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239. To make Laws, and to execute them, are the respective objects of the Legislative and Executive departments, and are, indeed, the two principal operations of Government; but Laws cannot be correctly and fully executed, without a power in the Constitution to expound and apply them.
240. Under a written Constitution, founded upon the principle of representation, and establishing a just division of the three branches of Government, the Judicial department exercises, moreover, the higher function, of expounding the Constitution, and thereby testing the validity of the acts of the Legislature; and hence the greater necessity of securing, by fundamental provisions, the independence of the Judiciary.
241. The Judicial Power in every Government must be co-extensive with the power of legislation; and if by express terms it should be restricted to a part only of the subjects of legislation, the whole system would, in that proportion, be impaired m efficiency and value. But the authority of the Judiciary cannot be made to exceed the Legislative power, as such excess would be inconsistent with its nature.
242. The Constitution of the United States recognizes a Judicial Power, not as an adjunct to the Executive, but as a necessary and substantive part of the Government; and this was the more requisite, from the extraordinary complications, unavoidably resulting from the nature of the Union, of the authority of the United States, with that of the several States.
243. The Judicial Power of the United States is accordingly vested "in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
244. A Chief Justice, and other Judges are contemplated by the Constitution; but the complete organization of the Supreme Court, as well as of the tribunals inferior and subordinate to it, is provided for by Law.
245. In reviewing the organization of the Judicial Power under the Constitution and Laws of the United States, it will be proper to consider: first, The mode in which this department is constituted; Secondly, The objects and extent of its jurisdiction; and, Thirdly, The manner in which that jurisdiction is distributed amongst the several Courts.
I. As to the mode in which this department is constituted.
246. The mode of appointment, by the President Ttnd Senate, as prescribed by the Constitution, is not only generally advantageous, but peculiarly proper, in regard to Judicial officers.
247. The just and vigorous investigation and punishment of every species of fraud and violence, and the exercise of the power of compelling every man to the punctual performance of his contracts, are duties which, although the faithful discharge of them will command the calm approbation and respect of the candid and judicious portion of the community, are not in their nature of the most popular character; and the fittest men would seldom be selected to fulfil them, by any more open and general mode of appointment.
248. The same considerations recommend the peculiar tenure by which Judicial magistrates hold their offices; which is, in effect, for life, if not sooner removed on impeachment and conviction for official delinquency; and it is esteemed one of the most valuable of modern improvements in the practice of Government.
249. The Judges, both of the Supreme Court, and of the inferior Courts of the United States, accordingly hold their offices, during good behaviour; which is deemed sufficient as a defence against the encroachments of the Legislative and Executive Powers, and the best expedient that can be devised to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of justice.
250. The Judiciary department, from the nature of its functions, must always be the weakest of the three great departments of power; and although individual oppression may sometimes proceed from Courts of justice, yet the liberties of the People can never be endangered, so long as the Judicial Power remains distinct from both the Legislative, and the Executive departments; and nothing can contribute so much to the firmness and independence of the Judiciary, as permanency in office. .
251. In addition to the tenure by which the Judges hold their offices, the permanent provision for their support is calculated to secure their independence. The Constitution accordingly declares, that they "shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."
252. This provision is considered an improvement on all former Constitutions; and tends to secure a succession of learned men as Judges, who, in consequence of a certain undiminished support, are induced to relinquish the lucrative pursuit of their professional practice, for the duties of an important and honourable station in the Government.
253. The perfect independence of the Judges is peculiarly requisite in a Constitution, containing, like that of the United States, certain specified restrictions upon the Legislative authority, both of the general and State Governments; which can only be preserved in practice through the instrumentality of the Courts.
254. But whilst the Constitution secures the independence of the Judges, it renders them amenable for any corrupt violation of their trust; and, on impeachment and conviction, they may be removed from office, and disqualified for the future from holding any office whatever under the Government of the United States.
255. The Judicial power being established on principles essential to maintain its independence, and to secure a vigorous administration of the Law, the Constitution next designates,
II. The objects of its jurisdiction.
256. The Judicial power of the United States extends,
1. To all cases arising under the Constitution;
because the meaning, construction, and operation of a compact, ought always to be ascertained by an authority derived from all the parties, and not by an authority derived from any one of them.
2. To all cases arising under the Laws of the
United States; because, as such Laws constitutionally made, are obligatory on each State, the measure of obligation and obedience ought not to be decided and fixed by the party from whom they are due, but by a tribunal deriving authority from both parties.
3. To all cases arising under Treaties made by
the authority of the. Union; because, as Treaties are compactsmade by, and obligatory on, the whole nation, their operation ought not to be regulated or affected by the local Laws or Courts of a part of the nation.
4. To all cases affecting Ambassadors, other pub
lic Ministers, and Consuls; because, as these are officers of foreign nations, whom this nation is bound to protect, and treat accordto the Law of Nations, cases affecting them ought only to be cognizable by national authority.
5. To all cases of Admiralty and Maritime juris
diction; because, as the sea is the joint property of all Nations, whose rights and privileges relative to it, are regulated by the Law of Nations and Treaties, such cases necessarily belong to national jurisdiction.
6. To all controversies, to which the United
States shall be a party; because, in cases in which the whole People are interested, it would not be equal or wise, to permit any one State to decide and measure out the justice due to others.
7. To controversies between two or more States;
because domestic tranquillity requires that the contentions of States should be peaceably terminated by a common judicatory; and justice ought not to depend on the will of either of the litigants.
8. To controversies between a State when plain
tiff, and citizens of another State; because, in such a case, it is better that a State should prosecute its demands in a national court, than in its own courts, or in the courts of the State to which those citizens belong; the danger of irritations arising