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Louisiana, 49 U. S. 8 How. 82 (12: 996); Smith | the States is not identical in its extent with the
▼. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465 (31:508).

The supreme court itself has never overruled the License Cases.

Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 649 (32: 314); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (32: 253); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 (32: 346).

When the goods which are brought into the State for sale therein are delivered to the consignee or owner, then and thereafter the state law takes hold of them to tax, to regulate and control the sale of same.

Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 633 (29: 261); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 497 (30: 697); Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 499 (31: 712); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 1 (6: 23); License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 470 (18: 500); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (31:205); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. 127 U. S. 271 (32:239); Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 525 (29:718).

The sales of beer, as made by plaintiffs' agent in Keokuk, were not rendered lawful under the plea of interstate commerce.

Council Bluffs v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. Co. 45 Iowa, 338; Carton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 59 Iowa, 148; Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U. S. 8 How. 82 (12: 996); State v. U. S. Express Co. 70 Iowa, 271; Cooley v. Philadelphia Board of Wardens, 53 U. S. 12 How. 299 (13: 996); Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 493 (31: 709).

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court:

The power vested in Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes," is the power to prescribe the rule by which that commerce is to be governed, and is a power complete in itself, acknowledging no limitations other than those prescribed in the Constitution. It is co-extensive with the subject on which it acts and cannot be stopped at the external boundary of a State, but must enter its interior and must be capable of authorizing the disposition of those articles which it introduces, so that they may become mingled with the common mass of property within the territory entered. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 1 [6: 23]; Brown v. Maryland, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 419 [6: 678].

And while, by virtue of its jurisdiction over persons and property within its limits, a State may provide for the security of the lives, limbs, health and comfort of persons and the protection of property, so situated, yet a subject matter which has been confided exclusively to Congress by the Constitution is not within the jurisdiction of the police power of the State, unless placed there by congressional action. Henderson v. New York City, 92 U. S. 259 [23: 543]; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 [24: 527]; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446 [29: 691]; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489 [30: 694]. The power to regulate commerce among the States is a unit, but if particular subjects within its operation do not require the application of a general or uniform system, the States may legislate in regard to them with a view to local needs and circumstances, until Congress otherwise directs; but the power thus exercised by

power to regulate commerce among the States. The power to pass laws in respect to internal commerce, inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws and laws in relation to bridges, ferries and highways, belongs to the class of powers pertaining to locality, essential to local intercommunication, to the progress and development of local prosperity and to the protection, the safety and welfare of society, originally necessarily belonging to, and upon the adoption of the Constitution reserved by, the States, except so far as falling within the scope of a power confided to the general government. Where the subject matter requires a uniform system as between the States, the power controlling it is vested exclusively in Congress, and cannot be encroached upon by the States; but where, in relation to the subject matter, different rules may be suitable for different localities, the States may exercise powers which, though they may be said to partake of the nature of the power granted to the general government, are strictly not such, but are simply local powers, which have full operation until or unless circumscribed by the action of Congress in effectuation of the general power. Cooley v. Philadelphia Board of Wardens, 53 U. S. 12 How. 299 [13: 996].

It was stated in the 32d number of The Federalist that the States might exercise concurrent and independent power in all cases but three: first, where the power was lodged exclusively in the Federal Constitution; second, where it was given to the United States and prohibited to the States; third, where, from the nature and subjects of the power, it must be necessarily exercised by the national gov ernment exclusively. But it is easy to see that Congress may assert an authority under one of the granted powers, which would exclude the exercise by the States upon the same subject of a different but similar power, between which and that possessed by the general government no inherent repugnancy existed

Whenever, however, a particular power of the general government is one which must necessarily be exercised by it, and Congress remains silent, this is not only not a concession that the powers reserved by the States may be exerted as if the specific power had not been elsewhere reposed, but, on the contrary, the only legitimate conclusion is that the general government intended that power should not be affirmatively exercised, and the action of the States cannot be permitted to effect that which would be incompatible with such intention. Hence, inasmuch as interstate commerce, consisting in the transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of commodities, is national in its character, and must be governed by a uniform system, so long as Congress does not pass any law to regulate it, or allowing the States so to do, it thereby indicates its will that such commerce shall be free and untrammeled. Mobile Coun ty v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 [26: 238]; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 631 [29: 257, 260]; Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 [30: 244]; Robbins v. Shelby County Taring Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 493 [30: 694, 696].

That ardent spirits, distilled liquors, ale and beer are subjects of exchange, barter and traffic like any other commodity in which a right of

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traffic exists, and are so recognized by the
usages of the commercial world, the laws of
Congress and the decisions of courts, is not
denied. Being thus articles of commerce, can
a State, in the absence of legislation on the
part of Congress, prohibit their importation
from abroad or from a sister State ? or when
imported prohibit their sale by the importer?
If the importation cannot be prohibited with-
out the consent of Congress, when does prop-
erty imported from abroad, or from a sister
State, so become part of the common mass of
property within a State as to be subject to its
unimpeded control?

uors into the State from any other State or Territory, without first being furnished with a certificate as prescribed, was declared invalid, because essentially a regulation of commerce among the States, and not sanctioned by the authority, express or implied, of Congress. The opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Matthews, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Field and the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, on behalf of Mr. Chief Justice Waite, Mr. Justice Gray and himself, discussed the question involved in all its phases; and while the determination of whether the right of transportation of an article of comIn Brown v. Maryland, supra, the Act of merce from one State to another includes by the State Legislature drawn in question was necessary implication the right of the consignee held invalid as repugnant to the prohibition of to sell it in unbroken packages at the place the Constitution upon the States to lay any where the transportation terminates was in impost or duty upon imports or exports, and to terms reserved, yet the argument of the mathe clause granting the power to regulate com- jority conducts irresistibly to that conclusion, [112] merce; and it was laid down by the great and we think we cannot do better than repeat magistrate who presided over this court for the grounds upon which the decision was made more than a third of a century, that the point to rest. It is there shown that the transportaof time when the prohibition ceases and the tion of freight or of the subjects of commerce, power of the State to tax commences is not for the purpose of exchange or sale, is beyond the instant when the article enters the country, all question a constituent of commerce itself; but when the importer has so acted upon it that this was the prominent idea in the minds that it has become incorporated and mixed up of the framers of the Constitution, when to with the mass of property in the country, Congress was committed the power to regulate which happens when the original package is commerce among the several States; that the no longer such in his hands; that the distinc-power to prevent embarrassing restrictions by tion is obvious between a tax which intercepts any State was the end desired; that the power the import as an import on its way to become was given by the same words and in the same incorporated with the general mass of proper-clause by which was conferred power to reguty, and a tax which finds the article already late commerce with foreign nations; and that incorporated with that mass by the act of the it would be absurd to suppose that the transimporter; that, as to the power to regulate mission of the subjects of trade from the State commerce, none of the evils which proceeded of the buyer, or from the place of production from the feebleness of the federal government to the market, was not contemplated, for withcontributed more to the great revolution which out that there could be no consummated trade, [111] introduced the present system than the deep either with foreign nations or among the States. and general conviction that commerce ought to It is explained that where state laws alleged to be regulated by Congress; that the grant should be regulations of commerce among the States be as extensive as the mischief, and should have been sustained, they were laws which recomprehend all foreign commerce and all com-lated to bridges or dams across streams, wholly merce among the States; that that power was complete in itself, acknowledged no limitations other than those prescribed by the Constitution, was co-extensive with the subject on which it acts and not to be stopped at the external boundary of a State, but must be capable of entering its interior; that the right to sell any article imported was an inseparable incident to the right to import it; and that the principles expounded in the case applied equally to importations from a sister State. Manifestly this must be so, for the same public policy applied to commerce among the States as to foreign commerce, and not a reason could be assigned for confiding the power over the one "If in the present case," said Mr. Justice which did not conduce to establish the propri- Matthews, "the law of Iowa operated upon all ety of confiding the power over the other. merchandise sought to be brought from an Story, Const. & 1066. And although the pre- other State into its limits, there could be no cise question before us was not ruled in Gib- doubt that it would be a regulation of combons v. Ogden and Brown v. Maryland, yet we merce among the States;" and he concludes think it was virtually involved and answered, that this must be so, though it applied only to and that this is demonstrated, among other one class of ar.icles of a particular kind. The cases, in Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., legislation of Congress on the subject of inter125 U. S. 465 [31: 700]. In the latter case, state commerce by means of railroads, designed section 1553 of the Code of the State of Iowa to remove trammels upon transportation beas amended by chap. 143 of the Acts of the tween different States, and upon the subject of Twentieth General Assembly in 1886, forbid- the transportation of passengers and merchanding common carriers to bring intoxicating liq-dise (Revised Statutes, sections 4252 to 4289. 135 U. S.

U. S., Book 34

within the State, or police or health laws, or
to subjects of a kindred nature, not strictly of
commercial regulation. But the transporta-
tion of passengers or of merchandise from one
State to another is in its nature national, ad-
mitting of but one regulating power; and it
was to guard against the possibility of com-
mercial embarrassments which would result if
one State could directly or indirectly tax per-
sons or property passing through it, or prohibit
particular property from entrance into the
State, that the power of regulating commerce
among the States was conferred upon the fed-
eral government.

133

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inclusive), including the transportation of ni- | merce between its people and those of the other tro glycerine and other similar explosive sub- States of the Union in order to effect its end, stances, with the proviso that, as to them, "any however desirable such a regulation might be. State, Territory, district, city or town within... Can it be supposed that by omitting the United States" should not be prevented by any express declaration on the subject, Conthe language used "from regulating or from gress has intended to submit to the several prohibiting the traffic in or transportation of States the decision of the question in each lothose substances between persons or places ly. cality of what shall and what shall not be artiing or being within their respective territorial cles of traffic in the interstate commerce of the limits, or from probibiting the introduction country? If so, it has left to each State, acthereof into such limits for sale, use or con- cording to its own caprice and arbitrary will, sumption therein," is referred to as indicative to discriminate for or against every article of the intention of Congress that the transpor-grown, produced, manufactured or sold in any tation of commodities between the States shall State and sought to be introduced as an article be free, except where it is positively restricted of commerce into any other. If the State of by Congress itself, or by States in particular Iowa may prohibit the importation of intoxicases by the express permission of Congress. cating liquors from all other States, it may also It is said that the law in question was not an include tobacco, or any other article, the use inspection law, the object of which "is to im- or abuse of which it may deem deleterious. It prove the quality of articles produced by the may not choose, even, to be governed by conlabor of a country, to fit them for exportation, siderations growing out of the health, comfort or, it may be, for domestic use (Gibbons v. Og or peace of the community. Its policy may den, 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 1, 203 [6: 23, 71]; Tur- be directed to other ends. It may choose to ner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38, 55 [27: 370, establish a system directed to the promotion 376]); nor could it be regarded as a regulation of and benefit of its own agriculture, manufacquarantine or a sanitary provision for the pur-tures or arts of any description, and prevent [115] pose of protecting the physical health of the the introduction and sale within its limits of community; nor a law to prevent the introduc- any or of all articles that it may select as comtion into the State of diseases, contagious, in- ing into competition with those which it seeks fectious or otherwise. Articles in such a con- to protect. The police power of the State dition as tend to spread disease are not mer- would extend to such cases, as well as to those chantable, are not legitimate subjects of trade in which it was sought to legislate in behalf of and commerce, and the self-protecting power the health, peace and morals of the people. of each State therefore may be rightfully In view of the commercial anarchy and conexerted against their introduction, and such fusion that would result from the diverse exexercise of power cannot be considered a regu- ertions of power by the several States of the lation of commerce, prohibited by the Consti- Union, it cannot be supposed that the Constitution; and the observations of Mr. Justice tution or Congress have intended to limit the Catron, in The License Cases, 46 U. S. 5 How. freedom of commercial intercourse among the 504, 599 [12: 256, 299], are quoted to the ef- people of the several States." fect that what does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the State, but that which does belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States; that to extend the police power over subjects of commerce would be to make commerce subordinate to that power, and would enable the State to bring within the police [114] power "any article of consumption that a State might wish to exclude, whether it belonged to that which was drunk, or to food and clothing; and with nearly equal claims to propriety, as malt liquors and the products of fruits other than grapes stand on no higher ground than the light wines of this and other countries, excluded in effect by the law as it now stands. And it would be only another step to regulate real or supposed extravagance in food and clothing. And Mr. Justice Matthews thus proceeds: "For the purpose of protecting its people against the evils of intemperance it has the right to prohibit the manufacture within its limits of intoxicating liquors; it may also prohibit all domestic commerce in them between its own inhabitants, whether the articles are introduced from other States or from foreign countries; it may punish those who sell them in violation of its laws; it may adopt any measures tending, even indirectly and remotely, to make the policy effective until it passes the line of power delegated to Congress under the Constitution. It cannot, without the consent of Congress, express or implied, regulate com

Many of the cases bearing upon the subject are cited and considered in these opinions, and among others The License Cases, 46 U. S. 5 How. 504 [12: 256], wherein laws passed by Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, in reference to the sale of spirituous liquors, came under review and were sustained, although the members of the court who participated in the decisions did not concur in any common ground upon which to rest them. That of Peirce v. New Hampshire is perhaps the most important to be referred to here. În that case the defendants had been fined for selling a barrel of gin in New Hampshire which they had bought in Boston and brought coast wise to Portsmouth, and there sold in the same barrel and in the same condition in which it was purchased in Massachusetts, but contrary to the law of New Hampshire in that behalf. The conclusion of the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taney is in these words: "Upon the whole, therefore, the law of New Hamp shire is in my judgment a valid one. For, although the gin sold was an import from another State, and Congress have clearly the power to regulate such importations, under the grant of power to regulate commerce among the several States, yet as Congress has made no regulation on the subject, the traffic in the article may be lawfully regulated by the State as soon as it is landed in its territory, and a tax imposed upon it, or a license required, or the sale altogether prohibited, according to the

policy which the State may suppose to be its
interest or duty to pursue.'

acting upon the article while it is within the
admitted jurisdiction of the general govern.
ment, and subject to its control and regulation.
The question, therefore, brought up for decis
ion is, whether a State is prohibited by the
Constitution of the United States from making
any regulations of foreign commerce, or of
commerce with another State, although such
regulation is confined to its own territory, and
made for its own convenience or interest, and
does not come in conflict with any law of Con-
gress. In other words, whether the grant of
power to Congress is of itself a prohibition to
the States, and renders all state laws upon the
subject null and void." He declares it to ap
pear to him very clear "that the mere grant of
power to the general government cannot, upon
any just principles of construction, be con-
strued to be an absolute prohibition to the ex-
the States. The controlling and supreme power
over commerce with foreign nations and the
several States is undoubtedly conferred upon
Congress. Yet, in my judgment, the State
may nevertheless, for the safety or convenience
of trade, or for the protection of the health of
its citizens, make regulations of commerce for
its own ports and harbors, and for its own ter-
ritory; and such regulations are valid unless
they come in conflict with a law of Congress."
He comments on the omission of any prohibi
tion in terms, and concludes that if, as be
thinks, "the framers of the Constitution
(knowing that a multitude of minor regulations
must be necessary, which Congress amid its
great concerns could never find time to consider
and provide) intended merely to make the
power of the federal government supreme upon
this subject over that of the States, then the
omission of any prohibition is accounted for,
and is consistent with the whole instrument.
The supremacy of the laws of Congress, in cases
of collision with state laws, is secured in the
article which declares that the laws of Con-
gress, passed in pursuance of the powers
granted, shall be the supreme law; and it is only
where both governments may legislate on the
same subject that this article can operate."
And he considers that the legislation of Con-
gress and the States has conformed to this con-
struction from the foundation of the govern-
ment, as exemplified in state laws in relation to
pilots and pilotage, and health and quarantine
laws.

Referring to the cases of Massachusetts and [116] Rhode Island, the chief justice, after saying that if the laws of those States came in collision with the laws of Congress authorizing the importation of spirits and distilled liquors, it would be the duty of the court to declare them void, thus continues: "It has, indeed, been suggested, that, if a State deems the traffic in ardent spirits to be injurious to its citizens, and calculated to introduce immorality, vice and pauperism into the State, it may constitutionally refuse to permit its importation, notwithstanding the laws of Congress; and that a State may do this upon the same principles that it may resist and prevent the introduction of disease, pestilence or pauperism from abroad. But it must be remembered that disease, pestilence and pauperism are not subjects of com-ercise of any power over the same subject by merce, although sometimes among its attendant evils. They are not things to be regulated and trafficked in, but to be prevented, as far as human foresight or human means can guard against them. But spirits and distilled liquors are universally admitted to be subjects of ownership and property, and are therefore subjects of exchange, barter and traffic like any other commodity in which a right of property exists. And Congress, under its general power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, may prescribe what article of merchandise shall be admitted and what excluded; and may therefore admit, or not, as it shall deem best, the importation of ardent spirits. And inasmuch as the laws of Congress authorize their importation, no State has a right to prohibit their introduction. These state laws act altogether upon the retail or domestic traffic within their respective borders. They act upon the article after it has passed the line of foreign commerce, and become a part of the general mass of property in the State. These laws may, indeed, discourage imports, and diminish the price which ardent spirits would otherwise bring. But although a State is bound to receive and to permit the sale by the importer of any article of merchandise which Congress authorizes to be imported, it is not bound to furnish a market for it, nor to abstain from the passage of any law which it may deem necessary or advisable to guard the health or morals of its citizens, although such law may discourage importation, [117] or diminish the profits of the importer, or lessen the revenue of the general government And if any State deems the retail and internal traffic in ardent spirits injurious to its citizens, and calculated to produce idleness, vice or debauchery, I see nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent it from regulating and restraining the traffic, or from prohibiting it altogether, if it thinks proper.'

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The New Hampshire case, the chief justice observed, differs from Brown v. Maryland in that the latter was a case arising out of commerce with foreign nations, which Congress had regulated by law; whereas the case in hand was one of commerce between two States, in relation to which Congress had not exercised its power. "But the law of New Hampshire acts directly upon an import from one State to another, while in the hands of the importer for sale, and is therefore a regulation of commerce,

But conceding the weight properly to be ascribed to the judicial utterances of this eminent jurist, we are constrained to say that the distinction between subjects in respect of which there can be of necessity only one system or plan of regulation for the whole country, and subjects local in their nature, and, so far as relating to commerce, mere aids rather than regulations, does not appear to us to have been sufficiently recognized by him in arriving at the conclusions announced. That distinction has been settled by repeated decisions of this court, and can no longer be regarded as open to re-examination. After all, it amounts to no more than drawing the line between the exercise of power over commerce with foreign nations and among the States and the exercise of power over purely local commerce and local concerns.

The authority of Peirce v. New Hampshire,

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in so far as it rests on the view that the law of | sages, from one State to another (Wabash, St. L.
New Hampshire was valid because Congress & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 [30:
had made no regulation on the subject, must be 244]); a statute levying a tax upon nonresident
regarded as having been distinctly overthrown drummers offering for sale or selling goods,
by the numerous cases hereinafter referred wares or merchandise by sample, manufactured
or belonging to citizens of other States.
bins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S.
489 [30: 694].

to.

Rob

The doctrine now firmly established is, as
stated by Mr. Justice Field, in Bowman v. Chi-
cago & N. W. R. Co., 125 U. S. 507 [31: 714], On the other hand we have decided, in Mobile
"that where the subject upon which Congress County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 [26: 238],
can act under its commercial power is local in that a state statute providing for the improve-
its nature or sphere of operation, such as harbor ment of the river, bay and harbor of Mobile,
pilotage, the improvement of harbors, the es- since what was authorized to be done was only as
tablishment of beacons and buoys to guide ves- a mere aid to commerce, was, in the absence of
sels in and out of port, the construction of action by Congress, not in conflict with the
bridges over navigable rivers, the erection of Constitution; in Escanaba & L. M. Transp. Co.
wharves, piers and docks, and the like, which v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678 [27: 442], that the
can be properly regulated only by special pro- State of Illinois could lawfully authorize the
visions adapted to their localities, the State can City of Chicago to deepen, widen and change
act until Congress interferes and supersedes its the channel of, and construct bridges over, the
authority; but where the subject is national in Chicago River; in Parkersburg & O. R. Transp.
its character, and admits and requires uniform Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691 [27: 584],
ity of regulation, affecting alike all the States, that the jurisdiction and control of wharves
such as transportation between the States, in properly belong to the States in which they are
cluding the importation of goods from one State situated unless otherwise provided; in Brown
into another, Congress can alone act upon it v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 [29: 257], that a gen-
and provide the needed regulations. The aberal state tax laid alike upon all property is not
sence of any law of Congress on the subject is unconstitutional, because it happens to fall upon
equivalent to its declaration that commerce in
that matter shall be free. Thus the absence of
regulations as to interstate commerce with ref-
erence to any particular subject is taken as a
declaration that the importation of that article
into the States shall be unrestricted. It is only
after the importation is completed, and the
property imported is mingled with and become
a part of the general property of the State, that
its regulations can act upon it, except so far as
may be necessary to insure safety in the dispo-
sition of the import until thus mingled."

goods, which, though not then intended for
exportation, are subsequently exported; in
Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of
Health, 118 U. S. 455 [30: 237], that a state
law requiring each vessel passing a quarantine
station to pay a fee for examination as to her
sanitary condition and the ports from which
she came, was a rightful exercise of police pow- [121]
er; in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465 [31:
508], and in Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co.
v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96 [32: 352], that a
state statute requiring locomotive engineers
to be examined and obtain a license was not in
its nature a regulation of commerce; and in
Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217 [32: 695], that
a statute providing that a person having in his
possession Texas cattle, which had not been
wintered north of the southern boundary of
Missouri at least one winter, shall be liable for
any damages which may accrue from allowing
them to run at large, and thereby spread the
disease known as the Texas fever, was consti-
tutional.

The conclusion follows that, as the grant of
the power to regulate commerce among the
States, so far as one system is required, is ex-
clusive, the States cannot exercise that power
without the assent of Congress, and, in the ab-
sence of legislation, it is left for the courts to
determine when state action does or does not
amount to such exercise, or, in other words,
what is or is not a regulation of such com-
merce. When that is determined, controversy
is at an end. Illustrations exemplifying the
general rule are numerous. Thus we have We held, also, in Welton v. Misscuri, 91 U.
held the following to be regulations of inter- S. 275 [23: 347], that a state statute requiring
state commerce: a tax upon freight transported the payment of a license tax from persons deal-
from State to State (Case of the State Freight ing in goods, wares and merchandise, which are
Tax, 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 232 [21: 146]); a statute not the growth, produce or manufacture of the
[120] imposing a burdensome condition on ship-mas- State, by going from place to place to sell the
ters as a prerequisite to the landing of passen- same in the State, and requiring no such license
gers (Henderson v. New York City, 92 U. S. 259 tax from persons selling in a similar way goods
[23: 543]), a statute_prohibiting the driving which are the growth, produce or manufacture
or conveying of any Texas, Mexican or Indian of the State, is an unconstitutional regulation;
cattle, whether sound or diseased, into the State and to the same effect in Walling v. Michigan,
between the first day of March and the first 116 U. S. 446 [29: 691], in relation to a tax
day of November in each year (Hannibal & St. upon nonresident sellers of intoxicating liquors
J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 [24: 527]); to be shipped into a State from places without
a statute requiring every auctioneer to collect it. But it was held in Patterson v. Kentucky,
and pay into the state treasury a tax on his 97 U. S. 501 [24: 1115], and in Webber v. Vir-
sales, when applied to imported goods in the ginia, 103 U. S. 344 [26: 565], that the right
original packages by him sold for the importer conferred by the Patent Laws of the United
(Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566 [24: 1015]); States did not remove the tangible property in
a statute intended to regulate or tax, or to im- which an invention might take form from the
pose any other restriction upon, the transmis-operation of the laws of the State, cor restrict
sion of persons or property, or telegraphic mes- the power of the latter to protect the commu-

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