the same evening she searched for the lost coin but was unable to find it. She notified plaintiff of her loss the following morning at 8.45, and as a result thereof credit was stopped. The articles in question, however, had been sold to the person presenting the coin before this notice had been given to the plaintiff.

In discussing the question which is here presented, it is well to ascertain just what the "coin" is. It is a small piece of metal with a number engraved upon it, which corresponds to the number of the account of the customer. The purpose of a store "coin" is to save the customer's time by allowing the customer presenting same and giving the name and address to take merchandise away at the store counter forthwith.

Neither the court nor counsel have been able, after diligent search, to find any reported case on the subject. It seems to be a new question, but it is one of considerable importance, in view of the fact that such coins are in general use by the large department stores.

The coin is in effect an order upon the plaintiff to deliver goods to the person presenting it, and to charge the said goods to the defendant's account. It is similar to a check, a bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument payable to bearer.

When securities are stolen from the owner his right is divested if they have been received by the holder in the usual course of business for value. The burden of proof is on the holder to show they were thus taken: Robinson v. Hodgson, 73 Pa., 202, 211.

A bill or note payable to bearer passes by delivery so as to vest the legal interest in the holder, and authorize him to sue upon it in his own name. Notes payable to bearer are transferable by delivery only. A bill, note or draft, endorsed in blank, is transferable by delivery: Gunnis v. Weigley, 114 Pa., 191.

Although the robber or finder of a negotiable instrument can acquire no title against the real owner, still, if it be endorsed in blank, or payable or endorsed to bearer, a third party acquiring it from the robber or finder bona fide for

valuable consideration before maturity, and without notice of loss, may retain it as against the true owner upon whom the loss falls, and enforce payment by any party liable thereon, upon the principle that whenever one of two innocent parties must suffer by the act of a third party, he who has enabled said third party to occasion the loss must sustain it: Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, Calvert (6th ed.), vol. 2, sec. 1469, p. 1647.

Even gross negligence on the part of a bona fide owner in receiving an instrument will not impair his title.

When negotiable securities are stolen. and sold by the thief to innocent persons, the title of the innocent holder will be protected: Cochran v. Fox Chase Bank, 209 Pa., 34; Jefferson Bank v. Chapman, 122 Tenn., 415.

A person who signs blank checks and puts them in possession of his agent, to be filled out by the agent and used as needed in the transaction of the principal's business, will be required to reimburse the bank for such a check which was stolen by reason of the agent's negligence, and filled out and cashed by the person named as payee therein. The person who signs a blank check is estopped, as between herself and the bank which cashed the check, by reason of her negligence, from setting up that it was stolen, and the name of the payee and the amount inserted without her knowledge: Snodgrass v. Sweetzer, 15 Ind. App. Rep., 682.

In the case at bar for every one of the purchases made, amounting to $61.10, the person making such purchases produced the defendant's coin and gave the defendant's name and address. The defendant made this possible by keeping her coin and her visiting cards with her address thereon in an insecure place. The coin was received and accepted by the plaintiff in the course of business for value and without notice. The case before us works a hardship upon both parties, but, as between two innocent parties, "he who makes the loss possible should bear it "; State v. First National Bank, 203 Pa., 69.

The defendant accepted and used the coin given her by plaintiff; she lost it,

Tested by the authorities, this affidavit to hold to bail is fatally defective in the particular above referred to. It has failed of its purpose to require additional security, but the defendant has been served and is in court by appearance of counsel. Upon the argument it was stated that the statement was also defective. It certainly shows that counsel for the plaintiff, when he prepared the statement, understood the above rules, but the sufficiency of the statement is not now before us. We shall follow the course indicated in Collins v. Hogg, 19 Dist. R., 975, and not quash the writ.

And now, the defendant be and is hereby discharged from the special bail filed herein. Motion to quash writ is

denied.

Tegal Miscellany.

Some Recent Developments in the Law

of Fraudulent Conveyances.

In actions to set aside conveyances or transfers of property alleged to have been made for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or defrauding the creditors of the grantor, the difficulty of establishing fraudulent intent by direct evidence is apparent and well recognized, and has long been the subject of much controversy in the appellate courts. In such cases the rules regarding presumptions or inferences, and the correlative rules as to the burden of proof, are most important. Yet certain aspects of these rules were for a long time unsettled.

In March, 1892, the First Division of the Court of Appeals, as the court was then constituted, held that a conveyance without consideration, by a grantor who was indebted at the time, did not give rise to an inference of fraud, but that the burden of proving a fraudulent intent still rested upon the creditor seeking to invalidate the conveyance (Kain v. Larkin, 131 N. Y., 300). Earl, Ch. J.,

"If the grantor remains solvent after the conveyance and has sufficient property left to satisfy all his just debts, then the conveyance whatever his intention was, can not be a fraud upon his existing creditors; and when a judgment creditor assails a conveyance made by the judgment debtor, he can not cast upon the grantee the onus of showing good faith and of establishing that the grantor was solvent after the conveyance by simply showing that the deed was not founded upon a valuable consideration. But the person assailing the deed assumes the burden of showing that it was executed in bad faith, and that it left the grantor insolvent and without ample property to pay his existing debts and liabilities; and so it has been repeatedly held."

In October of the same year, however, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals, with two judges dissenting, held to the contrary (Smith v. Reid, 134 N. Y., 568), Brown, J., saying (p. 575):

66

Our statute (2 R. S., p. 137, sec. 4), provides that the fraudulent intent to hinder, delay and defraud creditors by a conveyance of land shall be deemed a question of fact and not of law, and that no conveyance shall be judged fraudulent as against creditors solely upon the ground that it was not founded upon a valuable consideration. But the rule is well settled that a voluntary conveyance by one indebted at the time is presumptively fraudulent."

Kain v. Larkin, supra, was not cited in the prevailing opinion in Smith v. Reid, but was quoted in the dissenting opinion by Parker, J., (p. 581), so that the fair inference is that the Second Division of the court declined to follow the First Division on this point. It was inevitable that doubt and uncertainty should result from such a condition of the authorities (compare Wadleigh v. Wadleigh, 111 App. Div., 367, 370, with Lawrence Bros. v. Heylman, III App. Div., 848, 850, aff'd, in 189 N. Y., 573). The difficulty was not removed until last year, when the Court of Appeals expressly overruled Kain v. Larkin, and

be the law of the State that "a voluntary conveyance by one indebted at the time is presumptively fraudulent as against existing creditors" (Kerker v. Levy, 206 N. Y., 109).

The rule is not as harsh as it might seem, for it merely affects the burden of proof. It enables the plaintiff to make a prima facie case by proving that the conveyance was without consideration and that the grantor was indebted at the time; and it leaves the defendant free to establish (1) that the conveyance was made in good faith and (2) that it left the grantor with ample property to pay his creditors. Both of these facts, however, must be proved in order to constitute a defense, for a voluntary conveyance may be invalid as to existing creditors even though it leaves the grantor solvent. "It is only when one makes a voluntary conveyance in good faith, with no intent to defraud his creditors, that it will be upheld by proof showing that when he made it he retained an ample estate to pay all his debts" (Fox v. Moyer, 54 N. Y., 125, 131; Vollkommer 2. Cody, 177 N. Y., 124, 130); for "a rich man may make a fraudulent conveyance as well as one who is insolvent" (Hager v. Shindler, 29 Cal., 48, 59). It should be borne in mind also that our statute forbids a conveyance designed to hinder or delay creditors as well as one intended to defraud them (McConnell v. Sherwood, 84 N. Y., 522, 531; Buell v. Rope, 6 App. Div., 113); and that since a man is deemed to have intended the necessary consequences of his acts, a conveyance which necessarily results in hindering, delaying or defrauding his creditors, may be fraudulent per se, quite irrespective of his actual intent (Babcock v. Eckler, 24 N. Y., 623, 632; Young. Heermans, 66 N. Y., 374, 381-2; Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y., 17, 31; Coursey v. Morton, 132 N. Y., 556, 560). Of course, if a valuable consideration is paid for the property the attacking creditors must establish not only a fraudulent intent on the part of the vendor but that the grantee or purchaser participated therein or had notice thereof (Starin v. Kelly, 88 N. Y.. 418; Green

rule holds even though the consideration is an antecedent debt (Lehrenkrauss v Bonnell, 199 N. Y., 240). But as the fact of such notice may be inferred from circumstances (Parker v. Connor, 93 N. Y., 118), it may be enough to show that the purchaser had knowledge that the sale would deprive the vendor's creditors of the means of collecting their debts (Greenwald v. Wales, supra). In this connection, there is a recent decision of importance. In Clowe v. Seavey, 208 N. Y., 495, a woman conveyed to her mother-in-law all her right, title, and interest, present and future, in the estate of her grandfather, this being all the property she had, in consideration of a loan of $1,000 upon the security of the property and of an agreement by which the mother-in-law promised to dispose of all the property by will in trust for the use of the transferror and her husband during their lives, with remainder to their son. The trial court found that the transfer was made with intent to defraud creditors, but that the transferee did not participate in that intent. The Court of Appeals said:

"It is of no consequence that the transferee had no intent to hinder, delay or defraud the creditors of the transferror. A person can not successfully put his property beyond the reach of his creditors by a transfer which secures it to himself and his children, even though the transferee may have the best of motives and be ignorant of his fraudulent intent."

It seems to us that our courts are administering the law on this subject in a commendable spirit and with results that can not fail to be salutary. Honest preferences are still upheld as at common law (Lehrenkrauss '. Bonnell, supra) except when prohibited by statute in assignments for the benefit of creditors or by the Bankruptcy Act, and any sale or conveyance that is fair and just according to proper commercial standards is in no danger; but the schemes of dishonest debtors to "have their cake and eat it too" are likely to meet with prompt discouragement.

-Bench and Bar, New York.