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[17TH NOVEMBER, 1900.

MACDONALD v. SHEPPARD PUBLISHING CO. Discovery-Defamation—Justification—Immorality—Disclosure of name of

paramour.

The defendants having in their newspaper charged the plaintiff with immorality, the plaintiff sued them for libel, and the defendants pleaded that the charge was true. The plaintiff having required particulars, the defendants set forth that the plaintiff lived at a house of ill-fame; that he lived at a particular place in adultery; that a child was born to the woman with whom he lived; and that he brought to his house and kept with the members of his family a woman who had lived in a house of ill-fame. The plaintiff, being examined for discovery, admitted that he had lived in adultery with a woman who had previously lived in a house of ill-fame, and that she bore a child of which he was not the father, but denied the other allegations of the particulars.

Held, that the plaintiff was bound to disclose the name of the woman, although such disclosure might injure her. Bradford, for the plaintiff.

Riddell, Q.C., for the defendants.

MILLAR v. THOMPSON.

Attachment of debts-Fraud-Issue-Amount in controversy-County Court -Jurisdiction—Residence of garnishee—Rules 917, 918, 919—Receiving

order.

Where it was charged by a judgment creditor that a fraudulent arrangement had been made between the judgment debtor and his employers, the garnishees, whereby a third person had been substituted for the debtor, as the servant of the garnishees and money paid to such third person, while the debtor continued to do the work :

:

Held, that the judgment creditor was entitled to have an issue directed, to which the third person should be a party, to determine whether there was at the time of the

service of the attaching order any debt due or accruing from the garnishees to the debtor, without bringing home a case of fraud to the persons against whom it was charged; it was sufficient to shew unexplained facts and circumstances so unusual as to create a strong suspicion that fraud had been practised.

Held, also, that, upon the proper construction of Rules. 917, 918, and 919, the Judge of a County Court in which the judgment has been recovered has power, when the amount claimed to be due from the garnishee is so large as not to be within the jurisdiction of a County Court, to make the garnishing summons returnable before himself, even where the garnishee resides in another county.

Held, also, that an order for a receiver should not be made in respect of a fund which may be reached by garnishing process.

Idington, Q.C., for the plaintiffs.

R. N. Ball, for the defendant and others interested.

[ROSE, J., 2ND NOVEMBER, 1900.

In re GEDDES AND GARDE.

In re GEDDES AND COCHRANE.

Landlord and tenant-Renewal lease-Rent-Construction of lease.

A clause in a lease providing for a renewal stated that the renewal lease was to be "at such increased rent as may be determined upon as hereinafter mentioned, payable in like manner and under and subject to the like covenants, provisions, and agreements as are contained in these presents, including the covenant for renewal, such rent to be determined by three different disinterested persons as arbitrators."

The lease further provided for payment of the yearly rent as follows: "For the first ten years of the said term eighty dollars per annum; for the remaining eleven years one

hundred dollars per annum; all the said payments to be made half-yearly on the first day of January and July in each year."

Held, that the proper manner by which the rent should be increased during the renewal term was by adding to each payment during the twenty-one years, that is to say, adding to the rent of $80 per annum for the first ten years of the renewal term and to the rent of $100 per annum for the remaining ten years of the renewal term,-and not by adding together the annual payments for twenty-one years and making an addition to that, nor by adding to the sum payable during the last year before the renewal.

Held, also, that the condition as to the rent for the new term being an increased rent might be satisfied by making a merely nominal addition, whereas here, there was no increase in the rentable value of the premises.

Riddell, Q.C., and J. MacGregor, for the tenants.
H. D. Gamble, for the landlord.

!

[6TH NOVEMBER, 1900.

GRAVES v. GORRIE.

Copyright-Works of fine art-Imperial Act-Extension to Colonies. The Imperial Act 25 & 26 V. c. 68, being an Act for amending the law relating to copyright in works of fine art and for repressing the commission of fraud in the production and sale of such works, does not extend to the Colonies, but the copyright therein and thereby conferred is confined to the United Kingdom.

J. T. Small, for the plaintiffs.

J. H. Denton, for the defendants.

[STREET, J., 5TH OCTOBER, 1900.

LOVE v. LATIMER.

Trade-name-Sale of business-Right to use name.

The proprietor of a firm name of no pecuniary value per se, and not being merely his own name, who has sold

the business with which it was connected, and with it the right to use the firm name for a limited period, cannot, after the expiry of the time, prevent the user of such name, when he himself does not carry on or intend to carry on business under it.

Meek, for the plaintiff.

Heighington, for the defendant.

[10TH OCTOBER, 1900.

WILLIAMS v. TOWN OF CORNWALL.

Municipal corporations-Highway-Obstruction-Dwelling house-Projec tion from Statutes-Lowering grade-Compensation.

A survey of the town of Cornwall was confirmed by 47 V. c. 50 (0.). This Act declared the survey to lay down. correctly the lines of the street as originally laid out, and provided that:-"Where any dwelling house or shop . . had been before the 1st January, 1888, partly built upon any street as ascertained by said survey, it shall not be incumbent upon the owner or occupant of such dwelling house, shop, or building to remove the same off such street until the rebuilding of such dwelling house, shop, or building, or the repairing thereof to the extent of 50 per cent. of the then cash value thereof; but this proviso shall not apply to any fence, steps, platform, sign, porch, or projection attached. to any such dwelling house or shop."

The survey showed that a certain dwelling encroached. four feet upon the street, and that the verandah attached to it encroached three feet six inches further upon the street. This verandah was made of wood, rested on stone pillars, had its own roof, and was firmly attached to the house.

Held, that the verandah was an integral part of the dwelling house and not a porch or projection attached to it, and was not to be considered an obstruction on the street which should be removed, within the above proviso.

Held, therefore, that the position of the dwelling house and verandah did not bar the owner from applying for com

pensation under the Municipal Act for damages sustained by reason of the corporation having lowered the grade of the street in front to an extent interfering with his access. D. B. Maclennan, Q.C., for the plaintiff.

Leitch, Q.C., for the defendants.

[MEREDITH, J., 14TH NOVEMBER, 1900.

CONLEY v. CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY CO. Railways-Consignor and consignee—Delivery to wrong person—Liability.

The plaintiff consigned to the defendants certain goods addressed to the 'I. C. Company' simply. He knew that the company had not yet been incorporated; he also knew that the defendants' practice was never to deliver goods consigned "to order" without the production and indorsement of the shipping bill, but that when not consigned "to order" they did sometimes deliver the goods without the production of the shipping bill. The defendants did deliver the goods to a person carrying on business under the name of the I. C. Company, and at the ostensible office of the company.

Held, that the plaintiff was most to blame for such delivery, and that the defendants were not liable by reason of their having delivered the goods without first requiring the production of the shipping bills. There is no law here requiring carriers to take up the shipping bills before the delivery of goods.

F. D. Davis, for the plaintiff.

Aylesworth, Q. C., and Shirley Denison, for the de

fendants.

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