counter to the favourite notions of those who so earnestly contest what they call the existence of a moral sense. It is not, my purpose to enter into the speculations in which ethical writers have indulged on this subject, but I take leave to remark, that even admitting there is no such innate moral sense as is so vehemently contested by Mr. Paley and others, it by no means follows that the constitution of man is not such that by the due use and application of our natural faculties as we grow up, and become adult, the ideas of right and wrong, the moral sense of order, justice, and all the other virtues will not inevitably spring up in our bosoms. It does not follow that the sense of right and wrong is not implanted in the heart by nature, because it cannot be called into action without an object. The diamond is not less a diamond because it is yet unfashioned by the lapidary. It does not follow that there was no such sense in the bosom even of the wild boy caught in the woods of Hanover, because in his uninstructed state, he would feel no horror at the treachery of Toranius. The exercise of the moral judgment indeed, implies a just comprehension of the subject on which it is to be pronounced. The existence of the moral feelings does not. In the case of the wild boy of Hanover, it is obvious that until his mind was duly informed of the relation between Toranius and his father, and until he was taught by reflection the peculiar tenderness and filial piety which that relation implied, it would be impossible, (even if the existence of his moral sense be admitted) that he could feel the sentiment of horror at the baseness of the son, which every cultivated understanding must feel, when the incident is recited. But to deny the implanted sense of right and wrong for that cause, would be about as reasonable as to deny that the passion of love is innate in the heart, because it does not spring up until maturity and until an object is presented which is lovely to the eye. It is as reasonable as to sup

which the advantages of the social union are the smallest. As society advances, the relations among individuals are continually multiplied, and man is rendered the more necessary to man: But it may be doubted, if, in a period of great refinement, the social affections be as warm and powerful as when the species were wandering in the forest.

"Besides, it does not seem to be easy to conceive in what manner Hobbes' supposition could be realized. Surely, if there be a foundation for any thing laid in the constitution of man's nature it is for family union. The infant of our species continues longer in a helpless state, and requires longer the protecting care of both parents, than the young of any other animal. Before the first child is able to provide for itself a second and a third are produced, and thus the union of the sexes, supposing it at first to have been merely casual, is insensibly confirmed by habit, and cemented by the common interest which both parents take in their offspring. So just is the simple and beautiful statement of the fact given by Montesquieu, "That man is born in society, and there he remains."

"From these considerations, it appears that the social union does not take its rise from views of selfinterest, but that it forms a necessary part of the condition of man from the constitution of his nature. It is true, indeed, that before he begins to reflect he finds himself connected with society by a thousand ties; so that, independently of any social instinct, prudence would undoubtedly prevent him from abandoning his fellow creatures. But still it is evident that the social instinct forms a part of human nature, and has a tendency to unite men even when they stand in no need of each other's assisWere the case otherwise, prudence and the social disposition would be only different names for the same principle, whereas it is matter of common remark, that although the two principles be by no

tance.

means inconsistent when kept within reasonable bounds, yet that the former, when it rises to any excess, is in a great measure exclusive of the latter. I hinted too already, that it is in societies where individuals are most independent of each other as to their animal wants, that the social principles operate with the greatest force.

According to the view of the subject now given, the multiplied wants and necessities of man in his infant state, by laying the foundation of the family union, impose upon our species, as a necessary part of their condition, those social connexions which are so essential to our improvement and happiness. And, therefore, nothing could be more unphilosophical than the complaints which the ancient Epicureans founded upon this circumstance, and which Lucretius has so pathetically expressed in the following verses:

"Tum porro puer, ut sævis projectus ab undis
Navita, nudis humi jacet, infans, indigus omni
Vitali auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras
Nixibus ex alvo matris natura profudit:
Vagituque locum lugubri complet, ut æquum est,
Cui tantum in vitâ restat transire malorum." 11*

The philosophy of Pope is in this respect much more pleasing and much more solid:

Heaven forming each on other to depend,

A master, or a servant, or a friend,

Bids each on other for assistance call,

Till one man's weakness grows the strength of all.
Wants, frailties, passions, closer still ally

The common interest, or endear the tie.

To these we owe true friendship, love sincere,
Each home-felt joy, that life inherits here."+

The considerations now stated afford a beautiful illustration of the beneficent design with which the physical condition of man is adapted to the principles of his moral constitution; an adaptation so stri

* Lib. v. 1. 223.

† See on this subject the Moralists of Lord Shaftesbury,

pose, that there is no inborn sense of beauty and deformity in a blind man, merely because the film upon his pupil, or the existence of a cataract, has obstructed his vision, until his blindness has been removed by the dexterity of the occulist. The sensibility of the retina is there, though it was never called into exercise by the solar ray, till the operation of the surgeon. I hold therefore with those philosophers who affirm the existence of a moral sense, or sense of right and wrong implanted in the heart of man. I adopt it as the basis of all my reasonings. I do not affirm indeed that it enables us in all things rightly to decide upon what is right or wrong in human conduct. That depends, not upon the moral sense, but mainly upon the judgment; and that judgment is subject to be warped and influenced by various considerations, besides that it is liable to the inevitable defect of human imperfection. We should not deny to the judicial magistrate a sense of right and wrong, because he often errs. We concede to him the best intentions-the strongest love of right and hatred of wrong-even at the moment he decides against our own convictions. It is no objection then to the existence of a moral sense, that it wants uniformity in its operations; e. g. that the exposure of infant children or decrepid parents is in one age or country a virtue and in another a vice. In both the moral sense is just the same. In both, the object is the same-the promotion of what is held to be a good, and therefore right; the error is in the reasoning upon the matter submitted to the judgment; for reasoning may well vary our sentiments with respect to particular actions, and their influence upon that general happiness, which a just sense of right and wrong ever prompts us to promote; but it never could create our sense of right and wrong, since that is given us by him who gave us all things. As Cicero has well expressed it; it is "non scripta sed nata lex; ratio summa, insita in natura; quam nondidicimus, ac

cepus, legimus, verum ex natura ipsa, arrepuimus, hausimus, expressimus; ad quam non docti sed facti ; non instituti sed imbuti sumus."

This innate sense of right and wrong, however, though implanted in the human heart and constituting a law of our nature, is still susceptible of improvement by judicious attention and cultivation. Like the faculties of the mind, or the corporeal senses, its sensibilities on the one hand may be largely increased by exercise and sedulous care, while on the other, its just determination as to what is really right or wrong, its judgments upon the influence, effect, and tendency of human actions, and its consequent decision upon the propriety of an act, must always of necessity be mainly influenced by example, authority, sympathy, habit, and the usages, customs and opinions of the community to which we belong. Hence the true mode of ascertaining what is morally right is to enquire what the reason, the cultivated reason of mankind must necessarily pronounce on the matter in question. Hence too the necessity of the most scrupulous examination of every question of morals and of law; for though the moral sense be true as the needle to the pole, its polarity may be disturbed and controled by what is extraneous; and hence it arises that we are so often compelled to draw the broad line of distinction between the nature of the action, and the motives of the

actor.

On this corner stone then I rest, that there is in man a moral sense of right and wrong; and as that sense must have been implanted, to lead us to pursue the good and eschew the evil, it seems but a fair corollary from its existence, that the first law of our nature is, obedience to its dictates. Man too being a creature endued with reason, that reason must be his guide in deciding between what is right and what is wrong, and in pointing out those rules of moral conduct, or in other words, those laws of nature, to