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ing the principal and interest of the mortgage, and he at no time disavowed his authority, or gave notice to Hoeltzel that the payments should be made direct. Therefore, his receipt of these moneys from Brown was an acknowledgment and ratification of the agency, and was an acquiescence in Brown's acts in making collections on the mortgage for him. Having permitted Brown to act as his agent, he was bound by his act in collecting the subsequent payment of $500.00, even though the money never reached his hands. Under the facts and the law, we think Hoeltzel has a right to have a credit on the mortgage for the amount of $500.00.

The rule for judgment non obstante veredicto is now made absolute, and judgment is entered for the plaintiff for $400.00, with interest at five per cent. from April 1, 1910, making $495.50. Rule made absolute.

are in excess of his private instructions. | therefore, knew that Brown was collectIt applies to cases where the agent has been held out to the world as such by the principal, allowed to exercise enlarged powers from time to time, and his acts therein have been ratified by his principal." Following this rule, it was held, in Buck v. Henry, 52 Sup., 477, that, where a mortgage is negotiated through an attorney-at-law, and interest is paid through the attorney, and also a part of the principal, and this fact is known to the mortgagee, who acquiesces in the payment for eight years, and never informs the mortgagor that such payment will not be recognized, the mortgagor, in a suit on the mortgage, is entitled to a credit for the amount paid to the attorney. In Hubbard 7. Tenbrook, 23 W. N. C.. 351, it is held that a principal clothing an agent with apparent authority is estopped from denying the authority as to parties dealing in good faith; and, in Schrack v. McKnight, 84 Pa., 26, that a subsequent ratification by a principal of the unauthorized act of his agent may have the same effect as previous authority. In Patterson v. Van Loon, 186 Pa., 367, the same question arose as is involved in the present case. One, Taylor, who was an attorney-at-law, had received certain payments from the mortgagor on account of a mortgage. Credit was claimed by the mortgagor for them, and it was held by the Court that, if a person gives credit for money collected by another who represented himself as the creditor's agent, and such alleged agent subsequently in the same business collects more money and fails to pay it over to the creditor, a jury may infer that the creditor had ratified the act of the person representing himself as agent, and he will be compelled to credit collections which such person makes and fails to pay over."

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Applying these principles to the case in hand, it seems to us that but one conclusion can be arrived at. The uncontradicted evidence is, that Brown was the attorney for Goll, and, as such, collected the interest on the mortgage as it fell due up to April 1, 1910. He also collected three items of the principal, and paid them over to Goll. Two of them Goll acknowledged on the record. He,

Annie M. Thomas, Administratrix of Wil-
liam Horst, deceased, v. Lancaster Lodge
No. 1, American Order of Otters.
Death benefits-Intervention.

In a suit by an administrator against a beneficial society for a death benefit, the court has no power to permit a son of the decedent who claims the benefit to intervene as a defendant.

Rule to allow Wm. Horst to intervene. C. P. of Lancaster Co., August Term 1913, No. 60.

The petition of William Horst set forth:

That he is a son of William Horst, deceased, and that the said William Horst was a member of the defendant, Lancaster Lodge No. 1, American Order of Otters, and in good standing at the time of his death, and at the time of his death there was due benefits in the sum of One Hundred Dollars, which was due and payable to your petitioner.

Your petitioner at that time was a minor under twenty-one years of age. He is now of the age of twenty-one years, and became such on Wednesday, March 25, 1914.

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That the said moneys are in litigation and petitioner is informed and believes that the said defendant Lodge is willing to pay the money into Court. The said

plaintiff, Annie M. Thomas is no relation | general call from the banqueters Justice or kin of your petitioner and really had Brown said: no right to obtain Letters of Administration upon the estate of said William Horst, deceased.

Your petitioner desires to defend against the claims of the said Annie M. Thomas, as administratrix of William Horst, deceased, or otherwise, and for that purpose asks leave to intervene as a defendant in the said suit, he being as-ple, culminating in nearly forty years of sured that the Lancaster Lodge No. I American Order of Otters is willing to pay over the money to whoever the Court decides it shall belong, or that the Court make whatever order in the premises as to it may appear just and proper."

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"We are all very grateful to you, my colleagues and dear brothers, for having come here this evening. It is especially gratifying that our Brother Fell has been here, for nowhere is he more affectionately esteemed than in this county, from which he went out as a soldier for the Union, to begin a life of duty to the peofaithful service as an upright justice and courageous judge, who never feared the face of man. In his dignified ease upon which he has just entered, there goes with him the affectionate regard of the Commonwealth he has so long and faithfully served. To you, fellow members of the Lancaster county bar, I am profoundly grateful for the compliment you have paid me in permitting me to meet you under the pleasing conditions you have this evening created. Here among your predecessors, I began my professional career with nothing but the blessings of a good father, to the manner born, who believed in his native county as no other whom I ever knew, save only the dear partner of my professional life. Here my race as a practitioner was run; here are still my loves; here I shall live until I lay me down to my last long rest; and until then, my warmest affections as a lawyer, will continue to go out to my own bar. In the years of judicial life that may be vouchsafed to me, my shortcomings may be many, but in passing judgment upon them, I have faith to believe that the Bench and Bar of the state will not be unjust, and to no Bar shall I, at all times, turn with more confidence for a measure of forbearance, than to the bar of my own county which has always well borne its full part in the administration of justice. With its great tradition constantly before it, its future must not, and never will, be unworthy of its past."

C. P. AND Q. S. OPINIONS.
Saturday, January 9, 1915.
By JUDGE LANDIS.

In re Application for Naturalization of Drossos Antonio Skylas. Rule to

amend declaration of intention made! absolute.

John A. Nauman, assignee of George M. Woods v. T. Scott Woods, Jeanne Woods, Esther Woods, Katharine Woods, John S. Woods, George B. Woods and David C. Woods. Decree entered in favor of the plaintiff.

Cecelia M. Good v. J. W. Fehl, demurrer to bill in equity sustained and bill dismissed.

Mary B. Yeager v. Herbert R. Steigerwalt. Rule to strike off judgment of non-suit discharged.

William H. Goll v. William T. Denlinger, mortgagor and John Hoeltzel, terre tenant. Rule for judgment non

obstante veredicto made absolute and judgment entered. for plaintiff for $495.50.

Belmont Stamping and Enameling Co. v. Harry Edelson. Rule to strike off appeal made absolute.

Watt & Shand v. D. M. Dorsheimer. Rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense made absolute, and judgment for plaintiff for $177.16.

B. F. Davis v. John E. Malone, et. al. Demurrer sustained and bill dismissed. J. H. Jarrett v. Donald McCaskey. Rule to set aside execution made absolute.

Sam Montilovic, by his next friend, William H. Keller v. Pennsylvania Water and Power company. Rule to strike off judgment of non-suit made absolute.

C. D. Leeking v. Lena Wenger. Rule for judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto and for a new trial discharged.

ministrator c. t. a. of the estate of Oscar Frederick H. Hohein, surviving adHohein, deceased 2. A. B. Rote. Case Stated. Judgment for defendant.

Charles Gross v. John A. St. Clair. Rule to open judgment made absolute. John P. Albright v. Jacob Ziegler. Rule for action of ejectment made abso

lute.

John A. Shaub 7. Township of Manheim. Rule for a new trial discharged.

The Standard Knitting company (incorporated) v. H. B. Herr. Rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affiO.davit of defense discharged.

Matthias O. Hoffer v. Henry Hoffer. Rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense made

absolute and judgment for plaintiff for $1,047.32.

Martin Rudy v. Catherine M. Kegel. Rule for a new trial discharged.

Lanpher, Skinner & Co. (a corporament for want of a sufficient affidavit tion) v. H. B. Herr. Rule for judgentered for the plaintiff for $76.68. of defense made absolute and judgment

and John H. Myers, trustees in domestic F. Lyman Windolph, Warren S. Buch v.

Pequea township school district v. H. M. Klugh and Harry H. Benedict. Rule for judgment for want of a suffi-attachment against Hugh C. Brackbill 2. Abram L. Eshbach. Case Stated. cient affidavit of defense made absolute, Judgment for plaintiff for $160. and judgment against Harry H. Benedict for $1,077.61.

By JUDGE HASSLER.

Chester Huber, by his father and next friend, Abram C. Huber v. John Walker. Rule to strike off judgment. of non-suit discharged.

Clarence Schock v. H. A. Mettfett. Rule for a new trial discharged.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to the use of John M. Froelich v. Christian H. Nolt, Leroy H. Nolt and Irvin H. Nolt, executors of Benjamin Nolt, deceased. Rule for a new trial discharged.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Vivian Arnett. Murder. Rule for new

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all the tax on "all the estate bequeathed"

LANCASTER LAW REVIEW.
LAW REVIEW. to collaterals is payable "at the end of

one year from the death of the dece

VOL. XXXII.] FRIDAY, JAN. 22, 1915. [No. 12 dent,' and we believe that nowhere in

Orphans' Court.

Estate of John C. Montgomery, deceased. Collateral inheritance tax-Bequest for life and remainder both to collaterals -Act of May 6, 1887.

Where personalty is bequeathed to collateral kin for life with remainder to collateral kin, the collateral inheritance tax should on distribution be awarded, on the whole bequest. Section 3 of the Act of May 6, 1887, P. L. 79, making it optional with remainder men to pay the collateral inheritance tax before or

after possession, does not apply where both the

life beneficiary and the remainder man are collaterals.

In Section 6 of the Act of May 6, 1887, the words "upon condition or contingency designate a separate class and are not a qualification of the other classes designated. The section may therefore apply where there is not a condition or contingency.

Exceptions to adjudication. O. C. of Lancaster County, September Term 1914,

No. 68.

Frank S. Groff, for accountant and exceptions.

M. E. Musser, for Commonwealth. January 7, 1915. Opinion by SMITH, P. J.

Exception has been taken to the award of collateral inheritance tax. The testator apportioned a collateral bequest, divided it into life-interests and remainders. The awarding of the tax on the whole bequest, the remainder with the life-interests, is the error assigned. Reference will be made to the life-beneficiaries in the singular.

The residue of the estate was given to The Peoples Trust Company of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in trust for the use of testator's brother, M. F. Montgomery, for life, and after his death in trust for the use of his niece, Edith Curry, for life, and after the death of the survivor of them the remainder to collateral kin. By the Act of May 6, 1887, P. L. 79,

the Act can be found authority for withholding any part of the tax on any part of the bequest. It is contended, however, that the third section of the Act makes it optional with remaindermen to pay either before or after they come into actual possession of their interests. The following is a copy of the section:

"In all cases where there has been or shall be a devise, descent or bequest to collateral relatives or strangers, liable to the collateral inheritance tax, to take effect in possession, or come into actual enjoyment after the expiration of one or more life estates, or a period of years, the tax on such estates shall not be payable, nor interest begin to run thereon, until the person or persons liable for the same shall come into actual possession of such estate, by the termination of the estates for life or years, and the tax shall be assessed upon the value of the estate at the time the right of possession accrues to the owner as aforesaid: Provided, That the owner shall have the

right to pay the tax at any time prior to his coming into possession, and, in such cases, the tax shall be assessed on the value of the estate at the time of the payment of the tax, after deducting the value of the life estate or estates for years: And provided further, That the tax on real estate shall remain a lien on the real estate on which the same is chargeable until paid. And the owner of any personal estate shall make a full return of the same to the register of wills of the proper county within one year from the death of the decedent, and within that time enter into security for the payment of the tax to the satisfaction of such register; and in case of failure so to do, the tax shall be immediately payable and collectible."

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We might stop here and dismiss the exceptions, for the " owners" of the personal estate" have not entered into security for the payment of the tax," and it has not been offered as a reason for not having done so that they cannot be ascertained and identified

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immediately," as in Coxe's Estate, 193 Pa., 100. But feeling that, if there is an argument to show that the section has no application when both the lifebeneficiary and the remaindermen of "personal estate" are collaterals, it should be offered, and for other reasons we will not rest alone on the failure to give security.

While this section undoubtedly gives to remaindermen this right of election when the life-interest is exempt from the tax, there are reasons why it should not be permitted when both the lifeinterest and the interest in remainder are subject to the tax, and the reasons seem to justify a construction of the Act conformably with them. It is true that an estate given for life to either a lineal descendant or a collateral, in the broad sense, is a life-estate, and there are reasons why it should have been enacted to meet cases where the precedent interest is exempt from the tax, but we find none, nor has any been offered, why remaindermen should be thus indulged when the life-interest as well as the one in remainder are taxable. On the contrary, reasons appear to be plentiful why he should not be, and if so, it is a rational construction of the Act to find that the tax is now payable by the remaindermen in this case. The Act contemplates a prompt payment of the tax, encourages it by premiums, and punishes tardiness. It is the policy of the law, and influencing one in the construction of statutes, to lean to that which contributes to expedition, lessens circuity and reduces complications.

The section refers to the remainderman as if the only one "liable" for the tax. The life-beneficiary has been excluded, certainly not included; not even is there a reference to him as a taxable party, for the reason, it is fair to infer, that life-estates to lineal descendants only were contemplated. It is altogether probable that this was the legislative thought, because it is the usual happening and because if it had been said, or intended, that a remainderman might delay the payment of the tax until after the expiration of a collateral life-estate, it would have the appearance of an inane

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enactment, as we expect to mathematically demonstrate. The opinion that such was the legislative thought is supported by the provision in the Act of April 10, 1849, P. L. 570, section 13, amended by the Act of March 11, 1850, P. L. 170, which were re-enacted in the third section of the Act of 1887, and which relieves the remainderman from the immediate payment of the tax where the life-interest is given "to a father, widow, or other person" (undoubtedly, other person of the same class), manifests that such as are exempt from the tax only were contemplated as life-beneficiaries.

But what is the exceptants' complaint? It was said that the trustee is disturbed and excepts because an unapparent something might happen prejudicial to the remaindermen. Counsel for some one adds an exception. Together they make an hostile demonstration against the payment at this time of the tax owing by the remainderman, declaiming that the Court committed an error because it refused to apply the third section of the Act; to do which, assuming it to be applicable, would have required a potentiality not delegated to it. No proceeding under it was before us. The exceptants made no move by which it could be introduced. There was offered no appraisement as to the life-beneficiary's life-expectancy, no values estimated as to the respective interests, not even was the age of the life-beneficiary given; and if all these things which were left undone had been done, this Court, having only appellate jurisdiction and the matter not having come on an appeal, would not have been in a position to have done anything, had not another way been found. The twelfth section of the Act, which operates the third section, gives the right of appeal.

The Court is given original jurisdiction over the matters therein by the sixth section of the Act, which is as follows:

"If the legacy subject to collateral inheritance tax be given to any person for life, or for a term of years, or for any other limited period, upon a condition or contingency, if the same be money, the tax thereon shall be retained upon the

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