294. As the perversion or denial of justice to foreigners, is with reason classed amongst the just causes of war, and as a great proportion of the controversies to which they are parties, involve national questions, it is not less essential to the preservation of the public faith, than of the public tranquillity, that all causes in which aliens are concerned should be referred to the National tribunals.

295. In order to ascertain,

III. The manner in which the jurisdiction vested in the Judicial Power of the Union has been diffused and distributed,

either by the Constitution, or by the Laws passed by Congress for giving it effect, it will be necessary to review the powers vested in the several Courts of the United States, established by the Constitution of created by law.

296. The first of these is a high and peculiar jurisdiction, not otherwise mentioned in the Constitution than by way of exception to the ordinary modes of trial; and which is denominated "the Court for the trial of impeachments ;"-a tribunal which seems rather, to have been necessarily called into existence by the mere formation of the Constitution, than to be expressly created by it.

297. Impeachment is introduced into the Constitution as a known term of définite signification, to ascertain which we must have recourse to the English Common Law, from which it is derived.

298. The practice of impeachments arose from the experience, that persons entrusted with the administration of public affairs, would often infringe upon the rights of the People, and commit such crimes as

the ordinary Courts and Magistrates did not dare, or had no power, to punish.

299. Of such offences, the Representatives of the People in the Legislature, would not be proper judges, because they and their constituents are in such cases the parties injured; and are therefore properly the

accusers. *

300. As the ordinary Courts of Justice would na-. turally be swayed by the authority of such powerful accusers, the charge is brought for trial before the other branch of the Legislature; the members of which are supposed not to have the same interests and passions with the popular Assembly.

301. In accordance with this theory, the Constitution of the United States declares that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment," and that "the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments."

302. The power of originating the inquiry, and of preferring and conducting the prosecution, is thus lodged with that branch of the Legislature which immediately represents the People; and the reasons which establish the propriety of this arrangement, indicate the necessity of admitting the other branch of the Legislative body, to its appropriate share in the investigation.

303. As the members of the Senate are by one degree further removed from the People, and are elected upon a different principle of representation; as they are chosen for a longer period, are more independent of popular favour, and are presumed to be more secure from party influence; they are more fit to sit as Judges, than the members of the House of Representatives.

304. Besides, as the Senators are chosen with the knowledge that they may, whilst in office, be called upon to exercise this high jurisdiction, they bring with them the confidence of their constituents as to their qualifications for this special duty; and an implied compact on their own parts, that it will be faithfully and honestly discharged.

305. The objects of this jurisdiction are all acts which involve, or proceed from, the abuse or violation of a public trust, and are with propriety denominated political offences, or " high crimes and misdemeanors," as their effects and consequences are immediately injurious to the body politic itself.

306. The causes of impeachment have reference only to public character and official duty, though the terms of the Constitution comprehend "treason," as well as "bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." But the treason contemplated, is treason against the Government of the United States.

307. With the exception of treason, offences of every description, not immediately connected with the exercise of a public trust, are left to the ordinary course of Judicial proceedings; and neither branch of the Legislature can regularly inquire into them, except in relation to their own members, and with the view of expelling them if guilty. But the ordinary tribunals are not precluded, either before, or after an impeachment, from taking cognizance of public and official delinquency.

308. The only subjects, therefore, or persons liable to impeachment, are those who hold or have held a public office under the United States; and all Executive and Judicial officers of the United States, of every rank and description, are included.

dered in public; and can extend no further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold any office of trust or profit under the United States.

318. Although the party impeached may be found guilty of the highest political crime, viz. treason against the United States, yet his life is not thereby put in jeopardy before the Court for the trial of impeachments; and in no case is the liberty or property of a person convicted, affected by the judgment of this tribunal; as prosecution and punishment await him elsewhere, according to the usual course of Law.

319. As by the sentence pronounced on conviction in cases of impeachment, an appointment made by the Executive authority is superseded, and the party is rendered incapable of re-appointment to any office; the President is disabled from granting a pardon, and thus restoring the competency of the offender.

320. But there is no restriction on the power of pardoning for the same act, in case of a conviction in the common course of Law; for the pardon in that case extends only to the punishment imposed by the ordinary tribunals, without affecting the sentence of the Court for the trial of impeachments.

321. The distribution of the Judicial authority of the Union, amongst the several Courts of ordinary Judicature, except in a few specified cases, is devolved on Congress; and in the execution of that power, Congress is not bound to enlarge the jurisdiction of the respective tribunals to every subject, or to vest it in every form, which the Constitution might warrant in reference to each of them in particular.

322. The whole Judicial Power, in some form or other, must nevertheless, in all cases at least in which

it is exclusive of the States, be at all times duly vested and distributed amongst the National Courts; and in all cases where the Judicial Power of the United States is to be exercised, it is for Congress alone to prescribe the rules of proceeding, to direct the process, and to declare its nature and effect, and the mode in which the judgments consequent thereon shall be executed.

323. As the Judicial Power of the United States extends to all the cases enumerated in the Constitution, it may be extended to them by Congress where not restricted by the Constitution, in any form in which the Judicial Power may be exercised-either in the shape of original, or appellate jurisdiction, or both; for there is nothing in the nature of these cases which binds to the exercise of the one, in preference to the other.

324. In order to ascertain to what extent, and in what manner the Federal jurisdiction, both original and appellate, has actually been disposed of, either by the Constitution or by Law, it will be necessary to examine specifically the organization and powers of the several Courts, as ordained by the one, or established by the other.

325. The Supreme Court of the United States, although created by the Constitution, received its present organization from the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the several Laws subsequently passed by Congress in addition to that Statute.

326. The Constitution merely declares that there shall be a Supreme Court, with certain original and appellate powers; and it is only to be implied from that instrument, that the Chief Justice of the United States shall preside in it, with an indefinite number of Judges, to be associated with him.