altered or abrogated. Even in countries that have a modern code of civil law, a thorough knowledge of the Roman law is regarded as indispensable, inasmuch as that law is still applicable in cases not provided for by the code. The German law, i. e., the law of German origin, has chiefly to do with marital and domestic relations, and the rights and obligations of real property, more exactly, entailed and peasant estates. But all general ideas on legal topics, the entire legal nomenclature, the theory of contracts, payment, time, conditions, everything in short that is not limited or local, is derived from the Roman lav. A complete and accurate understanding of the principles embodied in the corpus juris is therefore justly considered as the basis of the lawyer's education. The Canon Law, i. e., the principles and rulings embodied in the corpus juris canonici, or body of mediæval Roman Catholic law, has not been adopted to the same extent as the corpus juris civilis. Although the university title of LL.D. is doctor juris utrinsque (sc.tam romani quam canonici), the Canon Law as such is no longer taught in Germany. The corpus juris canonici embodies the rules that governed the medieval ecclesiastical courts during their existence. As those courts had cognizance of everything relating to the church and church property, to marriage and divorce, crimes committed by or against the clergy, the sanctity of the oath, etc., their jurisdiction covered many cases that modern usage has vindicated for the secular courts exclusively. The terms Canon Law and Modern Ecclesiastical Law, therefore, do not coincide; the former is the law, whether spiritual or secular in its nature, administered by the old spiritual courts; the latter is the law now applicable to spiritual matters exclusively, whether that law be derived from the corpus juris eanonici or from modern statutes and concordats, whether it be Roman Catholic or Protestant law. The universities of Germany teach at the present time only Ecclesiastical Law. The Canon Law made its influence upon Roman and German law felt chiefly in practice and procedure, and most especially in the theory of evidence. All these matters, however, have been thoroughly revised and put upon a new basis by the modern codes of procedure.

As regards the Roman law more particularly, the course of instruction embraces ordinarily four sets of lectures, which I give by their German names: Institutionen, Rechtsgeschichte, Pandecten, Erbrecht. The Institutionen are a condensed exposition of the outlines of the Roman law. The order followed is usually that of the Institutes of Justinian, and the object of the course is, not the exhaustive statement of all the principles in all their details, but rather the historic development of the leading principles, from the earliest times of the Republic, through the Empire, to the age of Justinian. In other words, the organic growth of the Roman law during seven or eight, centuries forms the substance of the course called Institutionen. The

Rechtsgeschichte, or Aeussere Rechtsgeschichte, as it is more exactly called, is a history of Roman legislation rather than of Roman law. It treats of the various phases of the Roman constitution, the growth of the plebs, the power of the Senate, the scope of the senatus consulta, the functions of the prætor and the prætorian edict, the rescripts and decrees of the emperors, the responsa prudentium, the history of Justinian's codification. The Rechtsgeschichte, then, aims at acquainting the student with the various agents and means at work in producing the body of the law. The Pandecten are in one sense merely the Institutionen expanded; in another sense, they are quite different. The professor who lectures on the Pandects, taking for granted that his hearers are already familiar with the Institutionen and Rechtsgeschichte, develops the Roman law as a matter of scientific theory. He does not follow the order adopted by Justinian in his Liber Digestorum. He seeks to define law in general, to define persons, things, the rights of persons, family relations, the rights of things, modes of acquiring and losing property, modes of entering into, suspending, and annulling contracts, and the like, fortifying each position as he goes by citations from the corpus juris. The treatment of Erbrecht (the doctrine of inheritance) as a separate course is purely arbitrary; it belongs rightfully to the Pandecten. But inasmuch as it is the most complicated and difficult part of the whole, it is more conveniently treated by itself. Vangerow read it in his course on the Pandects. I cannot revert to my semester in Berlin with much satisfaction. The fault was not with the university or the professors, but lay in myself. I committed the mistake of attempting to begin a new study in a large city. One who has advanced beyond the rudiments, and has a clear idea of what he really needs, and what he can dispense with, will derive benefit from the concourse of intellect and character in a capital like Berlin. But the beginner, I am persuaded, cannot do better than by remaining in a small town for a term or two at least. He loses less time in finding out things, in making acquaintances among those who are pursuing the same study, and in catching the spirit of that study.

After pondering over the distracting list of lectures given above, and getting the advice of one or two acquaintances to whom I had letters of introduction, I made the following selection of lectures: Institutionen and Rechtsgeschichte, by Professor Gneist, and Encyclopa die und Methodologie der Rechtswissenschaft, by Professor Holtzendorff. As the reader will readily understand, the lectures were "all Greck" to me. The German was not difficult, and both lecturers spoke slowly and clearly enough to let me take full notes. But the subject itself was a strange world of terms and ideas. I forced myself to write down paragraph after paragraph without being able to see into the connection or practical bearings of the whole. Fortunately I caught up a hint thrown out by Professor

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Gneist in one of his lectures, and purchased a copy of Mommsen's Roman History. Here, at least, was something that I could understand. Although my recollections of early Roman history, the fabulous dynasty of kings, the law of the Twelve Tables, the centurial constitutions and the like were as shadowy and imperfect as those of the average American graduate, still it was scarcely possible not to learn much from a master like Mommsen. I read through the two large volumes of the original with great interest and care. Then it was that something like light began to shine upon me, that I caught something like an insight into the growth of that wonderful organism called the Roman Constitution and the Roman State. Using Mommsen as a running commentary, I succeeded in understanding my lectures after a fashion. I purchased also Gneist's edition of the Institutes of Gaius and Justinian, but could make little out of the book. The Latin was easy enough, but I had no appreciation of the technical terms, and no friend to whom to go for enlightenment.

[Before the close of the Summer semester, our Student leaves Berlin, and before returning to Göttingen, spent three weeks at Wiesbaden, where the climate, the waters, and a quiet life, wrought a perfect cure in his bodily ailments, and his conferences with Dr. Maxen, Privat-docent at Göttingen, settled his course and method of legal study for the next two years. ]

Value of a Privat-docent.

One afternoon, at a garden-concert, I was presented to Dr. Maxen, Privat-docent in the legal faculty, a stout, bluff, but genial and intelligent man in the thirties. Our conversation soon shook off all idle formality. Emboldened by the signs of friendly interest on his part, I told him my story; how I had made an attempt in Berlin and failed; how much, or rather how little, I had done; what a maze of doubt and ignorance I was in, even as to the best books to read. At all of which he laughed good-naturedly. "Well," said he, "I do not think that you have done much worse than other students in their first semester. Rome, you know, was not built in a day. What you need is to read certain books well, and especially to go at the Quellen. Let me draw up a scheme of work for you, In the first place, read through Marczoll's Institutionen. The book is not worth much, but it will familiarize you with terms and definitions, and the general ground plan of the law. Then, after reading Marezoll, take up Puchta's three volumes of Institutionen. This will give you everything you want to know in a clear, logical, thoroughly scientific shape. But, above all else, you must read the Institutes of Gaius and Justinian in the original. This study of modern text-books is all very well, but it cannot absolve you from the knowledge of the Quellen." I replied that I had Gneist's edition of the Institutes already in my possession, and had tried to read it, but without success. "Of course you can't understand it alone. You must have Heu

mann's Hand-lexicon to the corpus juris, and you must read in company with some advanced student who can explain things to you step by step. Call at my room to-morrow, or the day after, and by that time perhaps I shall have some one for you." I felt that a load had been rolled off my mind. These words of sympathy and advice, few, but to the point, had at least pointed out to me the way of knowledge. Henceforth it rested only with myself to follow up the clue.

I have dwelt at length upon this incident, because it will reveal in the brightest light the part played in a German university by the Privat-docent. The professors are, of course, very learned men, but they are not always amiable, at least not always communicative. Standing on the isolated pinnacles of science, they are rather cut off from the world below, and the student feels reluctant to approach them. But the Privat-docent, still a young man in the prime of physical life, fast growing in greatness, but not so far beyond the recollection of his own student days as to be unable to enter fully into the trials of his younger brethren beneath him, is the Vermittler, the mediator, in the university organism. With one hand he urges on the professor to renewed research, with the other he raises up and cheers the student. A university without Privat-docenten would be like a regiment without corporals, a ship without a boatswain; with them, it is the most powerful and yet the most flexible organization for spiritual purposes in the world. The student who knows one or more Privat-docenten can post himself readily on the literature of every topic as fast as it may come up, can get the latest ideas, pick up any amount of odds and ends of information such as books never give, and always be sure of friendly advice. The relation between Privat-docent and student is purely one of friendship, characterized on one part by elder-brotherly interest, on the other by respect, unrestrained by ceremonial awe.

Within twenty-four hours all the books mentioned by Dr. Maxen were in my possession. A brief examination of Marezoll's Institutionen showed me that the Doctor's estimate of the book had not been too unfavorable. But Puchta's work was something altogether different. Although entitled Institutionen, it was really a Pandecten treatise, but with a large infusion of the historical element. It gave me precisely the help that I had long sought after, a clear, concise exposition of legal ideas and doctrines, and a pretty complete genesis, so to speak, of the body of Roman law. The first volume is a discussion of Roman constitutional history and Rechtsgeschichte. The third volume, unfortunately, was left unfinished in consequence of the author's death, the last half being edited by Professor Rudorff from posthumous notes. For six weeks Puchta was scarcely out of my hand. I not only read through the entire three volumes (nearly 2,000 pages), but committed many of the definitions and distinctions

to memory, and reviewed incessantly. In this way I obtained a tolerably clear idea of what law in general is, the difference between statute law and common law, the theory of suspending, abrogating, and retroactive conditions, the distinction between a condition and a dies ad quem or a quo, the Roman notions as to natural persons and juristic persons, as to hereditas, patria potestas in manu, and the like, the more common kinds of contracts and of real property. Puchta's work is an eminently useful one for the beginner. It gives a good deal of law, but gives it in such a logical shape and in such a luminous style that it captivates the reader. It is much to be regretted that there is no similar work in English for the study of our English common law, in place of the antiquated method and jejune, eighteenth century philosophy called Blackstone's Commentaries. If the reader can imagine Shars wood's Blackstone, Parsons on Contracts, Washburne on Real Property, and Willard's Equity, condensed into three volumes, infused with the spirit of modern philosophic inquiry and couched in language as fresh and limpid throughout as that of Chancellor Kent, he will form some idea of Puchta as a jurist. With this exception, that no English or American writer goes, after the fashion of the Germans, into the history of the law. There are no such works in English as Savigny's History of Roman Law in the Middle Ages, Keller's History of Roman Procedure by Formula, Rudorff's Rechtsgeschichte, and a dozen others that I might mention, where advantage is taken of all the results of modern philology and modern historic inquiry. In England and in America, law is regarded as a practice, a mode of earning one's livelihood, a sort of blind swearing in verba magistrorum. In Germany, it is treated as an historic science, in fact, as the twin brother of history. Nearly every German jurist is somewhat of an historian, every historian is a jurist. Indeed, the student in history cannot obtain his Ph.D. without passing an examination in the rudiments of Roman and German law. We wonder at the firm grasp, the unerring insight of such men as Niebuhr and Mommsen, but we overlook the circumstance that they were jurists as well as historians. many years full professor in law. under the influence of the so called a set of principles which have been advocated by such men as Thibaut, Savigny, Puchta, Goeschen, Vangerow, and which may be reduced to one fundamental idea: that law is a growth and not a product, and that it can be neither comprehended, amended, expanded, nor expounded properly without a full and scientific study of it from its beginnings.

Mommsen in particular was for Germany has been for half a century "historic school," that is to say,

Puchta was to me at that time a sort of condensed student-library, it contained nearly everything that I needed for preliminary instruction. But Puchta did not make me overlook the Quellen, upon which my friend had laid such stress, Thanks to Dr. Maxen's