Opinion of the Court. 223 U.S. That this description adequately advised the defendant as to the identity of the proceeding in which the perjury was committed is settled by the following authorities: Markham v. United States, 160 U. S. 319, 320; Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425; Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29, 34, 40; Dunbar v. United States, 156 U. S. 185, 192; Bannon v. United States, 156 U. S. 464, 468; Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432, 452, and Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47, 64. A less definite description was held sufficient in the Markham Case, where the indictment specified "an inquiry then pending before and within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Pensions of the United States, at Washington, in the District of Columbia." As the specification of the identity of a defendant and the precise nature of his offense is normally the end, and not the beginning of grand jury proceedings (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 61, 65), and the very object of the proceeding may have been to determine the identity of the criminal, it was not essential that the proceedings should state the name of a specified defendant under investigation. That the indictment was not wanting in definiteness, because therein it was in effect simply alleged that before the grand jury, after Hawk had been sworn, the truth of the recited matters concerning which it was subsequently alleged Hawk testified falsely, "became and was a material question," and it was not specified in just what evidentiary way the perjured testimony became material, is settled by the Markham Case (160 U. S. 324, 325), where a similar point was directly held to be without merit. As, in view of prior decisions, the contention based upon the Sixth Amendment was manifestly frivolous, it results that the writ of error must be dismissed. Writ of error dismissed. 223 U.S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. ETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. ERROR TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF THE STATE OF MAINE. No. 166. Argued January 26, 1912.-Decided February 19, 1912. The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution does not extend to judgments of foreign states or nations, and unless there is a treaty relative thereto this court has no jurisdiction under § 709, Rev. Stat., to review a judgment of a state court on the ground that it failed to give full faith and credit to a judgment of a court of a foreign country. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Ralph W. Crockett for plaintiff in error: Where a life insurance policy is issued by a company of one State to one domiciled in another State, and the insured assigns the policy in the latter State, the law of the place where the assignment was executed shall govern. Coburn's Appeal, 74 Connecticut, 463; Lee v. Abdy, 17 Q. B. D. 309; Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Woods, 11 Ind. App. 335; Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 138 Massachusetts, 24; Miller v. Campbell, 140 N. Y. 457; Spencer v. Myers, 150 N. Y. 269; Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank, 68 Michigan, 116; 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), 90. This judgment is a valid and binding judgment in the Province of Quebec and by the decisions of this court is valid and binding upon our courts. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113; Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U. S. 235. The judgment set up by the Etna Life Insurance Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 223 U. S. Company in answer to the suit of Patrick F. Tremblay is a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in the Province of Quebec. No question is raised as to the identity of the subject-matter in the Quebec and Maine suits nor as to the identity of the parties. It was rendered in accordance with the laws and practice of Quebec. All parties were duly notified and cited to appear. There is no flaw in the record. The Federal question was raised in the original suit of Tremblay v., Etna Life Insurance Co., 97 Maine, 547, in which the credit to be given to the Canadian judgment is also discussed. The defendant company introduced evidence of the Canadian judgment. The plea was the general issue, with the agreement that all of the defendant's evidence, if admissible at all, might for the purpose of that case, be deemed admissible under the general issue; and see Etna Life Insurance Co. v. Tremblay, 101 Maine, 585. The Federal right was denied by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. The Federal question was erroneously decided, and the judgment of the state court was not founded upon any other matter broad enough to sustain the judgment. Taylor, Juris. & Pro. U. S. Sup. Ct. 434; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 163. The effect to be given to foreign judgments is altogether a matter of comity in cases where it is not regulated by treaty. 2 Kent's Comm. (6th ed.) 120; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 166; McEwan v. Zimmer, 38 Michigan, 765, 769; Bradstreet v. Insurance Co., 3 Sumn. 600, 608. The Canadian judgment in this case is pleaded in bar, and there is a marked distinction between judgments as a cause of action and as a plea in bar. A foreign judgment when brought forward as a cause of action may be only prima facie, but conclusive when called into question incidentally or by a plea in bar. Walker v. Witter, 1 Doug. 1; Buttrick v. Allen, 8 Massachusetts, 237; Galbraith v. 223 U.S. Argument for Defendant in Error. Neville, 5 East, 75; Wood v. Gamble, 11 Cush. 8; Williams v. Preston, 3 J. J. Mar. (Ky.) 600; Bigelow on Estoppel, 192; Freeman on Judgments (2d ed.), § 592. The Canadian judgment is in the nature of a judgment in rem. Such judgments are conclusive under conditions where it might be held otherwise with regard to judgments in personam. See Hilton v. Guyot, supra. There was no fraud on the part of the insurance company in any of the proceedings connected with the Quebec judgment. Mr. Henry W. Oakes, with whom Mr. William Frye White was on the brief, for defendant in error: This court has no jurisdiction. No authority to review the judgment of a state court exists because it refuses to give effect to valid contracts, or because in its effect it impairs the obligation of a contract. It must be the constitution or the statute of the State which impairs the obligation of a contract, or the case does not come within the jurisdiction of this court. Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 180; Railroad Company v. Rock, 4 Wall. 481; Knox v. Exchange Bank, 12 Wall. 379; Railroad Company v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511; Railroad Company v. Lovering, 12 Wall. 384; Chouteau v. Moffitt, 111 U. S. 200; Lehigh v. Borough of Easton, 121 U. S. 388; Parmalee v. Lawrence, 11 Wallace, 36; McManus v. O'Sullivan, 91 U. S. 578. Even had this court jurisdiction, it seems to us manifest that the decision of the court of Maine could not be successfully attacked on its merits. It was clearly within the power of the state court to decide as to the validity of the foreign judgment. Judgments of a foreign state are prima facie correct only. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 180. Having power to inquire into the validity of the foreign Opinion of the Court. 223 U.S. judgment, the court did so, and decided against it on several grounds as stated in its opinion. A foreign judgment, even in rem, is open to inquiry with respect to its original validity, both as to the question whether the subject of the judgment, the property or right upon which it undertook to act, was within the jurisdiction of the court, and also whether the judgment was obtained by fraud on the part of the plaintiff, or by fraud or collusion on the part of the party undertaking to set up the judgment as a defense. Wilkinson v. Hall, 6 Gray (Mass.), 568; Eddy v. O'Hare, 132 Massachusetts, 56; Whipple v. Robinson, 97 Massachusetts, 107; Wardle v. Briggs, 131 Massachusetts, 518. The court of Maine properly inquired into these questions, and after full hearing decided them adversely to the plaintiff in error. The questions were fully within the province of the court to decide, and the decision cannot be revised by this process. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court. The facts are these: At Quebec, Canada, in 1885, the plaintiff in error issued its policy of insurance for two thousand dollars upon the life of Jean O. Tremblay, a resident of Canada, his wife being named as the beneficiary. In 1891, Tremblay assigned the policy as collateral security to J. B. Cloutier, of Quebec. Ten years later Mr. and Mrs. Tremblay assigned the policy to their son, Patrick F. Tremblay, subject to the claim of Cloutier. Soon after this last assignment Jean O. Tremblay died, and both assignees made claim upon the insurance company. The contending claimants not being able to agree as to the amount of the claim of Cloutier, the insurance company, as authorized by the statutes of Canada, paid |