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to Mr. Kemmis, the crown solicitor of the circuit, and has received from that officer the answer, that “No case of the kind has come within the knowledge of the crown solicitor.'

“ In reply to a similar communication to Mr. Barrington, crown solicitor of the Munster circuit, three out of the four counties of which adjoin Tipperary, he states,

—No instance has occurred on the Munster circuit while I have been crown solicitor (now nearly twenty-five years), of injury suffered by any person in consequence of having found a verdict of conviction in any case.'

“His excellency also felt it his duty to refer the statement of the memorialists to the judge who presided at the last assizes, and his excellency has received a reply from that learned person, of which the following is an extract

“ • It did not appear to me there existed any grounds, either of fact or INFERENCE, for apprehending that the juries were intimidated ; on the contrary I consider they discharged their duties free from any bias arising from personal apprehensions or any other cause ; and with regard to their verdicts, they uniformly received and acted upon the legal character of the crime as laid down by the court, at the same time exercising their own judgments, as is their exclusive province, upon the credit to which they consider the witnesses to be entitled.'"

The following evidence was given upon the same subject before the same committee:

Mr. Hatton says, that “ He does not know that he ever saw ANYThing of the effect of the Riband system upon jurors.”—2894.

Mr. Hatton had been in the Irish constabulary for sixteen years and a half, when he gave this testimony. He passed, we believe, through every grade of the force up to that which he then occupied. He was one of the most active persons connected with it; and was, we think, personally concerned in each of the cases of Ribandism which were brought to trial: and his promotion, as well as that of his son, were in a great degree owing to his incessant exertions to detect and prosecute the Ribandmen.

Major Warburton says, that “ He knows no instance of Ribandmen intimidating either jurors or witnesses (1060); and knows no OBJECT of any kind which they have been the means of effecting.'--121.

Major Warburton is son to the late Bishop of Cloyne, and a conservative; he was upon the establishment of the Irish constabulary for twenty-two years, from 1816 to 1838—he was provincial inspector for about thirteen years—then deputy inspector-general, and finally inspector-general of the whole force.

Having given some instances of the Professor's veracity and candour in respect to matters of fact, let us attempt to diversify the exhibition a little with a sample of his candour and veracity in matters of science.

As a specimen of “ dreadful teaching," he states (p. 176) that Dr. Dens announces as an established maxim, that every oath implies necessarily saloo jure superioris. And again, in the note to page 126, he has the following words: “Now as every oath, according to Dr. Dens, implies necessarily the reservation salvo jure superioris.” In this passage the writer evidently wishes to make it appear that the reservation of the jura superioris was a doctrine peculiar to Dr. Dens, or to popery, and one which had something in itself not only unusual but immoral. Whether the Professor of moral philosophy has written the passage in that ignorance which characterizes every part of his “ Essay on Romanism in Ireland," or in that spirit of calumnious insinuation which equally distinguishes the same composition, we know not. What we do know is, that the doctrine is not peculiar to Peter Dens, or to any one else, and that it is to be found, we believe, in every treatise

ethics that ever was written, and that was expanded sufficiently to include all the details of the subject. In order to prove this assertion, we shall, for obvious reasons, make no citation from any Catholic author, but simply request the Professor to take the trouble of turning to a book which, though sufficiently well known to the public, appears not to be at all known to the author of “Romanism in Ireland." The work to which we allude is the production of a very eminent Protestant bishop, and is called, “ SEVEN PRELECTIONS DELIVERED IN THE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD,” by the celebrated Bishop Saunderson, who was then Regius Professor of Divinity in that university. In this work it is laid down in the tenth section of the second Prelection: first, that in every oath all ordinary exceptions and conditions must be reserved and understood ; and secondly, that in every oath the righT OF THE SUPERIOR must always be understood as RESERVED—“ semper subintelligendum salca potestate superioris "--and therefore that every oath must be considered as taken (to use the pleonastic and clegant apposition of the Quarterly Review), “with the reservation salvo jure superioris.Indeed Bishop Saunderson, who, according to Paley, “was the most eminent person of his time in this kind of knowledge,” evidently carries the matter higher than Dens does, by reserving, not merely the right of the


superior, but his power to prevent the execution of any promise made without such a reservation. In illustration of this principle, he puts the case of a young man who, without reservation, swore to do something which was lawful in itself; but whose father being ignorant of the matter, commands him to do something else, the doing of which will prevent him from doing that which he had sworn to do. In this case the bishop decides that the son is not bound by the oath, and that he is bound by the command of his father; and this decision he makes without laying down anything as to the nature of the act which the father has commanded, or the consideration upon

which the oath was taken to the third person, or the consequences of breaking the oath and obeying the command. The reason which he assigns for this rule is, that the act of one man ought not to prejudice the right of another, and he treats the principle all through as a matter about which there was no doubt. It is perhaps not unworthy of remark upon such an occasion, that the Protestant bishop having in his text laid down the doctrine which we have mentioned, cites in the margin the following passage upon the same subject from the Decretals, ii. 24, lib. 9: In the taking of an oath the RIGHT OF THE SUPERIOR is always understood as being RESERVED. In juramento jus superioris semper intelligitur exceptum.” Whether the passage from the Decretals is adduced as the foundation of the doctrine of the text, or adopted as a collateral authority upon the subject, we have no means of knowing. However this matter may be, it is perfectly certain, as well as perfectly obvious, that the effect of the whole passage as it stands, is to assert and to show the entire identity of doctrine between Protestant and Catholic divines upon the point in question,—to show that they are both agreed in this principle, that


oath must be understood to be accompanied by a reservation of the rights of the superior; which reservation, if it be not actually expressed, must be invariably understood. The same doctrine is found in Puffendorff, des Deo. de l'Homme et du Citoyen, par Barbeyrac, liv. i. ch. xi. sec. 6, note 3, where he shows at some length the grounds and extent of the power which the superior possesses to dispense with the observance of an oath, which had been taken to the prejudice of his own rights.

The following passage upon the subject is taken from Grotius de Jur. Bel., et P. lib. ii. cap. 13, sec. 20: “The act of a superior cannot indeed prevent the performance of an oath, in as far as the oath was truly obligatory, for the observance of such an oath is a duty enjoined by natural as well as divine law. But inasmuch as our own actions are not fully (plenè) in our own power, but only in such a manner as to depend upon the will of our superiors, there are therefore two acts which a superior can perform in reference to that which is sworn (by the inferior). One of these acts is directed against the person who has taken the oath, and another against the person to whom it has been taken. In respect to the person who hath taken the oath, the effect of the act (of the superior) is either before the oath has been taken to render it void altogether, in as far as the right of the inferior was contained under the power of the superior. If the oath has been taken in such circumstances, the superior can prevent it from being fulfilled (ne impleatur.) For the inferior, as far as he is inferior, had no power to bind himself any further than should be in accordance with the pleasure of the superior (superiori placiturum esset), for greater power than this, he, the inferior, did not possess.

He then goes on to give some instances and authorities upon the subject, and passes to the consideration of what the superior may do in respect of the person to whom the oath has been taken. The power of the superior in this respect he states to consist in taking away from him the right which he had seemed to acquire from the oath; or, if the right had not already arisen, by prohibiting that any should accrue from the obligation. But the doctrine is in truth quite universal, and is only a more particular form of that which is to be found in Saunderson ubi sup. sect. ix.-namely: that an oath which professes to bind the party swearing to an obligation, which may be inconsistent with any other obligation of a superior character, is void in its essence and ab initio.' This is a proposition so elementary in the science, that it has not been omitted even by Paley (Chapter on Promises, sec. iii. par. 2) although his treatise, as may be expected from its title, “ The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy,” is of a very general nature, and consequently presents not those numerous divisions and multitudinous details which are to be found in the disquisitions of the schoolmen upon these and similar subjects.

Our readers will probably recollect that the existence of this “reservation of the rights of the superior ” in some book at Maynooth, was one of the principal grounds of the attack made by Mr. Colquhoun upon that establishment in the late session of Parliament. Another of the principal grounds relied upon in the same debate, was that in some treatise which formed part of the course at Maynooth, it was made a matter of discussion, whether a person who had taken part of the property of another was guilty of a mortal or only of a venial sin, unless the value of the subject-matter was considerable - Some declaring that the appropriation of one grain of another man's wheat was a mortal offence, whilst others adopted, in respect to this ancient corn law, a sort of ethical sliding-scale, upon which the value required for constituting the higher species of criminality ranged from one farthing to sixpence or thereabouts. Whether the taking was in the hypothesis to be qualified by any superabounding wealth in one party, or necessity in the other, we do not recollect, nor is it in the smallest degree material that we should; as we do not mean to enter into any discussion about the merits of the theory itself. Mr. Colquhoun, for the purpose of giving a practical character to his motion, informed the House, that the principles to which he objected were enforced by the priests upon the people; and that if the case were otherwise, he should not have ever brought forward the subject. We believe that we know as well as most persons the characteristics of the moral teaching practised by the Catholic clergy of Ireland; and we certainly never heard of such a doctrine until we heard Mr. Colquhoun. If the Catholic clergy of Ireland have been in the habit of assiduously inculcating this kind of morality, their success has been astonishingly small, for we are informed by Mr. Rowan, in his evidence before the Roden committee (Q.1855), “ that considering how very poor the people were, and how many temptations there were to rob, it was most extraordinary how unfrequently offences of that kind were committed.” Of Mr. Rowan we shall only say at present, that he was the principal witness upon whom Lord Roden relied for making out a case for the impeachment of Lord Normanby and the utter extermination of the Catholic priests. To return to Maynooth and the speech of Mr. Colquhoun; what we propose to do upon this, as upon the former subject, is to present the reader with a specimen of the teaching of Protestant professors upon subjects of the same nature.

The following is the definition or rather description given of the nature of property in general in a work which at this moment forms part of the academical course in the University of Cambridge. If you should see a flock of pigeons in a field of corn; and if, (instead of each picking where, and what it liked, taking just as much as it wanted and no more), you




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