H. M. Houser and Frank S. Groff, pudiate an agreement after his judgment. for rule. creditor had acted upon it. See to the same effect Girard Trust Co. v. Baird, Chas. G. Baker and Chas. F. Hager, 212 Pa., 41. contra. The rights of third parties are not in September 26, 1914. Opinion by volved here, the application to open the HASSLER, J. This judgment was entered on a note containing a warrant of attorney to confess judgment dated January 18, 1910. It was given as collateral security for three promissory notes amounting to $1800 purchased by the plaintiff. The agreement that it was to be used for this purpose does not appear on the face of the note and is not in writing. The notes were subsequently paid by the defendant. He alleges in his petition that the plaintiff agreed to destroy the judgment when the said notes were paid. This the plaintiff denies, and further alleges in its answer that the defendant agreed, when he obtained other and subsequent loans from the plaintiff, that the judgment should be held as collateral security for them. The president and treasurer of the plaintiff company testified that this agreement was made, and that in pursuance of it the plaintiff loaned to the defendant various sums, which on June 18, 1914, were consolidated in one note amounting to $1,369. This amount with interest from July 18, 1914 the plaintiff claims the judgment is liable for. The defendant denies that any such agreement was made, but admits an indebtedness of $1369, with interest from July 18, 1914. From this we find that it was agreed by the defendant that the judgment was to be held as collateral security for loans to the amount of $1,369 with interest from July 18, 1914. It is decided in Pierce v. Black, 105 Pa., 342, that parties may, even by parol agreement, when the rights of third parties are not involved, change the purpose for which a judgment may be held as security, and that upon the payment of the loan for which the judgment was given as collateral security by agreement of the parties, it may be continued as security for other loans, where none but the parties to it are affected. It would be inequitable to permit a debtor to re judgment having been made by the defendant. As he agreed that the judgment should be held as collateral security for loans which the plaintiff made to him, and which it made on account of that agreement it would be inequitable to permit him to repudiate it. The fact that the new loans were made after the notes for which the judgment was originally given had been paid, does not affect the case. The judgment, however, is entered for $2,000, and the indebtedness at the present date is $1.384.89. The plaintiff must, therefore, remit so much of the judgment as is in excess of $1.384.89 within five days. If this is done, the rule to open the judgment is discharged. If it is not done the rule is made absolute. Every intendment is against a summary conviction, and the record of the justice of the peace must show affirmatively that the law has been violated. A justice of the peace has no jurisdiction to entertain a summary conviction, unless it is expressly conferred by statute. A prosecution for a violation of the Act of April 1, 1797, 3 Sm. Laws, 294, for selling bread in any other manner than by weight, should be by hearing and return to the Quarter Sessions and trial by jury and not by summary conviction by a magistrate. Certiorari. Exceptions to record. C. P. of Delaware Co. September Term, 1913, No. 282. Albert Dutton MacDade, for exceptions. A. A. Cochran, contra. February 22, 1914. BROOMALL, J. Opinion by It appears by the return of the magis trate that an affidavit was made before and the defendant says that he has a him on November 10, 1913: "That plunger machine into which the dough is Samuel Oglesby, a baker, of Chester, forced into pockets, and it is gauged Pa., did, in the City of Chester afore- and not weighed. Every intendment is said, on different occasions within the against a summary conviction, and it year last past, the last time being on must be made to appear affirmatively November 10, 1913, furnish, sell and that the law has been violated. This cause to be sold, at divers times and to does not so appear in this case. divers persons in the said City of Chester, loaf-bread by the loaf and not by the pound avoirdupois, as is required to do by the Act of General Assembly approved April 1, 1797, 3 Sm. Laws, 294. That he did sell the said loaves of bread with less weight than avoirdupois weight, thereby defrauding the persons who bought bread of him. The Act of April 1, 1797, 3 Sm. Laws, 294, is entitled "An act to regulate the manner of selling loaf-bread." It enacts "That from and after the 1st day of May next, all loaf-bread made for sale within this Commonwealth shall be sold by the pound avoirdupois, and every baker or other person offering the same for sale shall keep at his or her house, or at such other place at which he or she shall at any time offer or expose for sale any such bread, sufficient scales and weights lawfully regulated for the purpose of weighing the same; and if any baker or other person shall from and after the 1st of May next sell or offer for sale any loaf-bread in any other manner, the contract respecting the same shall be void, and the person offending against this act shall, on conviction, forfeit and pay the sum of $10 for every offence, one-half to the use of the informer and the other half to the use of the Commonweath." Moreover, there is no authority in the law for a conviction by a magistrate. The most that appears is that selling bread by the loaf and not by weight is a legal offence. A criminal procedure is commenced before a magistrate, who, when a prima facie case is made out, holds the accused under security for his appearance to answer the charge in court, and he makes return of his proceedings to the prothonotary, when an indictment is prepared and submitted to a grand jury, and, if found true, it is followed by a trial in court: 3 Wharton on Criminal Law, Sec. 2924. The magistrate has authority to thus proceed by virtue of the British Statute of 34 Edward III: Robert's Digest of British Statutes, 349, and the Act of May 22, 1722, Sec. 4, 1 Sm. Laws, 131. In order to summarily convict, the power must be conferred upon him by some statute. This power has not been conferred upon the magistrate by the law under consideration. It follows that defendant's exceptions numbered 1 and 8 are affirmed, and the other exceptions are dismissed, and the judgment of conviction is quashed and set aside. In short, this act directs that loaf Common Pleas--Equity. bread shall be sold by weight, and that the measure of weight shall be according to the pound avoirdupois; and it directs that if any person shall otherwise Bachman v. Ryle Law. sell bread, upon conviction, he shall for- Equity-Jurisdiction-Pending action in feit and pay $10 to the informer and the Commonwealth. In no part of the evidence returned by the magistrate does it appear that the bread referred to was not sold by weight. One of the witnesses says that he sent a person into the store to buy bread. The person sent says that he bought a loaf of bread from a saleslady in the store, deed, even though an action in ejectment is pending at the time. Equity will attach to correct and reform a In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, Sitting in Equity. Alfred P. Bachman v. Reuben Ryle. Bill in Equity. Demurrer. Thomas F. Diefenderfer, for com- would be best subserved by a court of plainant. A. G. Dewalt, for respondent. April 6, 1914. Opinion by GROMAN, P. J. This matter comes before the court on bill of complaint and demurrer thereto. The material facts averred in the bill are thus admitted and are to be taken as verity. Bitting's Appeal, 105 Pa. St., 517. equity and that jurisdiction attaches. Now, April 6, 1914, demurrer overruled and defendant ordered to answer over within thirty days of this order. Quarter Sessions. Road in North Codorus Township. Intersecting Roads De A statement in the petition for a view that the nearest intersecting public road to the proposed public road is 4350 feet from the point of ending and 750 feet from the point of beginning" of the proposed road is a literal compliance with the Act of April 23, 1909, P. L. 143, and must be presumed to be sufficient until the contrary is shown. The principal question raised by the demurrer and to be determined is: Has a Report Court of equity jurisdiction. It has been held that equitable jurisdiction does not. depend on the want of common law remedy, for whilst there may be such a remedy it may be inadequate to meet all the requirements of a given case or to effect complete justice between the contending parties, hence the exercise of chancery powers must often depend on the sound discretion of the Court. Bierdower's Appeal, 11 Out., page 14. Mortland v. Mortland, 151 Pa. St., page 593. Johnston, et al., v. Price, et al., 172 Pa. St., page 427. Where the termini are actually fixed it is not necessary to state specifically the direction of each from the intersecting road. Cochran, Williams & Kain and IV. B. Hays, for exceptions. Harvey A. Gross, contra. October 5, 1914. Opinion by WANNER, P. J. in the petition for the road "their exact distance from an intersecting road, street or railroad already opened.' It is contended by the defendant that because an action of ejectment is now pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, wherein the title to the real estate in this proceeding also It is objected that the termini of the comes in question, and in which action proposed road are not located in this the defendant herein is the plaintiff, and petition, with the accuracy required by the complainant in this bill the defend- the Act of April 23rd, 1909, P. L. 143, ant, that, therefore, a court of equity has which established a new method of fixno jurisdiction. We must not lose sighting them, to wit: by" definitely stating of the fact that in this proceeding the complainant prays for a decree to correct and reform the deed for the real estate referred to in both proceedings, and that the action of ejectment is founded on the identical deed sought to be reformed. We have a line of authorities holding that where a court of equity would afford the best and most convenient remedy for a just disposition of the question involved, jurisdiction would at- The intersecting road" of the Act is tach. Kirkpatrick v. McDonald, 11 Pa. construed to be one connecting with the St., 393. Brush Electric Company's Ap-road or roads in which the termini of the peal, 114 Pa. St.. 574. Warner 7. Mc-proposed road are located; Kennedy Mullen, 131 Pa. St., page 370. Drake v. Township Road, 50 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. Lacoe, et al., 157 Pa. St., page 17. 625. The court is of the view that a just disposition of the questions involved This provision is held to be mandatory and unless complied with in the petition itself, the proceedings are fatally defective: Fayette Township Road, 20 Dist. Rep. 171. Snake Spring Road, 42 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 16; Portage Township Road, 50 Pa. Super. Ct. Rep. 626. Prior to the passage of the Act of 1909, only such reasonable certainty was But the Highway Department does not derive its information from the petition, but from a "copy of the viewers' report, with the accompanying draft," which the Act directs shall be forwarded for its use. The petition itself, after it has been made the basis of the action of the viewers, is functus officio, and of no further significance in the proceeding. We find no substantial variance between the petition and the report of the viewers in fixing the location of the termini of this road. The viewers state that the road is laid out between the points located in the petition, and the only apparent difference is, that the viewers describe the "intersecting public road" as one leading " from Brillhart's Station to York New Salem," whereas the petition gave no detailed description of it at all. But this is immaterial, as it has not been shown that this statement in the report is erroneous. required in fixing the termini of a road, | from the information contained in this as would enable the viewers to locate, petition alone, if the intersecting public and the supervisors to open it, with sub-road referred to therein properly apstantial accuracy, and this was usually pears on said official plan of the public secured by reference to buildings, roads, roads of the State. and such other permanent and fixed objects as might answer the purpose. Under that rule the termini of this proposed road are located with sufficient certainty in this petition. The place of beginning is entirely accurate, and the ending is sufficiently so, to enable that point to be satisfactorily established on the ground. As to the latter, it was suggested at the argument that the words "leading from lands of Luther Klinedinst and Aaron Loucks" might refer to the public road in question, instead of to the private road there mentioned. But such could not be the case, because the public road here designated is the same one which had before been described as "leading from Brillhart's Station to York New Salem." There is, therefore, no real or substantial uncertainty in the location of the end of the proposed road. The petition in this case states that the nearest intersecting public road to the proposed public road is 4350 feet from the point of ending, and 750 feet from the point of beginning, of the proposed road." This is a literal compliance with the above quoted requirement of the Act of 1909, and must be presumed to be sufficient until the contrary is shown. It is contended that the petition should specifically state the direction of each of the termini of the proposed road, from the "intersecting road." But we have already seen that said termini are accurately fixed at the respective junctions of two well-located private roads with a certain public road. The viewers were therefore able to locate the intersecting road, and by actual measurements to verify the distances from it to the respective termini of this road, as given in the petition. The object of the Act of 1909 in requiring that the exact distance from the termini of the proposed road to an "intersecting public road already opened" be given, is to enable the State Highway Department to properly locate the new road on its general plan and survey of the highways of the Commonwealth. This it could do The exception to the necessity of a public road at this place was not pressed at the argument, and it could not be sustained, because no evidence was offered to the Court to show that the conclusions of the viewers as to that question were erroneous. The exception to the insufficiency of the notices because of the uncertainty of the termini of the proposed road has no merit, for reasons already given. The exceptions are dismissed. Golden's Contested Election. Election lae-Contest-Bond- Petition -Act of April 28, 1899. Filing the bond by the petitioner in a contested election within ten days after the court has fixed its amount is a compliance with the than ten days had elapsed after the petition Act of April 28, 1899, P. L. 118, although more was presented. It is sufficient if the petition avers facts which, prima facie, show the election to be illegal, although there is no express averment that "the election was undue or illegal." Contested election. Q. S. of Lacka wanna Co. December Sessions, 1913, No. 172. court had not at that time fixed the amount of the bond. How could the David J. Reedy and M. J. Murray, Jr., petitioners file a bond if they knew not for petitioner. the amount thereof? Should the bond be in the sum of $1,000 or $5,000, or for A. A. l'osburg and R. A. Zimmer- any other amount? The "sum of the man, contra. February 2, 1914. Opinion by EDWARDS, P. J. The petition in this case was filed on December 3, 1913, and was submitted to the court on the same day. On December 18th the court made an order adjudging the petition to be sufficient, fixing a time for a hearing of the rule to answer, and directing the petitioners to file a bond in the sum of $2,500 within ten days from the date of the order of the court. Such a bond was filed on December 27th. Subsequently, on December 29, 1913. a rule was granted to show cause why the petition in the case should not be dismissed, because the bond was not filed within the time specified in the act of assembly; and, later, a rule was granted to show cause why the said petition should not be quashed for other reasons than the failure to file the bond in proper time. These two rules are now before us for consideration. bond is to be "designated" by the court. If the contention of the respondent is correct, then the petitioners, in a contested election case, are liable to be thrown out of court, because the court itself, forsooth, is taking a few days to consider the sufficiency of the petition. Such a result would amount to a denial of justice. We are averse to the adoption of any technical rule of interpretation that would lead to such a result. We have reached this conclusion, notwithstanding the discussion found in the case of the Southampton Township Election, 12 Dist. R., 141, by Judge Stewart. The decision was undoubtedly correct under the facts of the case. It appears that the petition in that case was filed on April 28, 1902, after the same had been adjudged sufficient. More than a month after the petition was filed, and after the sufficiency thereof had been formally approved by the court, an application was made to file a bond nunc pro tunc as of the proper date. This was refused. We think the decision would have been otherwise if the fact appeared in the case that the court itself had made it impossible for the petitioners to comply with the letter of the act of assembly. The view taken by Judge Halsey in a contested election case (10 Kulp, 362) accords with ours, the facts being similar in that case to those of the case now under consideration. He decided that, in contested elections, the bond to be filed by contestants within ten days may be filed nunc pro tunc after ten days, if filed within ten days after the court has fixed the amount required. We shall first consider the question of the filing of the bond. The Act of April 29, 1899, P. L. 118, provides that when ever a petition to contest an election shall be presented to the court, the petitioners, "within ten days thereafter," shall file a bond in such sum as the said court shall designate," and that if the said bond shall not be filed as provided, the petition to contest the election shall be dismissed. In the case at bar the petition remained in the hands of the court for consideration for a period of fifteen days. It was then adjudged to be sufficient, and the amount of the bond was The general principle applicable to the fixed by the court at $2,500, the petition- facts of the present case is laid down ers being allowed ten days from the date by Mr. Justice Mitchell in Schrenkeisen of the order within which to file the. Kishbaugh et al., 162 Pa., 45, and is bond. The contention of the respondent is that the bond should have been filed within ten days from the date of the presentation of the petition to the court; that is, on or before December 13, 1913. This was an impossibility, because the as follows: "Where a statute fixes the time within which an act must be done, as, for example, an appeal taken, courts have no power to extend it or to allow the act to be done at a later day as a matter of indulgence. Something more |