the same consideration are exempted from contributing to their expences. The commons petitioned in parliament, first of Richard II, that all persons having lay fee might contribute to the charge of the knights. The king answered, that the lords of the realm would not lose their old liberties: yet in the same reign, by the twelfth of Richard II, chap. 2, it is enacted, that if any lord, or any other man, spiritual or temporal, hath purchased any lands or tenements, or other possessions, that were wont to be contributory to such expences before the time of the said purchase, that the said lands, tenements and possessions, and the tenants of the same, be contributory to the said expences, as the said lands, tenements and possessions, were wont to be before the time of the same purchase. This law, which hath continued through so many ages, appears to be founded in justice and equity, and will necessarily become the rule of our conduct; for as our paper money acts are near expir See Viner's Id. Tit. Peer. ing, and it may be hoped that no future assembly will give up their just rights for the obtaining of new emissions, whatever inconveniencies they may labour under for want of them, the payment of assemblymen's wages must become very burdensome if they are to be kept sitting, though to little or no purpose (as of late) through a great part of the year; and especially if our proprietaries, against our expectations, should have as much power as they have inclination to get their encreasing estates exempted from bearing any share of our taxes; for in this case we have reason to apprehend they may judge it their private interest to impoverish the people by exorbitant impositions, or a profusion of the public money; and as under these circumstances pretences will never be wanting, new and grievous burdens will be repeatedly called for, till by degrees the freeholds and possessions of this young colony must insensibly fall into the proprietaries hands; and thus by the continual proprietary exemptions, and the weight becoming still heavier upon the decreasing number who may be able, for a while, to bear up, and continue among the calamities of their country; these too must at length submit ahd leave the colony their predecessors had cultivated and settled with honor under a milder administration. Note. The editor takes the liberty of adding in this note the following authorities. The commons in 1700 having tacked or consolidated the land-tax and Irish-forfeiture bills, and the lords having returned the same with certain amendments, the commons rejected the said amendments for the following reasons, viz "for that all aids and supplies granted to his majesty in parliament, are the sole and entire gift of the commons; and as all bills for the granting such aids and supplies begin with the commons, so it is the undoubted and sole right of the commons to direct, limit and appoint, in such bills, the ends and purposes, considerations, limitations, and qualifications of such grants; which ought not to be changed or altered by your lordships. This is well known to be such a fundamental right of the commons, that to give reasons for it has been esteemed by our ancestors to be a weakening of that right," &c. and though the lords at a farther conference strenuously contended for their said amendments, in opposition to these reasons; the commons adhered, and left the bill with their lordships, to adopt in the gross, or reject as they thought fit. After which the reader need not be told what was the issue. Extract from the report of a free conference between the two houses, "That the ancient manner of giving aids was by indenture, to which conditions were sometimes annexed; the lords only gave their consent, with ont making any alteration; and this was the continued practice, until the latter end of Henry the fifth, and, in some instances, until Henry the seventh. That in the famous record, called the indemnity of the lords and commons settled by the king, lords, and commons, on a most solemn debate in 9 Henry IV, it is declared, that all grants and aids are made by the commons, and only assented to by the lords. That the modern practice is, to omit the lords out of the granting, and name them parties only to the enacting clause of aids granted to the crown; to which their lordships have always concurred, and on conferences departed from their attempts of petty alterations in acts relating thereunto. That if then all aids be by the grant of the commons, it follows that the limitation, disposition, and manner of account, must likewise belong only to them." Report of a committee of the assembly, September 23. In obedience to the order of the house, we have considered the proprietaries eleventh, twelfth, and twenty-first instructions, relating to money bills, and now offer such remarks thereon as occur to us. THE preamble to the eleventh instruction sets forth, That the interest money arising from the loan of bills of credit in this province, was intended by the proprietaries, and the house of representatives, to be applied for the public service of the province, and of the inhabitants thereof, and should therefore, under the direction of the same power that raises it, be most carefully applied to those purposes, as a greater security to the people against misapplications, than if it was entrusted only to one branch of the legislature; and such was the ancient practice in their said province.' That the interest money was intended to be applied for the public service of the province, and of the inhabitants thereof, is undoubtedly right; but that it was ever the practice,' or that there was ever even a single instance of the proprietaries or their deputies having a vote in the application of the interest money, we must absolutely deny. Their consent to the disposition is not required in any of our loan acts from the beginning to this day, the constant tenor of those laws being, that the interest money shall be disposed of as the assembly of this province shall from time to time order and direct.' Their consent was never asked, unless in the acceptance of presents made them out of that interest, which could not be forced on them without their consent; and that kind of application they have indeed been graciously pleased to consent to from time to time, to the amount of above thirty thousand pounds given to themselves out of that fund and the excise. If this was a misapplication, and we know of no other, the power they contend for would not have prevented it; for it is scarce probable they should ever disapprove or refuse to sign acts, votes, or resolves, which they thought so just and reasonable. And indeed, had these presents been always as regular as the seasons, and never intermitted, be the conduct of the governor ever so inconsistent with the public good, your committee have reason to believe, this new instruction had never been formed or thought of. But since the representatives of the people have dared to signify their disapprobation of a governor's measures, by withholding those tokens of their esteem, affection, and gratitude, which were constantly given when they found themselves well governed; this instruction is thought necessary to be enforced. Not for the greater security of the people against misapplication; for they never complained of any; but to compel your continuance of those presents; to compel an addition to them, for they are thought too small; and to compel the payment of what they are pleased to call the arrears of such presents to any governors from whom they have at any time been withheld. For if the people's money cannot be disposed of for their own benefit, without the proprietary or his deputy's consent, the passage of the bill, or the approbation of the resolve, must be facilitated, as the proprietaries were pleased to tell us on a former occasion, by a regard to their interest, that is, by putting at the same time into their private pockets whatever share of the public money they shall be pleased to insist on, under the specious name of salary or support; though by the quit-rents, and even by their other feès and perquisites, established by law or taken by custom, they have already a support much more than sufficient. The money arising by the interest of the bills of credit, as well as that arising by the excise, is paid wholly by the people. To dispose of their own money, by themselves or their representatives, is, in our opinion, a natural right, inherent in every man, or body of men, antecedent to all laws. The proprietaries pay no part of this money, and therefore can have no right to a share in the power of disposing of it. They might as reasonably claim a right to a negative in the disposition of every man's private fortune, and for the same reasons, to wit, the man's greater security, and to prevent misapplication; nay, the reasons would be stronger, bodies of men not being generally so apt to misapply their money, as single prodigals. The people have never complained that any such misapplication has been made by their representatives; on the contrary, they have shewn their approbation of the conduct of the assembly in this tender point, by long repeated annual elections of the same men to the same trust in the same office. They have always seen their money disposed of, from time to time, for the advantage and honor of the public, or for the king's immediate service, and they had reason to be contented with the disposition. The public cre. dit has been constantly preserved, and every man who served the government, has been always duly and readily paid; but if this new-claimed negative in the proprietaries takes place, the people will not have it in their power to reward the man that serves them, or even to pay the hire of the labourer that works for them, without the governor's leave first purchased; much less will they be allowed to support an agent in England to defend their rights, or be able to pay the expence of prosecuting their complaints |