terdict is a very flight punishment in compari son of excommunication. The confequence therefore is very fair and plain, whether it be granted, or not, by the Romanifts, that fince a free prince cannot be depriv'd of his dominions by excommunication, an interdict can by no means fubject him to fuch deprivation at the fame time; for as the addition of that clause to all excommunications is irregular, it would be still worse to tack it to an interdict, which is a punishment far inferior even to the minor excommunication. I am apt to think there is no logician upon earth but will draw the fame confequence, and that enough has been faid to convince fcrupulous confciences how abfurd it would be for an ecclefiaftical judge to inflict temporal punishment for a spiritual crime, fuppofing no other reafon for it than the enormity of fuch crime, at the fame time that he inflicts a fpiritual punishment fevere enough for the greatest of crimes. And from hence it may be clearly infer'd, even according to the maxims of the See of Rome, that whoever falls under an interdict, has no reason to fear being depriv'd of his dominions.

Now we will confider what reason the court of Rome has for not excommunicating a city or republic, as well as a free prince. How flagrant foever be the crime and difobedience of a republic, all the wit of man can only judge of the fact by appearance, tho' there fhould

not

not be the leaft doubt of the real offender. 'Tis very well known that a republic is a political body, conftituted of many members, which is not govern'd after the manner of human bodies, whofe members feem generally different in their particular operations, tho' they act all upon one and the fame principle and method of operation. Among the aphorifms of Hippocrates, this is one: "Tis the fame thing "to draw blood from one vein as from ano"ther, because it may be faid of them all, Confenfus unus & confpiratio una." The fame form of government holds in a free ftate, in which there are various Councils; but they all receive motion from the will of the fovereign, who, like a heart to the body, diffufes fpirits, blood, and fuch other alterations as are fuitable to his own difpofition. But the model of a republic is different, because every member, which makes a part of that body, has its operations independent on the fentiments of the other parts; and every one of them may be confider'd diftinctly as a microcofm of the whole fphere, of which he is really but a part. Tho' one citizen, or fubject, may have more power, or parts, than another, it does not follow that he has a right to compel the other, whether he will or no, to be of his own opinion. He may indeed do what he can to perfuade him, but muft ufe no violence; for if he fhould proceed to extremity, he would, by fo doing, fubvert the order of M 2 govern

government, and introduce infupportable tyranny. If any refolutions, pafs'd in a fenate, are fo far disobedient to the Church as to deserve her cenfures, it will be no eafy matter to diftinguish which of the fenators voted for the affirmative; and fhall therefore the whole fenate be excommunicated in the lump? This would be to involve the innocent with the guilty, fince it may happen that fome of the members never voted their way. But to avoid this extreme, Chrift has told us, that it is better to pardon a hundred criminals than to punish one innocent perfon; and the Church, which knows how much fhe is oblig'd to imitate that divine mafter, difpenfes with excommunication, which is the extremeft degree of punishment, and has recourfe only to an interdict, which, tho' it takes in all republicans, cannot be reckon'd for a destructive remedilefs punishment, because it carries along with it a corrective; for as we have already fhewn, an interdict does not deprive believers of those helps that are neceffary to their falvation.

It may be objected, perhaps, that when there is a certainty that fuch refolution of a fenate is pafs'd by the unanimous votes of all the members, excommunication would, in fuch a cafe, be denounc'd with juftice against the faid fenate, as fuppofing all the members were delinquent; but I anfwer, this reafon will not hoid with respect to the reft of the fubjects of fuch republic, because 'tis impoffible for all

of

of them to be senators, who, according to the practice of all the republics in the world, are only a number of the beft fubjects, chofen out of the whole. But admitting that a refolution was form'd by the concurrence of all the fubjects, yet, as they have no fhare in the administration, so they can have no fhare of the guilt of it; and confequently, when a whole republic is excommunicated, it would be abfolutely impoffible for the innocent to escape being punish'd with the guilty, and the former might chance alfo to be the greater number.

If the republic happen to be a democracy, 'tis certain the commonalty cannot be responsible for the actions of thofe magiftrates, or fenators, whom they have inftituted, or deputed; and it is a mere jeft to fay, that the commonalty, in fuch a cafe, are oblig'd to chufe, or conftitute other magiftrates, or fenators, better difpos'd, in order to repair the contumacy, or other misconduct of the former, and that if the commonalty refufe fo to conftitute new ones, they incur the guilt of their deputy's misbehaviour. This pretence, I fay, is not to be allow'd, because the commonalty having deputed, or chofe the fenators, or magiftrates, with a view, as 'tis fuppos'd, only to the public weal, and the good government of the state; 'tis not the fault of those that deputed them, if matters do not fucceed accordingly, and the electors ought ftill to be well thought of; fince, by the fame argument, if a doctor M 3

be

be chose physician to an hofpital, and all the patients fhould happen to die under his hands, those who deputed him would be to blame for it, tho', when they elected him, they had all the moral certainty, that could be, of his fufficiency. Another reafon ftill, which fecures the commonalty from being refponfible for the faults of their magiftrates, is this: That by appointing a fenate, or magiftrates, and vefting the authority in their hands, they fhut themselves entirely out of the fecret; fo that not knowing the caufes which determine the fenate, or magiftrates, to form fuch or fuch refolutions, they have no plea to condemn, or degrade them, and annul their decrees.

From all this it may be concluded, that tho' what I have demonftrated to be true were abfolutely falfe, and that a free prince might be depriv'd of his dominions by virtue of excommunication, yet a republic cannot run that risk, because the fame is never excommunicated de fact, nor can it be ever de jure, the court of Rome themfelves being confcious of their indifpenfible obligation not to confound the innocent with the guilty. Moreover, fince it may fall out there will be fome perfons whofe innocence alone may protect them from ecclefiaftical excommunication, it will be always allowable for every private perfon, in cafe he be excommunicated, to examine ftrictly whether he is innocent or guilty, in order to fee whether his excommunication be juftly founded;

for