losses which with usual credits reduce the balance to $285.21; that exceptions have been filed to his account; and that the balance which should be in his hands will be found to be $1860.21. There is no dispute as to the fact that George R. Evans was justly indebted to the petitioner, or as to the law that the conveyance of the farm to Sue Evans by her husband did not relieve him nor discharge it from his indebtedness to the petitioner. But it is contended that the petitioner is deserving of no consideration because of his delay, that "the policy of the law is to favor the vigilant not those who have slept on their rights". As the petitioner learned only in 1910 that George R. Evans had conveyed his farm to his wife, and it was fraudulently done as to him, he can not be censured for not having begun this proceeding earlier; but if any one will be injured by reason of his slumber since then he is deserving of no special consideration. Much of this time was wasted, as we learn from him and which we assume is admitted, by reason of his efforts to collect the debt from one who was jointly liable with George R. Evans. But whatever his excuse, or if he has none, no one but he has been injured in the slightest degree by reason of the delay. It is true that George R. Evans profited, for the income would be as much less as the interest on the amount by which the principal would have been reduced to pay the claim, and necessarily all the distributees would suffer accordingly if the petitioner now should be permitted to collect interest in addition to the face of his judgment. But the question of interest is eliminated by the petitioner's voluntary declaration that he claims none. It is admitted that he was the victim of a fraud, if not an actual fraud, a constructive one. Mr. Justice Williams in Kelly's Appeal, 77 Pa., 232, considerately expressed the position of a wife who was the grantee of her husband without consideration, and his words can be fittingly applied: "it seems to me that the presumption is that she took title in trust for her husband; not that she took it for the purposes of defrauding his creditors"; "that the wife took the legal title in trust for her husband, and consequently that he had such an estate in the land as descended to his heirs and was chargeable with the payment of his debts". While the decedent is relieved from any charge of fraudulent intent, her husband's act nullified the force of technicalities and opened a way for the petitioner to get his own regardless of forms of procedure, otherwise needful, if in so doing he injures no innocent party. Without attempting to carry the dictum of Mr. Justice Williams to its logical conclusion, we submit that George R. Evans being the debtor, the fraudulent grantor, and as administrator accounted and asked for distribution, hardly would he have been in a position to have denied petitioner's claim had the demand been made at the audit of his account. No one else interested in the estate could have successfully opposed it because they were interested only in the estate of the decedent, and the money owing the petitioner was no part of it, therefore, they would have had no standing. By reason of fraud technical forms may be leaped that substantial justice may be done. Part of the proceeds of the sale of the farm was in gremio legis, and, as in Paxson's Estate, 225 Pa., 204, the petitioner could have successfully demanded his claim at the audit of the account of George R. Evans, administrator of the estate of the decedent. This was not done because of the fraud, a part of the deception having been a hiding from him of essential facts necessary for his initiative. As soon as he discovered them he pursued a remedy open to him, which has culminated in this proceeding to open the decree of distribution entered May 28, 1908. The opening of this decree will virtually decree that a sum of money equal to the petitioner's demand was in the hands of the administrator of the decedent's estate, but it can be said it has passed out of his hands and is now in Court as a trust fund. True it is that the form has been changed, but the fact is not disguised that it represents the farm and the equitable title to part of it is in the petitioner. George R. Evans as tenant by curtesy was entitled to the enjoyment of the farm for Estate of Sue Smith deceased. Practice. whom was given the whole estate for life with remainder to her children, used the estate as Where a decedent's widow and executrix to life, but for reasons agreeable to the parties interested it was sold and one Consumption of estate by life tenantselected as custodian of the proceeds, in effect a trustee to invest them and turn over the income thereof to the tenant by curtesy. The relative positions of the parties have not been changed, nor have their rights been impeached, why, therefore, may not the petitoner participate in the distribution about to be made. All matters are within the jurisdiction of this Court, all accounts are subject to its adjudication,-the adminstration. account was, the trustee's account is, and an account of an administrator of the estate of George R. Evans would be. All facts are admitted and no one can be injured. It would seem like trifling and bring reproach upon the adminstration of justice, in additon to complicating circuity, multiplying costs and devastating the estate of the decedent, to declare it necessary to raise an administration on the supposed estate of George R. Evans, for it would be only a supposed estate to treat the amount of his indebtedness, subject to which he conveyed the farm to his wife, as his estate, with a view of having the petitioner present his claim. It will only be following in the path made by the Court in Garman's Estate, 211 Pa., 264, to permit the petitioner to participate in the distribution now to be made of the fund brought into Court by S. K. Orr, trustee. "Distribution is the only matter necessary to complete" everything which concerns the parties. Wagner's Estate, 227 Pa., 460 (465). The petitoner presented his claim at the audit, but later withdrew it and asked for the impounding of a fund to abide the disposition of this rule. As both matters are contemporaneous and are disposed of, we refuse to impound, but do reinstate his claim. The demurrer is not sustained. The rule is made absolute in so far as the prayer for a review of the decree is concerned. By adjudication filed the same day the Court awarded H. Frank Eshleman his claim in full viz.: $282.90 to which award exceptions have been filed. her own and invested the funds in her own name, on her death without leaving any esistrator will be confirmed as if that of the tate of her own, the account of her adminadministrator of herself, "who was executrix" of the first decedent, and the balance awarded to the children under his will. Adjudication. O. C. of Lancaster County, August Term 1914, No. 23. Coyle & Keller, for accountant. October 1, 1914. By SMITH, P. J. Sue Smith, who died June 11, 1914, was the second wife and widow of John D. Smith, and one of the executors of his will. To her by the will was given a life interest in his estate with remainder to his two sons, Jacob W. Smith and Edmund H. Smith. As an executor she was possessed of the whole estate, which she used as her own, investing the funds in her name instead as trustee. She left no estate, but upon her death letters of administration were granted as if upon her estate, and while apparently it was settled the administration actually was an assembling of his estate. The account is confirmed as if that of the administrator of the estate of Sue Smith, who had been the executor of the been dead more than six years and it is will of John D. Smith, and, as he has expedient, the balance is awarded in equal shares to Jacob W. Smith and Edmund H. Smith under the will of John D. Smith. Styers' Estate. Orphans' court practice-ExceptionsWidow's exemption-Act of April 1, 1909, P. L. 87. set 1. Exceptions to depositions should alleged to be deficient, and contain an offer forth the matter wherein the depositions are to prove same. 2. The death of a widow after she has claimed her exemption does not deprive her estate of the same. 3. The Act of April 1, 1909, P. L. 87, is a Estate of William H. Styers, deceased. In the Orphans' Court of Northampton County. Petition for rule on administrator to file appraisement of personal property, and to make appraisement of real estate. Rule absolute. John D. Hoffman, for petitioner. Frank P. McCluskey, contra. September 28, 1914. Opinion by STEWART, J. statute relating to descent, and where a man This exception is entirely insufficient. dies leaving a widow and no issue, but col-There is no reference to what was lateral heirs, and the widow dies before ap- omitted and no offer to supply the praisement of real estate is made, his administrator will be directed to appraise same to omitted part. Where an exception is to the value of $5,000.00 for her estate. the admission of evidence, the exception should show what evidence was improperly admitted, and where the evidence is excluded, the evidence offered should be Where the officer taking the deposition made the subject of the exception. Where the officer taking the deposition has acted improperly, a motion should be taken in support of the application. The whole subject is discussed in Reinbold's Estate, II North. Co. Rep., 377. After reading the depositions, we are of opinion that the petition has established, as a matter of fact, that the widow claimed her $300.00 widow's exemption, and also asked to have the real estate to the value of $5,000.00 appraised to her before her death. The testimony taken by depositions disposes of the contention as to the widow's exemption of $300.00. She undoubtedly made her claim both for the exemption and for the $5,000.00. With respect to the former, it has been decided in Lafferty's Estate, 16 Philadelphia, 211, as follows: "The death of a widow three days after filing petition for exemption, and before the approval of the appraisement by the court, does not invalidate her claim." Buddy's Estate, 7 Co. Ct. Rep., 466, it was held: "Where a widow has made her claim the fact of her death before its final confirmation is no consequence; the title to the property elected to be retained is vested in her from the time of the demand." See also Daggett's Estate, same volume, 338. With respect to the latter amount, however, no claim was necessary. The Act of April 1, From the petition of William H. Derr, executor of Mary E. Styers, it appears that William H. Styers died on the 27th day of July, 1913. intestate, leaving a widow, Mary E. Styers, and collateral heirs, but no issue; that Wilson R. Brown was appointed administrator of the estate of William H. Styers; that Mary E. Styers died on the 20th of November, 1913, testate. The petition alleged that the widow, right after the death of the decedent, demanded of the administrator her widow's exemption under the Act of 1851 and also demanded to have appraised to her $5,000.00 of the real estate under the Act of 1909. Petition prayed that the appraisement of the personal property should be made and filed and confirmed in court, and that the appraisement of the real estate should be directed to be made. A rule was granted on the collateral heirs of William H. Styers to show cause why this should not be done. Answers were filed by the collateral heirs in which they alleged that the real estate did not descend to Mary E. Styers, but on her death went to a party for life, and on his death to a sister of the whole blood of William H. Styers. Depositions were thereupon taken in support of the facts set forth in the petition, and an exception was filed to the depositions. This must first be considered. The exception filed is as follows: "That the depositions of Wilson Brown does not contain all of the evidence as given by said Wilson Brown at the time of taking the depositions." In 1909, P. L. 87, is an act of descent, as its title and provisions plainly indicate. The superior court has discussed the nature of the act in Moore's Estate, 50 Pa. Super. Ct., 76; and the supreme court in Gilbert's Estate, 227 Pa. St., 648; Guenthoer's Estate, 235 Pa. St., 67; Gwynn's Estate No. 1, 239 Pa. St., 238 (valuable for the procedure); Buckland's Estate, same volume, at 608; and Pursell's Estate, 244 Pa. St., 407. It is unnecessary to discuss the numerous authorities cited by the learned counsel on each side. If Buckland's Estate had been found by counsel and cited to the court, we could have disposed of this case upon the argument. It is the exact case herein presented and rules it in favor of the petitioner. And now, September 28, 1914, exception is dismissed, and rule granted February 16, 1914, on Wilson R. Brown, administrator of William H. Styers, deceased, to show cause why he should not have appraised and set apart of the real property claimed by said Mary E. Styers out of the estate of said William H. Styers, deceased, to a value not exceeding $5,000.00 and have the appraisement signed and certified by the appraisers and returned to court for approval and filing among the records thereof in pursuance of the Act of 1909, P. L. 87-88, and also that your honorable court grant a rule on said Wilson R. Brown, administrator of William H. Styers, deceased, to show cause why the $300.00 widow's inventory and appraisement, should not be duly signed and certified and returned to court for approval and filing among the records thereof, is made absolute. Legal Miscellany. Law and Social Customs in India. Every developed system of law harmonizes with natural love and affection and manners and customs of the people to whom it applies. The different parts of the system are so related to each other and so interlap, that any material change in social custom must necessitate a corresponding change in law; for otherwise the most mischievous consequence might follow. The widow in certain cases inherits her deceased husband's estate in Bengal, and in a separated family, in the rest of India; and as remarriage of widows was universally considered to be improper in the higher castes, and in the lower castes which imitated them it was practically abolished, even if the custom existed in ancient times, this part of the law of India was undoubtedly in accord with advanced juridical ideas. As soon, however, as the marriage of widows was legalized by Act XV of 1856, the legislature had wisely to lay down the rule of divesting. A change of an important and almost universal social custom, even without the intervention of the Legislative Council of India or of any of the Provincial Governments, would similarly require a change in the customary law of India, i. e., the Hindu Law. The correlation in most cases is such that without a change in law the change of custom would tell very hard on a large number of the members of society. Suppose ante-puberty marriages of Hindu girls were abolished and post-puberty marriages became the custom-such a custom would in the near future lead to a large number of the females in the higher castes remaining spinsters, if not all their lives at least to a good age. The rule of society that every female should be married and be a member of another family or gotra being violently shaken and the bar of age being moved, the state of Indian society would in a short time be the same as that of European or American society. Daughters, in Hindu law, do not inherit their fathers' estate with sons, as it was under Roman Law and is under the Indian Succession Act (which follows the Roman Law) and the Mussulman Law. What will the fate of these spinsters be without material modification of Hindu Law? The practice of making wills providing for unmarried daughters is not yet common and years may pass before they will be common. We should also remember that wills are not allowed to be made by members of joint families and an entire change in the copercenary system would be needed to enable members to dispose of their shares by wills. No provision is made in Hindu Law for making suitable provision for spinsters in a joint family, and they would be entirely at the mercy of male members. Hindu widows generally lead the lives of ascetics, their wants are few and no comparison may be made between these two classes of dependent members. fact, the rights of dependent female In members in a family are so interwoven | not like the idea of being non-Hindus.with the rights, duties and obligations An Ex. Judge of the Calcutta High Court of male members that any violent change in the Contemporary Law Review. in the social custom of ante-puberty marriage of girls would render legislation imperative without delay. But I am afraid there are not many who would like the intervention of the State in altering Hindu Law. At present it is against the policy of the State. Sir Rufus Isaacs. The new lord chief justice, Sir Rufus Isaacs, was the bad boy of the school," according to one of his old masters. "Lessons," says the latter, “he left unlearned, classwork he shirked and mischief was his only devotion. Further in his wicked ways. He was always in disgrace or being caned, and yet, with all, was very merry and deliciously humorous.' Changes in Hindu Law would also be necessary if intercaste marriages were allowed. The Hindu law-givers have laid down definite rules as to mainten-more, he delighted in inspiring others ance and succession of children born of intercaste marriages. The position of a Sudra wife and her children born of a marriage with a man of a higher caste, even if such marriages be deemed valid in the Kali Yuga, would be intolerable in the present state of ideas, and a change in the law of succession would be imperative. The custom moulded in the Kali Yuga has a law suitable to it. The archaic system of intercaste marriages cannot be revived without corresponding changes in Hindu Law. We do not intend to condemn social reforms. They are necessary and many of them are urgently needed with the changes of ideas brought about by the mixture with other and apparently more civilized nations, but revolutions and reforms must be differentiated. The progress and development of Hindu Law have been checked under British judicial administration. Any social revolution would require a change in the system of Hindu jurisprudence, and reformers must think of it and the ways and means of harmonizing law to changed social customs before they countenance any innovations. Where are we drifting to? This must be a question agitating the mind of every thoughtful man. Post-puberty marriages are becoming frequent from a variety of reasons influencing society; one of them is the growing evil of demands of dowries. in marriages at least in Northern India. How would the law be amended to meet the altered state of things particularly to provide for the number of spinsters that may grow up. Who can effect a change in law now-a-days? We would Undoubtedly the secret of Sir Rufus' success is his amazing capacity for work. For years it was his custom to get up at 4 o'clock in the morning to tackle his briefs. In this respect he was following the example of his predecessor, Lord Alverstone, who used invariably to get up between 5 and 6 o'clock in the morning. On one occasion he wanted to talk over a certain point in a brief with one of his juniors. He asked the young man. to call in the morning. "At what time?" asked the young barrister. "At half past 6 at my house," was the reply. The young man arrived on the stroke of the moment, but in order to keep the appointment he sat up all night. Passionately fond of music, Lord Alverstone in his early days possessed a very excellent voice. On one occasion, when he was Sir Richard Webster, he concluded a political meeting by singing a sacred solo. At the close a gaunt spinster rose at the back of the audience and said: "With your face and voice, Sir Richard, you ought to be teaching stead of telling honest folk to be polithe gospel truth to the poor heathen in tical." -London Tit Bits. "Why is she getting a divorce?” "On the ground of misrepresentation. She says that before they were married he claimed to be well off." "And what does he say?" "He says he was, but didn't know it." |