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43. The principle of representation is nevertheless applied in this Constitution, not only to the individual citizens of the United States, but also to the individual States of the Union; and it pervades the three great departments amongst which the powers of Government are distributed and apportioned.
44. The Constitution of the United States contains a general delegation of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers to distinct departments, and defines the powers and duties of each branch respectively.
45. It may therefore be most conveniently examined ; first, with regard to the particular structure and organization of the Government, and the distribution of its powers amongst its several departments; and, secondly, in relation to the nature, extent, and limitation of the powers vested in the National Government, and the restraints imposed on the States.
ON THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE COVERN
MENT, AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF ITS POWERS AMONGST ITS SEVERAL BRANCHES
46. The Legislative power, granted by the Federal Constitution, is vested in a Congress of the United States, consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives"; both chosen periodically,--the former by the States, the latter by the People.
47. The Executive power is vested in a President of the United States, elected, with a Vice President, for a term of years, in a mode and upon a principle which in effect combine the suffrages of the People with those of the States.
48. The Judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as Congress may from time to time establish,—the Judges of which hold their offices for life, unless sooner removed on conviction for misbehaviour.
49. The rule inculcating the separation of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments, is not understood to require, in its application, that those branches should be wholly unconnected with each other.
50. For unless they be so far connected and blended as to give to each one a constitutional check upon both the others, the degree of separation which the rule requires cannot in practice be maintained.
51. The powers proper to one department should not be directly and completely administered by another, nor should either branch possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence or control in the administration of the powers of both or either of the others.
52. In order to maintain the requisite partition of power amongst the respective departments, the inte. rior structure of the Government should be so contrived as to render its "several constituent parts, by their mutual relations, the means of keeping each other within their proper spheres.
53. The Constitution of the United States renders the mutual participation, to a limited extent, of the several branches of the Government in each other's
power, subservient to their mutual independence ; and thus the apparent violation of a fundamental principle affords the best security for its preservation.
OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER.
54. Under this head may be considered: First, The constituent parts of the Legislature, and the modes of their appointment: Secondly, Their joint and several powers and privileges : and Thirdly, Their method of enacting Laws, with the times and modes of their assembling and adjourning: I. Of the constituent parts of ihe Legislature, and
the modes of their appointment. 55. All Legislative powers granted by the Constitution, are vested in a Congress of the United States consisting of a Senate, and a House of Representa
6. This division of the Legislature into two coordinate branches, was meant to guard against the evil consequences of sudden and strong excitement and precipitate measures, which had been found to prevail in single legislative bodies.
57. A hasty decision is by no means so likely to be made, when a measure is liable to be arrested in its progress; and after its adoption by one branch of the Legislature, to be again subjected to the same forms and solemnities of deliberation, and to the jealous and critical revision of another body sitting in a different place, and from the delay thus induced, if from no other cause, enabled to avoid the prepossessions and correct the errors of the first.
58. Single Legislative assemblies without check or counterpoise, or a Government with all authority collected in one body or department, have been found, in all ages in which they have existed, corrupt and tyrannical dominations of majorities over minorities, uniformly and rapidly terminating in despotism.
59. The instability and passion which had marked the proceedings of two of the State Legislatures, consisting originally of a single House, were the subject of much public animadversion at the time of the contemplated establishment of the new Federal Govern. ment; and in subsequent-reforms of their Constitutions, the People of the particular States referred to, were so sensible of this defect, that in each a Senate was introduced.
60. These examples, as well as the experience af. forded by some of the proceedings of a Congress consisting of a single branch, and uniting in itself all the Executive and Judicial authority of the Union, with all the Legislative powers granted by the articles of confederation, must have had due influence in determining the Federal Convention to divide the national Legislature into two branches.
61. A further reason for this division of the Legislative power in the Government of the United States, arose from the combination of the national and federative principles in the new Constitution. .
62. Upon just principles of public polity, it is essential, when a People are thoroughly incorporated into one nation, that every district or territorial subdivi. sion of the community should have its proportional share in the Government; and that amongst indepen. dent sovereigns, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in respect to territory
and popustion, should each have an equal voi e in the public councils.
63. It was therefore proper, that in a Republic, · partaking both of the national and federal characters, . The Government should be founded on a combination
of the principles of propori.onal, and equal, representation.
64. The application of this rule of combined representation afforded a convenient and effectual mode of dividing the Legislature of the Union into two co-ordinate branches, by constructing o..e of them upon the principle of proportional, and th other upon that of equal, representation.
65. The House of Representatives is accordingly constituted with as much conformity as practicable, to the principle of proportional representation; but not entirely so, as it is composed of representatives of the People of the several Siates, and thus far partakes of the federative quality.
66. It consists “ of members chosen every second year by the People of the several States," and “ the times, places, and manner of holding elections for representatives are prescribed in each State by the Legislature ;" but to guard against the neglect or refusal of the States to exercise this power, “Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations.”
67. The electors of representatives in each State must possess “ the qualifications requisite for elec- . tors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature;” and these qualifications are not uniform, as the Constitutions and practice of the several States in relation to them are different and various.