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are in excess of his private instructions. therefore, knew that Brown was collectIt applies to cases where the agent has ing the principal and interest of the been held out to the world as such by mortgage, and he at no time disavowed the principal, allowed to exercise enlarged his authority, or gave notice to Hoeltzel powers from time to time, and his acts that the payments should be made direct. therein have been ratified by his prin- | Therefore, his receipt of these moneys cipal." Following this rule, it was held, from Brown was an acknowledgment in Buck 1. Henry, 52 Sup., 477, that, and ratification of the agency, and was where a mortgage is negotiated through an acquiescence in Brown's acts in makan attorney-at-law, and interest is paid ing collections on the mortgage for him. through the attorney, and also a part of Having permitted Brown to act as his the principal, and this fact is known to agent, he was bound by his act in colthe mortgagee, who acquiesces in the lecting the subsequent payment of payment for eight years, and never in- $500.00, even though the money never forms the mortgagor that such payment reached his hands. Under the facts and will not be recognized, the mortgagor, the law, we think Hoeltzel has a right in a suit on the mortgage, is entitled to to have a credit on the mortgage for the a credit for the amount paid to the at- amount of $500.00. torney. In Hubbard z'. Tenbrook, 23 W. The rule for judgment non obstante X. C., 351, it is held that a principal veredicto is now made absolute, and clothing an agent with apparent author- judgment is entered for the plaintiff ity is estopped from denying the au- for $400.00, with interest at five per cent. thority as to parties dealing in good from April 1, 1910, making $495.50. faith; and, in Schrack v. Mcknight, 84 Rule nade absolute. Pa., 26, that a subsequent ratification by a principal of the unauthorized act Annie_M. Thomas, Administratrix of Wilof his agent may have the same effect liam Horst, deceased, v. Lancaster Lodge as previous authority. In Patterson v. No. 1, American Order of Otters. Van Loon, 186 Pa., 367, the same ques- Death benefits-Intervention. tion arose as is involved in the present
In a suit by an administrator against a beneOne, Taylor, who was
ficial society for a death benefit, the court has torney-at-law, had received certain pay- no power to permit a son of the decedent who ments from the mortgagor on account of claims the benefit to intervene as a defendant. a mortgage. Credit was claimed by the Rule to allow Wm. Horst to intervene. mortgagor for them, and it was held by C. P. of Lancaster Co., August Term the Court that, "if a person gives credit 1913, No. 60. for money collected by another who rep- The petition of William Horst set resented himself as the creditor's agent, forth: and such alleged agent subsequently in “ That he is a son of William Horst, the same business collects more money deceased, and that the said William Horst and fails to pay it over to the creditor, a was a member of the defendant, Lancasjury may infer that the creditor had rati- ter Lodge No. 1, American Order of fied the act of the person representing Otters, and in good standing at the time himself as agent, and he will be com- of his death, and at the time of his death pelled to credit collections which such there was due benefits in the sum of One person makes and fails to pay over." Hundred Dollars, which was due and
- Applying these principles to the case in payable to your petitioner. hand, it seems to us that but one con- ** Your petitioner at that time was a clusion can be arrived at. The uncon- minor under twenty-one years of age. tradicted evidence is, that Brown was He is now of the age of twenty-one years, the attorney for Goll, and, as such, col- and became such on Wednesday, March lected the interest on the mortgage as it 25, 1914. fell due up to April 1, 1910. He also That the said moneys are in litigation collected three items of the principal, and and petitioner is informed and believes paid them over to Goll. Two of them that the said defendant Lodge is willing Goll acknowledged on the record. He, 'to pay the money into Court. The said
plaintiff, Annie M. Thomas is no relation general call from the banqueters Justice or kin of your petitioner and really had Brown said: no right to obtain Letters of Administra- We are all very grateful to you, my tion upon the estate of said William colleagues and dear brothers, for having Horst, deceased.
come here this evening. It is especially Your petitioner desires to defend gratifying that our Brother Fell has been against the claims of the said Annie M. here, for nowhere is he more affectionThomas, as administratrix of William ately esteemed than in this county, from Horst, deceased, or otherwise, and for which he went out as a soldier for the that purpose asks leave to intervene as Union, to begin a life of duty to the peoa defendant in the said suit, he being as- ple, culminating in nearly forty years of sured that the Lancaster Lodge No. I faithful service as an upright justice American Order of Otters is willing to and courageous judge, who never feared pay over the money to whoever the Court the face of man. In his dignified ease decides it shall belong, or that the Court upon which he has just entered, there nake whatever order in the premises as goes with him the affectionate regard of to it may appear just and proper." the Commonwealth he has so long and
faithfully served. To you, fellow memB. F. Davis, for rule.
bers of the Lancaster county bar, I am John M. Groff, contra.
profoundly grateful for the compliment September 26, 1914. Opinion by you have paid me in permitting me to HASSLER, J.
meet you under the pleasing conditions This is an application to permit Wil- you have this evening created. Here liam Horst, a son of the deceased, to in among your predecessors, I began my
professional career with nothing but the a defendant in the above blessings of a good father, to the manaction. He claims that he is entitled to
ner born, who believed in his native recover the amount sued for. We have no power to order this to be done, and county as no other whom I ever knew,
save only the dear partner of my prowe therefore discharge the rule.
fessional life. Here my race as a pracRule discharged.
titioner was run; here are still my loves ; here I shall live until I lay me down to
my last long rest; and until then, my Legal Miscellany. warmest affections as a lawyer, will con
tinue to go out to my own bar. In the
years of judicial life that may be vouchReception to Chief Justice Brown.
safed to me, my shortcomings may be
many, but in passing judgment upon On Friday evening, January 8, 1915 them, I have faith to believe that the the local Bar gave a very handsome and Bench and Bar of the state will not be successful reception at the Hamilton Club unjust, and to no Bar shall I, at all times, to the new Chief Justice of the Supreme turn with more confidence for a measure Court of Pennsylvania, J. Hay Brown, of forbearance, than to the bar of my the first member of the Lancaster Bar
own county which has always well borne to reach that exalted position.
its full part in the administration of jusThe function was well attended by the tice. With its great tradition constantly local bar and seldom if ever have so dis- before it, its future must not, and never tinguished a body of men met in Lan- will, be unworthy of its past.' caster.
All the members of the Supreme Court including former Chief Justice Fell at- C. P. AND Q. S. OPINIOXS. tended, also Judge Bechtold of the Supreme Court, and President Steel of the Saturday, January 9, 1915. Pennsylvania Bar Association.
By JUDGE LANDIS. A buffet lunch was served. No formal In re Application for Naturalization speeches were made, but in answer to a 'of Drossos Antonio Skylas.
amend declaration of intention made B. F. Davis v. John E. Malone, et. al. absolute.
Demurrer sustained and bill dismissed. John A. Nauman, assignee of George J. H. Jarrett v. Donald McCaskey. M. Woods v. T. Scott Woods, Jeanne Rule to set aside execution made absoWoods, Esther Woods, Katharine lute. Woods, John S. Woods, George B. Sam Montilovic, by his next friend, Woods and David C. Woods. Decree William H. Keller Pennsylvania entered in favor of the plaintiff.
Water and Power company.
Rule to Cecelia M. Good v. J. W. Fehl, de- strike off judgment of non-suit made murrer to bill in equity sustained and absolute. bill dismissed.
C. D. Leeking v. Lena Wenger. Rule Mary B. Yeager v. Herbert R. for judgment for defendant non obstante Steigerwalt. Rule to strike off judg- veredicto and for a new trial discharged. ment of non-suit discharged.
Frederick H. Hohein, surviving adWilliam H. Goll v. William T. Den- ministrator c. t. a. of the estate of Oscar linger, mortgagor and John Hoeltzel, Hohein, deceased 2. A. B. Rote. terre tenant. Rule for judgment non Stated. Judgment for defendant. obstante veredicto made absolute and judgment entered for plaintiff for
Charles Gross v. John A. St. Clair. S495.50.
Rule to open judgment made absolute. Belmont Stamping and Enameling John P. Albright v. Jacob Ziegler. Co. v. Harry Edelson. Rule to strike Rule for action of ejectment made absooff appeal made absolute.
lute. Watt & Shand v. D. M. Dorsheimer. John A. Shaub i'. Township of ManRule for judgment for want of a suf- heim. Rule for a new trial discharged. ficient affidavit of defense made abso- The Standard Knitting company inlute, and judgment for plaintiff for corporated) v. H. B. Herr. Rule for $177.16.
judgment for want of a sufficient affiNatthias O. Hoffer v. Henry 0. davit of defense discharged. Hoffer. Rule for judgment for want
Lanpher, Skinner & Co. (a corporaof a sufficient affidavit of defense made
tion) v. H. B. Herr.
Rule for judgabsolute and judgment for plaintiff for
ment for want of a sufficient affidavit $1,047.32.
of defense made absolute and judgment Martin Rudy v. Catherine M. Kegel. entered for the plaintiff for $76.68. Rule for a new trial discharged. Pequea township school district, v. and John H. Myers, trustees in domestic
F. Lyman Windolph, Warren S. Buch H. M. Klugh and Harry H. Benedict. attachment against Hugh C. Brackbill v. Rule for judgment for want of a suffi
Abram L. Eshbach. Case Stated. cient affidavit of defense made absolute, Judgment for plaintiff for $100. and judgment against Harry H. Benedict for $1,077.61.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.
Vivian Arnett. Murder. Rule for new By JUDGE HASSLER.
trial made absolute.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Chester Huber, by his father and Moses Snavely and Martin H. Nissley. next friend, Abram C. Huber v: John Motion to quash indietment refused. Walker. Rule to strike off judgment
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. of non-suit discharged.
Frank S. Vaysillis. Maintenance of Clarence Schock 7. H. A. Mettfett. children.
Rule to modify order of court Rule for a new trial discharged.
made absolute and order modified. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. the use of John M. Froelich v. Chris- L. Howard. False pretense. Demurrer tian H. Nolt, Leroy H. Nolt and Irvin to indictment overruled. H. Volt, executors of Benjamin Nolt, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. deceased. Rule for a new trial dis- L. Howard. False pretense. Demurrer charged.
to indictment overruled.
LANCASTER LAW REVIEW.
all the tax on “all the estate bequeathed” to collaterals is payable “at the end of
one year from the death of the deceVol. XXXII.] FRIDAY, JAN. 22, 1915. (No. 12 dent,” and we believe that nowhere in
the Act can be found authority for with
holding any part of the tax on any part Orphans' Court. of the bequest. It is contended, how
ever, that the third section of the Act
makes it optional with remaindermen to Estate of John C. Montgomery, deceased.
pay either before or after they come into
actual possession of their interests. The Collateral inheritance tax-Bequest for following is a copy of the section: life and remainder both to collaterals
“ In all cases where there has been or -Act of May 6, 1887.
shall be a devise, descent or bequest to Where personalty is bequeathed to collateral collateral relatives or strangers, liable to kin for life with remainder to collateral kin, the collateral inheritance tax, to take the collateral inheritance tax should on dis- effect in possession, or come into actual tribution be awarded, on the whole bequest.
Section 3 of the Act of May 6, 1887, P. L. enjoyment after the expiration of one 79, making it optional with remainder men to or more life estates, or a period of years, pay the collateral inheritance tax before or the tax on such estates shall not be payaiter possession, does not apply where both the able, nor interest begin to run thereon, life beneficiary and the remainder man collaterals.
until the person or persons liable for the In Section 6 of the Act of May 6, 1887, the same shall come into actual possession words “upon condition or contingency de
of such estate, by the termination of the signate a separate class and are not a qualification of the other classes designated. The estates for life or years, and the tax section may therefore anply where there is not shall be assessed upon the value of the a condition or contingency.
estate at the time the right of possession Exceptions to adjudication. 0. C. of accrues to the owner as aforesaid: ProLancaster County, September Term 1914, vided, That the owner shall have the No. 68.
right to pay the tax at any time prior to
his coming into possession, and, in such Frank S. Groff, for accountant and ex
cases, the tax shall be assessed on the ceptions.
value of the estate at the time of the M. E. Musser, for Commonwealth. payment of the tax, after deducting the
value of the life estate or estates for January 7, 1915. Opinion by Smith, years: And provided further, That the
tax on real estate shall remain a lien on Exception has been taken to the award the real estate on which the same is of collateral inheritance tax. The tes- chargeable until paid. And the owner tator apportioned a collateral bequest, of any personal estate shall make a full divided it into life-interests and remain-| return of the same to the register of wills ders.
The awarding of the tax on the of the proper county within one year whole bequest, the remainder with the from the death of the decedent, and life-interests, is the error assigned within that time enter into security for Reference will be made to the life-bene- the payment of the tax to the satisfaction ficiaries in the singular.
of such register; and in case of failure The residue of the estate was given to
so to do, the tax shall be immediately The Peoples Trust Company of Lan- payable and collectible.” caster, Pennsylvania, in trust for the use We might stop here and dismiss the of testator's brother, M. F. Montgomery, exceptions, for the "owners” of the for life, and after his death in trust for personal estate” have not entered the use of his niece, Edith Curry, for "into security for the payment of the life, and after the death of the survivor tax," and it has not been offered as a of them the remainder to collateral kin. reason for not having done so that they
By the Act of May 6, 1887., P. L. 79, cannot be ascertained and identified
immediately,” as in Coxe's Estate, 193 enactment, as we expect to mathematPa., 100. But feeling that, if there is ically demonstrate. The opinion that an argument to show that the section such was the legislative thought is suphas no application when both the life- ported by the provision in the Act of beneficiary and the remaindermen of April 10, 1849, P. L. 570, section 13, “personal estate" are collaterals, it should amended by the Act of March II, 1850, be offered, and for other reasons we will P. L. 170, which were re-enacted in the not rest alone on the failure to give third section of the Act of 1887, and security.
which relieves the remainderman from While this section undoubtedly gives the immediate payment of the tax where to remaindermen this right of election the life-interest is given “to a father, when the life-interest is exempt from widow, or other person (undoubtedly, the tax, there are reasons why it should other person of the same class), maninot be permitted when both the life- fests that such as are exempt from the interest and the interest in remainder are tax only were contemplated as life-benesubject to the tax, and the reasons seem
ficiaries. to justify a construction of the Act con- But what is the exceptants' complaint? formably with them. It is true that an It was said that the trustee is disturbed estate given for life to either a lineal and excepts because an unapparent descendant or a collateral, in the broad something might happen prejudicial to sense, is a life-estate, and there are the remaindermen. Counsel for some reasons why it should have been enacted one adds an exception. Together they to meet cases where the precedent in- make an hostile demonstration against terest is exempt from the tax, but we the payment at this time of the tax find none, nor has any been offered, why owing by the remainderman, declaiming remaindermen should be thus indulged that the Court committed an error bewhen the life-interest as well as the one cause it refused to apply the third secin remainder are taxable. On the con- tion of the Act; to do which, assuming trary, reasons appear to be plentiful why it to be applicable, would have required he should not be, and if so, it is a rational a potentiality not delegated to it. No construction of the Act to find that the proceeding under it was before us. The tax is now payable by the remainder- exceptants made no move by which it men in this case. The Act contemplates could be introduced. There was offered a prompt payment of the tax, encourages no appraisement as to the life-benefiit by premiums, and punishes tardiness. ciary's life-expectancy, no values estiIt is the policy of the law, and influenc- mated as to the respective interests, not ing one in the construction of statutes, even was the age of the life-beneficiary to lean to that which contributes to ex- given; and if all these things which were pedition, lessens circuity and reduces left undone had been done, this Court, complications.
having only appellate jurisdiction and The section refers to the remainder- the matter not having come on an apman as if the only one “liable " for the peal, would not have been in a position tax. The life-beneficiary has been ex
to have done anything, had not another cluded, certainly not included; not even way been found. The twelfth section of is there a reference to him as a taxable the Act, which operates the third section, party, for the reason, it is fair to infer, gives the right of appeal. that life-estates to lineal descendants The Court is given original jurisdiconly were contemplated. It is altogether tion over the matters therein by the sixth probable that this was the legislative section of the Act, which is as follows: thought, because it is the usual happen- "If the legacy subject to collateral ining and because if it had been said, or heritance tax be given to any person for intended, that a remainderman might life, or for a term of years, or for any delay the payment of the tax until after other limited period, upon a condition or the expiration of a collateral life-estate, contingency, if the same be money, the it would have the appearance of an inane | tax thereon shall be retained upon the