should be followed, and everything should be done for him that is needful. As we proceed, we shall adduce not only the old but some entirely new and conclusive proof that General McClellan was right, and that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief were wrong.

At the time of the receipt of this dispatch of the 6th, notwithstanding the appearance of a peremptory direction to march which the Secretary and the General-in-Chief had infused into its words, it is apparent from the context that something was left to General McClellan's discretion as to the line of movement, and that the President could not be persuaded to make the order peremptory in this particular. Moreover, General McClellan had to construe this order by the solemn assurance that Mr. Lincoln had given him, only a few days before, that he should not be required to move on the enemy before he was ready. Whether he was to invade Virginia by either of the two lines indicated in the order, the fact of his being or not being in a condition to make an aggressive movement into the enemy's country remained exactly as it in truth was. The condition of his army was a most essential element in the problem, by whatever line he was to move. That condition had not changed in the three days that elapsed from the time when the President himself saw what it was; and, as we go on, we shall show that it had not so materially changed, for three weeks after the date of this order, that the army could have been safely marched upon a new and aggressive campaign in the enemy's country.

General McClellan fought the battles of South Mountain and Antietam without any written order defining his command, excepting the ambiguous one of September 2d-ambiguous, that is to say, after the date on which it was issued from the War Department. What, then, would have been his fate if he had lost those battles, and especially the last? We must carry the reader back to a period when mean rivalries, deep hatreds, and vengeful prejudices had their sway. It can not be doubted that, if McClellan had been defeated in the battle of Antietam, he would have had to answer for it before a court-martial, and that his blood would have been demanded. We know what deeds were done in that period under the forms and mockeries of military justice. McClellan's bitterest enemies were among those who, from their official stations, would have had the power, which they would not have scrupled to use, to arraign him for having assumed a command to which he had not been legally assigned. They could have pointed to the narrow scope of the order of September 2d, and they would have pointed to the

lives of brave men that had been lost and the public property that had been destroyed beyond what, they would have contended, was the scope of the only authority that he had received which could avail him as a legal order. In suffering McClellan to be thus exposed, President Lincoln would seem to have been unconscious of what a strain might be brought upon his own sense of executive justice if any disaster should befall the General who had taken the command at his earnest personal entreaty, and who had been left without a proper legal authority for the acts which he was expected to perform. Beyond all doubt it would have cost Mr. Lincoln the deepest pain if any misfortune had exposed one hair of McClellan's head to any danger. At the base of Mr. Lincoln's statue which stands in the heart of this metropolis, and is passed every day by half a million of people, there is inscribed a legend which imputes to him that he had "charity for all, malice toward none." We may believe that the ascription is just. But what would Mr. Lincoln's amiable qualities have availed against the hatreds, the machinations, and the devices of McClellan's enemies if he had not been victorious in the battles which he fought without other than an implied authority for fighting them? When McClellan overtook and gave battle to the enemy on the field of Antietam, he may without exaggeration be said to have twice taken his life in his hand.*

G. T. C.

* General McClellan was under fire during the battle of Antietam several times, and on each occasion for a considerable period, and with great exposure. His duties required him to expose himself both to artillery and infantry fire, at many critical periods of the day. At one time, he rode along the lines for the very purpose of drawing the fire of a supposed concealed battery, in order to reveal its position. It opened upon him and his staff as soon as they were within range.

RELATIONS OF CANADA WITH THE UNITED

STATES.

Ir can not be undesirable that the people of the United States should make themselves acquainted with the commercial policy of a people with whom they carry on an extensive commerce, and whose railroads and canals are used for the transportation of United States products in common with their own. The modern policy of Great Britain toward her colonies and dependencies is so widely different from what it was within the last half-century, that it is doubtful whether the people of the United States realize the fact that Canada is practically an independent nation, enjoying a system of government which, it may be safely affirmed, gives as much general satisfaction to its inhabitants as any that could be devised.

It would be strange indeed if in a country where the utmost freedom of discussion is permitted, and which adjoins a great nation like the United States, there were no individuals entertaining a preference for republican institutions, and more especially when it is borne in mind that many influential inhabitants of our principal cities have either themselves immigrated from the United States, or are descendants of citizens of that country. It is, however, worthy of notice that any dissatisfaction which has been expressed with the political state of Canada has been based, not on the imperfection of the system of government, but on the obstructions to free commercial intercourse which have existed since the abrogation of the treaty of reciprocity negotiated in the year 1854. Since the termination of that treaty agitators have, from time to time, endeavored to create disaffection among the people by representing the advantages that would result from a commercial union, which they maintain is unattainable so long as the Canadian Dominion is a dependency of Great Britain. Ample proof can be given that the untiring efforts of the few, who have endeavored to create dis

affection, have been wholly unavailing, but it is likewise desirable to convince the people of the United States that for many years Canada has enjoyed practical independence. This fact has been conceded by a writer (Mr. Goldwin Smith) who has no confidence in the stability of its existing institutions. In his essay on "The Political Destiny of Canada," in the London " Fortnightly Review " of April, 1878, the following passages occur: "Self-government is independence; perfect self-government is perfect independence; and all the questions that arise between Ottawa and Downing Street, including the recent question about appeals, are successively settled in favor of self-government. . . . In Canada, government being parliamentary and constitutional, monarchy is the delegation of a shadow. . . . Canada, though adorned with the paraphernalia of eight constitutional monarchies (one central and seven provincial) is a democracy of the most pronounced kind; the Governor-General was not wrong in saying that she is more democratic than the United States, where the President is an elective king, and where the Senate, which, though elective is conservative, possesses great power, whereas the nominated Senate of Canada is a cipher."

In the exercise of its self-governing powers, the Canadian Parliament has recently enacted a tariff which has created a good deal of dissatisfaction in Great Britain, while in the United States an impression has been created that its main object was to retaliate against that country for its persistent refusal to entertain any measure for establishing reciprocal free trade between the two countries in products and manufactures which are natural to both. It can not be denied that such an inference might be drawn from statements made in the course of heated party discussions, but the impression is by no means strictly correct. In one or two instances, to which special reference will be made, the Canadian tariff may be deemed retaliatory, but when it is borne in mind that the duties are almost invariably the same on the products and manufactures of the United States as on those of Great Britain, against which country there is no ground whatever for retaliation, it may fairly be urged that the United States can have no just ground of complaint against the Canadian tariff.

In order to place the subject fairly before the people of the United States, reference must be made to the imports into Canada, and to the course of its trade with Great Britain and the United States. The last published trade returns are for the year ending June 30, 1878, and a fair comparison can be instituted between that

year and the one ending June 30, 1875, there having been no material difference in the tariff. It must be borne in mind that the bulk of Canadian imports are received from Great Britain and the United States, the proportions having been, in the year 1878, from Great Britain $37,431,180, from the United States $48,628,189, and from all other countries $5,136,658. Of the goods imported from the United States $25,163,686 were admitted free of duty, and $23,468,053 at various rates of duty, while from Great Britain $5,291,397 were free and $32,139,783 were subjected to duty. In that year there were exports of the value of $11,164,878 not the produce of Canada, of which over $9,000,000 were agricultural products. Thus the bona fide free imports from the United States must be reduced to about $14,000,000.* In the year ending June 30, 1875, the aggregate imports from Great Britain were $60,347,067, and from the United States $50,802,899. The dutiable goods from Great Britain were $49,239,119, and from the United States $22,023,665, the free goods from Great Britain $11,107,948, and from the United States $28,779,234.

On comparing the imports of 1875 and 1878 it will be found that there was a decrease of about seventeen millions of dutiable goods from Great Britain, while there was a decrease of a little over one million from the United States; and, when the shrinkage in the value of goods is taken into consideration, there can be no doubt that there was a considerable increase in quantity in 1878. The duties in 1875 were in the aggregate $15,354,616, and in 1878 $12,795,693. While such was the decrease in the principal branch of revenue, there was an increase in the interest and sinking fund of the public debt of nearly a million. The facts stated afford conclusive proof that it was absolutely necessary to obtain additional revenue, irrespective altogether of any question either of retalia

* Since this article was in type the Canadian trade returns for the year ending June 30, 1879, have been laid before Parliament, and it may be interesting to give the latest figures. The aggregate imports from Great Britain were $30,943,703, of which $27,026,210 were dutiable and $3,917,493 free. From the United States the aggregate was $43,626,027, of which $23,693,359 were dutiable and $19,932,668 free. From all other countries the imports were $5,609,259, of which about a million were free. The falling off in imports from 1858 was about $11,000,000. The exports not the produce of Canada amounted to $8,355,644-chiefly agricultural products-which will reduce the free imports from the United States to $11,577,024. On comparing the returns for 1879 with those of 1878, it will be found that in dutiable goods there was a decrease from Great Britain of $5,113,573, and an increase from the United States of $218,306.