have entered into the mind of a single member of the convention, that an express power to make laws was necessary, to enable the legislature to make them? That a legislature, endowed with legislative powers, can legislate, is a proposition too self-evident to have been questioned.

such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of congress to adopt any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end. This provi[sion is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have preBut the argument on which most reliance is pla- scribed the means by which government should, in ced, is drawn from the peculiar language of this all future time, execute its powers, would have been clause. Congress is not empowered by it to make to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, all laws which may have relation to the powers con- and give it the properties of a legal code. It would ferred on the government, but such only as may be have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immu"necessary and proper" for carrying them into exe-table rules, for exigencies when, if foreseen at all, cution. The word "necessary" is considered as con- must have been seen dimly, and which can be best trolling the whole sentence, and as limiting the right provided for as they occur. To have declared that to pass laws for the execution of the granted pow- the best means shall not be used, but those alone ers, to such as are indispensable, and without which without which the power given would be nugatory, the power would be nugatory. That it excludes would have been to deprive the leg slature of the the choice of means, and leaves to congress, in capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its each case, that only which is most direct and simple. reason, and to accommodate its legislation to cirIs it true, that this is the sense in which the word cumstances. If we apply this principle of construc"necessary" is always used? Does it always import tion to any of the powers of the government, we an absolute physical necessity, so strong, that one shall find it so pernicious in its operation, that we thing, to which another may be termed necessary, shall be compelled to discard it. The powers vestcannot exist without that other? We think it does ed in congress may certainly be carried into execunot. If reference be had to its use, in the common tion, without prescribing an oath of office. The affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find power to exact this security for the faithful performthat it frequently imports no more than that one ance of duty, is not given, nor is it indispensably thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another. necessary. The different departments may be es To employ the means necessary to an end, is gene-tablished, taxes may be imposed and collected, arrally understood as employing any means calculated mies and navies may be raised and maintained, and to produce the end, and not as being confined to money may be borrowed, without requiring an oath those single means, without which the end would of office. It might be argued, with as much plausibe entirely unattainable. Such is the character of bility as other incidental powers have been assailed, human language, that no word conveys to the mind, that the convention was not unmindful of this subin all situations, one single definite idea; and nothing ject. The oath which might be exacted-that of is more common than to use words in a figurative fidelity to the constitution, is prescribed, and no sense. Almost all compositions contain words, which, other can be required. Yet, he would be charged taken in their rigorous sense, would convey a mean- with insanity who should contend, that the legislaing different from that which is obviously intended. ture might not superadd, to the oath directed by the It is essential to a just construction, that many words constitution, such other oath of office as its wisdom which import something excessive, should be under-might suggest. stood in a more mitigated sense-in that sense which common usage justifies. The word "necessary" is of this description. It has not a fixed character peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison, and is often connected with other words which increase or diminish the impression the mind receives of the urgency it imports. A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary. To no mind would the same idea be conveyed by these several phrases. This com- Congress is empowered "to provide for the pument on the word is well illustrated by the passage nishment of counterfeiting the securities and current cited at the bar, from the 10th sec. of the 1st art. of coin of the United States," and "to define and punish the constitution. It is, we think, impossible to com-piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, pare the sentence, which prohibits a state from lay- and offences against the laws of nations." The seve ing "imposts, or duties on imports or exports, except ral powers of congress may exist, in a very imperwhat may be absolutely necessary for executing its fect state to be sure, but they may exist, and be carinspection laws," with that which authorizes con-ried into execution, although no punishment should gress "to make all laws which shall be necessary be inflicted in cases where the right to punish is not and proper for carrying into execution" the powers expressly given. of the general government, without feeling a convic- Take, for example, the power to establish post tion that the convention understood itself to change offices and post roads." This power is executed by materially the meaning of the word "necessary" by the single act of making the establishment. But, prefixing the word "absolutely." This word, then, from this has been inferred the power and duty of like others, is used in various senses, and, in its con- carrying the mail, along the post road, from one struction, the subject, the context, the intention of post office to another. And, from this implied powthe person using them, are all to be taken into view. er, has again been inferred, the right to punish those Let this be done in the case under consideration. who steal letters from the post office, or rob the The subject is the execution of those great powers, mail. It may be said, with some plausibility, that on which the welfare of a nation essentially depends. the right to carry the mail, and to punish those It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to ensure, as far as human prudence could ensure, their beneficial execution. This could nat be done by confiding the choice of means to

So, with respect to the whole penal code of the U. States; whence arises the power to punish in cases not prescribed by the constitution? All admit that the government may, legitimately, punish any violation of its laws; and yet, this is not among the enumerated powers of congress. The right to enforce the observance of law, by punishing its infraction, might be denied with the more plausibility, because it is expressly given in some cases,

who rob it, is not indispensably necessary to the cstablishment of a post office and post road. This right is indeed essential to the beneficial exercise of the power, but not indispensably necessary to its

existence. So, to the punishment of the crimes of stealing or falsyfying a record or process of a court of the United States, or of perjury in such court. To punish these offences is certainly conducive to the due administration of justice. But courts may exist, and may decide the causes brought before them, though such crimes escape punishment.

2. Its terms purport to enlarge, not to diminish powers vested in the government. It purports to be an additional power, not a restriction on those already granted. No reason has been or can be assigned for thus concealing an intention to narrow the discretion of the national legislature under words which purport to enlarge it. The framers of The baneful influence of this narrow construction the constitution wished its adoption, and well knew on all the operations of the government, and the that it would be endangered by its strength, not by absolute impracticability of maintaining it, without its weakness. Had they been capable of using la rendering the government incompetent to its great guage which would convey to the eye one idea, and, objects, might be illustrated by numerous examples after deep reflection, impress on the mind ano drawn from the constitution and from our laws. ther, they would rather have disguised the grant of The good sense of the public has pronounced, with-power, than its limitation. If then their intention out hesitation, that the power of punishment apper-had been, by this clause, to restrain the free use of tains to sovereignty, and may be exercised when- means which might otherwise have been implied, ever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidental that intention would have been expressed in terins to his constitutional powers. It is a means for carry-resembling these. "In carrying into execution the ing into execution all sovereign powers, and may foregoing powers and all others," &c. "no laws shall be used, although not indispensably necessary. It be passed but such as are necessary and proper." is a right incidental to the powers, and conducive to Had the intention been to make this clause restricits beneficial exercise, tive, it would unquestionably have been so in form

If this limited construction of the word "neces-as well as in effect. sary" must be abandoned in order to punish, whence The result of the most careful and attentive consiis derived the rule which would reinstate it, when deration bestowed upon this clause is that, if it does the government would carry its powers into execu- not enlarge, it cannot be construed to restrain the tion by means not vindictive in their nature? If the powers of congress, or to impair the right of the leword "necessary" means "needful," "requisite," gislature to exercise its best judgment in the selec"essential," "conducive to," in order to let in the tion of measures to carry into execution the constipower of punishment for the infraction of law, why tutional powers of the government. If no other is it not equally comprehensive when required to motive for its insertion can be suggested, a sufficient authorize the use of means which facilitate the exe- one is found in the desire to remove all doubts recation of the powers of government without the in-specting the right to legislate on that vast mass of fliction of punishment? incidental power which must be involved in the

In ascertaining the sense in which the word "ne-constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid cessary" is used in this clause of the constitution, we bauble.

may derive some aid from that with which it is asso- We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of ciated. Congress' shall have power to make all the government are limited, and that its limits are Jaws which shall be necessary and proper to carry not to be transcended. But we think the sound coninto execution" the powers of the government. Istruction of the constitution must allow to the natithe word "necessary" was used in that strict and rional legislature that discretion, with respect to the gorous sense for which the counsel for the state of means by which the powers it confers are to be carMaryland contend, it would be an extraordinary de-ried into execution, which will enable that body to parture from the usual course of the human mind, as perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manexhibited in composition, to add a word, the only possible effect of which is to qualify that strict and rigorous meaning; to present to the mind the idea of some choice of means of legislation not straightened and compressed within the narrow limits for which gentlemen contend.

ner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.

But the argument which most conclusively de- That a corporation must be considered as a means monstrates the error of the construction contended not less usual, not of higher dignity, not more refor by the counsel of Maryland, is founded on the quiring a particular specification than other means, intention of the convention, as manifested in the has been sufficiently proved. If we look to the oriwhole clause. To weste time and argument in prov-, gin of corporations, to the manner in which they ing that, without it, congress might carry its powers have been framed in that government from which into execution, would be aot much less idle than to we have derived most of our legal principles and hold a lighted taper to the sun. As little can it be ideas, or to the uses to which they have been applirequired to prove that, in the absence of this clause, ed, we find ao reason to suppose that a constitution, congress would have some choice of means. That omitting, and wisely omitting, to enumerate all the it might employ those which, in its judgment, would means for carrying into execution the great powmost advantageously effect the object to be accom-ers vested in government, ought to have specified plished. That any means adapted to the end, any this. Had it been intended to grant this power as means which tended directly to the execution of the one which should be distinct and independent, to constitutional powers of the government, were in he exercised in any case whatever, it would have themselves constitutional. This clause, as construed found a place among the enumerated powers of the by the state of Maryland, would abridge and almost government. But being considered merely as annihilate this useful and necessary right of the le-means, to be employed only for the purpose of cargislature to select its means. That this could not rying into execution the given powers, there could he intended, is, we should think, had it not been al-be no motive for particularly mentioning it. ready controverted, too apparent for controversy. We think so for the following reasons.

1. The clause is placed among the powers of congress, not among the limitations in those powers.

The propriety of this remark would seem to be generally acknowledged by the universal acquies-cence in the construction which has been uniformly put on the 3rd sec. of the 4th article of the consti

tution. The power to "make all needful rules and unanimous and decided opinion of this court that regulations respecting the territory or other proper- the act to incorporate the bank of the United States, ty belonging to the United States" is not more com- is a law made in pursuance of the constitution, and prehensive, than the power "to make all laws which is a part of the supreme law of the land. shall be necessary and proper for carrying into exe- The branches proceeding from the same stock, cution" the powers of the government. Yet all ad- Jand being conducive to the complete accomplishmit the constitutionality of a territorial government, ment of the object, are equally constitutional. It which is a corporate body. would have been unwise to locate them in the char

Ifa corporation may be employed indiscriminate-ter, and it would be unnecessarily inconvenient to y with other means to carry into execution the employ the legislative power in making those subpowers of the government, no particular reason can ordinate arrangements. The great duties of the be assigned for excluding the use of a bank if re-bank are prescribed; those duties require branches; quired for its fiscal operations. To use one, must and the bank itself may, we think, be safely trusted be within the discretion of congress, if it be an ap-with the selection of places where those branches propriate mode of executing the powers of govern- shall be fixed; reserving always to the government ment. That it is a convenient, a useful, and essen- the right to require that a branch shall be located tial instrument in the prosecution of its fiscal opera-where it may be deemed necessary. It being the tions, is not now a suject of controversy. All those opinion of the court that the act of incorporating. who have been concerned in the administration of the bank is constitutional; and that the power of es pur finances, have concurred in representing its im-tablishing a branch in the state of Maryland might portance and necessity; and so strongly have they be properly exercised by the bank itself, we probeen felt, that statesmen of the first class, whose ceed to enquireprevious opinions against it had been confirmed by every circumstance which can fix the human judgment, have yielded those opinions to the exigencies

2. Whether the state of Maryland may, without violating the constitution, tax that branch That the power of taxation is one of vital import of the nation. Under the confederation, congress, justifying the measure by its necessity, transcendedance; that it is retained by the states; that it is not perhaps its powers to obtain the advantage of a abridged by the grant of a similar power to the gobank; and our own legislation attests the universal vernment of the union; that it is to be concurrently conviction of the utility of this measure. The time exercised by the two governments; are truths which has passed away when it can be necessary to enter have never been denied. But, such is the parainto any discussion in order to prove the importance mount character of the constitution, that its capaciof this instrument as a means to effect the legiti-ty to withdraw any subject from the action of even mate objects of the government.

this

power, is admitted. The states are expressly But were its necessity less apparent, none can forbidden to lay any duties on imports or exports, deny its being an appropriate measure; and if it is, except what may be absolutely necessary for executhe degree of its necessity, as has been very justly ting their inspection laws. If the obligation of this observed, is to be discussed in another place. Should prohibition must be conceded-if it may restrain a congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt mea-state from the exercise of its taxing power on imsures which are prohibited by the constitution; or ports and exports, the same paramount character should congress under the pretext of executing its would seem to restrain, as it certainly may restrain, powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects a state from such other exercise of this power as is not entrusted to the government; it would become in its nature incompatible with, and repugnant to the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case re-the constitutional laws of the union. A law absoquiring such a decision come before it, to say such lutely repugnant to another as entirely repeals that an act was not the law of the land. But where the other, as if express terms of repeal were used: law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to cf- On this ground the counsel for the bank place it. fect any of the objects entrusted to the government, claim to be exempted from the power of a state to to undertake here to enquire into the degree of its tax its operations. There is no express provision necessity, would be to pass the line which circum- for the case, but the claim has been sustained on a scribes the judicial department, and to tread on le-principle which so entirely pervades the constitugislative ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.

tion, is so intermixed with the materials which compose it, so interwoven with its web, so blended with its texture, as to be incapable of being separated from it, without rending it into shreds.

After this declaration it can scarcely be necessary to say that the existence of state banks can have no possible influence on the question. No trace is This great principle is, that the constitution and to be found in the constitution of an intention to the laws made in pursuance thereof, are supreme; create a dependence of the government of the uni-that they control the constitution and laws of the reon on those of the states, for the execution of the spective states, and cannot be controlled by them. great powers assigned to it. Its means are adequate From this, which may be almost termed an axiom, to its ends; and on those means alone was it expect-] other propositions are deduced as corrollaries, on ed to rely for the accomplishment of its ends. To the truth or error of which, and on their application impose on it the necessity of resorting to means to this case, the cause has been supposed to depend. which it cannot controul, which another govern- These are-1st. that a power to create implies a ment may furnish or withhold, would render its power to preserve. 2nd. that a power to destroy, course precarious, the result of its measures uncer- if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and intain, and create a dependence on other govern-compatible with these powers to create and to prements which might disappoint its most important serve. Sd. that where the repugnancy exists, that esigns, and is incompatible with the language of authority which is supreme must control, not yield at constitution. But were it otherwise, the choice that over which it is supreme. means implies a right to choose a national bank preference to state banks, and congress alone n make the election.

After the most deliberate consideration it is the

These propositions, as abstract truths, would, perhaps, never be controverted. Their application to this case, however, has been denied; and, both in maintaining the affirmative and the negative

-

splendor of eloquence, and strength of argument, seldom, if ever, surpassed, have been displayed.

This is true. But to what source do we trace this right? It is obvious that it is an incident of soveThe power of congress to create, and of course reignty, and is co-extensive with that to which it to continue, the bank, was the subject of the pre-is an incident. All subjects over which the soveceding part of this opinion, and is no longer to be considered as questionable.

reign power of a state extends are objects of taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are, upon the soundest principles, exempt from taxation. This proposition may almost be pronounced self-evident.

That the power of taxing it by the states may be exercised so as to destroy it, is too obvious to be denied. But taxation is said to be an absolute power, which acknowledges no other Imits than those The sovereignty of a state extends to every thing expressly prescribed in the constitution, and like which exists by its own authority, or is introduced sovereign power of every other description, is trust-by its permission, but does not extend to those ed to the discretion of those who use it. But the means which are employed by congress to carry invery terms of this argument admit that the sove- to execution powers conferred on that body by the reignty of the state, in the article of taxation itself, people of the United States? We think it demonis subordinate to, and may be controlled by, the con- strable that it does not. These powers are not givstitution of the United States. How far it has been en by the people of a single state. They are given controlled by that instrument must be a question of by the people of the United States, to a government construction. In making this construction, no prin- whose laws made in pursuance of the constitution, ciple not declared, can be admissable, which would are declared to be supreme-consequently, the defeat the legitimate operations of a supreme go- people of a single state cannot confer a sovereignty vernment. It is of the very essence of supremacy which will extend over them. to remove all obstacles to its action within its own If we measure the power of taxation residing in sphere, and to modify every power vested in subor- a state, by the extent of sovereignty which the peodinate governments, as to exempt its own opera-ple of a single state possess, and can confer on its tions from their own influence. This effect need government, we have an intelligible standard apnot be stated in terms. It is so involved in the de- plicable to every case to which the power may be claration of supremacy, so necessarily implied in it, applied. We have a principle which leaves the that the expression of it could not make it more cer- power of taxing the people and property of a state tain. We must, therefore, keep it in view while con-unimpaired: which leaves to a state the command struing the constitution. of all its resources; and which places beyond its The argument on the part of the state of Mary-reach, all those powers which are conferred by the land is not that the states may directly resist a law of congress, but that they may exercise their acknowledged powers upon it, and that the constitution leaves them this right in the confidence that they will not abuse it.

people of the United States on the government of the Union, and all those means which are given for the purpose of carrying those powers into execution. We have a principle which is safe for the states, and safe for the Union. We are relieved, as we ought Before we proceed to examine this argument to be, from clashing sovereignty, from interfering and to subject it to the test of the constitution, we powers: from a repugnancy between a right in one must be permitted to bestow a few considerations on government to pull down, what there is an acknowthe nature and extent of this original right of taxa-ledged right in another to build up; from the incomtion, which is acknowledged to remain with the patibility of a right in one government to destroy states. It is admitted that the power of taxing the what there is a right in another to preserve. We people and their property is essential to the very are not driven to the perplexing enquiry, so unfit existence of government, and may be legitimately for the judicial department, what degree of taxation exercised on the objects to which it is applicable, is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the utmost extent to which the government may to the abuse, of the power. The attempt to use it chuse to carry it. The only security against the on the means employed by the governments of the abuse of this power, is found in the structure of the union, in pursuance of the constitution, is itself an government itself. In imposing a tax the legisla-abuse, because it is the usurpation of a power which ture acts upon itself and upon its constituents. This the people of a single state cannot give. is in general a sufficient security against erroneous We find then, on just theory, a total failure of this and oppressive taxation. original right to tax the means employed by the goThe people of a state, therefore, give to their government of the Union for the execution of its powvernment a right of taxing themselves and their ers. The right never existed, and the question property, and as the exigencies of government can- whether it has been surrendered, cannot arise. not be limited, they prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of the legislator, and on the influence of the constituents over their representative, to guard them against its abuse. But the means employed by the That the power to tax involves the power to degovernment of the union have no such security, nor stroy; that the power to destroy may defeat and renis the right of a state to tax them sustained by the der useless the power to create; that there is a plain same theory. Those means are not given by the repugnance in conferring on one government a pow people of a particular state, not given by the con-er to controul the constitutional measures of anostituents of the legislature which claim the right to ther, which other, with respect to those very meatax them, but by the people of all the states. They sures, is declared to be supreme over that which are given by all, for the benefit of all-and upon exerts the controul, are propositions not to be detheory, should be subjected to that government on-nied. But all inconsistencies are to be reconciled ly which belongs to all. by the magic word confidence. Taxation, it is said,

But, waving this theory for the present, let us resume the enquiry whether this power can be exercised by the respective states, consistently with a fair construction of the constitution?

It may be objected to this definition that the pow-does not necessarily and unavoidably destroy. To er of taxation is not confined to the people and pro-carry it to the excess of destruction, would be an perty of a state. It may be exercised upon every abuse, to presume which would banish that confiobject brought within its jurisdiction. dence which is essential to all governments. But is

have been cited, is the unlimited power of taxation
which is vested in the general government.

this a case of confidence? Would the people of any
one state trust those of another with a power to con-
the objection of this unlimited power, which the
troul the most insignificant operations of their state
government? We know they would not. Why then argument seeks to remove,is stated with fullness and
should we suppose that the people of any one state clearness. It is, "that an indefinite power of taxa-
tion in the latter (the government of the union)
should be willing to trust those of another with a
power to controul the operations of a government might, and probably would, in time, deprive the
to which they have confided their most important former (the government of the states) of the means
and most valuable interests? In the legislature of of providing for their own necessities; and would
the union alone, are all represented. The legisla- subject them entirely to the mercy of the national
ture of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted legislature. As the laws of the union are to be-
'come the supreme laws of the land; as it is to have
by the people with the power of controuling mea-
sures which concern all, in the confidence that it power to pass all laws that may be necessary for
will not be abused. This, then, is not a case of con-carrying into exécution the authorities with which it
Is proposed to vestit; the national government m ght
fidence, and we must consider it as it really is.

6

6

If we apply the principle for which the state of at any time abolish the taxes imposed for state obMaryland contends, to the constitution generally,jects upon the pretence of an interference with its we shall find it capable of changing totally the cha-own. It might allege a necessity for doing this, in racter of that instrument. We shall find it capable order to give efficacy to the national revenues; and of arresting all the measures of the government, and thus all the resources of taxation might, by deof prostrating it at the foot of the states. The Ame-grees, become the subjects of federal monopoly, rican people have declared their Constitution, and to the entire seclusion and destruction of the state the laws made in pursuance thereof, to be supreme; governments." but this principle would transfer the supremacy in fact to the states.

6

The objections to the constitution which are noticed in these numbers, were to the undefined power of If the states may tax one instrument employed by the government to tax, not to the incidental privithe government in the execution of its powers, they lege of exempting its own measures from state taxmay tax any and every other instrument. They may ation. The consequences apprehended from this tax the mail, they may tax the mint, they may tax undefined power, were: that it would absorb all the patent rights, they may tax the papers of the cus-objects of taxation, "to the exclusion and destructom-house, they may tax judicial process, they may tax all the means employed by the government, to an excess which would defeat all the ends of government. This was not intended by the American people. They did not design to make their government dependent on the states.

tion of the state governments." The arguments of the Federalist are intended to prove the fallacy of these apprehensions; not to prove that the government was incapable of executing any of its powers, without exposing the means it employed to the embarrassments of state taxation.

authors of those excellent essays been asked, whether they contended for that construction of the constitution, which would place within the reach of the states those measures which the government might adopt for the execution of its powers, no man, who has read their instructive pages, will hesitate to admit, that their answer must have been in the negative.

Arguments urged against these objections, and Gentlemen say, they do not claim the right to extend state taxations to these objects. They limit these apprehensions, are to be understood as relattheir pretentions to property. But on what princi-ing to the points they mean to prove. Had the ple is this distinction made? Those who make it have furnished no reason for it, and the principle for which they contend denies it. They contend that the power of taxation has no other limit than is found in the 10th section of the 1st article of the constitution; that, with respect to every thing else, the power of the state is supreme, and admits of no control. If this be true, the distinction between property and other subjects to which the power of taxation is applicable, is merely arbitrary, and can never be sustained. This is not all. If the controling power of the states be established, if their supremacy as to taxation be acknowledged, what is to restrain their exercising this control in any shape they But the two cases are not on the same reason.may please to give it? Their sovereignty is not confined to taxation. That is not the only mode in which it might be displayed. The question is, in The people of all the states have created the genetruth a question of supremacy; and if the right of the ral government; and have conferred upon it the gestates to tax the means employed by the general go-neral power of taxation. The people of all the vernment be conceded, the declaration that the constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, is empty and unmeaning declamation.

It has also been insisted, that, as the power of taxation in the general and state governments is acknowledged to be concurrent, every argument which would sustain the right of the general government to tax banks chartered by states, will equally sustain the right of the states to tax banks chartered by the general government.

states, and the states themselves, are represented in congress, and by their representatives exercise this power. When they tax the chartered institutions of the states, they tax their constituents; and In the course of the argument, the Federalist has these taxes must be uniform. But, when a state taxbeen quoted; and the opinions expressed by the au-es the operations of the government of the United thors of that work have been justly supposed to be States, it acts upon institutions created, not by their It acts upon the measures of a entitled to great respect in expounding the consti- own constituents, but by people over whom they tution. No tribute can be paid to their worth which claim no control exceeds their merit; but in applying their opinions government created by others, as well as themto the cases which may arise in the progress of our selves. for the benefit of others in common with government, a right to judge of their correctness themselves. The difference is that which always must be retained, and to understand the argument, exists, and always must exist, between the action of we must examine the proposition it maintains and the whole, or a part, and the action of a part and the objections against which it is directed. The the whole-between the laws of a goverment desubject of those numbers, from which passages (clared to be supreme, and those of a government