Craig v. First Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. 46. An act of assembly can not be declared void unless it violates the constitution cleary, palpably, plainly and in such manner so as to leave no doubt or hesitation in our minds. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch U. S. 87. Sharpless v. The Mayor, 21 Pa. 164. Eakins v. Raub, 12 S. & R. 330. P. R. R. v. Riblet, 66 Pa. 164. Comth. v. Butler, 99 Pa. 535. Comth. v. Keary, 198 Pa. 500. Comth. v. Moir, 199 Pa. 543. New Brighton Boro v. Biddle, 201 Pa. 96. It is the effect not the purpose of an act which determines its constitutionality. P. R. R. v. Riblets, supra. The several provisions of the act of 1913 surely, "have a proper relation to each other," and all the details, constitute parts of a scheme to accomplish a single purpose," They "relate to the same subject"; "and have a common object." See also Comth. v. Pflaum, 50 Pa. Superior Ct. 55 It is clearly germane to the preservation of the health of domestic animals to prevent the transportation of any sick. animals of any kind. The act is not a delegation of legislative authority. Com. v. McKnight, 16 Dist. R. 869. Pa. Telephone Co. v. So. Bethlehem, 16 Dist. R. 878. Locks' Appeal, 72 Pa. 481. Foster Twp. Road Tax, 31 Super. 51. McGownell's License, 209 Pa. 327. Even if the Act of July 22, 1913, is unconstitutional the indictment should have been sustained under the Act of 30th March, 1905, P. L. 78. Section 3 of that Act is practically identical with Section 26 of the Act of 1913. The fact that an indictment was drawn under an unconstitutional section of a Statute did not render it invalid where it constituted a good indictment under another section of the Statute. State v. Vandenburg, 159 Mo. 230, 60 S W., 79. 22 Cyc. Page 3, Sec. 8. The indictment in this case charges a violation of law, viz.: “It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or move or transport on or across or along any public highway, or in wagons or in railroad cars or other vehicles, any animal affected with any disease mentioned in sec. 9 of this act, or with any disease now or hereafter adjudged and proclaimed by the State Live Stock Sanitary Board, to be of a transmissible character, except State Live Stock Sanitary Board, or any upon permission in writing from the member, officer, or agent, of the Board." The defendant filed a demurrer alleging that no indictable offense was set out; that the act under which the indictment was drawn is unconstitutional, as it violates sec. 3, of art. 3, of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in having more tional as it confers legislative powers than one subject; that it is unconstituupon the State Live Stock Sanitary Board; that it failed to set forth that the animal suffering with tuberculosis was a domestic animal, or was one of the animals defined in sec. I of the act, which was sustained by the Court. The construction placed upon this statute of July 22, 1913, P. L. 929, is entirely too narrow and refined to meet the substantial and vital demands of this important legislation. The act in question is the last declaration of the legislative will starting in 1897, and it has been enlarged in nearly every succeeding session of the assembly, so that the act of 1913 stands as a codification of all previous legislation relating to the subjects. embraced in its title, which is as follows: "An Act relating to domestic animals; defining domestic animals so as to include poultry; providing methods of improving the quality thereof, and of preventing, controlling, and eradicating diseases thereof; imposing certain duties upon practitioners of veterinary medicine in Pennsylvania; regulating the manufacture and sale of tuberculin, mallein and other biological products for It cannot be open to controversy that but one purpose is sought by this enactment, which is intended to embrace the whole subject-matter, and a fair examination of the body of the act, as suggested by the comprehensive title, would lead any inquiring mind to an examination of its contents. use with domestic animals; defining the (mestic animals and providing methods powers and duties of the State Live of improving the quality thereof. It has Stock Sanitary Board, and the officers been repeatedly stated that our only duty and employees thereof; fixing the com- and our only power in scrutinizing an pensation of the Deputy State Veterin- act with reference to its constitutionality arian; and providing penalties for the is, to discover what, if any, provision violation of the Act.' of the constitution it violates. The presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of an act of assembly, and it cannot be declared void unless it violates the constitution clearly, palpably, plainly, and in such manner as to leave no doubt and hesitation: Commonwealth vs. Moir, 199 Pa. 543. The interpretation of a statute should be determined by its paramount purpose, rather than by the details through which that purpose is to be accomplished. The subject may have but one object, while the measure necessary for the attainment of that object may necessarily embrace many subordinate subjects, differing in their nature and particular effect, yet all contributing to it, and comprising within the principal subject everything which the nature of the subject of a title reasonably suggests as necessary or appropriate for the accomplishment of its expressed purpose, is sufficiently indicated by such title: Commonwealth v. Jones, 4 Pa. Superior Ct. 362: Commonwealth v. Pflaum, 50 Pa. Superior Ct. 55. The restricted definition of " domestic animal" was enlarged so as to embrace any equine or bovine animal, sheep, goat, pig, dog, cat, or poultry. Every provision in the statute reasonably and directly related to the general subjectmatter of the legislation, and each provision was considered necessary to carry into effect the beneficent purposes of the enactment. The method adopted by the legislature of enforcing the general provisions of the act was clearly within its power, and in defining the authority and duties of the State Live Stock Sanitary Board, and the officers and employees thereof, are so necessarily related to the preventing, controlling, and eradicating the diseases against which the enactment is directed, that each is germane to the general subject. The powers and duties devolved upon the State Live Stock Sanitary Board and its officers, are but an enumeration of methods referred to in sec. 6, and are clearly within the power therein defined. Such legislation would be of no effect unless the power to enforce its provisions was lodged somewhere. This Board was deemed the most efficient agency for preventing, controlling and eradicating disease, and enforcing the prescribed penalties for violation of the act. And every power given to the Board was deemed to be directly and immediately necessary to accomplish the expressed objects of the statute. With this authority vested in the Board, the compensation of its employees and all other expenses follow as a reasonable provision, and all are germane to the one object which relates to do The several provisions of the act have a proper relation to each other and all the details constitute essential parts of the general design to accomplish a single purpose, and each relates to the same subject which is the common object of the enactment. The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make its own action depend: McGonnell's License, 209 Pa. 327; Foster Township Road Tax, 32 Pa. Superior Ct. 51. As was said in Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, “There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend, which cannot be known to the law-making power, and must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of halls of legislation.”. See also C., M. & St. Paul R. R. v. Minn., 134 U. S. 413; Elwell v. Com stock, 100 Minnesota, 261. Railroad v. Railroad, 206 U. S. 314; Saratoga v. Gas Co., 191 N. Y. 125, and the recent Minnesota Rate Case, 230 U. S. 380. The list of dangerous diseases enumerated in the act, rendered it vitally important to provide that the inspection and care of affected animals and the disposition of carcases of such, should be under the control of experienced persons, both for the treatment of such and the prevention of epidemics, and for preservation of the records, which result could only be secured by organized bodies of men, who were specially trained in that department of learning. The act is intended to regulate the transportation of any animal, wild or domestic, having a transmissible disease. The purpose is avowedly to prevent, control and eradicate diseases of domestic animals, but it is just as proper to regulate the transportation of elk, deer or foxes when they may be the means of spreading infectious diseases among domestic animals as it is to prescribe the manner of transporting the well-known barn or herd stock. The act is framed in clear, unambiguous words and is meant to apply to all animals under the control of man. The defendant did not ask for a bill of particulars, and could not be misled by any of the provisions of the act which are fully indicated by the title. Even if the act of July 22, 1913, is at all doubtful, as to its constitutionality, which is not admitted, the indictment was good under the Act of March 30, 1905, P. L. 78, which is in substance the same as sec. 26 of the act before us, and is still in force. It made no difference under what particular section of a statute the indictment may have been drawn, nor are the infirmities of such section of the indictment thereunder material, provided the indictment be good under some other section of a statute which is valid: 22 Cyc. p. 3, sec. 8. See also State v. Vandenburg, 159 Missouri, 230; 60 S. W. Repr. 79. The judgment is reversed, the record to be remitted to the court below with a procedendo. (See two following cases.) Opinion (For opinion of the Court below, HASSLER, J., See 31 LAW REVIEW 184). The error assigned was the action of the Court below in sustaining the de murrer as follows to wit: 'We sustain the demurrer.' John M. Groff, District Attorney, Coyle & Keller, A. H. Woodward, J. E. B. Cunningham and John C. Bell, Attorney General, for appellant. Even if the Act of July 22, 1913, is unconstitutional the indictment should have been sustained under the Act of 27th April, 1909, P. L. 189. Section 1 of that Act is practically identical with Section 27 of the Act of 1913. Commonwealth v. Weber. Constitutional law Domestic animals -Acts of April 27, 1905 and July 22, 1913. An indictment for failure to report a case of tuberculosis to the State Live Stock Sanitary Board "contrary to the form of the Act of the General Assembly in such case made and provided" which does not specify. Sec. 9 of the Act of July 22, 1913, . L. 928 is good and valid under Act of March 30, 1905, Sec. 1, P. L. 78 even though the Act of 1913 were unconstitutional as both Acts are in force. Appeal No. 91 of October Term 1914 from judgment of Q. S. of Lancaster County sustaining a demurrer to an indictment for failure to report case of transmissible disease of cattle. (For opinion of the Court below, HASSLER, J., see 31 LAW REVIEW 184). The error assigned was as follows: 1. The Court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the indictment, as follows: "As we are of the opinion that the Act of 1913 is unconstitutional, we sustain the demurrer.' John M. Groff, District Attorney, Coyle & Keller, A. H. Woodward, J. E. B. Cunningham and John C. Bell, Attorney General, for appellant. Edwin M. Gilbert, for appellee. fense is as specifically set out in one as the other and both acts are in force. For the reasons given in Commonwealth v. Falk, No. 90 October Term, 1914, the judgment in this case is reversed and the record remitted to the court below with a procedendo. (See two preceding cases.) Common Pleas--Law Hoover v. Haefner. Evidence Deeds - Purchase money -Assumpsit for goods detainedAffidavit of defense - DepositionsRule of C. P. Court XV, Sec. 2, page 19. The sum named and receipted for in a deed as the consideration, is only prima facie evidence, and the amount actually agreed upon as the consideration may be shown. Where, in a suit for purchase money the plaintiff claims on an express agreement to assume liens amounting to $20,800 and pay a fixed sum of $4,200, he can not recover a less than $20,800. sum that $4,200, if the liens aggregate more A granter cannot waive the tort and bring assumpsit against the grantee for certain personal property detained on the premises by the grantee, in the absence of anything further to show a conversion or sale of it. A deposition can not be admitted in evidence if taken at a place other than that men February 24, 1915. Opinion by tioned in the notice. ORLADY, J. 66 The indictment in this case concludes contrary to the form of the Act of the General Assembly in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" and does not specify the ninth section of the Act of July 22, 1913, P. L. 928, which the learned trial judge in the court below held to be unconstitutional, and for that reason sustained the demurrer filed by the defendant. Conceding this to be true, which we do not do, yet the indictment was clearly a good one and valid under the first section of the Act of March 30, 1905, P. L. 78, to which the offense charged is as applicable as to the ninth section of the latter statute. The identification of the of Under Section 2, Rule XV of the Rules of Common Pleas the depositions of an aged and Court is satisfied that the witness could not infirm witness is not admissible unless the personally attend the trial, and this should be shown, not by an interested party to the suit but by the witness's physician. It is proper to refuse to send to the jury on application made after the jury has retired, an affidavit of defense a portion of which had been admitted in evidence. Rule for a new trial. C. P. of Lancaster County. B. F. Davis, for plaintiff and rule. March 27, 1915. Opinion by LANDIS, P. J. The plaintiff in her statement declared that, being the owner of certain houses, Nos. 242 and 244 West Orange Street, | agreed to be paid, but is not conclusive." and Nos. 241 and 243 West Grant Street, she made a deed for the same to the defendant, on or about June 9, 1911; that the consideration, as set forth in the said deed, was $25,000.00, but that no money was paid; that the defendant took the property subject to a dewer of $3,000.00, a mortgage of $7,000.00, and a second mortgage of $10,800.00, and the difference, being the sum of $4,200.00, was to be, but has never been, paid, and it is, therefore, still due and owing to her. She also claimed that she was, in addition, the owner of a lot of household goods and furniture, and that the same, being on the premises thus conveyed, were taken possession of by the defendant, and he, having refused to deliver the same up to her, is indebted for the same to the amount of their value, which is $449.58. The uncontradicted evidence showed that the property was conveyed to the defendant as above stated, and that the consideration in the deed was 25,000.00. The defendant, however, asserted that this consideration was only nominal, and that, as there were liens against the land in excess of what have been set forth in the statement, the consideration was, at the suggestion of the defendant's son, fixed at $25,00.00, as "it looks better," and he, the defendant, was to pay nothing. Therefore, the plaintiff having brought an action for unpaid purchase money of a lot of ground, as the testimony as to the price agreed upon and the amount paid was conflicting, the question was said to have been properly submitted to the jury. In Long v. Reed, 16 Pa. C. C. R., 110, it appeared that the plaintiff had sold land to the defendant for the consideration, as expressed in the deed, of $10,600.00. The evidence tended to show that the transaction was to accomplish the same purpose as an ordinary mortgage. The plaintiff brought a suit in assumpsit to recover an alleged unpaid balance of the purchase money. The defendant offered evidence to show that the purchase money expressed was not the real consideration, but that $6,000.00 of debts owing to him was the true consideration. The Court admitted the evidence, and a verdict having been entered in favor of the defendant, a new trial was refused. In Nichols v. Nichols, 133 Pa., 438, it was said: “But it is perfectly well settled law that receipts, whether contained in deeds or elsewhere, are not conclusive of the payment of money, but only prima facie proof, and always open to explanation. Thus, an acknowledgment of the purchase money in the body of a deed, and a receipt endorsed, are not conclusive evidence of such payment." See, also, Baeder's Estate, 224 Pa., 452; Townsend v. Lacock, 222 Pa., 330. This question would seem to be settled. The first question urged on the part of the plaintiff is, that the defendant cannot contradict the consideration as stated in the deed. It seems to us that The plaintiff now urges that the liens this question, if correct, would be as against the premises, outside of her morthurtful to the plaintiff as to the defend-gage of $6,000.00, which she satisfied. The receipt on the deed for the aggregated only $24.710.50, and that she, whole of the purchase price is signed in any event, was entitled to the differby the plaintiff, and she, if such is the ence between that sum and $25,000.00. law, would be equally bound and es- It will be seen that the plaintiff declared topped by her said receipt, as he would upon an express contract. She did not be as to the consideration. We do not, claim the difference between the total of however, think that either proposition is all the liens and $25,000.00; but definitely correct. The real consideration and the asserted that the agreement between hercontemporaneous agreement can be in- self and Haefner was, that he was to quired into, if an agreement as to the pay her $4,200.00. In the charge to the same was really made. In Rimestone jury, the Court called attention to the v. Reifsnyder, 4 Sup., 78, it was held testimony presented on her behalf, and that, "ordinarily, the deed is prima facie said: "Now, only if you believe that there evidence of the amount of consideration was such an arrangement made at that |
