Argument for the United States.

223 U. S.

payment of such charge, such owner shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Harr for the United States:

The manifest purpose of the steamship company in taking, at Bremen, the 150 rubles as security for the return passage of Nuchim Dossik and his wife, was to evade the provisions of § 19 of the Immigration Act.

The statute should be construed so as to prevent this plain and palpable attempt to evade it.

Unless the indictment be sustained, the return charge will be made, and the purpose of the statute defeated. The presumption of intent to violate the statute became conclusive when the defendant, after the immigration authorities refused to admit the aliens, retained the security so taken.

The rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed is qualified by the further one that such statutes are not to be so strictly construed as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95; American Fur Co. v. United States, 2 Pet. 358, 367; United States v. Morris, 14 Pet. 464, 475; United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 395; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 653.

The statute covers a taking of security for a return charge made previous to the bringing of the aliens into this country, where the intent to defeat the manifest purpose of the statute exists, or to treat the retention of the security, under such circumstances, as a "taking."

The statute does not only undertake to punish a charge made or security taken within the territory of the United States. To so hold would be to nullify the statute entirely, because no charge need be made for the return passage of an alien until after he had departed from the United States. The statute is broad enough to cover a

223 U.S.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

charge made or security therefor taken before the service is rendered.

The service for which the charge is made or the security taken is performed partly within the territorial waters of the United States and partly on the high seas, either of which would be sufficient to give to this country jurisdiction of acts inhibited as contrary to its policies with respect to immigration or foreign commerce. The statute applies, and the authority of Congress can be upheld, as to acts occurring in a foreign jurisdiction which are intended to interfere with the legitimate operations of the Government or to defeat the exercise of its rightful powers. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 356; United States v. Craig, 28 Fed. Rep. 795; United States v. Lavarrello, 149 Fed. Rep. 297.

The passenger acts undertake to regulate matters wholly beyond the jurisdiction of Congress except for the fact that the owners or masters of the vessels regulated bring themselves within our jurisdiction by attempting to introduce aliens into the country.

Mr. Joseph Larocque for defendant in error:

The section in question does not apply to an act done by an alien corporation in a foreign country. The section is penal and must therefore be strictly construed.

Even were it a question of doubt as to whether Congress intended to cover the case of a charge made or security taken from a person about to embark in a foreign country, the court in construing the section would be bound to exclude such an interpretation.

While a country may treat some relations between its own citizens as governed by its own law in regions subject to no sovereignty, like the high seas, or to no law recognized as adequate, the general rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where it is done.

A statute will, as a general rule, be construed as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits within the jurisdiction of the lawmaker, and words of universal scope will be construed as meaning only those subject to the legislation. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347.

The indictment cannot be sustained upon the theory that it charges the commission of a continuing offense.

The act which the indictment charges to be an offense had its inception and completion at Bremen, Germany. This is not the case of an offense commenced within one jurisdiction and completed in another.

While the indictment alleges that the money in question was received and collected at Bremen, Germany, it does not allege that the said money was ever sent to this country or that it has ever been held or retained by the defendant within this jurisdiction.

Section 19 does not make it a misdemeanor to make a charge or receive security from an alien in a foreign country, or to bring into this country a non-admissible alien from whom money or security therefor has been received abroad for his return passage.

Congress intended to prohibit a shipowner from exacting from an alien, who has been brought to this country in violation of law, money for his return.

If Congress had intended to make it a misdemeanor for a shipowner to retain moneys previously received abroad from an alien for his return passage, it could easily have done so in clear and concise terms.

None of the authorities cited by the learned government counsel has any bearing upon the question at issue.

MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

Section 19 of the Immigration Act of 1907 (February 20,

1907, 34 Stat. 898, 904, c. 1134), is not aimed at the aliens of the excluded class, but at the owners of vessels unlawfully bringing them into this country. The Government might in large measure protect itself by inspection, rejection and order of deportation, but it is purposed, also, as far as possible, to protect the alien. He might be ignorant of our laws and ought to be deterred from incurring the expense of making a passage which could only end in his being returned to the country from whence he came. This policy could best be subserved by securing the cooperation of the transportation companies, and to this end the statute required that they should not only maintain the aliens unlawfully brought by them into this country, but should take them back free of charge. In the absence of this last provision the company might well afford to accept as passengers those known or suspected to belong to the excluded class. It would receive from them their passage money from Europe to America. If they passed the inspection the transaction was ended. If they were deported the company would be at the trifling expense of maintaining them while here. But if it could charge and secure payment for the return passage, it would collect two fares instead of one. This would have made the transportation of an excluded alien more profitable than the carrying of one who could lawfully enter. This was so obvious that the statute not only required the cost of their passage to be borne by the transportation company, but prohibited the making of a charge, or the taking of security for the return passage, which might be collected or enforced at the end of the journey.

It is said, however, that no such charge was made in New York; that the indictment shows only the case of an ordinary sale of a round-trip steerage ticket from Bremen to New York, and that what was lawfully done in Germany cannot be punished as a crime in New York.

The statute, of course, has no extra-territorial opera

tion, and the defendant cannot be indicted here for what he did in a foreign country. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347. But the parties in Germany could make a contract which would be of force in the United States. When, therefore, in Bremen, the alien paid and the defendant received the 150 rubles for a return passage they created a condition which was operative in New York. If, in that city, the company had refused to honor the ticket the alien could there have enforced his rights. In like manner, if by reason of facts occurring in New York, the statute operated to rescind the contract, the rights and duties of the parties could there be determined, and acts of commission or omission, which, as a result of the rescission, were there unlawful, could there be punished.

If, as argued, the company did nothing in New York except to retain money which had been lawfully paid in Germany, the result is not different, because, under the circumstances, non-action was equivalent to action. The indictment charges that on December 16, 1910, it was found that the aliens had been unlawfully brought into this country. The company at once was under the duty of taking them back at its own cost. Instead of returning to them the money previously received for such transportation, the defendant retained it up to the date of the indictment, April 3, 1911, with intent to make charge and secure payment for their passage to Bremen. This retention of the money, with such intent, was an affirmative violation of the statute. The company could not take the aliens back free of charge, as required by law, and at the same time retain the fare covering the same trip.

The demurrer admits that, with knowledge that it was bound to carry the excluded aliens back at its own cost, the defendant in New York made a charge, and retained the 150 rubles with intent to apply that money in satisfaction thereof. If that be true the defendant violated